VOLUME II, NO. 48
NOVEMBER 30, 1949

DAY OF REPROACH

FROM a number of reputable sources, we now have information to the effect that strong ethical, material, diplomatic, and psychological reasons for not using the atomic bomb against the Japanese were either known or easily accessible to the persons who made the decision to use it. Apart from the obvious horror of the bomb's destructiveness, the most cogent ethical argument against its use came from those with the greatest moral right to a voice in the decision—the men who invented and built it, the atomic scientists. It is fairly well known that the Chicago group of research physicists working in association with J. Robert Oppenheimer made strenuous appeals to Washington, protesting the use of the bomb as a weapon, and even sent representatives to plead with the authorities with whom the decision lay.

The diplomatic reasons were recently rehearsed by Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias in *UN World* for October, where he stated that five separate bids for peace were made by Japan, the first coming toward the close of 1944. The evidence of Japanese willingness to sue for peace mounted so steadily that by June, 1945, Admiral Zacharias, although himself wholly in ignorance of the existence of the atom bomb, as Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence told Secretary Forrestal that Japan would "surrender within six weeks."

The material reasons, which were certainly at the finger tips of the organizers and directors of the war-effort, are summarized in Helen Mears' *Mirror for Americans—Japan*, published in 1948, but prepared during the war. In this volume, Miss Mears collects evidence that "the Japanese military machine was completely defeated even before our mass fire-bombing raids in July, 1945." Her study includes an analysis of the effects of cutting off Japan's supply routes and the statistics of Japanese industrial, agricultural and shipping losses.

The psychological reasons are presented by Dr. Alexander Leighton, a psychiatrist and anthropologist who during the war was invited to organize and head the Foreign Morale Analysis Division. This group was to determine whether Japanese morale could be cracked, or whether the Japanese might be expected to fight on to the last man, woman, and child. At the time, American military opinion inclined to the latter view, and American military opinion prevailed—although Dr. Leighton's learned force of thirty specialists reported that civilian morale in Japan broke suddenly in June, 1944, and predicted that Japan would probably surrender in the fall of 1945. Discussing Leighton's book in the *Progressive* for September, Stuart Chase quotes the report of the Strategic Bombing Survey—compiled by experts sent to Japan immediately after the surrender—which says "that the [Japanese] Government would have surrendered prior to Nov. 1, 1945, and certainly before the end of the year . . . even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion [of the home islands] had been planned or contemplated." Apparently, Dr. Leighton's staff was quite able to recognize the psychological signs of impending surrender.

Thus diplomatic advisers, intelligence agents, economists and psychologists all said peace was possible, even imminent, and they said it in ignorance of the existence of the atomic bomb, which is the same as saying that the bomb was wholly unnecessary for ending the war.

It is customary, at this point, to thrash at Our Leaders, who, as Chase says, will listen to expert opinion only when they agree with it; or to remark, with Leighton, that the policy-maker in government "uses social science the way a drunk

uses a lamp post, for support, not illumination." The facts are now out in the open and it would be easy to work up a fine show of indignation, excoriating those terribly callous men who had a new toy, the atom bomb, and wouldn't be satisfied until they dropped it where it would do some "good." It seems more important, however, to understand *why* the executives do not listen to the experts. Maybe there is something to be said for the executives who make snap decisions by "intuition" and who tend to regard scientists as "impractical visionaries."

In the first place, neither the political nor the military leader is "free" in the sense that the private citizen or the specialist who serves the government in a particular capacity is free. The political leader is in the position of ultimate responsibility with respect to the political community. If, in a period of national crisis such as war, he is to be expected to make decisions which run counter to the prevailing psychological attitudes of the people, he has the right to ask for determined minority support—or, in the case of a choice that will be criticized *after* he has made it, to be guided by what he anticipates will be the public reaction. There are, of course, limits to this dependence of the political leader upon public opinion. There ought to be some things that he will not do, no matter what the expectations of the populace, and when such demands are made, the elected representative can always resign. But within these limits, the public servant is bound by his own sense of the trust placed in him by the people to act for their good—which means, in a democracy, to act in some measure at least according to what the people *think* is for their good. On this question of what the people think, the responsibility shifts to those who control the channels of public information, and, again in some measure, to the people themselves. Thus responsibility for a public man's decision is distributed rather widely, and in varying degree, throughout the entire population, with the degree increasing for those individuals whose place in society gives them natural access to the public mind, either as interpreters of events or as officials with the prestige of their positions.

It may be argued that a political leader should be an example of moral independence to the people. But how can any voice save the voice of the political leader's own conscience urge this strenuous duty upon him, unless private individuals are willing to be examples of moral independence to the leaders? For a leader to act counter to popular fears and prejudices would amount to political suicide, and are the people who demand this integrity of their leaders ready to make a comparable sacrifice?

Take for example the scientists who set off the trial explosion of the bomb at Alamagordo. There was, at least in the minds of these specialists, a feeling that no one knew how far the chain reaction might go—a sense of an outside chance that the explosion *might* destroy even the entire planet. How should they have weighed the two compulsions—the compulsion of "military necessity" against the moral compulsion not to take a chance like that, however small, with the destiny of every living thing on earth? Suppose that, reflecting on this possibility, the atomic scientists had quit in a body, recording their unwillingness to gamble with the fate of the world: How much more insistent, then, would have been the sense of responsibility of the military leaders who decided to use the bomb?

Suppose, when the report of Dr. Leighton's Foreign Morale Division was pigeonholed and ignored, that the members of his staff had resigned, making a public explanation of their action, instead of continuing to work in meek frustration, leaving their protest to appear, four years later, in Leighton's book. Or suppose that Admiral Zacharias had turned his commission back to the Navy when he found that definite peace bids from the Japanese were being ignored. Suppose, in short, that all the specialists charged with important fact-finding acted with complete personal integrity with respect to those of their conclusions about which they felt no doubts: *what*

effect would this have upon the men who shape the national policy?

Post mortem criticisms are easy enough to make. Anyone can look back on the war and say that it was unnecessarily prolonged—at great cost in human lives—or assert, as some of the experts are now doing, that the bomb need not have been used. But even this "easy" sort of criticism is found in only a few serious periodicals and books, today. The publishers of newspapers and mass magazines (with one or two exceptions, perhaps) are not carrying the complaint of the experts to the great reading public, even now. It follows, therefore, that, given the opportunity, in June or July, 1945, to protest the use of the bomb—at the time when the atomic scientists registered their appeal—those publishers would have emphatically supported the military decision and heaped condemnation on anyone who dared to oppose it. So, a considerable portion of the responsibility lies with the journalism of the wartime period, although this, again, reverts in some measure to the general population which supports a press that is more responsive to irrational fears than to facts with unpopular meaning.

Thus far, we have discovered one important reason why the recommendations of specialists are so often ignored by men with political power: when the conclusions of the specialists relate, not to some "technical" problem, but to terrible moral realities of almost incalculable consequence to mankind, the specialists do not behave like real men, but only like "hired" men—they are technological mercenaries who, years afterward, work off their bad consciences by writing exposes of the folly of their superiors in office. The men in power, for all their limitations, are really acting for the nation; they, or most of them, *feel* the weight of their decisions and hold themselves answerable to the country. Why should they be impressed by the claim of an expert who, when disregarded, only goes home and makes cynical remarks to his wife and to his colleagues in research? The idea of the Captain going down with his ship, of the Roman General who killed himself when he failed the Republic, or even of the Japanese patriot who ceremoniously destroyed himself when he failed his Emperor, or when he felt his Emperor had failed him—these are not altogether nonsensical customs, but represent, in principle, the basis of moral authority. The sailor who knows that the Captain is staking his own life, first of all, on his decisions, is more likely to obey the Captain's orders out of respect for his integrity as a man than from mere fear of punishment. The Roman General took his life as a symbol of his complete personal devotion to Rome, not because his death could serve his countrymen in any immediate sense. This principle of commitment to a more-than-personal good is sound and necessary to good government, even if the applications of it seem unnecessarily sanguine. It is a principle that is almost unknown to the modern specialist.

But there is a further reason why the counsels of specialists are ignored. The specialist—in particular the scientific specialist—is schooled in a discipline which recognizes no national boundaries; theoretically and by tradition, he is a disciple of impersonal fact and truth. If such men are admitted to have actual knowledge, knowledge superior to the political leader, then the very essence of nationalist political authority is challenged. Miss Mears, for example, in a letter to the *Progressive* for November, suggests that Leighton's Foreign Morale Division ought to have been far more aggressive in its relations with the High Command. She writes:

> . . . there was sufficient evidence, even without the Morale Division, to justify the conclusion that the Japanese would have to surrender. Our High Command did not act on this evidence, but instead based its wartime strategy on assumptions which were, as Mr. Chase points out "almost 100% wrong." Surely the most important job for our social scientists was either to use their techniques to persuade our High Command to use facts instead of false assumptions as the basis for policy, or to analyze the High Command to discover why they did not do so.
>
> Our social scientists would have served us rank and file Americans better if instead of

> psychoanalyzing the Japanese, they had psychoanalyzed our own High Command. . . .

Miss Mears remarks that if social scientists merely invent techniques for carrying out the decisions of political authorities, they may be dangerous rather than helpful. We ought not to forget, she says, that "Dr. Goebbels knew and applied scientific principles of manipulating human behavior." She concludes:

> It is easier to generate hate and fear than dispel them: It can surely be asked whether it would not have been more socially useful had these social scientists collaborated to (a) discredit our wartime leadership which they felt was "almost 100% wrong," and (b) work out a program for a general post-war settlement based on facts instead of false assumptions.
>
> *If social science is to aid civilization rather than hasten its extermination, the social scientist must become a critic of government rather than its technician.*

So, what is the use of pretending that we want scientific help in government and in momentous political decision, unless we are willing to accept the full implications of what it may mean, and to require our political leaders to accept these implications, also? Scientific thinking is unemotional, impartial, international; victory in modern war has almost exactly opposite requirements. Successful statecraft requires intense moral commitment, and the willingness to accept complete responsibility; social scientists, to date, judging by their behavior in relation to the follies of war, feel neither the commitment nor the responsibility which an active political life demands. Are they, or *we*, ready to become committed to this extent?

Letter from INDIA

BOMBAY.—*Gram panchayats* or village republics are coming into their own in India. For more than a year, both discussion and provincial enactment have drawn attention to the significant role that panchayats can play in the reconstruction of rural life. In addition to this current interest, there has always been a general recognition of the importance of adequately replacing, if not reviving, the village republics of the ancient Indian polity, so that it is natural that the resuscitation of panchayats should come under the purview of Governmental policy and planning.

There are those, however, who believe that the "panchayat" remedy for village disorganisation would be worse than the disease. Dr. Ambedkar, for one, raised a storm of opposition in the Constituent Assembly by dismissing the panchayat institution as a mere historical relic. Actually, the controversy about village panchayats is a reflection of the conflict between the official and popular conceptions of local government. It is doubtless true that, as the past relationship between the Government and the local authorities has been one of unequal partnership, the present stage of the country's political development demands that administrative efficiency should not be sacrificed to democratic control. But this is no argument against freely-elected and autonomous panchayats; it means simply that the panchayats must be administratively efEcient as well.

Attempts have already been made toward the revival and reform of panchayats in the various provinces and states. Of India's 700,000 villages, over 80,000 have panchayats and the target for the next three to five years is 100,000. Though many governments first started cautiously with villages of over 1,000 people, schemes have now been launched for the formation of panchayats in villages of 500 and over. The credit for being the first and most successful in the establishment of village panchayats goes to the United Provinces. The main features of the Panchayat Movement, as embodied in the comprehensive Bill contemplated by the Madras Government, are the democratisation of the panchayats, the abolition of special seats for minority communities, the direct election of presidents by the people and the co-option of women up to a maximum of three for every panchayat. It is also interesting that the system of village courts does not permit any legal practitioner to appear on behalf of any party, and that no appeal is possible from most of the decisions. These courts are expected to administer civil and criminal justice.

The powers and functions of Gram Panchayats are very wide, and village autonomy is truly complete. The administration of public health services, the maintenance of accurate farm and vital statistics, the supply and storage of water, the construction of streets and parks, the management of common grazing grounds, the improvement of irrigation, the provision of primary education, the execution of Governmental schemes of rural development, and the encouragement of cooperative enterprises—these are some of the important duties of panchayats.

The village panchayats, however, cannot fulfill their myriad functions without a high quality of volunteer leadership. It is futile to expect that the modern panchayat will establish itself and succeed in taxing an unwilling electorate unless both the members of the panchayats and the rural population as a whole are taught the value of the powers in their hands and trained in their use. The breakdown of the community spirit, the misapplication of money, the prevalence of faction, the rampancy of corruption and jobbery, the dictatorship of cliques and the general apathy of the average villager are conditions which require extraordinary efforts if they are to be corrected. While some control should no doubt be exercised by the State, to prevent local anarchy, the development of a new social consciousness will require the progressive "de-officialisation" of the panchayat movement and the

voluntary labours of organised groups.

The granting of full protection and powers by the provincial governments to the Gram Panchayats constitutes the first step towards the establishment of *Kisan-Mazdoor Rajya*, the ideal of Gandhi's constructive programme. As the architect of the resurrection of the time-honoured panchayat system, Gandhi envisaged a uniform pattern of self-sufficient villages throughout the country, with the farmer becoming his own master and contributing his legitimate share in the administration of the country as leader of its smallest unit.

The panchayat movement of India is part of the wider community movement the world over—an attempt to enable the individual villager to become a conscious participant in the democratic process at the community level. It is a movement for self-reform and self-education based upon faith in the power of the free but responsible individual. Together with the cooperative movement and the basic education movement, the panchayat movement can help the Indian village to become a true centre of culture, with an assured pace of economic and political development. Toward this end, earnest efforts are being made, and the great and silent revolution that is now taking place all over the land is bound to bear its fruits.

INDIAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

MR. NOCK ON EDUCATION

ALBERT JAY NOCK'S *The Theory of Education in the United States* has three qualities which, quite apart from what he says, make it an important book. The qualities are brevity, clarity and honesty. While written from the point of view of the general welfare, the book is equally useful to the private individual who is interested in his own education or that of his children. In fact, one critical test of a book on education lies here: if it does not serve both the community and the individual in some essential way, it is not worth reading.

The volume is made from lectures delivered by Mr. Nock at the University of Virginia in 193I. It was issued by Harcourt, Brace in 1932 and is now again made available in a new edition ($2.25) by the Henry Regnery Company of Chicago. Except for a tiresome, misunderstanding and far too apologetic introduction by Mr. Nock's son, Samuel A. Nock, the new edition is the same as the old one. As the author died in 1945, there are no changes and no new Preface.

To get the spirit of Mr. Nock's book at the outset, we have his definition to go by:

> . . . education, traditionally, is the establishmnt of certain views of life and the direction of certain demands on life, views and demands which take proper account of the fundamental instincts of mankind, all in due measure and balance; the instinct of workmanship, the instinct of intellect and knowledge, of religion and morals, of beauty and poetry, of social life and manners. The aim at an inculcation of these views and demands is the Great Tradition of a truly civilised society. The traditional discipline, the process which has been found most competent to the purpose, is that chiefly of scrutinising the longest available continuous record of what the human mind has hitherto done with those instincts, what it has made out of them what its successes and failures have been; and what is to be learned from both.

There is no difficulty in understanding what Mr. Nock means by education, nor does his devastating attack on prevailing educational theories in the United States leave any great obscurity as to what he thinks is wrong. He finds education in America to have developed from three general principles, or rather, from the popular distortions of those principles. They are, first, the idea of Equality; second, the idea of Democracy; and third, the conviction that the public good, in a democracy, rests with a literate citizenry. Nock finds ridiculous in the extreme the assumption that, because of the philosophical idea of equality, all men have the same intellectual capacities and aptitudes for education. One might as well say that all men are six feet tall, because, each having his portion of the moral essence which makes him man, all are "equal" in the sight of the Declaration of Independence and the law of the land. Here, of course, is one of the central problems of education—the differences among human beings. Mr. Nock notes the *fact* of these differences, but makes no effort to explain them, saying, simply, that "the Creator, in His wisdom and in His loving-kindness, had for some unsearchable reason not quite seen His way to fall in with our theory, . . ."

The vulgarization of the idea of equality has had drastic consequences for the United States. As Nock says, "in the social sphere, the doctrine of equality has regularly been degraded into a kind of charter for rabid self-assertion on the part of ignorance and vulgarity; in the political sphere it has served as a warrant for the most audacious and flagitious exercise of self-interest." In education, instead of merely setting standards for equality of opportunity, it has placed a ceiling on the possibility of educational achievement and has chained the level of higher education to the low floor of mediocrity. It says, in effect, to the young man of talent—"If what we teach is good enough for the millions, it's good enough for *you*"—and if the young man of talent knows no better than to agree, his talents will go to waste. This, obviously, is the "democratic" version of equality—involving what Nock terms "the popular error which accepted as democratic whatever was merely indiscriminate." He has some bitter things to say about this error in relation to education:

> The popular idea of democracy is animated by a very strong resentment of superiority. It resents the

> thought of an elite; the thought that there are practical ranges of intellectual and spiritual experience, achievement and enjoyment, which by nature are open to some and not to all. It deprecates and disallows this thought, and discourages it by every available means. As the popular idea of equality postulates that in the realm of the spirit everybody is able to enjoy everything that anybody can enjoy, so the popular idea of democracy postulates that there shall be nothing worth enjoying for anybody to enjoy that everybody may not enjoy; and a contrary view is at once exposed to all the evils of a dogged, unintelligent, invincibly suspicious resentment.

Quite evidently, Mr. Nock was not afraid of being an unpopular man. He was one of the few professional educators and men of letters who resisted, publicly and emphatically, the attack on civilization which Ortega describes in more general terms in the *Revolt of the Masses.*

Finally, as to the development of an intelligent citizenry—which must be the object of the public-spirited educator—Nock is almost wholly pessimistic. Not only would basic reforms have to overcome "the composite force of inertia, diffidence, preoccupation, a kind of timidity. . . , infirmity of purpose, the tendency to absorption in one's immediate interests and surroundings, deference to convention," but also, the refusal of those who know what is wrong to speak out would have to be replaced by a crusading daring.

To complete our survey of this book, some account should be given of Nock's vital distinction between education and instruction. In his view, education is essentially disciplinary—it is *formative* rather than *instrumental.* It aims at maturity, not at a particular vocation. What Mr. Nock means by maturity is the gist of the entire book, but one quite practical illustration may be repeated. A businessman who was much respected and widely quoted as having "almost unearthly wisdom" was asked by one of Nock's friends what he had learned from the first year of the 1929 depression. "We have learned," the executive replied, "that it won't do to reduce wages." Nock comments:

> Think of it! To have gone through a year of economic convulsions of catastrophic importance, and to have learned *that!* One might suppose that the survivor of a deluge, say, some Hasisadra or Noah, or one who had lived through the subsidence of Atlantis, as Plato described it, would see point to digging into the natural laws that govern such happenings and finding out all he could of them, in the hope of turning up something that might be useful in the event of their threatened recurrence. Suppose you met one of these survivors and asked what he had learned from his experience, and he told you with a great air of finality that he had learned that it is a good thing to go in when it rains!

Maturity, Nock thinks, is to be found through study of the literatures of Greece and Rome. This is the weak portion of his book, not because he is wrong, but because it offers too limited a solution. Samuel Nock, in his introduction, finds fault with his father's insistence upon the classics as the "only way" by saying that "there have been too many civilizations of a high order that knew nothing of our Classics, and will never know anything of them," but this criticism seems to miss the point. *Our* classics are classics, not because they are ours, but because they contain the civilizing thought of great men, and these thoughts are to be found wherever there is civilization of a "high order." Classics are classics because they embody universal truths, not because they are "unique." The study of the classics, presumably, is one way to enable a man to recognize another classic when it comes before him—it makes of him, in short, an educated man.

We are not going to offer a revision of Mr. Nock's prescription, at this point, but will say only that nothing important on the subject of education can be offered by anyone who has not reasoned his way to several of Mr. Nock's conclusions, and is ready to go on from there.

HUMAN NATURE

BY not uncommon coincidence, this week's lead article, the Review section, and even the discussion under Frontiers, seem to combine to set a basic human problem—one which seldom receives any direct attention from the modern students of human nature.

The problem has to do with what men think of themselves, and whether or not there is a real difference between self-reliance and self-respect, on the one hand, and egotism and conceit on the other. Some men, when their authority is successfully challenged, utterly collapse. With others, self-confidence is based upon something more fundamental than the opinions they hold, the status they enjoy in society, or the fortunes they have gained.

A question of this sort goes deeper than the differences among men in terms of what Mr. Nock calls "educability," for it relates to human attitudes which seem largely independent of intellectual capacities and attainments. The intellectual skills, as such, are mere static quantities in comparison to the dynamic qualities of human dignity which this question involves.

In a society which has not yet fallen into the hands of demagogues, the men who gravitate naturally to the tasks of leadership are those in whom a sense of moral power resides—an incommensurable and almost indefinable quality of being which inspires confidence in other men. Both Washington and Lincoln seem to have possessed this power in abundance to the confusion and bewilderment of biographers and historians who have never considered its somewhat "mysterious" nature.

If we may, with diffidence, formulate a theory of human nature, it is that the most admirable qualities of human beings—the qualities most frequently assigned to human greatness—have each their superficial counterparts or substitutes which emerge as constituted of the coarser stuff of the human *psyche.* For the *principle* of loyalty in human relationships, for example, a man may substitute a blind devotion to some "hero"; or, for the quality of integrity, he may mistake unreasoning allegiance to some dogmatic rule of conduct. In both cases, the *giving of oneself* wholeheartedly to an objective may excite our admiration, but unless a distinction is made between the two, we shall have lost sight of the difference between ethical and emotional commitment.

So far as we know, no branch of modern psychology concerns itself with such distinctions, yet what could be more important, for the individual, for the community?

C H I L D R E N

. . . and Ourselves

WE are sure that it is again time to discuss the most important goal of education—the development of a sense of justice. And on this question, we are on the side of the Ancients rather than that of the Moderns. Along with Socrates and Plato, we feel that great men are principally distinguished by an incapacity to be biased or prejudiced against anyone for any reason. Our innumerable clever books on child-training and adolescent psychology may help us to recognize incipient personality traits which are undesirable, but, unfortunately, we don't learn about human ideals and human greatness by discussing what happens in their absence—not any more than we could expect to understand Christ by studying the case history of Judas, or Gandhi by poring over accounts of the earliest environmental conditionings to which his assassin was subject.

One fundamental question is involved in any discussion of a "sense of justice": Does a man's capacity for fair evaluation originate from his surroundings—is it "conditioning"—or is it a capacity innate in every human being? This is not an academic question, because, whether we like it or not, all our educational techniques must proceed either from one of these two assumptions, or from a third and not so desirable alternative suggested by conventional theology—the alternative that claims man to be innately unjust.

It has long been unfashionable to use "abstract" terms such as justice in discussing education. Modern educators wish to rid themselves of that particular habit of their religious forebears which demanded a copious amount of moralizing to pupils. And expansive use of "justice" has often been associated with the idea of punishment or retribution. But one can believe that much is to be gained from using the word justice as if it stood for an almost independent quality—separate, that is, from the minor manifestations of personal idiosyncrasy. Plato, for instance, did not "moralize" in ways familiar to us. He described the psychology of human relationships as practiced by the just man and the psychology of human relationships as practiced by the unjust man. He dwelt upon the consequences of each course, up to and including a reaping of what one had sown in other lives on earth. But he did not rant and rave against the sinner, nor did he imply that righteousness could ever enter men's hearts through fright of what would happen to them if they sinned.

Learning how to be just would seem to involve a growing conviction of the importance—if not sanctity—of each individual's life *as an individual.* The human sense of justice might be said to begin with a certain self-respect. Unless we believe that we, ourselves, are important as moral individuals, there is no compulsion which can make us feel it important to regard the welfare of other selves—which is just another way of saying that we must prove the potentialities of humanity for ourselves, within ourselves.

Something of this tone seems to pervade the psychology of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. Its formulators believed in a sort of Divinity *in* man, and this is what the word "Deist" usually implied when applied to Paine, Washington, Jefferson and others of similar stature. These men were not self-effacing about their conceptions of their own moral integrity, and, as a result, they were able to see in others something of the same essential importance which they attached to themselves as moral agents. This view of human nature subsequently suffered considerably from the various forms of cynicism accompanying a mechanistic or materialistic outlook. The growth of an industrial culture, too, has discounted the importance of the individual "as an individual." It makes him seem a unit, manipulated by another person or persons, for purposes he neither envisions nor controls. (This is also the psychology of militarism, and one reason why industrialization seems, so far, to

bring a corresponding development of militarism.) Further, we are still affected by the unwarranted dogmatism of many biologists and anthropologists who would have us accept the view that man is no more than a highly complicated bundle of conditioned reflexes.

We hold, then, that these tendencies in our civilization have to be recognized *and rejected* as the basis of one's personal philosophy before he will be free to be a "just" man. We have to believe that the human being is *capable* of an impartial and impersonal judiciousness before we can feel it important to consider seriously the needs of others.

If we are right in these-contentions, children have to be given a fair opportunity to evaluate themselves less cynically. We must hold out to them the hope that they, and all other human beings, are of great potential power, promise and beauty. We cannot do this by teaching them to fear God, and we cannot do it if we allow them to believe that they are forever to be moved by forces beyond their own control—which is one reason why each child in the home needs to participate in all those family decisions which will affect him.

It would do no harm for parents to acquaint themselves with the judicial tradition of the U. S. Supreme and Federal Courts, for many jurists have kept alive sparks of that central philosophical fire tended in the days of the founding of this country. True, jurists are not called upon in public to pass judgment upon *themselves*—as we must whenever we attempt to be completely fair in our dealings with others—but the jurist has to do something like this on behalf of the community, for he will often find that his own prejudices, opinions and interests run counter to a law which he is pledged to uphold. Books, and even motion pictures which show man's capacity to transcend both prejudice and self-interest in order to see justice served are extremely valuable to the child. Some aspects of *The Oxbow Incident* must have heightened this consciousness in many who viewed the picture or read the book, and a more recent film called *Boomerang* admirably performed the same function.

If the child is to learn to be judicial and impartial, he must have the constant example of his parents before him, and it is not illogical to suggest that many parents might adopt a regular procedure for the settling of controversies—even those in which they themselves are involved—which will serve as reminders of the judicial spirit and the supreme importance of a sense of justice.

If none of the children of the world knew anything about reading, writing, arithmetic or technology, but *did* understand what a sense of justice is, and strove to develop it, this world would shortly become a paradise in comparison with its present condition. For a capacity to see and stand by justice is the key to all successful human relationships, whether personal or political.

FRONTIERS

Canon of Knowledge

BACK in 1936, when many of the world's greatest scholars and thinkers were assembled at Cambridge, Mass., to participate in the celebration of the Harvard University Tercentenary, more than one learned notable expressed the flattering notion that the United States was well on the way to becoming the leader of the world in affairs of culture. Alfred North Whitehead wrote in the *Atlantic* (September, 1936):

> The term "European civilization" is now a misnomer, for the center of gravity has shifted. . . . the world will rotate around the long line of American shores. . . . A new epoch is opening in the world. There are new potentialities, new hopes, new fears. . . .

Other statements were to the effect that an old and tired Europe is handing the torch of civilization to the people of the New World, to whom the responsibility for the future is given in trust.

While there can be no doubt that the United States has the physical plant to carry on the cultural tradition of the West—the libraries, the laboratories, the university buildings, and even the exuberant energy that is required—it seems advisable to consider whether or not there is sufficient *maturity* in America to execute this task. The maturity will come, eventually, perhaps, but right now, as thirteen years ago, the capacity for reflective judgment seems more a European quality than an American one. Prof. Whitehead, himself, was an excellent example of the sort of maturity which the United States has not produced, and there are many other illustrations. Who, in America, could write a book like W. Macneile Dixon's *The Human Situation?* Ortega y Gasset is another European without any sort of counterpart in the New World, although he has many admirers, here. There is little reflective political thought in America to compare with the studies of Harold Laski; and the brilliant perspectives of the Existentialists on the moral chaos of the time are a French rather than an American invention.

This is not to suggest that the contributions of the United States to science and scholarship have been either negligible or unworthy. Rather, the point is that these Europeans whom we have mentioned are a special sort of thinker—men who discuss whatever is before them as human beings, as encompassing and humanely critical intelligences, and not as specialists who are adding their discoveries to particular stores of human knowledge. This, it is suggested, is the quality of genuine maturity, and the very essence of civilization.

The concern of the civilized man is with ultimate meanings. He thinks and writes, therefore, at the level of philosophical common sense—a level that is fundamentally different from that of the specialist. The civilized man insists upon judging the assumptions of the specialist before adopting them; he judges them according to humane standards, not specialists' standards. The civilized man consciously takes the position assumed by Niccolo Tucci in *Partisan Review* for November, in an article on the importance of destructive criticism. Writing of the popular aversion to criticism based on common sense, Tucci says:

> . . this typically modern hatred *of all* criticism *based on common sense is* just another aspect of the current prejudice that *all human activity should be specialized.* The common man, to use for once with concreteness the most outworn cliche of our age, has a right to declare that things as they are don't please him, from the point of view of his ignorance alone. His ignorance may of course exclude him from a meeting of experts (in ballistics, bacteriological warfare, propaganda, counter-propaganda, etc.), but it cannot possibly exclude him from the number of the living, because, beyond all the knowledge that man may (and, alas, *does)* acquire, there is still, even if not for too long, man himself, with the unexplainable fact of his existence.

The civilized man, in short, reserves the right to examine *all* important assumptions about the nature of things, and to decide about them on the basis of his own standards, not the standards handed down to him by someone else. And he uses his own standards to evaluate both the methods and the conclusions of the specialists.

A good illustration of this sort of criticism is offered by L. L. Whyte, English author of *The Next Development in Man* and other books, in a recent pamphlet on what seem to him to be the two basic modes of human thought. He calls them the Atomic Method and the Pattern Method. The pamphlet is really a discussion of the assumptions which characterize scientific as well as other kinds of thinking. The Atomic method, for example, is aimed at the discovery and exact definition of the parts of a thing. The Pattern method studies the thing as a whole, its development and movement in relation to other things.

The choosing of one of these methods amounts to the claim that "reality" will be found by that means, and while, as Mr. Whyte points out, no one "practices either method exclusively in every field of thought or activity," a particular emphasis on one will result in conclusions which are bound to be partial, and even disastrous in effect. Whyte says in summary:

> The main achievements of the Western intellect derive from the atomic method, just as Eastern wisdom was based on the intuition of a unity in the pattern of process. Man, when most irritatingly male, is usually obsessed with an atomic argument; woman, when she seems most perversely female, is often relying on her subjective sense of the whole. Exact science has been created by atomic analysis, art is always created by the intuition of pattern. The atomic method serves the differentiation and self-restraint of the individual, while the pattern method evokes his enthusiastic surrender to some over-riding principle.

What we want, Mr. Whyte says, is a way of thinking that will help us to see the whole without neglecting the parts—"the true correlation of whole and part."

Without claiming any extraordinary originality for Mr. Whyte, it seems just to point out that here, simply stated, is the essential problem of modern thought. Instead of announcing himself as the champion of one particular method, or declaring with nineteenth-century certainty that it is only a matter of time until Science Knows All, he calls attention to the fact that the tools of knowing are not knowledge. This, we suggest, is maturity—or, at any rate, it is the form which mature thinking takes, even if the content of so brief a discussion must necessarily be inconclusive.

Having gained from Mr. Whyte this orientation, new questions arise. What is the proper way to think about a part, as part, and the whole, as whole? What are the significant "parts" of a man? Shall we divide man into blood, bones, tissues and organs, or into body, emotions, mind and soul? Can a single man be considered a "whole" apart from the human race any more than a bee can be considered apart from the swarm? Manifestly, in *some* relationships, a man can be considered apart, and in some others, he cannot. How are these lines to be drawn?

Or, turning to physics, what are the "true" parts of physical reality? If a point is reached when matter must be redefined in terms of energy, will another point be reached where energy melts into thought? And, how important are such questions for everyday life? Quite important, thinks Mr. Whyte:

> The atomic method in physics led to the atomic bomb. The moral equivalent to the atomic bomb, which the world so badly needs, is that elegant mode of thought which can overcome the clash of atomistic and pattern thought, and establish a new canon of ordered knowledge, and hence also of social standards.

Our own suspicion is that the modern world is very nearly ready for a great metaphysical revival, in which at least tentative principles of order between relative parts and relative wholes will provide the basis for the kind of "elegant" thinking Mr. Whyte is talking about. As one contribution to this revival, we suggest Leibniz' *Monadology* as the basis for ultimate thinking about "parts," and Part I of Spinoza's *Ethics* as the foundation for thinking about "wholes." And, for the "relation" between the two, the Eastern doctrine of Atman as the transcendental nexus—the Self in All.