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THE DUTIES OF FREE MEN

THE idea of *noblesse oblige* did not vanish altogether from the European and American scene with the eighteenth-century downfall of the blooded nobility. It was adopted, instead, by the philosophical leaders of the revolutionary parties, who took upon themselves the responsibilities of kings and princes. The old idea of the duties of the noble was not without its merits, and something of it survived for a while in military tradition, in the special responsibilities which are supposed to attach to being an officer. The noble individual was expected to comport himself at all times as an example to the people, to whom he stood almost in *loco parentis.* He was to be their ideal of courage, generosity, discipline, and self-sacrifice. His personal interests must not be allowed to weaken these obligations, for the well-being of the entire social order depended upon him. His prerogatives of power were matched by his responsibilities; if he failed, society would falter and lose its form. Then would the whole structure of hierarchy topple, from the weakness of those who should be the best of men, leaving only the authority of naked power to rule. This principle of order is voiced by Ulysses in *Troilus and Cressida:*

> O! when degree is shak'd
> Which is the ladder of all high designs,
> The enterprise is sick. How could communities,
> Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,
> Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
> Prerogative of age, crowns, scepters, laurels,
> But by degree, stand in authentic place?
> Take but degree away, untune that string,
> And, hark! what discord follows . . .
> Then everything includes itself in power,
> Power into will, will into appetite;
> And appetite, a universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded with will and power,
> Must make perforce a universal prey,
> And last eat up himself.

This is Ulysses' reproach to Ajax and Achilles, whose violent personal rivalry so weakened the program o£ the Greek attack upon Troy that the war ended in chaos. In *Hamlet,* again, we see the dependence of the social order upon the behavior o£ the ruling family, for Marcellus senses that there is something rotten in the *state* of Denmark, and the prince, upon discovering his mother's unfaithfulness and the treachery of his uncle, sees his whole world shattered and corrupt, including even the heavens above. The play is a treatise on the interdependence of politics and the ruler's morals. Great responsibilities are heaped upon Hamlet, as the prince who will one day be king, in the speech of Laertes to Ophelia. Hamlet, he says,

> may not, as unvalu'd persons do
> Carve for himself, for on his choice depends
> The safety and the health of the whole state;
> And therefore must his choice be circumscribed
> Unto the voice and yielding of that body
> Whereof he is the head.

In any event, there is no mistaking the assignment of responsibility to the hereditary rulers. Upon them rested the good of all. Who, then, would bear these burdens in the new republics of the eighteenth century?

The answer is clear from the writings of the revolutionaries themselves, who undertook to design institutions which would embody the traditions of excellence once preserved in the persons of kings and those of noble origin. The shift of responsibility to the people was exceedingly plain to the Founding Fathers of the United States—even to the point, for some of them, of fearing its consequences—and they saw, also, that the institutions of a self-governing society would have to be very different from the static arrangements of monarchy. Benjamin Rush, who had been surgeon general of the American Army during the revolution, wrote of the need for an educational system which would inculcate republican duties upon the pupils and also inspire

them with republican principles. The new form of government, he urged, had "created a new class of duties to every American." Nathaniel Chipman, a Vermont lawyer and legislator of *Mayflower* ancestry, declared that "the civil and political institutions of these United States differ in principles and construction very essentially from all that have preceded them," and he saw need for a flexible sort of governmental and educational institutions which would develop "a capacity of growing better." He wished to avoid "an habitual veneration for ancient establishments, and a dread of encouraging a spirit of innovation," since these attitudes would only perpetuate the despotism of tradition. Chipman was thoroughly aware of the difficulty in allowing for change. "Indeed," he wrote, "could every individual in society, have an intuitive prescience of the changes, as they were to arise, it would still, perhaps, be impossible to form any human institution, which would accommodate itself to every situation in the progress."

Samuel Harrison Smith, a Philadelphia journalist, dreamed of an America which would give synthesis to the fruits of civilization throughout the world. Patriotism, as he saw it, "would become a study and a rational principle. . . Love of country would impel us to transfuse into our own system of economy every improvement offered by other countries." Noah Webster wanted an educational system that would help to erase distinctions of class, and he proposed a "national language" to go with the new "national government." He wanted a phonetic American with simplified spelling and a grammar that would replace the Latin grammar then in use in the schools. He wanted American classics studied in preference to Greek and Roman classics and he found fault with American schools because "the writings that marked the Revolution, which are perhaps not inferior to the orations of Cicero and Demosthenes, and which are calculated to impress interesting truths upon young minds, lie neglected and forgotten."

These men of the republican revolution, in short, undertook to replace the role of the noblemen, who had no place in the new society. Not the peer, but the school, would embody the traditions of human excellence. Not the viceroy, but the judge, guided by a body of law, would dispense justice. And, unlike the feudal scheme, which always looked backward for authority, this new society founded upon republican principles, would look forward, seeking from practical experience and from science the knowledge that would direct all choices for constructive change.

Today, a century and a half from those dreams and high resolves, the task of criticism and of planning for the future is far more difficult. It was easy enough to indict a personal ruler like George III. The rolling rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence, the incisive polemics of Thomas Paine, the incendiary letters of Samuel Adams, leave no doubt of who the Enemy is, and what must be done about him. But when, as was sometimes the case, the criticism was directed at British institutions, instead of the British King, the problem was set more pertinently, if more obscurely. Chipman, after warning that American institutions must be capable of accommodating changes made appropriate by progress, pointed to British institutions for his horrible examples:

> The greater part of the nation [Britain] appear fully persuaded, that all further improvements are impracticable, and that because their government was once the best, perhaps, which existed in the world, it must through all the progressive advances in knowledge, in morals, and in manners, continue the best, a pattern of unchanging perfection, though in its principles, it is much too limited for the present state.

Unhappily, a large sector of the American population now seems to have embraced similar delusions concerning the present institutions of the United States, although it might be said with justice that no comparable scheme of revolutionary reform, such as the people of the thirteen colonies adopted in the American Revolution, is now available to contemporary

Americans for comparison with the existing state of affairs.

The real point, however, is that criticism of institutions which have lost their original inspiration is much more complicated than criticism of kings who no longer practice *noblesse oblige.* Institutions are impersonal agencies. The wrongs they do are a function of habit and lethargy rather than of overt offense. The world still finds it difficult to hate an evil unless it be personified. If you want to start a war, you don't talk about evil institutions, but about evil men who must be purged so that the world can be clean and good again.

The political philosophers and political scientists believe that most of the bad things about modern society result from impersonal institutions, but political philosophers and political scientists have never had a very large audience, nor are their opinions widely respected. Thus the political scientists and philosophers are unable to do very much about either starting or stopping wars, and this creates an unfortunate breach in the structure of social intelligence—a kind of alienation at the top, throwing the initiative of political and institutional change to those who still practice politics at the level of personal conflict and personal good and evil.

It might be possible to claim as an exception to this discouraging picture the advances in democracy represented by the Supreme Court decision obliging integration of Negro and Caucasian children in the public schools. This is certainly a step forward in practice. But is it a step forward in principle? Surely the principle of equality among all men, regardless of race or color, is a fundamental which has long been part of the American conception of human rights—it is not, that is, a *new* principle. What is new is the attempt to honor it with greater consistency.

One question, then, which we might ask ourselves, is this: What are the duties of free men? What is the twentieth-century form of *noblesse oblige?*

The fight for civil liberties is an obvious duty, but it is a question whether this is the most vital area of human effort, even though, to most men, this seems to be the only place where constructive work shows a direct relation to here-and-now problems and is at the same time possible to undertake. Or, to put the question differently: Is work with existing institutions the most important thing to do?

The Founding Fathers were creators of institutions. They made new patterns of human relations, and for a century or more thereafter Americans learned how to use those patterns. It is no deprecation of American institutions, however, to raise the possibility that efforts in behalf of the ideal working of those institutions are bound to be limited in effect. This is rather to say only that institutions, by their very nature, are no more than *safeguards* of the higher qualities of civilization, and are not those qualities themselves.

For example, independent thinking is prior to independent speech or expression, and independent expression is prior to the legal mechanisms which assure it freedom. When independent thinking declines, independent expression loses its importance, and then the guarantees of freedom of expression begin to seem superfluous. The vigilance which is the price of liberty is practiced only by those who prize their liberty, and liberty is valued only by those who feel that their lives are meaningless without it.

The point we have been leading up to is this: When the best writers and the best thinkers among us devote their best energies to books and articles—and foundations, such as the Fund for the Republic—which are concerned with preservation of the mechanisms and guarantees of freedom, then they, and we, have got things backward. In these terms, freedom is at best an abstract ideal—something we fight for because it is a theoretical good. We fight for freedom for the reason that, *if* someone were to say something

important, it is important that they be permitted to say it, and we to hear it.

But if no one is saying anything really important—what then? This, we think, comes very close to being the practical situation, today. It is not our design to minimize the work of groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, nor of any of the bodies which endeavor to be alert guardians of the constitutional rights of American citizens. But we feel need to confess an overwhelming sense of inadequacy—not futility, but inadequacy—during even strenuous efforts of this sort. We can think of no other way to account for this feeling except by saying that the fight for civil liberties is rear-guard action, and can never be anything more. Rear-guard actions are necessary functions in a society like ours; they need to be supported and participated in, especially by those who can think of nothing better to do, and this, these days, includes most of us. But it would be a serious mistake to suppose that the role of *noblesse oblige* has been properly fulfilled by support of the institutional mechanisms of freedom.

An article by Paul Goodman in a recent issue of *i.e., The Cambridge Quarterly*, deals with a phase of this issue. Goodman is reviewing two books on academic freedom, both, in their way, excellent. Goodman's point is that universities are by no means places where the most important free expressions are heard; and that, therefore, an element of pretentiousness pervades books which assume that universities are the best hope of freedom. Discussing Robert MacIver's *Academic Freedom in Our Times* (Columbia University Press), Goodman notes the author's neglect of certain areas of discussion, one of which is war:

> In my opinion there is, in our times, a still more problematic area of social relationships: how to cope with war and the complex issues around it, conscription, the expenditure on armaments, international diplomacy. Now in Professor MacIver's book, pactfism is accorded three pages; in the history [*The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*, Hofstadter and Metzger, Columbia], more interestingly, the cases of the First World War are given a large number of pages, but "academic freedom was relatively little affected during the Second World War." (*Dev. 505*.) Why was it not? It seems to me that [in] this area a strong conviction tends to be dramatic and drastic, e.g. a young man may refuse the draft, a physicist may decline the job. Therefore these areas are sensitive, and therefore they are not much the objects of inquiry. But the suppression is not proximately extra-mural but intra-mural, and it is not forced by the president but by the faculty.
>
> I am reasoning somewhat as follows: What is problematic for inquiry is always just beyond the known; in socio-psychological matters this is an area of confusion and anxiety, and of suppression and repression; then its exploration *must* involve interpersonal daring and personal risk, whether or not there is "acting out," and in these matters there is a generic tendency toward acting out. The vital social questions for inquiry are those you are likely to get jailed for messing with. When you are threatened with academic sanctions, it is a good sign that you are on the right track; when you are fired, it is better; but when you are beyond the pale of the academy and "will receive no support from your colleagues," then you are possibly touching the philosopher's stone. My point is not that universities are worthless, but that one cannot seriously regard them as primarily places of inquiry nor found [on them] the case for academic freedom or freedom of inquiry. . . .

Paul Goodman performs what might be termed a "psychoanalysis" of these books; not having read the books, we cannot assess his evaluation of them, but the manifest pertinence of this *kind* of criticism is all that need be considered, here. After summarizing the pages in the MacIver book dealing with the hunt for communists on American university campuses, Goodman writes:

> It is useful to distinguish two strata in such a list: judgments that could be called anti-McCarthy and those that are anti-anti-anti-McCarthy. Objections to high-handed and unfair pressures, to informing, to lack of due process, to almost all restraints on freedom of speech: this is simple anti-McCarthyism; and at it are leveled charges of political naivete, of being duped, of not seeing that this is a unique conspiracy, of locking the stable after the horse is gone, and so forth. The response to *these* charges, in turn, is anti-anti-anti-McCarthyism: granting that there are grounds for the investigations,

> yet their effect is so productive of fear and withdrawal and inhibition of useful functioning that they weaken the body politic rather than purging it; thus they play into the hands of the enemy.
>
> I think that it is this latter attitude, the prevalence of academic anxiety, rather than any righteous indignation, that has prompted the books we are reviewing. For the fact seems to be—at least so it is agreed by all sides in this controversy except the investigators themselves—that the communist infiltration has been trivial, was never large and has steadily waned for years; that the furore of investigation has been out of all proportion. The question, then, is why anything so groundless and inappropriate has been met with anything but simple manly rejection, either quiet, derisive, or indignant, depending on one's temperament. Why such big books? . . .

We are indebted to Goodman for putting his finger on the source of our distaste for such books. Such big books, and so many of them. Ours is a world entranced by method. Is the security of our freedoms threatened? Then we have a method for making secure our security. Our most precious opinion is our belief in the importance of free opinions. We know the method of being free, and we work at it with great fervor and righteous conviction . . . but with indifferent success.

The roots of freedom lie deeper than this. They grow in the soil of high conviction and are driven to send up foliage and blooms in the air of thought by an irrepressible affirmation. Only technically and ideally is freedom an end in itself. The Pilgrim Fathers may have had straitened and confined views, but they had *views.* The men who formed this Republic may have had dreams tinged with illusion, but they had *dreams.* To have views and dreams—this is the duty of free men. This, for us, is "the ladder of all high designs," and unless there are men to bear the ladders, the enterprise, as Shakespeare warned, is sick.

REVIEW
A "MARXIAN" EVALUATION

ONE of our subscribers recently challenged our critical capacities by submitting for review a book by a New York physician and clinical psychologist, Joseph B. Furst, which seems in large part to be both a "materialist" criticism of Freud and a Marxian attack on capitalism. *The Neurotic—His Inner and Outer Worlds* presents Dr. Furst's contention that neurosis is primarily the social product of capitalism. While we feel that his argument is carried to an illogical extreme, some puzzlement occurs if one attempts to measure the truth in this contention. This is Dr. Furst's basic argument:

> The division of society into classes, those who rule and those who are ruled over, the division into economic groupings, i.e., those who have and those who have not, with the accompanying exploitation, has obscured the true relationship of men to one another. In order to enjoy and perpetuate this form of class society, those who rule, exploit and control the political and economic wealth, find it necessary to conceal, justify and rationalize their position. Systems of law, religion, politics, ideologies, art forms, etc., have arisen upon this basis, their chief function being in every way possible to perpetuate the existence of the ruling classes at the time.
>
> The reader should not assume that this statement does not apply to the United States of America. Economic classes do exist in our society and class position exerts a profound influence on the material circumstances, social outlook and way of life of the members of the various classes. However, these facts have been covered over with propaganda denials, with confusion and with all manner of conflicting social theories. Confusion marks the status of social science in the United States today. If the reader should attempt to understand why there are economic depressions in the land of free enterprise, he will be able to choose from among nine different theories, including one that sun spots cause these social catastrophes.
>
> The complicated nature of capitalist society, together with the various ideologies that present a one-sided, rose-colored view of it, have prevented a rational understanding of human relations among the people in general, or even among most scholars, for that matter. The general lack of understanding of these social and interpersonal relations is correspondingly reflected in a lack of understanding ourselves.

Furst, in other words, insists upon carrying the case against capitalist institutions well beyond the point made familiar by Karen Homey. One of his contentions is that there is no real separation between the "unconscious and the conscious mind," for the simple reason that the two continually interpenetrate one another. As Furst puts it, "they are not struggling with each other, nor do they reside in different parts of the mind. Nor are they separate entities. *What they actually are is opposite qualities of action.* Every act, at our present stage of knowledge, is both understood and not understood, both conscious and unconscious." Our relationship to capitalism, Furst argues, is a perfect illustration of the confusion caused by mingled "conscious and unconscious" perceptions of our relation to the status quo.

A possibly valuable criticism of orthodox psychiatry is provided in a paragraph concerned with "certain glaring errors and vagueness in all psychoanalytical approaches." Furst continues:

> Psychoanalysis suffers from an absolutely basic error in scientific methodology. The analysts make certain observations about the behavior of neurotic people. They draw a theory from these observations and then mistakenly believe that this theory is proven when they can make other observations of the same type and kind as the first ones on which their theory was based. What they really do is merely confirm the observations which led to the theory; they do not confirm the theory itself. The fact that we see children who suck their thumbs, or children who are filled with anxiety and guilt, by no means confirms Freud's Libido theory or his Oedipus Complex theory. We are merely repeating the observations which Freud made. Psychoanalysis has been plagued from the beginning to the present time with this fallacious and circular type of reasoning. To be proven, a theory must be verified by objective data which are different from the ones that led to its postulation in the first place.

So Dr. Furst challenges the *psychic* determinism of the Freudians, but, while valuing Horney and Fromm as critics of the psychiatric status quo, is himself eager to replace one brand of determinism with another. However, he is not so brash as to condemn orthodox psychiatry *in toto*, nor to hold that only entirely new and different approaches to mental disorders are valid. The dogmatism of many psycho-analytic assumptions, he feels, calls for thorough revaluation. We cannot "reject" psychiatry, since rejection is as thoroughly unscientific as is a sort of divine-right enthronement. Were it not Dr. Furst's clear desire to substitute a materialistic social theory for Freud's "determinism of the unconscious," we would be more impressed by his arguments. As a too-eager polemicist, he disposes of orthodox psychiatry too quickly and easily.

Freud's original contributions to knowledge of neurosis were certainly great enough to ensure that his works would be both utilized and criticised for at least the span of a full century. So it is with pioneering works in any field. The fire of a percipient and creative mind burns so brightly that caution is usually thrown to the winds, and the gaps and inadequacies of theory which result are covered over with religious zeal by the great man's followers, although later attacked with zest by others. Recently, at a meeting of the American Psychiatric Association held on the 100th anniversary of Freud's birth, attending psychiatrists were startled by an address delivered by Dr. Percival Bailey, an anti-Freudian neurosurgeon and neurologist. According to *Newsweek* for May 14, Dr. Bailey attacked Freud's followers as ridiculously religious in attitude, charging that many of his celebrated theories were "hoaxes." As the *Newsweek* story puts it:

> To Bailey, Freud developed no system of values and overemphasized the "unconscious," as compared with the results of intelligent conduct. He went on to condemn Freud's "badly battered" theories regarding dream psychology. "One wonders how long the hoary errors of Freud will continue to plague psychiatry," Bailey concluded. "The task of the psychiatrists, it seems to me, is to get back to the asylums and laboratories, which they were so proud to have left behind them, and prove, by scientific criteria, that their concepts have scientific validity."

Here, Dr. Furst and Dr. Bailey seem to be in perfect accord. The charge that "Freud developed no system of values" is an old one, in many respects correct. But we have the feeling that most of those who *talk* loudly of the need for a rational system of values exhibit a "subconscious" desire of their own to oversimplify the nature of man. Those who are sure of their capacity to instruct in a proper value-system, tend to forget, contrary to the sound advice of Immanuel Kant, "the great diversity of human nature." Freud believed that the therapist should restrain himself from suggesting fixed standards of "value" to his patients, but this may also have meant that Freud wished to desert entirely the managerial tendencies of the priest. Relieved of hidden complexes, the patient stood ready, in his opinion, to realize the significance of his individuality in his own way.

So there are many subtleties involved in criticism of Freud. The religionist attacks Freud, partly because he believes that the individual man, unaided, cannot possibly order his life according to correct values. Economic determinists such as Dr. Furst similarly display no capacity for imagining that each human may be on a wondrous voyage of soul, independent, at least at times, of the voyage of society. Dr. Bailey, again, wants "proven" standards of value—proven in the laboratory, so that none can question their formulation.

All in all, we should rather find ourselves wrong part of the time with Freud than "right" most of the time with the system-builders. The formulators of wild and furious ideas at least spur the imagination, and if the pioneer theorizer is sometimes careless and blatantly in error, this may be a good thing—demonstrating that no one is apt to be "right" all of the time about anything.

COMMENTARY
THE SOURCES OF FREEDOM

BY happy coincidence, material presented in this week's "Children . . . and Ourselves" gives balance and perspective to Paul Goodman's discussion of books on academic freedom (see page 8). The conclusions quoted in "Children" from the report of the special committee of the American Association of University Professors represent the other side of the picture. Here the contrast is between professors and administrators, with the laurels going to the professors.

Goodman, on the other hand, regards the effects of the current attack on academic freedom from a different and perhaps "larger" point of view, examining the rhetorical aspect of academic defense against the mood and methods of loyalty investigations.

The point of Goodman's article is that freedom of inquiry on the campuses is not really inhibited by the investigating committees, nor even by the "voluntary" collaboration of university presidents in loyalty checks, for the reason that authentic inquiry is not dependent upon the universities nor especially fostered by them. Original inquiry is too much an individual undertaking to be confined in institutions, nor will a real inquirer be stopped from what he is doing by the routine harassments which the defenders of academic freedom find disturbing.

Our own point is a similar one—that the present agonized preoccupation with the techniques of freedom betrays a certain impoverishment of mind. Too much dignity is given to the fight against McCarthyism—a fight, we suspect, which cannot really be won until we begin to find great and inspiring uses for what freedom we still possess, or the freedom we simply *take*, regardless of the consequences.

A Bill of Rights is a rationalization and justification of freedom already taken and exercised. When a Bill of Rights is threatened, the best defense will be found in the activities which *preceded* the declaration of those rights. Those activities and the affirmative ideas which made them important are the true sources of the freedom which was later defined in the Bill of Rights.

The fight to preserve the legal rights of free men is a fight to maintain the institutional matrix created by past greatness. We may be able to preserve that matrix for a while, but it can be *re-created* only by present and future greatness.

CHILDREN
. . .and Ourselves

AN interesting comparison of the attitudes of teachers and administrators in education is revealed by a recent discussion of the meaning of "Academic Freedom." In 1953, the American Association of University Presidents, hoping to allay public concern about "Communist leanings" among professors, recommended that college instructors forego their constitutional right to invoke the Fifth Amendment when facing loyalty hearings. Adopting the questionable position that teachers, when charged with "radical" views or associations, should undertake the burden of proof of their proper Americanism, the President's Association declaration stirred up determined opposition from professors throughout the nation.

On March 21, 1956, a special committee of the American Association of University Professors called for the public censure of five colleges and universities for what it said were "violations of academic freedom." Candidates for special rebuke were the University of California, Ohio State University, Rutgers University, Temple University, and Jefferson Medical College of Philadelphia. The report accompanying this request for action by the Association makes excellent reading—so good, in fact, that we felt many of our readers would value the opportunity to study selected passages, which we print below.

* * *

When the instances of academic dismissals and the unfortunate policies they exemplify are cast against the stormy background of popular agitation, governmental investigation and hostile legislation, it is not surprising that scholarship has lost ground and that we are threatened with a shortage of qualified teachers just as mounting enrollments are beginning to require an increased number of able academic recruits. . . .

We accept unhesitatingly the application to colleges and universities of needed safeguards against the misuse of specially classified information important for military security to the extent to which these are applied elsewhere. We insist, however, that these safeguards should extend only to persons who have access to such information; in no degree do they justify the proscription of individuals because of their beliefs or associations, unless these persons were knowingly participants in criminal acts or conspiracies, either in the past or at present. Inquiry into beliefs and associations should be restricted to those that are relevant to the discovery of such actual or threatened offenses.

The academic community has a duty to defend society and itself from subversion of the educational process by dishonest tactics, including political conspiracies to deceive students and lead them unwittingly into acceptance of dogmas or false causes. Any member of the academic profession who has given reasonable evidence that he uses such tactics should be proceeded against forthwith and should be expelled from his position if his guilt is established by rational procedure. . . .

We deplore the entire recent tendency to look upon persons or groups suspiciously and to subject their characters and attitudes to special tests as a condition of employing them in responsible positions. For all these reasons, and because of the unhappy disruption of normal academic work which extreme actions in the name of security entail, as well as because of their evident fruitlessness, we oppose the imposition of disclaimer oaths, whereby individuals are compelled to swear or affirm that they do not advocate or have not advocated, or that they are not or have not been members of any organizations which advocate overthrow of the Government. For similar reasons, we oppose investigations of individuals against whom there is no reasonable suspicion of illegal or unprofessional conduct or of an intent to engage in such conduct.

On the same grounds we oppose legislation which imposes upon supervisory officials the duty

to certify that members of their staffs are free of subversive taint. We particularly object to these measures when they are directed against members of the academic profession as a special class apart from the population as a whole. Not only is the stigma of such a discrimination unjustified but the application of these discriminatory measures denies the particular need for freedom from pressures and restrictions, which is a productive requirement of the academic profession and, for similar reasons, of lawmakers, judges, clergymen, journalists and the members of certain other professions. . . .

Several general conclusions emerge clearly from the review made by this committee. The most important conclusion is that a misconceived notion of "public relations" has led various university administrations to interrogate entire faculties or particular members of faculties who, for one reason or another, have been suspected of Communist taint. Public pressure from newspapers, legislatures, state officials, or just from the general climate of opinion during the most critical years seems to have brought about nearly all of these administrative activities. All but two of the institutions where the dismissals now under review occurred are publicly controlled or receive public funds. In several instances specific public campaigns against these institutions or against individuals within them preceded the action.

We cannot accept an educational system that is subject to the irresponsible push and pull of contemporary controversies; and we deem it to be the duty of all elements in the academic community—faculty, trustees, officials and, as far as possible, students—to stand their ground firmly even while they seek, with patient understanding, to enlarge and deepen popular comprehension of the nature of academic institutions and of society's dependence upon unimpaired intellectual freedom. . . .

Administrations have repeatedly announced their adherence to a policy of refusing to employ a known member of the Communist party, even when their actions were stated to be based on other considerations; and faculties under pressure have from time to time adhered to the same position. Administrations have consequently assumed the difficult burden of reconciling the ferreting out of Communist faculty membership with the maintenance of academic freedom and with procedural due process in situations involving tenure. With Communist party membership as difficult to ascertain as it is, the danger is great that injustice will result from this policy and that innocent, capable people will be lost to the academic profession. The public demand for the heads of persons suspected of communism is not characterized by fine discrimination; and the answering actions of academic institutions, like those of other organizations, are likely to reflect a similar crudeness of judgment.

It clearly would have been better for the health of higher education in this country if academic institutions had refused to be stampeded, and had insisted that competence and satisfactory performance in teaching or research, and good character in relation to these functions, are the matters to be judged when academic tenure is at stake.

We urge that American colleges and universities return to a full-scale acceptance of intellectual controversy based on a catholicity of viewpoint, for the sake of national strength as well as for academic reasons. Such a policy is complicated in this country by the growing tendency towards the legal outlawing of the Communist party. Simple membership in the party has not yet been clearly defined as illegal. The influence of the academic community should, we think, be directed against the proscription of membership in a movement which needs to be kept in view rather than driven underground. . . .

The case of an individual who is asked to testify about some past political indiscretion and who is ordered to disclose the names of other

persons who were involved is illustrative. There is a popular prejudice against informers as such, but there is also reason to sympathize with a person who declines to aid in the ruin of others who, in his judgment, do not deserve such a fate. The use of the Fifth Amendment as a basis for silence in such situations may not be morally or academically blameworthy, although it might be legally indefensible.

The policy of placing "a heavy burden of proof" on a teacher who has invoked the Fifth Amendment must be considered in relation to the constitutional protection that the amendment is designed to secure. This report has already expressed a belief in the duty of a faculty member to be open and truthful with his associates if he has invoked the Fifth Amendment and is for this reason questioned; but it does not follow that it is wise or right to place his professional survival in jeopardy by demanding that he not only talk freely but also refute unspecified inferences drawn by his accusers from his refusal to testify. The adoption of such a policy tends to substitute economic punishment for the criminal punishment against which the amendment is designed to guard; and it impairs in direct proportion the constitutional guaranty.

* * *

The Association's special committee insists that removal of a teacher can be justified only on the grounds of incompetence, serious misuse of the classroom, or conscious participation in conspiracy against the government. Any other criteria, it is held, will result in a vast chain-reaction of alarming consequences—inevitable whenever a political sort of security procedure is adopted in the halls of learning.

When the annual meeting of the Association of American Professors took place in St. Louis, April 6 to 8 of this year, the recommendations of the special committee were adopted, and a motion of censure carried against the schools listed, plus the University of Oklahoma. Not only does this action set an excellent example of forthrightness and courage for the universities, but also, we hope, the points made with such clarity will encourage men of letters everywhere to oppose unconstitutional loyalty procedures in civic and federal government.

FRONTIERS

The Tendency of Scientists

SOME weeks ago, a MANAS (April 11) article quoted Miss Anne Sayre, a contributor to the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* on the subject of the scientific disregard of the individual. Her comment seemed so well put that discussion of what she said was resumed in another article (in MANAS for May 7). We now have a letter from Miss Sayre, elaborating the issue. She begins by remarking that, while not herself a scientist, she lives in circumstances which make her "very keenly aware of the implications as well as the techniques of modern scientific thinking," and that she finds these implications "disturbing." She continues:

> I do not deplore any changes or advances in scientific thought, method, technique or achievement as such; I think I am far from wishing to join the ostrich-like group which confines itself to wishing that nobody had ever achieved nuclear fission or invented an H-bomb, for all this seems to me (as I gather it also seems to you) inevitable. Nor am I one of those who place any moral blame upon scientists as individuals or a group for loosing the peculiar horrors of our time upon the world.
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> What I do object to is the increasingly arrogant claim of science that all matters worthy of consideration can be and should be approached "scientifically." I am honestly frightened by the prospect of a world in which the most responsible and socially-rewarded intellects dismiss as unimportant all phases of man's life not amenable to dissection by the scientist's experimental logic, and furthermore assert that this experimental logic can do things which it cannot in fact accomplish at all. Certainly not all scientists fall into these twin sins, but I think their tendency, and the tendency which is emphasized in contemporary university science teaching, is precisely along these lines. The danger lies, for me, in the increasing tendency of scientists to prefer to regard humans not at all as individuals—who are not, as you say "data for scientific study"—but as depersonalized population units. It does seem to me that with the increasing advances in techniques of automation this bodes very ill for the future. Any extensive automation in industrial production is bound to provide a new industrial revolution and a consequent social revolution; these things are, I think, inevitabilities. But the nature of the social revolution, and particularly its nature with respect to the position of the individual, ought to be examined now. Developments in automation are almost exclusively concentrated in the hands of scientists and engineers and other technicians entirely engrossed in the scientific method, and it seems to me very likely that such thinking will shape from the outset the human changes consequent upon their work. There are already signs of this: those people who are working upon the most advanced developments in general automatic production theory and design are seeing the necessity for overlooking human variability and individuality in order to have their machines function correctly. As I think they have for the most part no philosophical concept of the value of individuals as such, they are apparently quite unconscious of the direction in which they are moving—which is roughly towards a society in which creativity is assigned as a function of machinery and in which individuals have little purpose beyond predictable consumption of economic output.
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> This too may be an inevitability; I object to accepting it as such, however, on no stronger evidence than the basic judgment of many scientists that (however contradictorily) nothing unamenable to scientific reasoning matters and that all things can ultimately be subjected to such objectivity. And it does seem to me that most religious doctrine with which I am familiar is failing to consider this situation seriously, and therefore failing to offer any philosophy to offset it. I do believe that large numbers of people are finding present-day religious teaching not wrong but inadequate, insufficiently extensive. Its function is surely to emphasize clearly the concept of the value of each individual soul, and it has come today into the difficult position of having to do this not only against scientific philosophy but the increasing, everyday, common scientific practice.
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> I think I may well have taken quite a lot upon myself in deciding to defend the wayward individual against his own skill in producing the arguments of his destruction—his moral, intellectual and individual destruction as well as his very likely physical extermination. But *someone* has to argue, not against scientific method and thought, but against its indiscriminate or disproportionate application and its humane insufficiencies, and I am therefore delighted to find that I am far from alone.

From this sharpening of the issue by Miss Sayre, two lines of investigation emerge. First is the question of *why* the individual is at a discount in

modern scientific thinking. This question could be discussed at great length, but, briefly, the explanations seem to be two—one connected with the intellectual development of Europe, the other with the nature of technology. The extreme skepticism and atheism which found expression in the French Revolution, and later in Marxist thought, was the product of a far-reaching historical rejection of Christian dogmas—in which intellectual distaste for irrational claims was exacerbated by social indignation toward the injustices tolerated and even fostered by the priestly representatives of Christianity. To disarm religion, God was made the principal target of the unbelievers, but the soul, as God's "creation," soon suffered a like fate. So thorough-going was the attack on all spiritual ideas—actually, the initial attack was not upon spiritual ideas, but upon their theological counterfeits—that by the middle of the nineteenth century, thoughtful men became apprehensive as to the result for mankind. Alfred de Musset's apostrophe to Voltaire is even more appropriate today than it was a century or more ago, when it was written:

> Sleep'st thou content, Voltaire?
> And thy dread smile, hovers it still above
> Thy fleshless bones . . . ?
> Thine age they call too young to understand thee;
> This one should suit thee better—
> Thy men are born!
> And the huge edifice that, day and night, thy great hands undermined,
> Is fallen upon us. . . .

In our time, the drive for skepticism and unbelief is no longer an aggressive campaign, conducted as it was in the eighteenth century by the *philosophes* and in the nineteenth by the "earnest atheists"—the Tyndalls, Huxleys, Haeckels, and others who tried to make a "gospel" out of Materialism. But today, the "cause" of unbelief has no need of such champions. Their men, as de Musset put it, are born—without even a basis in faith for the prayer of the agonized father in St. Mark: "Lord, I believe; help thou my unbelief."

It is thus that the impressive achievements of modern technology and engineering methods, to which the presence of individuality is a threat and a hazard, find us. The "ethic" of technology—mechanical efficiency is the highest good—depends upon eliminating individuality, and because we have no "whole" philosophy, we do not know how to delimit technological operations to functions which will not become inhumane when individuality is left out.

It is natural enough for scientists and technologists to accept confinement by a mechanistic account of nature and life. What else have they to go on? What else, that is, with comparable discipline and promise of results? And they are trained to demand results.

Fortunately, scientists and technologists are also human beings, however much they may be occupationally conditioned to overlook the fact. In time, perhaps, they will become humanly frightened by the all-devouring tendencies of their own techniques.

The question for the rest of us is whether we can afford to wait for this awakening. The trouble with waiting is that time is short, and fear, while an adequate motive for inspiring flight, can never supply a positive inspiration. Fear brought warnings from Dr. Einstein and a few other eminent men. Fear brought punishment to Dr. Oppenheimer for his unhappy moral ambivalence, and fear caused Dr. Norbert Wiener to break out of the conventional harness which holds our best minds in the service of "military necessity." But fear will not supply us with a philosophy of and a deep conviction about individuality, so that we can reconstruct our technological arrangements and give intelligent order to the relationships between technological and human values.

Only a creative act of the individual can affirm and protect individuality. This is what we need, and fear can never help us to get it. Meanwhile, articulate criticism of the tendency of scientists to ignore individuality, and of the general acquiescence to the sort of world that neglect of the individual creates, may stir us to a more realizing sense of this need.