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THE HEALTH OF THE STATE

DURING the past two months there has been a great deal of comment and reaction abroad concerning the recently detonated H-Bombs in the Pacific. The American descriptions of their effects, such as that of the Atomic Energy Commission's own Lewis Strauss, seem "modest" enough. Interpreting the March 1 blast, he said: "The nature of an H-bomb is that, in effect, it can be made to be as large as you wish, as large as the military requirement demands; that is to say, an H-bomb can be made large enough to take out a city." When asked how big a city, he simply replied, "Any city."

Time reported that the 45-megaton bomb, to be tested, would produce a "radius of approximately 6.7 miles of utter destruction and 22.3 miles of severe-to-slight blast damage." But Ritchie Calder, science editor of the British *News Chronicle*, had this to say:

> The safety zone around the Marshall Islands proving area has now been extended to a radius of 450 miles. Anything within that radius will be "at risk." Transferred to Britain with Birmingham as the center, that would include the entire British Isles, half of France, all of Holland, and Belgium, and Germany as far as Frankfurt. Surely the time has come to pause and think again about the hydrogen effects, because one is entitled to assume that the Russians are not likely to be any more certain of the calculations of their experiments than the American scientists. This is not a question of how or on whom you use the H-bomb. It has nothing to do with politics or strategy, but with the limitations of knowledge.

Prof. L. S. Martin, the defense scientific adviser to the Australian Government, declared:

> For the first time I am getting worried about the H-bomb. I cannot say I think it would be wrong to explode a hydrogen bomb on or near Australia, because I am defence Adviser. I can say, as an individual, that the hydrogen bomb has brought things to a stage where a conference between the four powers, Britain, the United States, France, and Russia, in mankind's own interests can no longer be postponed.

Now *Time* would probably refer to the men who made these statements as "hand-wringers," for in its April 12 issue, *Time* remarked that some of the "first and loudest reactions were not necessarily the wisest—nor were they typical. . . . Emotional reaction was sharply opposed to the reaction of the U.S. Government, which knew a year and a half ago most of the facts that the public learned last week. . . . The Government, working with these facts, did not recoil in horror and abandon the new weapon. Instead, it built upon its H-bomb knowledge the Dulles policy of possible 'massive retaliation' against further Communist acts of aggression."

"Who," *Time* asks, "was tragically, wildly wrong? Eisenhower and Dulles? Or last week's hand-wringers?" The rest of the article leaves little doubt what *Time* believes. And of course, *Time* knows *everything*.

Unfortunately, *Time* doesn't recall for us the tortuous path over which it and John Foster Dulles have passed since 1945. For it was in August of that year that Dulles, then the Chairman of the Federal Council of Churches' *Commission on a Just and Durable Peace*, issued jointly with Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam a statement which read in part:

> One choice open to us is immediately to wreak upon our enemy mass destruction such as men have never before imagined. That will inevitably obliterate men and women, young and aged, innocent and guilty alike, because they are part of a nation which has attacked us and whose conduct has stirred our deep wrath. If we, a professedly Christian nation, feel morally free to use atomic energy in that way men elsewhere will accept that verdict. Atomic weapons will be looked upon as a normal part of the arsenal of war and the stage will be set for the sudden and final destruction of mankind.

Have you ever heard such hand-wringing? It is clarifying to know that today John Foster is an ex-Christian and has forsworn his earlier associations. No more hand-wringing, only threats of "massive retaliation." This makes him part of that fit company dear to the heart of *Time*, Incorporated: the

unemotional, right-thinking and unhesitating men who will never "recoil in horror," but instead will "build its policy upon the H-bomb." The Church's firm foundation, as we all know, is elsewhere.

But if you think Dulles has come a long way from his hand-wringing days, consider the growth inside the Luce publications. Back in its naive youth, when it wasn't as careful as it should be with regard to its associations, *Time's* sister publication, *Life*, in that same disastrous month of August, 1945, produced an editorial in which it said things like this:

> Power in society has never been controlled by anything but morality; and morality (in Bertrand Russell's formulation) is of two kinds: the social pressure of the dominant group ("positive" morality) and individual morality. Nowadays, says Russell, "positive morality is in effect a department of government." The example of Germany shows us how unsafe a guide that is. Our sole safeguard against the very real danger of a reversion to barbarism is the kind of morality which compels the individual conscience, *be the group right or wrong.* The individual conscience against the atomic bomb? Yes. There is no other way.

I pause to remind you that this is *Life* (Life Magazine, that is), and the year is 1945. Having gotten those pearls off their chests, the editors go on to say—and imagine this from the usually omniscient writers of *Time* and *Life*—"The thing for us to fear today is not the atom but the nature of man, lest he lose either his conscience or his humility before the inherent mystery of things."

But that was 1945, and the time for humility is past. Perhaps Henry Luce's editorial writers have all been brainwashed in the intervening years. At any rate, it is obvious that the party line has taken a flip-flop somewhere.

That's the trouble with these ex-Christians. Having given up their evil ways, they fail even to remember how they used to think, and so have no compassion for others who have not yet given up the light. Thus, they brand those with whom they disagree "hand-wringers." Yet notice how close to *Life's* 1945 statement, if not quite as radical, is this March, 1954, statement by Professor Alexander Haddow, the Director of the Chester Beatty Research Institute of the Royal Cancer Hospital, as it appeared in the London *Times:*

> Recent events in the Pacific, with their demonstration of the powers of the hydrogen bomb for limitless annihilation, at once bring to an end the notion that the area of danger can have any but relative meaning, and destroy the conception of civil defence. If we are entering the realm of the incalculable so far as the individual test explosions are concerned, the likelihood of ultimate disaster grows steadily greater. The issue is so universal, and the Governments of the world are so comprised in their attitudes towards it, that we must despair whether there exists in fact either the mechanism or the will {for solution}. Clearly the resources of national governments and of traditional diplomacy are bankrupt, when it appears impossible to bring together the heads of the States concerned. If all solution is beyond the present means, the question must be raised whether the representatives of world science itself, imbued by some sense of humane responsibility, can assist in the judgment . . . from such a body alone might we expect a factual appraisal and an advocacy of policy, of such overwhelming weight as to commend itself to the whole of the civilized world.

Here, again, Professor Haddow suggests what *Life* proclaimed in 1945: Governments are not going to save us. Rather, they are likely to be the agents of our destruction. Then Prof. Haddow weakens his statement by appealing to the scientists to save us. How unlikely this is, we all know. Some of the most eminent atomic scientists in this country were opposed on moral grounds to developing the H-bomb, but only a handful of them dared do what *Life*, in 1945, said was necessary. The 1945 statement is worth repeating: "Our *sole* safeguard against the very real danger of reversion to barbarism is the kind of morality which compels the individual conscience, *be the group right or wrong.* The individual conscience against the atomic bomb? Yes. There is no other way."

You can number on the fingers of one hand the scientists who refused to take part in further atomic developments. Something, either conscience or courage, was lacking. And still is. No, the scientists won't save us.

But if the government won't save us, and the scientists won't save us, who or what will?

This is not a new problem, and we can get some perspective on it by going back into history. At the time of the first World War, a young American radical,

Randolph Bourne, a protege of John Dewey—who broke with his master—wrote an essay with a theme and a refrain that will not be downed even though the essay itself is out of print, and seldom seen. "War," said Randolph Bourne, "is the health of the State." While he wrote in 1917, his contention is still generally valid; today we need only supply the term "cold war" for war; and tomorrow we may be able to drop the word "cold":

> Wartime [wrote Bourne] brings the ideal of the State out into very clear relief and reveals attitudes and tendencies that were hidden. In times of peace the sense of the State flags in a republic that is not militarized. The ideal of the State is that within its territory its power and influence should be universal. . . . And it is precisely in war that the urgency for union seems greatest, and the necessity for universality seems most unquestioned. The State is the organization of the herd to act offensively or defensively against another herd similarly organized. The more terrifying the occasion for defense, the closer will become the organization and the more coercive the influence upon each member of the herd. War sends the current of purpose and activity flowing down to the lowest level of the herd, and to its remote branches.
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> All the activities of society are linked together as fast as possible to this central purpose of making a military offensive or a military defensive, and the State becomes what in peacetime it has struggled to become—the inexorable arbiter and determinant of men's businesses and attitudes and opinions. The slack is taken up, the cross-currents fade out, and the nation moves lumberingly and slowly, but with accelerated speed and integration, towards the great end, towards the "peacefulness of being at war."
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> The classes which are to play an active and not merely passive role in the organization for war get a tremendous liberation of activity and energy. Individuals are jolted out of their old routine, many of them are given new positions of responsibility, new techniques must be learnt. . . . Every individual citizen who in peacetimes had no function to perform by which he could imagine himself an expression of a living fragment of the State, becomes an active amateur agent of the Government in reporting spies and disloyalists, in raising Government funds, or in propagating such measures as are considered necessary by officialdom. Minority opinion, which in times of peace, was only irritating and could not be dealt with by law unless it was conjoined with actual crime, becomes with the outbreak of war, a case for outlawry. . . . Public opinion, as expressed in newspapers, and the pulpits, and the schools becomes one solid block. "Loyalty," or rather war orthodoxy, becomes the sole test of all professions, techniques, occupations. . . . War is the health of the State. It automatically sets in motion throughout society those irresistible forces for uniformity and for passionate cooperation with the Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack the larger herd sense. . . .

Need we go on? Bourne, you see, has written about it all back in 1917—before scientists received magnificent laboratories and millions of dollars from the government to make weapons. Before the Smith Act, which controls thought and imprisons not for acts but for advocacy. Before McCarthy, Velde, or any of thousands of self-appointed government agents. Before the world-wide threat of Communism. Before loyalty oaths in colleges and universities, and for churches and people seeking housing. Before, in short, all the current phenomena with which his general statements can be documented. Bourne said in effect, in 1917, before the atomic bomb, that "our sole safeguard against a reversion to barbarism is the kind of morality which compels the individual conscience, be the group right or wrong."

What will save us? Nothing, *if not ourselves.* What will save us will be for you and for me to learn how to say, "No," and to mean it, whatever the punishment that may follow, or whatever the social pressure and promise of reward that might precede. Do you know how to say "No"?

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REVIEW
"THE MEASURE OF MAN"

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH'S new work of this title should be of considerable importance to most MANAS readers. The word "work" is used advisedly, since *The Measure of Man* is in every sense a notable endeavor, motivated more by an educator's conscientious truth-seeking than by the sprightly interests which must make many of Krutch's "lesser" projects as enjoyable to write as to read. The subject is the intellectual temper of modern man, and the method employed in its assessment is that of philosophical analysis. The logic, though, is not ponderous or difficult to follow. The theme is that the age of scientism has weakened man's faith in himself, and that the "Great Discourse" on the ends and aims of human life must be kept going if we are to avoid sinking into personal apathy, political totalitarianism, or both.

The modern emphasis on statistical evaluations of man, Krutch points out, derives from nineteenth-century science. Within this "climate of opinion" or "frame of reference," new orthodoxies have sprung up, revealing themselves clearly in the fields of psychology and sociology. It becomes crucially important to realize, therefore, that "even scientific thinking is, after all, only a *way* of thinking, rather than a description of ultimate reality." For when the measure of man is a mere mathematical yardstick, those aspects of the human being intrinsically incapable of being represented by mathematical formulae seem to become "less and less real"—a trend which could, ultimately, lead to apathy in regard to heroism and insensitivity to the finer emotions.

Mr. Krutch describes a dilemma which increasingly claims the attention of intellectuals:

> Though many have tried, no one has ever yet explained away the decisive fact that science, which can do so much, cannot decide what it ought to do, and that the power which it confers must be guided by something outside it, if power is not to become—as it is already becoming—an end as well as a means. Yet it is just at this moment, when choices have become unprecedentedly fateful (because intentions can now be implemented as never before in the history of mankind), that scientific theories have persuaded us to abandon the very premises which might have made us feel capable of directing the power that science has put into our hands. If in one sense man is now more like a god than he ever was before, he has in another sense become less godlike than he ever previously imagined himself to be. The attributes of a god must include not merely power itself, but also the knowledge of how power should be used. What we have fallen victim to is thus not so much technology itself as the philosophy that has grown with its growing.

To some brave realists among the devotees of scientism, the possibility has occurred, as it did to H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw, that the present humanity is "not good enough to survive." This, to Krutch, is unnecessary bleakness. Why not "entertain the possibility that the creature who has become not good enough to survive is not man himself but only that version of man that he has recently accepted." The mere fact that we have long been drifting into the assumption that we are helpless creatures of our environment does not mean that this is the only drift of which man is capable. We have, in fact, derived unnecessarily demeaning conclusions from Darwin, Marx and Freud. As Krutch demonstrates, all three of these great thinkers have been popularly interpreted as saying that man is the product of choices outside of his control—"at worst each could be and has been made the excuse for a sort of secular Calvinism in the light of which man is seen as the victim of an absolute predestination." The view that a person is at least something like a god has been replaced by the disquieting suspicion that man never becomes anything except through environmental conditioning—that his behavior will always be scientifically predictable as soon as the conditioning factors are isolated and studied.

This view reaches its logical extreme in a fantasy entitled *Walden Two,* recently concocted by B. F. Skinner, a Harvard psychologist. Krutch uses the theme of this book as a weathervane for testing many currents presently swirling in the

intellectual atmosphere. For *Walden Two* is a Utopian society peopled by men and women who have voluntarily submitted themselves to the ultimate in scientific conditioning. They are controlled by a psychologist who has mastered "the scientific ability to control men's thoughts with precision"—who can *make* all citizens think benevolently. Faith in this Utopia is placed neither in God nor in human reason, but in the conditioned reflex. Everyone is given the "right responses" and everyone is mechanically activated by them. No ill health, no racial intolerance, no acts of violence are found in *Walden Two,* the only trouble being that the creatures left to enjoy the benefits are no longer men in any meaningful sense. Having abrogated the right of free choice, they are unable to appreciate their good fortune since they no longer have criteria for independent evaluation. Mr. Krutch does not imply that all scientists or even all devotees to scientism really want this kind of world, but he does imply that this is the kind of world we have been building for a long time, whether we know it or not.

To prove that the basic questions are still open and must ultimately be recognized to be such, Mr. Krutch turns to evidence contained in recent developments within the sciences themselves. While certain statistical sociologists still believe that it is only a matter of time before they learn how to formulate unalterable laws of human behavior and thus control the development of man, physicists have informed us that even *their* world is not as simple as Newton once made it seem:

> Consider for instance the striking and spectacular example which happens to involve very recent discoveries and concerns a pair of categories which seem obviously fundamental, namely the matter-energy dichotomy. To have said to any nineteenth-century scientist that a thing was not necessarily either matter or energy but that it might be now one and now the other would have seemed the merest nonsense. Common sense saw the distinction as primary and self-evident; scientific experiments confirmed it and scientific laws were based on it. Yet the concept of matter-energy is now universally accepted as a concept superseding the former one. Matter which may turn itself into energy is not "material" in any older meaning of the word. Similarly a machine which can be aware of itself is no longer "mechanical" in any meaningful sense of the word. . . .
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> If those physicists are right who remark quite casually that the revolution which the last few years has witnessed in their science is at least as fundamental as the revolution which took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the "modern" view assumed definite shape, then the time may be approaching when "modern" will have to mean not the world view of the Newtonian but something quite different, and we shall have to find a new adjective to distinguish the first "scientific world view" from that which has taken its place. . . .
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> Newton told us that the mysterious heavens were as knowable to common sense as our own back yard; Einstein tells us that our own back yard is as mysterious as the heavens were ever supposed to be.

We have been "conditioned" for so long to expect that the mysteries of the universe will some day disappear that it is understandably hard to reverse our anticipations and welcome the return of mystery to the cosmos, but Mr. Krutch is trying to get us to see that only in this way is man likely to reaffirm faith in his *own* "mysterious" potentials. The best hope of man, then, is in the discovery that the rigid categories of mechanistic scientism, upon which totalitarianism may so logically be built, are erroneous. Meanwhile, the road to totalitarian conditioning is unwittingly prepared by the statistical approach to man:

> In "mental tests," those most characteristically limited manifestations of our concept of the criteria appropriate to the judgment of the human mind, the stress is chiefly upon the ability to analyze and to scheme, so that we put into the category of the most superior men those most likely to scheme successfully and we usually exhibit not the slightest concern over the question whether these "most superior" men are capable, to even an average extent, of the awarenesses, the emotions or the mental reactions which make men attractive, either to themselves or to others. And so, just as the economists have given us the ideal economic man who does nothing but produce and consume, so the mental testers have given us the ideal intelligent man who does nothing

except scheme. Between them they have outlined a utopia in which creatures who are really only very flexible calculating machines do nothing except make goods which they then use up—living to eat and eating to live. For such creatures, living in such a world, most of the forms of consciousness would be not only unnecessary but also a burden. In a sense, therefore, the definition of man assumed by the tester prepares us for that definition of man in terms of which the calculator is human.

It follows that the devotees of democratic theory who are also devotees of "scientism" find themselves in this ambiguous position:

> The paradox in democratic thinking is inherent in the fact that while we have exalted man's importance by making his "welfare" the measure of all things, we have, at the same time, belittled him by assuming that he is, nevertheless, nothing in himself. If we could say to the Communist, "There is one supremely important respect in which we differ from you. We believe, as you do not, that freedom is real, that choices are possible, and that man can think as well as rationalize," then we would know—as now we often do not—what the meaning of our conflict really is. We could say that the traditional instruments of democratic government—free discussion, the secret ballot, etc.—are not the mere fetishes which Communists sometimes call them, but genuinely important because they furnish a method by which the autonomous desires and preferences of the free individual can influence the course of political history. But we cannot say that now, because too many so-called democrats do not believe anything of the sort, and to them, whether they know it or not, the traditional instruments of democratic government are therefore, in fact, little more than fetishes.

The really fascinating implication of recent discoveries in physics and biology is the total inadequacy of the prevailing intellectual temper. Julian Huxley's later writings, for instance, emphasize that "the miracle of mind is that it can transmit quantity into quality. This property of mind is something given: it just is so. It cannot be explained: It can only be accepted." Such admissions serve to break down the mechanist assumptions which have helped men to become proficient machines, but helped them not at all to become more satisfactorily human.

The social sciences may have destroyed religion, and this may or may not be a good thing, but it is clear to Mr. Krutch that they have come close to destroying something more important than any particular religious tradition—man's propensity to judge concerning matters of good and evil, values, and individual responsibility:

> It may be that the social sciences would have served mankind better and would have more successfully promoted even that "adjustment" they lay so much store by if they had been as willing as the physicists have shown themselves to admit the unpredictable, intangible and paradoxical aspects of nature and behavior. Their attempts to minimize and disregard the importance of conscious process, to deny the autonomy of the individual mind, to reject as without real significance the hard facts of direct intimate experience, and to insist on regarding consciousness itself as a deluding epiphenomenon, has done more than encourage a split between the two worlds in which moderns try to live. It has also resulted in a theoretical picture of the human universe which is both fantastically complicated and startlingly inadequate: complicated because its attempts to explain away the apparent reality behind such concepts as free will and the ethical sense are necessarily very elaborate; inadequate because the most ambitious mechanical man remains obviously a very incomplete one.
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> The suggestion is not that we must return to theology, to simple Christian belief, or to anything else. But the suggestion, or rather the insistence, is that the old-fashioned Science of Man is as inadequate to account for the universe in which man has his physical being. Behind the ancient and possibly quite unsatisfactory concepts of free will, individual responsibility and the validity of value judgments, lie some realities without the recognition of which it is not possible to manage a world in which human beings will be either successful or happy.
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> The minimum responsibility of the social sciences is to recognize this fact freely and to make some serious attempt to find out what those realities are. They will never help us solve our problems as long as they continue to go on the assumption that whatever is true of a rat is true of a man. Indeed they will not be able to solve them so long as they assume that even a rat is adequately accounted for on the basis of mechanistic premises.

> If it should turn out, as it probably will, that they cannot investigate the reality behind the key concepts without reconciling themselves, either permanently or temporarily, to paradoxes not resolvable by common sense, then they had better follow the physicists who have already done just that. There is certainly no reason for assuming that the human being is both simpler and more mechanical than the ultimate particles out of which actual machines are made.

There is one important consideration which we are not sure that Mr. Krutch has yet sufficiently pondered. It seems to us that the movement *away* from scientism is more characteristic of the intellectual temper at present than thralldom to its earlier, more mechanistic forms. A considerable number of philosopher-psychologists have been making the points Krutch makes, effectively, and to a growing audience. Further, the very fact that Bobbs-Merrill takes pride in publishing a work of philosophical analysis such as *The Measure of Man* indicates that the "great discourse" on the ends and aims of life is at least thought by someone to interest a great number of people. Just as we once looked forward to a sequel to *The Modern Temper,* we shall now look forward to a sequel to *The Measure of Man,* concerned with that now developing "climate of opinion" which veers as resolutely away from mechanism as our scientific forbears veered away from the rigidity of theology. *The Measure of Man* might be sub-titled "Why a Revolution is Needed," and a possible sequel could be named, "How the Needed Revolution is Taking Place."

COMMENTARY
A USE FOR MODERN MAN

AN out-of-town reader has sent us a news dispatch originating in Los Angeles which reports (with a straight face) the statement of an air-conditioning executive concerning the problems of space travel. This spokesman for future industry (air-conditioning space ships) explains that, despite modern technology, human beings will be needed, since, as he puts it, "for some control functions, human beings are more efficient because they occupy less space and weigh less."

Our reader explains that he sent this clipping in because he found it comforting. Modern man, Norman Cousins to the contrary, is *not* obsolete. He can always make himself useful regulating the air-conditioning control mechanisms on space ships.

Thus the romance of Modern Progress continues, at least in industrial publicity releases. Movie theaters add their chapter with newsreel features showing how the first H-Bomb explosion wiped out an entire Pacific isle. And our diplomats and publicists (see Roy Kepler's lead article) are keeping up with the times by abandoning all humanitarian nonsense and presenting a tough exterior to the world at large and our cold-war enemies in particular.

One wonders just when, and how, the Great Disillusionment will set in. It's bound to come, of course. You can't plant psychological time-bombs all over the place and not have at least some of them go off. You can't write into the program for national morale a requirement of suspicion of even mildly humanitarian doubts of modern methods of warfare and hope to end up anything but a population drugged by fear and brutalized by angry resentment of the decent impulses of their fellows. And you can't do these things and hope to avoid a revolution—for there will be those who will resist, who find that they are able to say "No!"

The difficult thing, for most people, is to realize the enormity of plans and projects for atomic destruction. People want so much to think that "everything will turn out all right," but how can anything be "all right" when national leaders contemplate blowing up large portions of the world's population, as if such peoples were not even members of the human race?

The growing inhumanity of our times is reaching almost an incredible extreme. Yet this development is barely noticed, while we move complacently toward a future in which threat of total destruction will be a commonplace of foreign policy.

Of course, to raise questions like this will be regarded by many as "stirring up trouble." The people who hope that "everything will be all right" are disturbed when anyone seems to be stirring up trouble. The solid, respectable citizens of Athens couldn't understand why Socrates didn't mind his own business and stop criticizing the Authorities. And the good Christians of the eighteenth century who were grateful to Thomas Paine for helping along the American Revolution felt that he lost his senses when he turned to exposing the psychological tyranny of orthodox religion.

A time may come when men will honor the opinions of men like Socrates and Thomas Paine while they are still alive, but we fear that it is still in the distant future. Until that time comes, however, we plan to remain completely unimpressed by the claims of "modern progress."

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

IT may seem a bit odd for a paper like MANAS to recommend perusal of *Look* magazine, yet a Robert Hutchins article, "Are Our Teachers Afraid to Teach?", appearing in the March 9 issue of *Look* can hardly be ignored. It is possible, too, that some of our readers, like the editors, at times overlook excellent writing when it appears in an unexpected setting. *(Look*, however, we recall, has published several outstanding articles on important public issues—especially those of Justice William O. Douglas, which appeared at a time when the outspoken jurist's words on Communism in Asia were a forthright challenge to popular prejudices.)

"Are Our Teachers Afraid to Teach?" strikingly illustrates how much of importance can be said in only three pages on this subject. And while Hutchins contributes invaluable philosophical, political, psychological, and sociological insights, these are all conveyed in classically simple language. The article begins:

> Education is impossible in many parts of the United States today because free inquiry and free discussion are impossible. In these communities, the teacher of economics, history or political science cannot teach. Even the teacher of literature must be careful. Didn't a member of Indiana's Textbook Commission call Robin Hood subversive?
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> The National Education Association studied no less than 522 school systems, covering every section of the United States, and came to the conclusion that American teachers today are reluctant to consider "controversial issues." But what does that mean? An issue is a point on which the parties take different positions. A non-controversial issue, therefore, is as impossible as a round square. All issues are controversial; if they were not, they would not be issues.
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> In Los Angeles, Houston and Pawtucket, a teacher would hesitate to mention UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, because school authorities have made it plain that they are afraid of it. Since those who oppose UNESCO generally oppose the United Nations, the teacher should probably not refer to the U.N. either. Since those who oppose the U.N. believe that the United States should somehow isolate itself from world affairs, the teacher would be unwise to say very much about international relations. How, then, can teachers say anything worth while about the world in which we live?
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> The fact that President Eisenhower has endorsed UNESCO will not protect the teacher who follows his example. What teacher would dare to say what Secretary of State Dulles has said about the ultimate admission of Red China to the society of nations? A teacher might risk his job by saying what Harold Stassen, Foreign Operations director, has said about the eventual necessity of some kind of world law and world government. It is even dangerous for him to say what everybody was saying ten years ago, that we must do all we can to promote world understanding. Vocal pressure groups throughout the land now take the view that any kind of interest in organizing the world for peace is unpatriotic.

Mr. Hutchins brings into sharp focus some neglected aspects of academic freedom:

> Whittaker Chambers and Prof. Sidney Hook of New York University, both of whom proclaim themselves devotees of academic freedom, say, "Don't worry; only a few teachers have been fired." What has this got to do with it? The question is not how many teachers have been fired, but how many think they might be, and for what reasons. It is even worse than that: Teachers are not merely afraid of being fired; they are afraid of getting into trouble, with resultant damage to their professional prospects and their standing in their communities. You don't have to fire teachers to intimidate them all. The entire teaching profession of the United States is now intimidated.
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> Chambers and Hook say individuals still speak out. What if they do? Their number is getting smaller every day, and it is a sad commentary that we have to congratulate ourselves that a few still speak when millions should feel free to do so. The spirit of the teaching profession is being crushed, and, with it, our hopes of education.
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> Competence or professional skill will not protect the teacher. In the investigations that have gone on around the country, I do not recall one in which it was charged that the teacher was not a good teacher. I do not remember more than one or two in which it was suggested that the teacher attempted to get his pupils to adopt his alleged political views or even that they knew what those views were.

Another disturbing fact to which Hutchins alludes briefly is that "highly publicized investigations" of institutions, because they are primarily political fish being fried for sale, are apt to become regrettable examples of perpetual motion. Legislative inquiries into educational or philanthropic institutions may be renewed year after year, even when nothing discreditable to them has been turned up. In 1953, Congressional investigation of the philanthropic foundations yielded no real grist for the McCarthy mill—but the investigations are to be renewed anyway. Hutchins laconically observes: "On the basis of an association with these organizations, on the receiving or the giving end, that covers thirty years, I can testify that the trouble with the foundations has not been their radical ideas but their fear of any ideas. Their most well-defined characteristic has been timidity. Imagine, then, what the current allegations that they are subversive have done. Now, after McCarthy's attack on Harvard, they will hesitate to give money to the university."

We entirely agree with Hutchins' conclusion that "no country ever needed education more than ours does today," and for the same reasons that he lists:

> The view is growing that we must avoid "controversial issues" in the classroom. But issues cannot be omitted from education, except through falsity, distortion or concealment. If an issue is presented as though it were not one—that is, as though there were only one side to it this is not education; it is indoctrination. This is precisely what the Russians do. And those who pass through a similar process in the United States are being trained to become passive subjects of a police state. They cannot think and act as independent citizens in a democracy: They will not know what are the issues with which, as citizens, they must cope; they will not know how to go about facing those issues.

The assertion that many youngsters in the United States are today being trained to become "passive subjects of a police state" does not imply a deliberate conspiracy on the part of government. Society certainly can create "passive subjects" without intending to, and does so, to some degree, wherever and whenever the tyranny of the *status quo* holds sway. A sufficiently fearful and passive population will demand something like a "police state" to provide it with a sense of security. One might argue, therefore, that if the United States becomes predominantly totalitarian, it will do so by popular acclaim, thereby making the totalitarianism really "democratic." Perhaps there is nothing wrong with this logic, but a democratic abandonment of democracy is hardly consistent with that noble conception of freedom expressed in the Bill of Rights. More than ever, it seems necessary for the educator who wants to serve the genuine interests of a democracy to become "a troublemaker"—as Hutchins suggested some ten years ago at the University of Chicago.

FRONTIERS

In Behalf of Humanism

Or all the available socio-philosophical labels, that of "Humanism" is by far the least confining in attitude and outlook. Lloyd and Mary Morain are Humanists who have written a book in which they say: "Humanism is the most rapidly growing religious movement in America today." We hope they are right, for a strong Humanist movement—one wonders if it can really qualify as religious, in the accepted sense of this word—should have the effect of making life in the United States more thoughtful, more tolerant, more honestly humanitarian.

A San Francisco businessman, Mr. Morain is President of the American Humanist Association, and Mrs. Morain is a director of the International Humanist and Ethical Union. Their book, *Humanism as the Next Step*, has the distinction of being a labor of love. While well put together, it is pleasantly lacking in academic flavor. The reader is bound to be impressed by the simply expressed convictions of the authors, who hope in this book to reach the open-minded of all faiths. Issued by the Unitarian publishing house, the Beacon Press of Boston, it sells for $2.00.

As a movement in modern thought, Humanism dates from the Florentine Revival of Learning in particular, and from the Renaissance in general. The name of the movement is an appropriate one, for the keynote of Humanism is a faith in man, in his power to shape his own destiny and to understand himself and the world about him. Humanism is, therefore, a kind of rationalism, yet a rationalism warmed by generous sympathies and altruistic intent. A key sentence concerning the origins of Humanism in the article in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* is this: "In its thought it depended upon no authority." This was indeed a new way of thinking for the Western world, and the late Robert A. Millikan was undoubtedly right in attributing to the early Humanists the pioneer spirit of independent research which led, in time, to the whole development of modern science.

There have been religious humanists, scientific humanists, and humanists devoted to the civilizing influences of the humanities in education, but there have not been, and cannot be, any *orthodox* humanists—whether the orthodoxy be some familiar school of doctrinal opinion or the result of an attempt to create a sect out of humanism itself.

The Humanist outlook is hospitable to many perspectives. Among the distinguished expressions gathered by the authors of *Humanism as the Next Step* in their effort to give Humanism comprehensive definition is this statement by Malcolm H. Bissell:

> . . . the tragedy of mankind has not been written by searchers for the final answer, but by those who have found it. No man ever hated his brother for doubting what he himself could still question. No Columbus who *knows* what lies beyond the horizon ventures forth to find a new world. The fruitless battle of the sects has long since told its bitter and bloody tale. A thousand centuries of fears and forebodings, of priests and prayers and persecutions, have brought us only to the inscrutable stars and the silent mountains. The gods have not spoken; we ourselves must design the good society of which we dream.

Here is a great historical discovery concerning the course of human experience. The essential integrity of the human spirit, embodied in Humanism, revolts against any doctrine or faith which is proposed as a substitute for investigation. This is no criticism of the man who offers to share his knowledge by showing others how to find it for themselves, but of those, usually priests, or self-declared agents of the Deity, who insist that others are unable to find truth for themselves, and therefore must accept it at second hand.

The habit of religious belief in Revelation, as a substitute, not so much for fact as for the *quest* for fact, has not been a wholesome influence upon the political life of the United States. How easily we believe and repeat evil of others! The

Humanist, who wants to *know,* is peculiarly skeptical of his own beliefs, and deplores that he has need of them while he seeks a larger certainty. His final convictions center upon *a method of reaching conclusions* rather than upon such conclusions as he may have already reached. A man who swears only by his conclusions is likely to have been partisan or careless in arriving at them, and unwilling, therefore, to contemplate changing them. The Humanist, on the other hand, maintains on principle an open mind. As Lloyd and Mary Morain say:

> Because of this flexibility, this dislike of generalizing, he [the Humanist] would not be blocked or upset, for example, by hearing someone allege that such and such a policy is "un-American." His interest would be in examining into what the results of such a policy might be. How would they affect fellow Americans? He knows that words are dangerous though necessary tools—meaning different things to different people. Sometimes words, or the meanings hastily applied to them, serve to discourage us from looking sharply into what is happening, or may happen.

But that, someone may say, is only common sense! So it is, and Humanism is a philosophy which supports common sense with principles which stand up in extreme situations.

The authors have an apt quotation from Albert Schweitzer for those who imagine that Humanism is somehow opposed to religion. Humanism is opposed to dogma, to those elements in religion which suffocate the inquiring mind and violate the spirit of impartial thinking, but it is in fundamental support of the ethical quality of human life. As Schweitzer puts it:

> The world thinks it must raise itself above humanism; that it must look for a more profound spirituality. It has taken a false road. Humanism in all its simplicity is the only genuine spirituality. Only ethics and religion which include in themselves the humanitarian ideal have true value. And humanism is the most precious result of rational meditation upon our existence and that of the world.

There are those who have little more than contempt for the idea of respecting the "rational." "Oh," they say, "there is a deeper reality than the matters mere *reason* can discover!" This may be. Even men of extraordinary reasoning powers, great mathematicians, inventors, and scientists, have admitted it. Yet no great man has even abandoned reason as the reviewer and critic of his intuitions. The principle of humanism is the principle of *balance* in evaluation, of *weighing* evidence. It is a principle which may oppose emotionalism, but it welcomes inspiration and genuine enthusiasm as the motive power for all great accomplishment.

We spoke of hoping that the Morains are right in reporting that Humanism is a rapidly growing movement. Perhaps we are unduly pessimistic, but the fact of the matter is that Humanism involves authentic discipline, and discipline, being a highly individual affair, seldom spreads in the way that a movement grows. The spread of a method is very different from the spread of a faith, and we do not see how Humanism can spread as a faith and remain Humanism. Consider this account of the Humanist spirit by the Morains:

> In the first place, it is a certain state of mind. This is one of self-reliance and confidence. People and things act as they do from perfectly natural causes. As these are natural causes rather than occult ones there is hope of understanding and perhaps even of controlling them. Success or failure does not depend upon the conjunction of Mars and Jupiter, on whether it is our lucky day, . . . It depends on whether we can see the chains of cause and effect leading up to the present situation and on whether we act on the basis of this knowledge. This is both a disciplinary and an encouraging philosophy. We are allowed no transcendental alibis but we are freed from insoluble riddles. We are encouraged to feel that there is usually some kind of answer to a problem if we could but find it.

Humanism, we see, is not an "easy" philosophy. It requires the full exercise of human qualities by human beings. And since the world has long been plagued by religions which restrict the exercise of human qualities, more than a few

years will be occupied in recovering from the intellectual and moral weaknesses of centuries.

A word as to "scientific" Humanism: Not all scientific Humanists, it seems to us, clearly distinguish between scientific theory and scientific fact. As a result, some of those who write under this label are at times guilty of accepting "Naturalist" or "Scientist" dogmas, while berating the believers in religious dogmas. This makes for a certain strenuous insistence in Humanist tracts which seems out of key with the great Humanist tradition. The central idea of Humanism is the independence and creative nature of the human being. Man is *not a creature*—neither a creature of Jehovah's making nor a ripple in the sea of mechanistic causation. He is an independent intelligence, capable of making choices which have real significance, and the Humanist, it seems to us, need not feel obliged to "explain" this account of the human being in order to acknowledge it as the primary assumption of his philosophy. To banish freedom from human behavior is to banish validity from human thought. The humanist who errs in this direction, imagining that his speculations acquire a scientific flavor by this means, deserts his cause to join the ranks of the Authoritarians.

But nothing of this sort is found in *Humanism as the Next Step*, a book which carefully preserves the undogmatic excellence of the traditional Humanist philosophy.