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THE TORMENTING QUESTIONS

ON the whole, men give most of their time to considering questions which have practical answers. These are not tormenting questions, but questions which require careful attention, exact calculation, and some hard work. If a man wants to build a house, he may not know at first what is involved in this undertaking, but he can find out. If the working staff of a government committee wants to know how to bring power and light to an increasingly populated rural area, there are ways in which to define sharply each step that will be necessary to perform this public service. The number of the questions of this sort grows with the rapid advance of science and technology, but the answers multiply at a similar rate, and the people who concern themselves professionally with this sort of fact-finding experience a natural feeling of accomplishment, as the years go by. In general, we call this asking and answering of practical questions the path of Progress.

There is, however, another sort of question, with which we are not so successful. We could say that these are the "philosophical" questions, but it will probably identify them better to call them the tormenting questions. These questions torment us because we do not know how to go about answering them. The tormenting questions present themselves in an infinite variety of ways and often they can be ignored with very little effort. We have our practical work to do; there are always the questions which we do know how to answer, so why divide our energies in a useless preoccupation with insoluble puzzles?

But these difficult or unanswerable questions keep on coming, and there are periods in human history when they grow insistent. Why does this happen? The tormenting questions grow insistent whenever men find that no matter how competent and industrious they are in practical ways, they are still oppressed and frustrated by the circumstances of their lives. When they are obliged to recognize that the multiplication of technical answers seems to have become a self-defeating process, they are driven to ask why, and to ponder long-neglected questions of another sort.

Often, a man's first impulse is to seek a new kind of technical answer to the tormenting questions. He tries, that is, to reduce his problem to technical terms. Like a good scientist, he wants to redefine the strange in the terms of the familiar, so that he can deal with it. He may even work out some private or public utopian formula. Sooner or later, however, the problem of the tormenting question returns. Sooner or later, he finds that his program was filled with unexamined assumptions, and then he begins to suffer torment in earnest.

Take for example the reflections which might take place in the mind of a man who examines the ethical values at stake in the program of national defense of the United States. For one seriously considered opinion, we take some concluding paragraphs from an article by Paul H. Nitze, President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation, on the ethical aspects of the foreign policy of the United States. The statement is useful as putting into a few words the views of a great many people. Mr. Nitze writes:

> The argument is made that the whole purpose of a policy of nuclear deterrence is to prevent nuclear weapons from being used. The thesis is that nuclear deterrence both makes possible the preservation of the values of freedom, diversity, and cultural growth and makes the general destruction of a nuclear war so unlikely as to make the risk tolerable.
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> Some would argue that no risk of so important a stake is tolerable. At a minimum it is clear that the risk must be reduced below its present magnitude. Can that be done? This is largely a question of fact rather than a question for ethical judgment. I believe it can, with great effort, be done—that by, say, 1965 we can so design and construct our nuclear defense system that no rational purpose could be served by the Soviet Union in initiating nuclear war and that, thereafter, little purpose would be served by either side in further accelerating the nuclear arms race. At

> such a time, if it has not earlier been possible, agreements on the control and regulation of armaments still further reducing the risk of nuclear war should, in my opinion, be possible. *(Worldview*, February, 1960.)

What Mr. Nitze is saying here is a somewhat euphemistic version of the "reliable balance of terror" theory, widely accepted by tough-minded advocates of full preparedness for nuclear war. This is a theory which maintains that our only choice is between submitting to another Pearl Harbor, as a result of unreadiness for aggressive war, and making it plain that we have all the striking power necessary to destroy or mortally disable the enemy, should he attack us. As Herman Kahn remarked in the *Stanford Research Institute Journal* (Fourth Quarter, 1959): "The mutual annihilation theory can be successful in forestalling an all-out nuclear attack only if both sides completely accept it. If only the 'West' buys it, the negligence can be incredibly dangerous." Mr. Kahn means that if the Soviets are willing to risk a nuclear war, the United States must prepare for one, too. And he seems convinced (perhaps rightly) that the Soviet leaders are willing to take that risk.

So, for Mr. Kahn, and apparently for Mr. Nitze, the problem is simply one of defining the best possible "balance of terror" and then establishing it.

At this point, having left the moral question behind, the tacit implication being that it is "settled," these advocates move with more assurance to the practical question. How, asks Mr. Nitze, can the risk of nuclear war be reduced? He answers: "This is largely a question of fact rather than a question of ethical judgment." And since the problem is now a question of fact, we can safely leave the answer to the experts of the Rand Corporation and similar philosophers of technology who are men of obvious skill in the gathering of facts, and whose sagacity in explaining their meaning can hardly be challenged.

But for many men, the feeling of uneasiness and the tormenting questions will remain. What has happened? Where did we slide by the real issue in this problem? Let us look again at Mr. Nitze's statement. "The thesis," he said, "is that nuclear deterrence both makes possible the preservation of the values of freedom, diversity, and cultural growth and makes the general destruction of a nuclear war so unlikely as to make the risk tolerable."

Usually, this thesis is challenged by the claim that the threat of violence does not really deter. The weakness in this claim is that it seems speculative, while the "balance of terror" advocates are ready with a lot of facts which seem impressive. The facts are about something else, but that doesn't seem to matter.

The man who is persuaded by the balance of terror theory will probably admit that to live under the shelter of an all-pervasive terror may be a bad thing, but he will add that even that is better than trusting to "guess-work." And if you ask him how he expects to preserve "the values of freedom, diversity, and cultural growth" under such conditions, he will shrug and say that we'll have to make the best of it.

There are a lot of arguments that might be presented, but they don't have much popular weight. For example, it is easy to find out from psychiatric literature what happens to people whose behavior is controlled by an atmosphere of terror. They become rigid in behavior, withdrawn, and begin to lose normal human qualities and reactions. These symptoms would perhaps be attenuated on a mass basis, but on a mass basis they would also be institutionalized in various ways, and would soon make grotesque caricatures of "the values of freedom, diversity, and cultural growth."

And let us make no mistake about the possibility of a one-sided reign of terror. A *balance* of terror means that there is plenty for both. The analysts of this theory preserve a high-minded impartiality in the development of its implications. They admit quite readily that the Russians will probably have "appreciable numbers of ICBM's in, say, three years after their successful test—which would be next August."

There are also a lot of arguments against the idea that nuclear weapons will protect the values of freedom, diversity, and cultural growth. The trouble with these arguments is that they involve some subtlety. If you say to a man, "How are you going to write great poetry while you are waving a club at the

Russians?", he may ask you who needs poetry. If you say that there won't be much "diversity" in the Garrison State, he may reply that life imprisonment is better than execution. And you will probably decide to forget about the matter of cultural growth.

It isn't that all the people who respond in this way are coarse or indifferent to these values, even though they may become so in argument. The essential difficulty lies in a general inability to *imagine* a good life apart from existence under the armed protection of a national State. The basic, unexamined assumption is the assumption that the only realistic good is a political good and that, finally, all other values must be sacrificed, if need be, to preserve the political good.

It is on this assumption that we announce ourselves ready to go to war, regardless of how horrible or how futile a nuclear war promises to be. We turn away from the warnings we hear concerning the total destruction a nuclear war would bring, since we have no experience in thinking about the alternatives of a nuclear war.

The real issue is one of *identity*. A man who is willing to contemplate the possible defeat of his State in war is either a man cowed by history or a man whose conception of freedom reaches beyond the political definition of freedom to its roots in philosophy.

Obviously, anyone who comes out for unilateral disarmament is likely to be a man of the latter sort, since those ready to accept defeat by reason of a sense of weakness are not the sort who make their opinions publicly heard.

So, the man who takes seriously the idea of life in an unarmed society is a man who has thought a good deal about what he wants in his life and why he has small hope of getting it except from a society which abandons preparations for all-out nuclear war.

There is very little point in arguing this question at a "practical" level. People who try to argue against nuclear war in practical terms may be right in even practical terms, but their real point is a moral one, so that they tend to become careless and rhetorical, since they do not really believe in the practical argument. This makes them easy for the practical man to defeat, since he *does* believe in his argument and he knows what he is talking about. He is a trained specialist in the things he is talking about.

The hope for peace lies in attention to the tormenting questions. The tormenting questions have to do with the real nature of our lives, our hopes, our freedom. There is one way, however, in which practical situations sometimes collaborate with the insistence of the tormenting questions. We get help in focussing our attention on the tormenting questions whenever the practical arrangements we have made begin to look like a closed system of self-defeat. This is our condition today, for the advent of nuclear weapons, together with a number of other, less obvious developments of modern technology, seem to demand that we tolerate an intolerable situation. And while the technological thinkers are doing their best to make the situation seem tolerable—we have to *go on*, don't we?—even they have their moments of doubt. Mr. Kahn, for example, says toward the close of his discussion in the *SRI Journal:*

> We do not have unlimited time. Our supplies are being increased rapidly by many things including the mounting rate of technological progress, the "revolution of rising expectations," increasing nationalism, and an increasing diffusion of the newer military techniques. It is not at all unlikely that there may be some invention, discovery or crisis that simply cannot be handled in our present international society, even momentarily. . . .

Letter from ITALY

NAPLES.—Naples is a very old city trying to renew itself by tearing down its oldest buildings and replacing them with beautiful new apartments, but old habits and traditions are not so easily disposed of. Here is something I gathered from a non-partisan review, called *Il Pensiero Nazionale*, a semi-monthly devoted to comments and criticism of the national scene, and to political action.

It seems that Pope John XXIII, liked for his real goodness and his simplicity, has issued some admonitions to his clergy and his nuns, to apply themselves to more study and to lead a life more in accord with their religion and less with worldly things. These admonitions, according to *Il Pensiero*, have been almost unnoticed by the conservative press of the party in power, showing that the wealthy crusaders of the capitalist-clerical order of the West pay little attention to the Pope as symbol and guide of the Christian law, although they find him very useful when his pronouncements accord with their interests.

The writer of the article goes on to enumerate in detail some of the admonitions mentioned by the Pope: men and women wearing the garb of a holy order should observe all civil laws, keep away from all that spells material gain—from business deals, commerce, brokerage, big earnings, betting and begging. This last shall be strictly forbidden; members of a religious order should not be seen in streets, squares, public buildings, offices, bars, hotels and private homes. Nuns should not go about alone, except in cases of necessity. And so on.

What really happens? From what I have seen myself, and from the *Il Pensiero* report, it seems that the clergy "has mistaken the liberation (from Fascism] for a pontifical re-conquest." Allowing for many exceptions, priests and monks put their finger in the political pie, forgetting their church and their mission. Priests, monks and nuns are seen in the streets, in business houses, in prefectures, or riding in shiny motor cars and motorcycles with an air of importance as if to say, "We are the bosses." They ask for donations in public places, in cafés and the post-office, and go from house to house; sometimes they do it in a subtle manner, appealing to the religious feelings of people, as I noticed when a friend showed me an appealing letter neatly written by a child of seven from an orphanage kept by priests: it asked for a new suit of clothes and new shoes "so he could appear before Jesus properly dressed for his first communion." Alas, his mother and father would not share this wonderful event, for he was an orphan, but would the addressee not take their place? Such incidents are the cause of anti-clericalism in Italy.

Speaking of beggars, Naples still has too many of them, and most of them, I hear, beg from ingrained habit. Mendicants are found most often in crowded places, in front of churches, at the entrance to sweet-shops, on trains, in under-street passages, and in railroad stations. Not many of them look starved or needy. Many of them go about singing or playing an accordion, or the violin; sometimes I felt like giving a coin to make them stop, they sounded so badly. I asked whether this public begging is not forbidden by law? "Of course," replied the well-dressed young man sitting opposite me in the train, "but what can we do? These people have done it for so long, it has become a habit—you can't change these things."

This fatalistic attitude and the tenacious grip upon these southerners of old traditions and superstitions make one despair of any improvement. It is also an old Neapolitan habit to disregard all disciplinary regulations, and the law, apparently, is either too weak to enforce them, or officers become frustrated from having so many to discipline. So children stay out of school, drivers exceed the speed limit, or they drive to the left. The streets are continually littered with papers or fruit skins, smoking goes on where it is forbidden, loud noises are heard in the streets until almost dawn, sidewalks are obstructed by groups who stop to chat, clothes-lines are strung anywhere to hang out the wash, marring the beauty of the streets, and many more things are tolerated of which good taste forbids mention. Yet, with a bit of discipline, Naples could be one of the most wonderful cities in the world.

CORRESPONDENT IN ITALY

REVIEW
NOVELS AND THE MOVIES

NICOLA CHIAROMONTE has contributed to the March *Encounter* a frightening analysis of the cinema as an "art form." In this "Note on Movies," Mr. Chiaromonte turns æsthetic criticism into effective philosophic criticism.

What worries him the most is this:

> We can look without seeing, grasp without understanding, be excited without having any definite feeling. The density and slipperiness of real events with which we are connected by fears, expectations, desires, ideas, and conflicts of ideas are put out of action by the photographic image. Reduced to clear-cut appearances, things become infinitely more evident and infinitely more meaningless than they can ever be in reality. What we are left with is, indeed, the "film" of life. Instead of being brought *to* us, the world has been successfully "gotten out of our system."
>
> The eye of the camera gives us that extraordinary phenomenon—the world disinfected of consciousness.

There are many forms of illustration, but the sort of illustration associated with creative fantasy—and in ancient times with myth and allegory—has a certain magic. Fantasy *can* suggest values and situations which are "better" than life, but in Chiaromonte's terms the movies, no matter how many visual dimensions are present, constitute a one-dimensional view of human experience. Light is thrown on this point by a technical analysis of movie-making, as for example, in Joseph Mascelli's "Directional Continuity" in the November 1959 issue of *Films in Review*. Mr. Mascelli is concerned with the contrivances which substitute for creative fantasy. The movie audience is almost entirely captured by technique. Mr. Mascelli observes:

> The power of screen direction is so great that if in one scene the hero rides away from the ranch left-to-right, and in the next scene the heroine is shown riding right-to-left, the audience will assume they will meet *unless explicitly told through dialogue* that they are riding away from each other. . . .
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> It has been found that the movement on the screen that is the most dramatic occurs on the diagonal from lower left to upper right. An especially powerful effect is achieved if the subject moves from a distant point in the lower left to a closer position in the upper right, and this effect is further enhanced if the subject is brought closer and higher so that the image grows larger as it climbs nearer to the camera (this is usually accomplished by shooting with a wide-angle lens from a low angle) .
>
> Generally speaking, we are left-to-right people, and for the most part movement from left to right is easier for an audience to follow.

The point is, that when we are being "left-to-right" people, we are not being thinking people. And when movies are "based upon" novels, their tendency is to reduce all the situations which require thought to forms of movement. Consequently, as Mr. Chiaromonte elsewhere indicates, one cannot discuss a motion picture in terms of its plot or human meanings for very long, whereas one can discuss a good novel for hours upon end.

It is no accident that the most discussed motion picture of recent years, Elia Kazan's production of Tennessee Williams' *Baby Doll*, was so completely atypical. Whether regarded as worthy or unworthy from the standpoint of plot, *Balky Doll* was one of those rare productions of symbolic art on the screen, the consequence being that everyone had an opinion about the picture. But a production of this sort almost seems to acquire a life of its own: it cannot be planned or produced according to formula. Few pictures have any genuine individuality, and on this point we may continue with Mr. Chiaromonte:

> The eye of the camera is, indeed, the "eye of the world"—nobody's and everybody's eye. It gives us a kind of absolute perception which is impossible in reality, insofar as real perception is intrinsically complex, accompanied as it is by the richness and ambiguity of an individual consciousness. In reality we are never completely external to the world of persons and objects, but are always involved through our feelings and our thoughts. Photography,

> however, is a feat of mechanical magic by which we are made to stare at the world from the outside, so that we can actually look at it (for the first time, as it were) instead of just seeing it.
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> This strange privilege is what makes for the enormous importance and magnetic power of the camera as an instrument. But it is also the limit which can never be passed. Practically boundless, the magic of the camera is actually confined to the presentation of the physical appearance of things, *isolated from all the rest.* The language of physical appearance is the camera's own language, and it is the most elementary language we can conceive of, the least common denominator of all human expressions. It is, in fact, so elementary and so common that it might be said that the camera's is the idiom of the inarticulate itself in man. The idiom not of Caliban, the unhappy monster, but of a Caliban who has found perfect "adjustment" in a world made up entirely of fleeting acts and shadows, and cleared of all malicious spirits.

Now what is the difference between reading a novel and seeing a movie? Chiaromonte answers:

> A good novel tells us something while a good movie shows us something; or, to be more precise, a good movie *has shown* us something, since the emotional effect is over when the film is over, and can be recalled only verbally and in a peculiarly abstract fashion. For in spite of the way critics retell the plot of a film, a movie is not a narrative but a series of actions that seem to be occurring. And the emotion they give us is the emotion of the onlooker, not of the participant, which we are in the novel. What we remember about a novel is the *meaning* of the facts, which are always related from the point of view of the characters, who are pure possibilities of consciousness and not physical entities. Moreover, each one of its sections is a distinct, yet indivisible, part of the whole.

In what Chiaromonte calls "real life," movement is incidental to meaning. One may deplore too much TV-watching or movie-going without becoming a "crank" for the reason that the whole aim of education is to demonstrate that movement is actually incidental to meaning. The Greeks understood this, and because they did Johannes Kepler could go from a study of Pythagorean writings to the rediscovery of the heliocentric system for modern mathematical science. Education in the field of psychology may be said to consist of continual disclosures of the fact that the actions of human beings are often not really what they appear to be. An education in philosophy is successful only to the extent that one learns that the values of time, space and circumstance are of subordinate importance.

COMMENTARY
TWO APPEALS

IT may come as a surprise to some readers to learn that Governor Brown of California is so unequivocally opposed to capital punishment. (See Frontiers.) We have seen copies of letters to him repeating arguments against the death penalty which are much better put by Mr. Brown himself.

Caryl Chessman is scheduled to die in the gas chamber on May 2—next Monday. As this is the last issue of MANAS before that date, it became a moral impossibility to let this issue go by without informing our readers of the fact that there seem to be two avenues of influence open to those who would like to see this execution called off. It is within the power of the California State Supreme Court to approve of clemency and allow the Governor to commute the sentence. No California Supreme Court has ever refused to concur when a governor decided upon clemency. Accordingly, appeals to both the Governor and the State Supreme Court, in Sacramento, are in order. While the Governor is said to be receiving letters on the Chessman case at the rate of a thousand a day, and for this reason can hardly be expected to read them personally, there can be but little doubt that he receives tabulations which inform him of the direction and the volume of public feeling in the matter.

It is appropriate to report here, in connection with what is said on page 8 concerning the "general inability to *imagine* a good life apart from existence under the armed protection of a national State," that some thoughtful citizens of the United States are joining together, under the informal name of "Committees of Correspondence," to do the kind of thinking which may possibly assist themselves and others to conceive of a way of life which does not depend upon the terrifying engines of nuclear war. Among the twenty-four signers of a general letter issued by the founders of the Committees of Correspondence are such men as Erich Fromm, Sidney Lens, A. J. Muste, Robert Pickus, David Riesman, Mulford Sibley, and Clarence Pickett. This letter said in part:

> We see the arms race as a growing danger to the quality of life, and a threat to life itself. We see that a nation's obsession with security and its lack of a sense of purpose are interrelated. We know that today's alienation is unlikely to be remedied easily. But we are resolved to test whether humane intelligence, mobilized from private life, may help to find a way, and we want you to join us.
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> We want to know whether you feel, after looking over the enclosed statement, that you can associate yourself with our efforts. . . . We want ... to see new groups come into existence and to promote the search for strategies which can end the Cold War, replace "deterrence," reduce the virulence of nationalism, and alter the quality of life in industrial society, not merely in detail but radically.

The Committees of Correspondence may be reached at 130 Brattle Street, Cambridge 38, Mass. This effort to mobilize humane intelligence "from private life" may be taken as a natural response to the fact that the best technological brains of the nation have been more or less officially mobilized to concentrate upon elaboration of the "balance of terror" theory. It is no longer a question of Pacifism versus National Defense, but a question of, in the words of Dr. Jerome Frank, Sanity and Survival. A "Statement" circulated by the Committees of Correspondence has the following paragraph:

> Weapon developments of the past decade have swiftly and grossly altered the nature of war. Only within the past five years have deliverable thermonuclear weapons been tested from airplanes. Intercontinental missile tests have been made only during the past three years. Construction is now proceeding of submarines which can remain isolated for months, each with the autonomous capability of obliterating more than a dozen cities. In more than a score of countries, reactors are now in operation producing plutonium, a nuclear explosive. We cannot long entrust our lives to small numbers of men scattered about the world, men with the means for mass death at their fingertips, men filled with fear and conditioned to accept without question orders to

kill tens of millions of individuals. The continuation of this pattern will lead us and world society to a dead end.

In its conclusion, the Statement says:

We ask that men of knowledge, insight, and skill all over the world turn from research in military technology, from providing rationalizations for nuclear deterrence policies, from planning for organized violence, and instead join with us in applying ourselves to the development of constructive alternatives. . . .

Could there be a more sensible—and more urgent—request?

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
THE FOURTH R—HUMAN RELATIONS

[This "guest contribution" should be of interest to those who may wonder about our stress on the need for intellectual "discipline" during the early years of school training. In this article, Dr. Burton Henry, professor of education at Los Angeles State College, makes a good case for some of the views originating from Columbia's Teachers College, but Dr. Henry goes beyond such familiar theories when he demands that "social studies" focus on the actual issues which torment our society—divorce, race prejudice, and international ethical issues. If, he says, you are serious when you talk of "human relations" in teaching, you have to get down to cases. You cannot, in other words, avoid the challenge and the controversy *unless* you are satisfied with a sort of learning which ignores problems of personal and social relations.]

WHAT is this thing called Human Relations? Is it some new gadget to keep the educationists in power and to prevent the teaching of good, clean, solid, classical facts?

Actually Human Relations in education means a return to the humanist tradition that the most important focus in the schools should be upon man himself—specifically upon the art and science of being a human being. Several thousand years of living with homo sapiens has led us to believe that man is not born human, he must learn his humanity. This task of developing the mature individual, of modifying behavior, becomes the major goal of the public schools.

Human Relations signifies a refocusing of values in school philosophy and curriculum: the three R's no longer become the be-all and end-all of education (or the return-all, for that matter, whenever someone complains about contemporary education), but the means to an end. The goal becomes the development of mature human beings who use the three R's to practice good human relations. It has become fairly obvious that the mere transmission of information from the teacher's notebook to the student's notebook has not led man to increase his human potential or even to increase the length of time he has left to develop it. As a matter of fact, one kind of technological education is bringing man dangerously near the point where time to develop human beings on this planet is running out. It is indeed an indication of man's rich sense of humor that the only place on this planet that he has been able to make safe by international treaty from atomic explosion is the Antarctic, the home of the penguin—and man's successor.

Human Relations education is of course concerned with the cultural heritage; however, it does not regard the democratic cultural heritage as a collection of facts, but of ideas—a frame of mind, an attitude that appreciates the worth of human life and of each human being regardless of color, or sex, or class, or creed; an attitude that proclaims that nothing that is human is foreign to it. It is only when the school is concerned with the transmission of this kind of cultural heritage that the culture can accomplish its prime purpose, that of transforming the human genotype into the human being.

How can the human relations attitude become the focus of the school curriculum, become *the* "subject matter" which integrates, correlates, and gives meaning to all other subject matter? Paramount I would think is the need for teachers who perceive themselves more as facilitators of growth than as dispensers of information, teachers who are more interested in the learning process than in the teaching process (who do not equate teaching with telling), teachers who understand themselves in some depth and who therefore can help children understand *themselves* in some depth. We need teachers who accept themselves and are therefore not fearful of differences in others in order to develop in children the self-respect which must precede respect for others.

The teacher who has the human relations point of view will use it as a frame of reference to give human significance to whatever subject matter he considers himself an expert in—be it children or chemistry. Human relations education means educating human beings to relate to other human beings in ways that allow for the maximum fulfillment of the needs and capacities of all concerned. At any one time in the current of affairs

there are innumerable critical sore spots which are symptomatic of man's immaturity and lack of self-fulfillment: for example, intergroup problems such as race prejudice and ethnic discriminations leading to tremendous waste in human resources; family relation problems such as divorce, barriers in child-parent relationships leading to personality maladjustment and delinquency; labor-management difficulties resulting in economic disturbance; international conflicts resulting in holocaust. These human relation problems become the core of the curriculum for the human relations teacher whether he happens to be teaching physical science or social science, literature or math, physical education or fourth grade, and serve as a challenge to his ingenuity, imagination, and creativity. How can he expose students to his course of study so that the subject matter will throw light upon the central human relations problem involved? Indeed *what are* the central human problems in a subject matter becomes the chief question of the human relation teachers. When the teacher can bring human significance and meaning to his history, math, physics and poetry he has gone a long way towards changing the stereotype that the adult population (themselves the products of the public schools) has towards their subjects.

This kind of teacher will not expect solutions to human relations problems to be of the same order as solutions to technological problems, but he will expect to develop in his class an attitude that human problems can be rationally solved by human beings, that man is not innately depraved or ruthless with built-in aggressions which must be periodically purged by war, self-castigation, social punishment, harsh discipline, "solid" subjects, or colon irrigation; but rather that man is a peculiar animal who achieves his essential humanity through love and cooperation, and that conflict and hostility and infantilism and inadequate personalities are learned by children and grownups because of unresolved frustrations to the need for love and cooperation in homes and schools and societies.

Moreover, this kind of teacher will not commit the double error of holding that the facts in the human relations area are any more miraculous than the facts in the three R's curriculum. For example, although he will recognize the importance of facts regarding race and sex relations, he will not be so naïve as to believe that these facts *per se* will change racial prejudice or sex behavior in his students. In fact there are no sacred facts nor any sacred matters. The most important fact to the human relations teacher is the fact that feelings themselves are facts and are indeed the roots of attitudes, and that to modify attitudes he must work with the feelings behind the words. People do not behave in accordance with the facts, but as they perceive the facts. They see what they need to see. Perception then and unconscious motivation are the keys to behavior and any teacher who does not recognize this as a primary psychological fact is not going to be teaching what he purports to teach.

The task of changing man's attitude toward the nature of human nature, his self-concept, is of course not solely the task of the human relations teacher nor of education as an institution. It is infinitely complex and inextricably related to the social milieu whose inconsistent and contradictory values the school reflects. This is a circular affair in which the culture produces the people who produce the culture.

But one advantage of a circle is that a break at any one locus will affect the entire structure. Certainly, for example, school administration will have to practice good human relations, which, for one thing, means sharing the power for making policy with those who are affected by that policy, in order for teachers en masse to assume the human relations role; for nowhere is it truer than in education that somebody's hand on somebody's head leads to somebody else's hand on somebody else's head.

However, the individual and courageous teacher who sees the dire need for human relations education in our times will not wait for the millennium of democracy in school administration or the utopia of consistency in society's values. There is no more time for waiting for men to mature before the teacher feels safe in changing his role. There is no more time for the teacher to curse the darkness. He had better start lighting his one small candle.

FRONTIERS

Governor Brown's Lost Cause

[Below is printed Governor Edmund G. Brown's March 2 message to the state legislature, urging abolition of the death penalty in California. In our opinion, what he says constitutes one of the best brief statements concerning capital punishment that we have ever seen. We should perhaps add that this decision to reprint Mr. Brown's unsuccessful plea is not intended to have political significance, since the Governor of California happens to be something of a controversial figure at present. MANAS has little or no interest in politics and makes no claim to either skill or wisdom in forming political judgments. Further, our editorial policy prohibits any sort of "political" endorsement. But Mr. Brown's statement on capital punishment, we think, is so good that it deserves as wide a circulation as possible.—Editors.]

AS an act of public conscience and from the experience of over a decade and a half in law enforcement work, I ask the Legislature to abolish the death penalty in California. There are powerful and compelling reasons why this should be done. It is not based on maudlin sympathy for the criminal and depraved. And although I believe the death penalty constitutes an affront to human dignity and brutalizes and degrades society, I do not merely for these reasons urge this course for our State.

I have reached this momentous resolution after 16 years of careful, intimate and personal experience with the application of the death penalty in this State. This experience embraces seven years as District Attorney of San Francisco, eight years as Attorney General of this State, and now 14 months as Governor. I have had a day-to-day, first-hand familiarity with crime and punishment surpassed by very few.

Society has both the right and moral duty to protect itself against its enemies. This natural and prehistoric axiom has never successfully been refuted. If by ordered death, society is really protected and our homes and institutions guarded, then even the most extreme of all penalties can be justified.

But the naked, simple fact is that the death penalty has been a gross failure. Beyond its horror and incivility, it has neither protected the innocent nor deterred the wicked. The recurrent spectacle of publicly sanctioned killing has cheapened human life and dignity without the redeeming grace which comes from justice meted out swiftly, evenly, humanely.

The death penalty is invoked too randomly, too irregularly, too unpredictably, and too tardily to be defended as an effective example warning away wrong-doers.

In California, for example, in 1955, there were 417 homicides. But only 52 defendants were convicted of first degree murder. And only 8, or 2%, were in fact sentenced to death. There can be no meaningful exemplary value in a punishment the incidence of which is but one to 50.

Nor is the death penalty to be explained as society's ultimate weapon of desperation against the unregenerate and perverse. The study of executions over a 15-year period produces the startling facts that of 110 condemned cases, 49% of those executed had never previously suffered a prior felony; that 75% of them came from families which had been broken by divorce, separation or otherwise when the condemned was still in his teens.

Again I say, that if this most drastic of sanctions could be substantially to serve the ends of legal justice by adding to our safety and security, it would deserve some greater place in our respect. But no available data from any place or time that I have been able to find from research over many years gives support to the grand argument that the presence or absence of the death penalty exerts any substantial effect upon the incidence of homicide. Indeed, the report of the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, one of the most universally respected and objective studies ever made on the subject, is that there is no clear evidence that the abolition of capital punishment has ever led to an increase in

the homicide rate. The Royal Commission concluded, as has nearly every other scientific survey of the problem, that factors other than the presence or absence of the death penalty account for the homicide rate in any given area.

Specifically, the death penalty has been abolished in nine states (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Rhode Island, North Dakota, Maine, Alaska and Hawaii) and in 30 foreign countries (as Sweden, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Western Germany, Puerto Rico, Austria and 22 others).

In none of these states has the homicide rate increased, and indeed, in comparison with other states their rates seem somewhat lower. And these rates are lower not because of the death penalty but because of particular social organization, composition of population, economic and political conditions.

I have attached to this document a map of the United States in which the various states are shaded to indicate their murder rate over a 10-year period from 1948 through 1957, compiled by the California Department of Corrections. It shows graphically that the states without capital punishment along with several others which do retain the death penalty have the least incidence of homicides. And in striking contrast, 12 southern states have the highest homicide rate of all.

This last points up the most glaring weakness of all, and that is that, no matter how efficient and fair the death penalty may seem in theory, in actual practice in California as elsewhere it is primarily inflicted upon the weak, the poor, the ignorant, and against racial minorities. In California, and in the Nation as a whole, the overwhelming majority of those executed are psychotic or near-psychotic, alcoholic, mentally defective, or otherwise demonstrably mentally unstable. In the experience of former Wardens Lewis Lawes of Sing Sing and Clinton P. Duffy of San Quentin, seldom are those with funds or prestige convicted of capital offenses, and even more seldom are they executed.

The shading of the attached map shows the disproportionate rate of homicides in the southern states, all of which zealously apply the death penalty.

As shocking as may be the statistics in our deep South where the most extensive use of the death penalty is made and against the most defenseless and downtrodden of the population, the Negroes, let it be remembered too that in California, in the 15-year period ending in 1953, covering 110 executions, 30% were of Mexicans and Negroes, more than double the combined population percentages of these two groups at the time. Indeed, only last year, 1959, out of 48 executions in the United States, 21 only were whites, while 27 were of Negroes. These figures are not mine. I tender them to you for critical examination and comparison. But I believe you will find them compelling evidence of the gross unfairness and social injustice which has characterized the application of the death penalty.

And finally, I bring to your attention the lessons I have learned here, in California, in 16 years of public service, but especially since I became Governor. Last January I inaugurated the practice of personally conducting executive clemency hearings in every death case upon request. Every such case is carefully investigated and comes to me complete with transcripts, investigative reports, and up-to-date psychological, neuropsychiatric, and sociological evaluations.

These are all hard cases to review and consider. There have been 19 of them these past 14 months. They present a dreary procession of sordid, senseless violence, perpetrated by the wandering outcasts of the state. Not a single one of these 19 accomplished a pittance of material gain. Nine of the 19 suffered obvious and deep mental imbalance. In the only three cases where actual murder was entertained by conscious design, sickness of mind was clinically established to have existed for many years. All of them were

products of the hinterlands of social, economic, and educational disadvantage.

Six of these I have commuted to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Eight of them we have given unto the executioner: miserable, bewildered sacrifices. We have taken their lives. But I have seen in the files and transcripts, in the books which we have now closed upon them, that who they were and where they were, played just as big a part in their ultimate condemnation as what they did. And I saw also that, but for just the slightest twist of circumstances, these 19 might have received a term of years as did the other 98% of those who killed.

I have studied their cases and I know that not a single execution has ever halted the sale of a single gun or restrained a moment's blind rage.

And in these cases, too, there looms always the ugly chance that innocent men may be condemned, however careful are our courts and juries. Our judicial system gives us pride, but tempered by the realization that mankind is subject to error.

And this to me has been no idle fear. Within six months after I became Governor there came to me the duty to pardon a man who had, despite the care of court and counsel of his choice, been convicted of the willful slaying of his wife.

This man, John Henry Fry by name, admittedly under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crime, stood convicted by the force of circumstances which he could not explain. Happily, he was not executed. And last June 16th we pardoned him for that which he had never done.

Here, but for the grace of God, there might now be on our hands the blood of a man, poor, ignorant, friendless—and innocent.

I issue this call for consideration of the death penalty as a matter of conviction and conscience.

It is a Governor's task to present to the Legislature those matters on which he feels action is important and urgent, and to make clear his position and the principles for which he stands.

The Legislature, directly representing the people, has a wisdom of its own and an independent function for which I have the greatest respect.

I am a realist and know the great resistance to what I propose. But public leadership must face up to the humane as well as economic and social issues of our communities. And it is not enough for those charged with public responsibilities to be content to cope with just the immediate and readily attainable—the basic and long range values of our society must also constantly be brought into fuller reality. I believe the entire history of our civilization is a struggle to bring about a greater measure of humanity, compassion and dignity among us. I believe those qualities will be the greater when the action proposed here is achieved—and not just for the wretches whose execution is changed to life imprisonment, but for each of us.

Finally, I urge that the deliberations on this profound issue, whatever the outcome, be conducted with reason and restraint. There is already too much senseless violence and vituperation in our lives. Conscientious people may differ, but the ultimate issue here is clear. Can law and order be maintained as well or better if capital punishment is abolished?

Whatever the decision, I urge every one of us to search his conscience carefully and fully. In the final outcome of that I have full confidence.