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HALVES INTO WHOLES

THE question, "How can we make our half-religions into wholes?", was asked in a recent MANAS article. The half-religions we have, according to this article, are "things like the scientific method, humanism, democracy, psychotherapy, the arts and literature."

There will be some, of course, who will say that the development of these attitudes and approaches is actually the real progress we have attained to, over the past—that these are not "religion," but better than religion, and that they are all that civilized man has need of to achieve a good life.

What this comment seems to neglect is the fact that the men who live by these attitudes with strength and grace have somewhere a hidden reservoir of moral or ethical resources—they perform, that is, beyond their philosophies.

If religion is something to *live* by, then there are intuitive supplements which inform the half-religions of our time, completing their philosophical content and enriching them with feelings which flow spontaneously from the heart.

How might this intuitive inspiration be defined? In general, we think, it is a deep conviction of meaning in the idea of a self which transcends physical being, and a conception of purpose which is so absorbing that it brushes aside all that is trivial or irrelevant.

There is no real substitute for this sort of intuitive inspiration, but a whole religion, as contrasted with a half-religion, must at least intimate by some means the reality of such inspiration and the inadequacy of a life without it. Real religion will make provision for the quest for the sense of self, in either metaphysical (intellectual) or symbolic terms. One could argue that the history of religion is the story of attempts by extraordinary men to restore to declining faiths and secularized philosophies the foundation for this sense of self and purpose.

The *Bhagavad-Gita* surely represents such an attempt. Apparently, there is a deeply ingrained tendency in human nature to evade the heroic efforts involved in the discovery of the self, and to make doctrinal or ritualistic substitutes for the struggle. When this happens, religion becomes a vast system of deception by which the believer is allowed to think that he need not pursue the discovery on his own. He will get to heaven, he assumes, if he fulfills all the prescribed duties which are said to lead to salvation. Or that placing himself under the protection of the "true" Saviour will bring him safely to the portals of Eternal Life. Whole religions fall back into perverted half religions when they permit this self-deception to take the place of arduous personal search, building a system of sacerdotal conformity out of the dead shells of ancient mysteries.

Religious reformers are men who, by the strength of their individual insight, see what has happened to the religion of their time and labor to awaken men to that inward striving which is the life of all true religion. Krishna, in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, speaks of the inwardness of religion thus:

> When thy heart shall have worked through all the snares of delusion, then thou wilt attain to high indifference as to those doctrines which are already taught or which are yet to be taught. When thy mind once liberated from the Vedas shall be fixed immovably in contemplation, then shalt thou attain to devotion.

The "snares of delusion," in this philosophy, are the wiles of the "not-self," by which a man is misled into vain desires and futile actions.

The most philosophical religions are all religions which illuminate the idea of the self. The *Dhammapada*, a scripture recording the oral teachings of the Buddha, begins:

All that we are is the result of what we have thought: all that we are is founded on our thoughts and formed of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain pursues him, as the wheel of the wagon follows the hoof of the ox that draws it.

All that we are is the result of what we have thought: all that we are is founded on our thoughts and formed of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness pursues him like his own shadow that never leaves him.

Then, speaking of emancipation, there are these verses:

Many a House of Life
Hath held me—seeking ever him who wrought
These prisons of the senses, sorrow-fraught;
Sore was my ceaseless strife!
But now,
Thou Builder of this Tabernacle—Thou!
I know Thee! Never shalt Thou build again
These walls of pain,
Nor raise the roof-tree of deceits, nor lay
Fresh rafters on the clay;
Broken Thy House is, and the ridge-pole split!
Delusion fashioned it!
Safe pass I thence—deliverance to obtain!

Buddha was a reformer of Hinduism, Jesus, of Christianity. On the Mount, Jesus spoke to his disciples:

Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill.

For verily, I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. . . .

For I say unto you, That except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven. . . .

For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? . . .

Be ye therefore perfect, even as your father which is in heaven is perfect.

The sermon on the Mount was an exhortation to inward religion. It went beyond the issues of behavior to the motives behind all behavior, and it urged the ideal of perfection upon the followers of Jesus.

The thing that Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity have in common, in addition to their ethical content, which is practically identical, is that they all three arise in a context of archaic religious authority. That is, Krishna speaks to those who are already believers in a vast cosmological scheme. He brings no "new" doctrines, but a fresh penetration of old teachings and beliefs. Krishna was not the founder of a new religion, but one of a series of *avatars* or incarnations of the divine spirit. At the beginning of the fourth chapter, he says to Arjuna:

This exhaustless doctrine of Yoga I formerly taught unto Vivaswat; Vivaswat communicated it unto Manu and Manu made it known unto Ikswaku, and being thus transmitted from one unto another it was studied by the Rajarshees, until at length in the course of time the mighty art was lost, O harasser of thy foes! It is even the same exhaustless, secret, eternal doctrine I have this day communicated unto thee because thou art my devotee and my friend.

Buddha uses the vocabulary of Hinduism freely. He seeks to restore the purity of Upanishadic religion—the intimate, sit-down-near religion of ancient India. He would have his followers abandon forms and pretense:

Not by matted locks, not by lineage, not by caste does one become a Brahamana. By his truth and righteousness man becomes a Brahamana. . . . Him I call a Brahamana who has gone beyond the miry road of rebirth and delusion difficult to cross, and who has reached the other shore; who is without doubt, without attachment, who is calm and content.

In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus makes it plain that he comes to renew the understanding of the law that was taught of old. He takes the commandments one by one, giving each a subjective interpretation. He, too, is a religious reformer.

But when we come to the present, hoping to illuminate our problems by these illustrations from the past, the analogy breaks down. Our "half-religions" are not the same as the decaying faiths which ancient reformers were able to revivify and restore. Our religions, or the conceptions of life which do service for us instead of religion, are

framed in a different context. The scientific method, humanism, democracy, psychotherapy, the arts and literature—what have these to say about the nature of the human self, the destiny in which the human being is involved, and where it may lead? Taken separately or together, the half-religions hardly even hint at these great questions.

It is easy, therefore, for the critics of the modern spirit to disparage the half-religions. They are so obviously lacking. They do not move the heart. They do not raise a storm in a man's conscience. They do not lift him beyond the horizons of immediate perception to levels of uncompromising commitment.

And yet they have a verity—very nearly the only verity we are willing to acknowledge. This is an age of heightened intellectuality, and the scientific method gives full intellectual satisfaction in what it sets out to do. Even if it does not do enough—as we are now beginning to suspect—it performs perfectly within its scope. Obviously, we are not about to abandon a tool of this quality and record.

Humanism has a history which stands in unceasing reproach to the religions of revelation and authority. Humanism is already the classical defense of man against the inhumanity of the historical religions, the supposedly *whole* religions. Humanism refuses to abandon the realm of ends to some misty, theological future. It wants decency and humane behavior *now* and it will sanction no crimes against earthly man for the sake of some sanctified man of tomorrow. Humanism stands on stubbornly contested ground. It has survived every species of anathema and abuse. Its voice is the voice of civilized man *in spite of* religion.

Democracy is akin to humanism. Democracy celebrates the brotherhood of man which historical religion has honored more in the breach than in the observance. Moreover, while pretentious deceptions can be and are practiced in the name of democracy, these deceptions are easier to detect than the deceptions practiced in the name of religion. "Mystery, miracle, and authority" are alien to the spirit of democracy. The practice of democracy may produce its characteristic confusions and tomfoolery, but as a system it can never become as heavy handed as religious autocracy.

Psychotherapy has been a strange development in the company of the half-religions. More than any other innovation of the modern age, psychotherapy offers distinctive rivalry to the whole religions of the past. Attentive to the psychic difficulties of human beings, it must of necessity work out approaches to man's mental and emotional disorders which in some sense parallel religious psychology. Quite possibly, the rise of modern psychotherapy in the West is explained by the fact that Christianity has less psychological content than any of the other religions, so that the West had great need for a balance that was not provided by its traditional faith. At any rate, the at least semi-religious role of psychotherapy cannot be denied. In a recent paper, "Religious Overtones in Psychoanalysis," Prof. David C. McClelland, of the Harvard Center for Research in Personality, has this to say:

> Psychoanalysis stands in striking contrast to Christianity in intellectual circles. It is enthusiastically accepted, or at least taken very seriously, by the very same men who ignore or despise Christianity. Unfortunately I have no precise figures, but it is my strong impression that an influential minority among both faculty and students in our great urban universities have either been psychoanalyzed or would like to be. It has been seriously proposed in one university department known to me, that a psychoanalyst be added to the permanent staff of the department whose function would be largely to analyze his fellow staff members. In Cambridge where I live it is as difficult to spend an evening with friends without discussing some aspect of psychoanalysis as it was perhaps a hundred years ago to spend the same kind of an evening without discussing Christianity.

Prof. McClelland's contention is that the early leaders of psychoanalysis, preeminently Freud, "borrowed heavily from mystical traditions which were widely influential in which they grew up"—

an idea which he develops at some length, but which here must be left to some other discussion. The point—and it hardly seems debatable—is that psychotherapy has for many people taken over some of the functions of religion in relation to the problem of psycho-emotional adjustment or balance. Since the psychoanalytical movement is today in flux (see *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology*, by Ira Progoff), it is impossible to say what further encroachments on hitherto sacred ground will be accomplished by the analysts, and with what justification.

The arts and literature possibly come the closest to supplying the full strength of religion to their practitioners; at least, the arts and literature seem to have this potentiality, and one may easily encounter in these fields persons whose expression is so intense and so much of a personal fulfillment that they seem to need nothing else. Moreover, the content of whole religion has always found symbolic representation in the arts, while it is difficult to draw a line to show where literature leaves off and philosophical religion begins. The arts are so strongly endowed with an intuitive element, requiring, as well, that the work be done as an end in itself, and not for some calculated purpose, that they are a true parallel of whole religion.

But in the past, the arts and literature have been filled with the content of the great religions. Not so, today. Or rather, religion, when it enters into contemporary art, enters as an incidental form which confirms or embodies the private intuition of the artist. It serves *him*, instead of the other way around. The validity of this use of religion lies in the inspiration of the artist, and not in the authority of an ancestral revelation. It is a man who speaks, and not a god. It is certainly not the voice of a revelation, and least of all the voice of an institution. These are things which the arts and literature have both left far behind.

If, in these circumstances, we desire to turn our half-religions into some wholeness of outlook, it is probable that we shall have to learn to think of religion in a new way. It is quite impossible for the enlightened portion of mankind—the people who are "making do" with the modern half-religions—to return to either revealed or institutional religion. The new criteria of truth are too impressive in practice. The sense of the individual competence to *know* which the scientific method affords is a priceless acquisition. The immediate moral satisfactions of the humanist position can hardly be given up for the sake of a second-hand assurance of "salvation" from some external authority. Further, the healing power, hardly in doubt any more, of psychotherapy, is a major achievement of our time in the difficult area of intra-personal relations and psychological hygiene.

The half-religions, however, obviously need the illumination of conviction in depth concerning the nature of the self, and if this cannot be had in acceptable terms from past religions, then where are we to get it? There is only one source—ourselves. From others, from the philosophers, from past religious traditions, from mystics and transcendental thinkers of various sorts, we may get some indication of the conceptual content of thought about the self, but the impact of self-realization is a private experience which results from strenuous search. A philosophy of self would include reflections on these ideas and would press home the need for the attainment of individual religion. Out of this pursuit would come, also, larger conceptions of the role and purpose of human life.

A philosophical undertaking of this sort would make an end to "group beliefs," those substitutes for true religion, although men might easily share one another's thinking and pool the fruits of their wondering.

Philosophy is not truth, it is *love of truth*. For the purposes of this inquiry, philosophy would mean a deliberate cultivation of the intuition, to bring into the sphere of the individual inner life the function of discovery that once was left to the revealed religions. We need to think of

philosophy in this way, as something which is as essential to our moral life as breathing is to our physical life.

It may sound apocryphal, or even half-baked, to assert that we are living in a new age—an age which makes new demands upon the individual—but the entirety of current history testifies to the importance of a conclusion of this sort. This is a time of crisis, and while the portents seem to be political and international in origin, their underlying significance points to the need for individuals to exercise their prerogatives of private decision. It is the abdication of individual decision which has created the political crises from which we suffer. Men have fallen into the habit of allowing the issues of their lives to be joined on a scale which lies outside the region of their choice. This must be changed—changed arbitrarily if necessary.

The men who died wasting and despairing deaths in concentration camps during the past twenty years were sacrifices to the moral apathy which the rest of mankind had permitted to cloak the real issues of their lives, opening a way to power for nihilists and sinister tyrants. When the world should have taken a step forward, it took a step back, seeking "security" in blind, insensate power and faceless military authority. We have paid an incredibly high price for this failure—we have paid it already, in agony, death, and unceasing anxiety, but the pain so far endured could easily become only a first installment, should we continue to reject the meaning of this experience.

REVIEW
THE GOLDEN HORDE

HAVING preferred to read instead of to write for a bit too long, we are overtaken by the deadline for the copy for this Department while still in the middle of a fascinating book—the story of a man who chose beekeeping as a career. He is no Maeterlinck or Henri Fabre, just a man who has liked looking after bees since he was a small boy and who has made this work into a pleasant way of supporting himself and a growing family.

For a man who is looking for a means of livelihood that will give him independence, a symbiotic relationship with a living aspect of nature—bees, one learns, are classed as "wild animals" by the Department of Agriculture!—and scope for a scientific or naturalistic bent, the keeping of bees affords an unusual opportunity. There is also the matter of being a producer—or the manager of a multitude of producers—of an excellent food which, if Dr. Jarvis can be depended upon, has also an endless variety of medicinal applications.

The book which supplies complete information on what it takes to be a beekeeper—not so much all the technical facts as the temperamental qualities and the determination that are needed—is Harry J. Whitcombe's *Bees Are My Business* (Putnam, 1955). Today, Mr. Whitcombe does a whale of a mail-order business in bees, shipping them all over the country, and as far as the north woods of Alberta, Canada, where an Indian every spring receives fifty packages of bees from Whitcombe to start his colonies anew.

Bees Are My Business is autobiographical. It tells the story of a boy who before he was in his teens convinced an unenthusiastic father that he should have his own hive and go into the honey business. The interest deepened as the boy grew older. He attended the State College of Agriculture at Davis, California, to learn more about beekeeping. He worked his way through school by running a score of jobs, more or less at the same time, got married in his senior year and launched himself in a fairly large-scale venture soon after graduation.

You find out a lot of things in this book, including interesting data on the idiocy of state legislatures. Whitcombe relates:

> Late in 1929, for example, a bee embargo law was under consideration by the Utah legislature. This law was designed to prohibit the movement of bees from California and other states into Utah. Vansell [a research scientist who was devoting his life to trying to prove the importance of bees to the nitrogen-fixation legumes such as alfalfa, the clovers, and the vetches] realized that there was not a sufficient number of bees in Utah to pollinate the state's legume crop, and to him it looked like an American version of Hara-kiri—which it proved to be. Under the mistaken idea that bees were harmful to crops, however, agronomists and farmers exerted strong pressure on the legislature, and the embargo law was passed. In 1930, the year the law went in effect, alfalfa-seed production dropped seventy-five per cent. Production declined still further in each of the three following years. When the embargo was lifted in 1934, thousands of colonies of bees were moved into the state, largely from California. Alfalfa-seed production soared that year. But Utah received such a setback that it has never regained its pre-eminent position as a legume-producing state.

The strange part of this story is that today, for many beekeepers, the honey made by the bees is practically a by-product of other activities such as assuring the pollination of alfalfa blossoms. In agricultural regions where the use of lethal sprays has killed off the bees and other pollinating insects, the beekeeper finds he is more in demand as a doctor to the land—that is, as a man with the power to restore the balance of nature with his golden horde of pollinators.

After a decisive experiment conducted by George Vansell in 1949, in which Whitcombe participated, it was obvious that California farmers needed bees. The test was in alfalfa-seed production, and the result, on fields provided by a cooperating farmer, was as follows:

> When it had been cleaned and sacked, we found that the yield was nearly 1,000 pounds of seed to the

> acre—a fabulous crop when you consider that the average yield for the state in 1949 was only 220 pounds.

The news spread, bringing a minor revolution to California agriculture:

> In 1949, the production of Ranger [alfalfa seed] was but 627,139 pounds in the state. The following year, when there was widespread use of bees for pollination, the yield was 2,655,763 pounds; in 1952, 22,143,390 pounds; and in 1953, the last figure for which figures are available, it rose to 23,660,000 pounds. Buffalo Certified jumped from a drop-in-the-bucket 294,250 pounds in 1949 to 6,868,000 in 1953; and Atlantic, in that same period, from 5,300 to 2,285,000 pounds.

At the time of Vansell's pollination experiment, California production of alfalfa seed was not important enough to be listed among the ten leading states. In 1953, her production of these seeds led all other states and was equal to that of Kansas, Washington, Utah, and half of that of Nebraska—the next four states in volume of yield. California's yield per acre skyrocketed to three times the United States average. It was due to the bees.

For their services in pollination, beekeepers receive a pollination fee and a portion of the seed production, based upon the increase of yield over production without managed bee pollination

An unexpected outcome of this development has been reduced prices on seed, enabling the farmer to afford the legume seeds he needs to restore the nitrogen to his soil. Thus the beneficence of the bees to the health and nutrition of human beings is almost beyond calculation.

Beekeepers seem to be kindly people. As a boy, Harry Whitcombe was befriended by men who understood his hunger to know about bees and their care. His own story is one of unostentatious friendliness to others. Beekeeping is a work of which it seems fair to say that it is "on the side of life."

COMMENTARY
SOME PARALLELS

ONE of the things accomplished by modern psychotherapy—although we doubt that analysts and psychiatrists think of it in this way—is an elimination of obstructions and irrelevances in regard to the idea of the self. A man suffering from an intolerable feeling of guilt has a dark inclusion in his thinking about himself. He thinks of himself as evil, as sinful, and it becomes the task of the healer to help him to reach a conception of the self which dispenses with this morbid judgment.

The process of recovery involves, for the patient, the explanation of the oppressive idea or feeling on a rational basis. He has thought of himself in this way, he learns, because of some intense emotional experience which affected him adversely. When he finds that his feeling has a *cause*, that the feeling is itself only an *effect*, and not an intrinsic part of his character, he begins to separate himself from the feeling. When the separation is accomplished, he is free. The feeling does not "belong" to him any more; it has become a "thing," which he can leave behind.

From the viewpoint of ancient philosophy, this process amounts to a fundamental step in self-discovery. In Eastern thought, the business of the philosopher is to learn to distinguish between the self and the not-self. When the multitudinous elements of the not-self are mistaken for a part of the self, the individual is vulnerable to all the vicissitudes of change to which those elements are naturally subject. The feelings rise and fall. If a man is unable to think of himself apart from his feelings, he must rise and fall with them. If he mistakes his appetite for possessions for the needs of the self, he suffers agony when he is deprived, and heady elation when he acquires—losing, in both cases, his emotional balance.

The question naturally arises—as a man strips himself of his grosser attributes, and then, perhaps, of the subtler elements of a finite character, what, finally, is left? What is he, in reality, after he has externalized all non-essentials? We have not the habit of thinking in this way, yet our sparse metaphysical vocabulary permits of a pure concept of the self—*bare subjectivity.*

This is a contentless idea, without much satisfaction for those who think of human life as rich in color and filled with a variety of experience. And it is here that we encounter what may be the essential weakness of Western culture—its inability to discover in abstract ideas the fullness they contain from a metaphysical point of view.

What may we say of "bare subjectivity" without doing violence to the notion? Well, it represents the ultimate reduction of the idea of self, but at the same time it gives the idea a universal dimension. Certainly, the same identity may be said to be at the heart of being in all other forms of life. There is a "self" in everything, and why should it not be the same self in all?

Universal ethics may be found on a principle of this sort. As the sheaths of the self accumulate, more particular relationships appear, to take the place of the hidden identity. The forms embodying the self provide varying types of individuality, setting beings apart and at the same time establishing noticeable relationships between them. But underlying all is the one Self.

All mysticism contains implications of this sort, although the tendency is clearer in Eastern than in Western mysticism. Just as a man who pursues the sort of self-study made possible by psychotherapy learns to dispense with erroneous ideas of the self, so the mystic learns to discard extraneous notions of God. A point is reached by the mystic when there is no longer a distinction between the idea of self and the idea of God. Eventually, the discovery of the self *is* the revelation of Deity, and both are approached and found within.

An unnatural haste is not possible in this discovery. It takes time to wear away illusions.

The reality a psychically sick man assigns to the knots in his heart is dissipated only by a growing sense of proportion. He begins to see things more rationally, and then the knots unravel; the spastic contractions in his *psyche* loosen and let go. So also with the man who seeks an inner religion. More and more, the artificialities of dogma and the imagery of tradition vacate the places of reverence in his thinking and feeling. He begins to sense the breath of a larger being flowing through his own being. He finds that, in an appropriate way, he is not less than the All, just as, in another way, he has a limiting place and part in the affairs of the world. His being is a nexus between the finite and the infinite, and it is the same with all other beings, in varying degrees of consciousness and self-awareness.

This, at any rate, is the suggestive meaning of ancient mysticisms such as Shankara's *Awakening to the Self* and other scriptures.

Is it possible for a mystical enrichment of the idea of the self to emerge in the clinical and somewhat profane atmosphere of modern psychotherapy? This is what we wonder, after reading a bit in the McClelland paper cited in this week's lead article. Psychotherapy seems to have some of the mechanisms of purgation and release that are afforded by mystical disciplines, yet the ardor of the spirit is missing, and there is no symbolism of ends except for the somewhat prosy notion of the "mature human being."

But there is another kind of ardor in the writings of some of the psychotherapists—in Erich Fromm, for example, who obviously has a deep social concern. Just possibly, there is an organic necessity in modern thought requiring that the return to a philosophic idea of the self shall be by this route—not so much by a private mysticism as through a large-hearted regard for the mass of bewildered human beings. There have been too many private contracts between individuals and their gods, too much "exclusive" salvation in traditional religious theory. Perhaps we need a clean break with all types of selfish pietism and egotistical purity. In this case, the laggard pace of the half-religions in the movement toward whole religions for our time may be something to be thankful for.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
CIVICS LESSON

WHAT every young man and woman should know about a democracy is that it is inevitably created by an aristocracy—a self-selected aristocracy composed of men who think beyond the horizons of contemporary prejudice. Aristocrats like Jefferson, Adams and Washington established the basis upon which the great educational experiment of democracy was to take place. Today democracy is being defended by an aristocracy of "virtue and wisdom"—the Supreme Court.

In an article in the January *Progressive,* "The American Spirit," Milton Mayer highlights the meaning of the classic fifty-year debate between Jefferson and Adams. "Of course," writes Mayer, "neither one of them believed in democracy. Neither of them believed that democracy would ever achieve liberty or preserve it. Both believed in government by an aristocracy of the wisest and most virtuous. But Jefferson believed that the people could be educated to choose such an aristocracy to govern them. Adams did not. Adams believed that the people would always be the dupes—and, in their folly, the willing dupes—of the rich, the cunning, and the cruel, and would choose no others." Often it has seemed that Mr. Adams' forebodings were prophetic. Deluded by the belief that equality and liberty are synonymous, we have made a poor show of respecting the rights of the individual citizen as a *person.* Everyone has gotten rich, or nearly so, but we have failed to preserve, amid this specious equality, the perception that only a wise and virtuous man will be concerned with *everyone's* individual rights. Mayer continues:

> It was not alone that we got rich; it was the way we got rich that prevented the rise of Jefferson's aristocracy of virtue and wisdom. Our folk heroes were Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford, none of whom was pre-eminently virtuous; still less so wise. If Henry Ford could get a billion dollars together and still maintain that history is bunk, why should anyone else who wanted a billion dollars study history? From being non-philosophical—like any raw people confronted with practical obstacles and practical opportunities—we proceeded aggressively and defensively to being anti-philosophical.
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> But the defense of liberty, not of one's own but of one's Communist neighbor's, is a matter of principle. It is impossible to defend liberty concretely without being abstract about it and seeing that it is applicable everywhere or nowhere. But abstraction is philosophy, and we are an anti-philosophical people.

In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville saw that the decline of a natural aristocracy in leadership would lead to a new and unprecedented sort of tyranny—the same de Tocqueville who remarked of America and Russia that "their starting point is different, their ways are diverse, yet each of them seems called by the secret design of Providence to control, some day, the destinies of half the world." What had happened, by 1835, to the original conception of a republican democracy? "I know of no country," writes de Tocqueville, "in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. In any constitutional state in Europe, every sort of religious and political theory may be freely preached and disseminated . . . But in . . . the United States there is but one authority, one element of strength and success, with nothing beyond it . . . the omnipotence of the majority. . . ."

When the once "common man" organizes himself as a pressure group—whether as manufacturing association, labor union, or political party—he is no longer apt to be greatly concerned with the interests of the isolated individual. He is being "cared for" by the partisan association to which he gives allegiance, and his views on the rights and needs of others will be governed by the relation of their opinions to the interests of his own group. In the South, the opponents of desegregation have been capably organized, with a pretentious platform of "majority rule" in a given locality. This is uneducated democracy. An educated democracy,

determined to learn from leaders in the aristocracy of wisdom, would comprehend that the majority should rule in only one respect—by continued insistence that the laws of the land be administered by men who are capable of seeing beyond partisan interests.

Saturday Review for March 7 has an interesting article by Harris Wofford, Jr., titled "The Supreme Court as an Educator." Mr. Wofford endeavors to show that without careful loyalty to the constitutional principles which the Supreme Court embodies, a democracy becomes a jumble of conflicting tyrannies. (There can be a tyranny of capital, a tyranny of labor, a tyranny of opinions prejudical to ethnic groups—all "justified" by the majority opinions of the separate constituencies.) Yet Mr. Wofford is optimistic:

> What happens when the public disagreement runs so deep that the law cannot be successfully enforced, as is the case in parts of the South with school integration? The answer is that the American constitutional process is educational even when it is temporarily deadlocked, and the Supreme Court is a great teacher even when it is massively resisted.
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> As Bryce said, "The Supreme Court is the living voice of the Constitution. . . ., the conscience of the people." As it expounds the great constitutional promises such as "freedom of speech," "due process of law," and "the equal protection of the laws"—broad provisions that were, as Justice Frankfurter said, "purposely left to gather meaning from experience"—it inevitably goes against the opinions of some part of the people. As a kind of Socratic teacher, the Court must expect that those who are stung from their slumbers will come back with sharp criticism and with challenges to its authority. Any good teacher wants this. At times the Court restrains us until the constitutional doubt is resolved, at times it goads us to follow the logic of our first principles into new fields. But in each case it is playing a part in the national process of persuasion that is the grand design of the Constitution.
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> The decisions of the Supreme Court and the resistance to them in the South are raising the most fundamental questions about our national purpose and the nature of our law. We can expect that out of this conflict national enlightenment is coming.

Returning to Mr. Mayer, it seems apparent that our careless inattention to democratic principles is catching up with us, and that, both from our own internal dislocation and our dubious rivalry with Russia, we may finally be forced to learn something the hard way. Mayer concludes:

> Maybe, in order to escape worldly authoritarianism—of the one or the many—we have got to learn something that our silver-spooned experience has not taught us. The Greeks were fond of saying that man is schooled in suffering. Maybe we have got to suffer. It looks as if we might. We never have, and we won't like it. But Jefferson's God said, "I have refined thee, but not with silver, I have chosen thee in the furnace of affliction." Maybe we have got to get ourselves afflicted. It looks as if we are trying.

The "underprivileged" peoples of the world, as the last twenty years have so graphically illustrated, can work themselves up to violent partisanships of a dangerous nature. But the privileged peoples, of whom we Americans are the prime example, fall victim to partisanships of another sort. Our partisanships are defensive, protective, reactionary, whereas the partisanships of the underprivileged are aggressive. Yet it is the spirit of partisanship which democracy, conceived as an educational enterprise, should seek to erase. The "natural" leaders of a true democracy are most likely to be found among the educators—whether they be teachers or writers—who pursue their work by an inner compulsion, rather than from any particular alignment of interests. The Nine Men of the Supreme Court are in this sense educators, and merit all the respect they will some day be accorded by all.

FRONTIERS

Two Varieties of Non-Conformity

ONE might have known that it would happen: "Non-conformism" is becoming a fad. After Riesman made a modern folk hero of "the autonomous man," many readers who pretend to understand him have wanted to qualify for this distinction. And with Erich Fromm and others stressing the need for discovering one's unique individuality, a massive "coterie culture" has been developing new shibboleths to live by. T. J. Ross begins a review of J. P. Donleavy's *The Ginger Man (New Republic,* March 9) with a spoof of this "guided" non-conformity:

> For the lively 19th-century man the term, "self-help," implied mainly how to go about achieving some dominance over external resources. When we think of "self-help" now, it is not in terms of making use of external resource, but in terms of a gruesome and plaintive query: In those shocks it has endured in its combat with the external, have any inner resources been left to the self which may serve to remind it that it does, in fact, exist? Our ad-mass commentators have been quick to seize on this change to emphasis. We are in the midst of a spate of uplifting fare like: "A Guide to Wholesome Non-Conforming Activities For You—and For the Entire Family" by Dr. Abigail Trailblazer; or, "Are You the Individualist You Could—and Should—Be?" Every freshman in America is now scribbling a theme on these Problems.

The non-conformist without a purpose is a dreary deal. What he conforms to, whether he knows it or not, is his idea of non-conformity, and what he usually gets is alienation without creativity. The non-conforming traditions of earlier epochs, on the other hand, developed because the creative spirit had to fight through certain barriers. Now, we understand, a number of psychiatrically inclined educators are trying to figure out how college youths can be induced to depart from conventionality.

On the other hand, the non-conformist with a purpose sometimes finds it possible to align himself with others—non-conformist or not—in the struggle to bring to birth a broader human perspective. At the fringe of the political arena, we encounter the indefatigable American Civil Liberties Union, rushing around throughout America to insist that the only kind of democracy that is any good is one in which civil rights are more important that the rule of majority prejudice. Of all the American groups of this character, the ACLU has won the greatest respect abroad. Writing in New York for the *Manchester Guardian* for Feb. 19, Alistair Cooke tells of the hand-to-mouth existence of the ACLU, and ends by describing the Union's action on Lincoln's birthday. The New York branch of the Union reported on the candidates for the Union's annual award to that "individual, organisation, or group, who, by word or action, has displayed consistent and outstanding courage and integrity in the defence of civil liberties." Mr. Cooke relates:

> This year N.Y.C.L.U. looked right through 71 distinguished or popular nominations and picked out five anonymous dots on the Arkansas horizon. They were the five coloured children who suffered the threats, the jeers, and the cold shoulder of their white brethren in Little Rock the five "integrated" Negroes who stayed in the Central High School as long as it stayed open.
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> There were nine in all who went to school on that infamous first day in September, 1957. Four of them either took scholarships in other states, or came north, or gave in. Elizabeth Beckford, Thelma Mothershed, Melba Patillo, Carlotta Walls, and the magnificently named Jefferson Thomas were the irreducible five who, in the stark citation of N.Y.C.L.U.'s chairman, Charles Siepmann, "stuck it out. . . and in the performance of their duty paid an ugly price.
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> "What these children did we know. What they suffered we can only guess," sighed Mr. Siepmann, a handsome, gaunt man, himself as Anglo-Saxon and bone-white as Siegfried.

Apart from the spontaneous enthusiasm of the Union people for these recipients of the welcome cash award, it may be that such a selection is designed to show that something *can* be won by willingness to stand up and be counted

for a good cause—and the willingness to align one's efforts with others of like mind.

In the March *Encounter,* Edward Shils provides an interesting account of the last Congress for Cultural Freedom, held at Rhodes. Much of the spirit of the Congress is conveyed by *Encounter,* which the Congress publishes as its organ, now edited by Stephen Spender and Melvin Lasky. It is interesting to note that many of the writers for *Encounter,* who share the ideal of international cultural freedom, have passed through several stages of "non-conformism." Ignazio Silone, and Arthur Koestler, for instance, told in *The God That Failed* how their own desire to break through frozen political attitudes led them into the Communist Party. But since the CP insisted upon conformity above all, the Party could not hold these men.

Meetings such as the Rhodes conference bring together men of widely differing background and their combined voices are heard, at least in certain circles, throughout the world. A few months ago, assembled in what Shils calls "one of the worst *de luxe* hotels in the world," were Raymond Aron, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Michael Polanyi, Gunnar Myrdal, Robert M. Hutchins, Judge Charles Wyzansky, D. R. Gadgil, J. K. Galbraith, Ignazio Silone, Kenneth Kirkwood, Prince Kukrit Pramoj, Minoo Masami, Moshe Sharett, Oya Ogunsheye, Thomas Diop, Richard Rovere and Asoka Mehta. As indication that such a gathering, heavily seasoned with men of "non-conformist" background, can achieve respect, we may note that a number of distinguished statesmen from several lands were prevented from attending the Congress only by emergency situations at home.

The Ford Foundation supported the initiative of the Rhodes Congress, supplying funds for drawing up "elaborate draft agenda" to inform participants of the lines of discussion, which were circulated months before the meeting was scheduled to take place. Among those finally unable to attend were the following:

> Sardar K. M. Panikkar (who was the first to send in his paper on "The Traditional Order and the Free Society") begged off because of the press of ambassadorial duties during the de Gaulle crisis. Mr. Hugh Gaitskell (after sending in his paper on "Opposition" had to cancel his participation because of events in Cyprus); Mr. Walter Reuther had to withdraw because the United Automobile Workers went on strike at General Motors and Ford, and new contracts had to be negotiated. Mr. Dudly Senanayake could not leave Ceylon because of the "Emergency." Beirut had to be cancelled as a site of the seminar. (In fact, one of the persons we had tentatively considered as a member was conducting military operations against the Government from his mountain headquarters.) Indonesia was in civil war, and the Army seized power in Iraq; in Burma the Prime Minister turned over the Government to the Army. At least we had a real problem to discuss.

The parenthetical sentence above seems singularly impressive—as if the effort of the Congress and the problems of some of those delegates presage a time when intelligent discussion, by intelligent men, will triumph over international misunderstandings.

Mr. Shils remarks: "Rhodes was remarkable for many things. Not the least of these was the small place accorded to the dangers of Communism. Certainly none of the participants was sympathic with Communism, and none was blind. The main reason seems to me to be that, except for those who have become caught up in the coils of the Communist movement, Marxism has lost its power to attract; it has ceased to be a valid intellectual or moral challenge." Mr. Shils says further:

> There was, indeed, an atmosphere of a common quest. There was no suggestion that we in the West have solved our problems, and that we knew what the answers were to the problems emerging in Asia and Africa. On the contrary, Raymond Aron and Bertrand de Jouvenel spoke frankly of the vicissitudes of political democracy in France; Ignazio Silone and John Kenneth Galbraith both asserted their dissatisfaction with the party structure of their own countries; and Robert M. Hutchins' critical remarks concerning the United States, trenchantly exaggerated as usual, were only an extreme instance of a more

general disposition to examine problems rather than to praise, apologise, or denigrate.

Hutchins, in the midst of a characteristic excoriation of American education, revealed the underlying unity of the problems of free societies everywhere, with the assertion that "the greatest educational institution in the United States is the American Constitution." "It instructs the citizens concerning the nature of their society and trains them to live under its laws." M. de Jouvenel put the same thesis differently when he said that one of the chief tasks of the new states is to establish *"majesty,"* that relationship between the government and the citizens in which the rulers believe they are governing "for the whole society" and the citizens believe in the moral concern and competence of their rulers. Where the rulers failed to establish their competence and their moral integrity and to meet reasonable expectations of the populace, democratic government would be discredited.

When "non-conformists" of this calibre manage to get together they always find something to say, and an agency like the Congress of Cultural Freedom provides means for having what they say widely heard.