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TWO VISIONS OF MAN

ONE thing encouraging that can be said about Western civilization at the present time is that a new—or new-old—conception of the human being is gradually emerging, and may eventually dominate the best of modern thought. Various ideas of man—theological, scientific-mechanistic, political, economic—have each had their epoch of dominion during the cycle of Western history, but today what might be called the idea of essentially *human* man is taking on definite shape. There are many ways to give an account of this development, none of them really adequate, and certainly none of them "final" (this being a distinctive virtue of definitions of man), and it is perhaps the diversity of the conceptions, although all with basic elements in common, which permits us to speak of the emergence as a contemporary fact.

A handy summary of these new views was quoted in last week's "Children . . . and Ourselves," from an article by Robert E. Nixon in *Psychiatry* for February. Having noted the semantic confusion concerning the meaning of "self," Dr. Nixon observes:

> However, some current usages appear to have much in common, at least implicitly, with the concept offered here, such as Riesman's *autonomous man,* Fromm's *ethical man,* Maslow's *self-actualizer,* Rado's *biocultural acting self,* Murphy's *fusion of the three natures of man,* Erikson's concept of *ego-identity,* May's *conscious self,* and Allport's *proprium.*

It is true enough that these terms do not tell us very much, and this is no doubt a good thing, since their common meanings become apparent only from study of the works of these men, and then only in the context of specific human behavior. This means that the terms are not "labels," but represent a common perception of structure and substance in human beings, however differently arrived at. Work of this sort is the stuff of common *discovery.* Fortunately, Dr. Nixon spells out some of the qualities these terms represent, using ordinary language:

> People who possess these characteristics try to rid themselves of misconceptions and blind spots concerning themselves and their actions in society, they have the capacity to face the unknown with courage, they have the strength of their own convictions, and they have the humility to seek objective appraisal of those convictions. They seem to be idealized figures, unreal, too good to be true, and yet they exist. Perhaps they embody the realization of everyman's dream, of everyman's potentiality. If it is their use of self-cognition which makes the dream come true, then perhaps the psychiatrist can learn from them enough to help others accept the same potentiality in themselves and to use it, so that their growth toward adulthood may be less haphazard, less painful, less wasteful than it is now.

Two comments seem in order. First, it would be nonsense to suggest that this sort of maturity is somehow a unique product of the twentieth century. There have always been such people. What we have never had, however, as a common social possession, is any kind of general awareness of the qualities of such people in *functional* terms—the terms, that is, of contemporary Western civilization, with its special sort of self-consciousness. Antique religions and philosophies had words with which to describe these people—or the qualities they manifest—but these words are often associated with a revelatory religious tradition or with some other vocabulary which, for some reason or other, encourages people to neglect hard thinking about their meaning. The only useful vocabulary is a vocabulary which is forged in the fires of personal psychological experience. And today, as possibly the key development of the twentieth century, there is this new spirit of "objectivity" toward the realities of man's subjective life. In this sense, the emerging

idea of the self, characteristic of the present, is a new "thing."

Something of this idea is found in Lewis Mumford's *The Transformations of Man* (Science of Culture series, Harper). Concerning the idea of the self, Mr. Mumford writes:

> One is born *with* the first self, the biological substratum or id: one is born *into* the second self, the social self, which makes the animal over into a modified human image, and directs its purely animal propensities into socially useful channels, carved by a particular group. But one must be reborn if one is to achieve the third self. In that rebirth the latest part of the self, assuming leadership, projects a destination that neither man's animal nature nor his social achievements have so far more than faintly indicated. In this detachment lies the promise of further growth.

Now what should be especially marked in such expressions is that they are all inhabited by the temper of the scientific spirit at its best. They have a profoundly intuitive quality, but the assertions are nonetheless wrung from some more or less apparent version of the "facts of life." These writers bring ardor and compassion to their work, but when they get down to specifics they represent the very flower of the Western tradition of independent intellectual penetration of the immediacies of experience. You get the feeling that what they say is the result of a living touch with *men.* They don't "borrow" from the pre-scientific past, although they may have assimilated aspects of ancient insights to a point where they become indistinguishable from contemporary perception. It is as though Western thought has a built-in sort of integrity which makes its most honored representatives say, in effect: "I am a man, and I write about what I feel and can see, augmented with what seems a consistent consequence, intellectually and morally, of what I feel and see." They do not repeat hearsay, not even hearsay of great and auspicious origin, so long as they cannot feel its life and vitality for themselves.

This makes for certain characteristic qualities in Western thought. On the whole, it has no conscious metaphysical frame. It tends to be existential so far as the world around us is concerned. Cosmology has practically no direct role in Western humanist thought. It has of course an indirect role, since it is impossible to think without some kind of cosmological background, but this is the shadowy area of Western thinking. Western humanism is about man—man as we know him, and as we see or divine his promise for better things. It is not about the universe. So far as man is concerned, the pavilion of the universe is wrapped in darkness.

But the temper of modern western thought also makes for an unmistakable strength. When an Erich Fromm, an A. H. Maslow, or a Lewis Mumford writes something down, you know that he meant to say just that, as a fruit of his own independent thinking. If the statement has assumptions, they are at least examined and, if possible, tested assumptions. Even if they should fail in this attempt, and some cultural truism slips into their work uninspected, you know it is by accident and not by stealth.

For example, Dr. Maslow said recently, in a radio broadcast over KPFK:

> It is certainly true that mankind, throughout history, has looked for guiding values, for principles of right and wrong. But he has tended to look outside of himself, outside of mankind, to a God, to some sort of sacred book perhaps, or to a ruling class. What I am doing is to explore the theory that you can find the values by which mankind must live, and for which man has always sought, by digging into the best people in depth. I believe, in other words, that I can find ultimate values which are right for mankind by observing the best of mankind. If under the best conditions and in the best specimens I simply stand aside and describe in a scientific way what these human values are, I find values that are the old values of truth, goodness, and beauty and some additional ones as well, for instance gaiety, justice, and joy. I do not say we should look for goodness because we *ought* to, or because there is some principle outside of ourselves that tells us to. I am saying that if you examine human beings fairly, you will find that they

themselves have innate knowledge of yearning for goodness and beauty.

Here, perhaps, is a surprisingly complete outline of the Western temper, with all its strength and excellence. We do not mean to elevate Dr. Maslow unduly above his contemporaries, since the emergence of this temper is in some measure a concert of numerous excellences, but the quotation is at hand and it almost perfectly illustrates our point. Further, he is acknowledged by many men working in this general field of the new psychology as being a discoverer and a pioneer.

This, then, is one of the visions of man of which our title speaks. The other vision belongs to the East.

How can anyone dare to speak of "the East" as though it represented some actual consensus concerning man and the nature of things? It is difficult to give an adequate answer to this question, yet at the same time many thoughtful writers adopt some such view of the East. It seems practically unavoidable, however one may fail in justifying or explaining it.

It was not until we read one of the few available novels by Japanese authors—in this case, *Homecoming,* by Jiro Osaragi (Berkeley paperback)—that we felt encouraged even to attempt an explanation. After all, when a book is able to produce so strong a feeling that the consensus of "the East" exists, and that it is in some sense representative of a large part of all Asia, one should not ignore such an impression. Fortunately, this book has an introduction by Harold Strauss which confirms this idea, at least in relation to Japan. Mr. Strauss writes:

> The first five chapters of *Homecoming* are set in wartime Singapore, and are quite cosmopolitan in tone. Many of the more typical characteristics of the Japanese novel do not begin to appear until later chapters. In fact, the gradual change in tone and technique from modern and cosmopolitan to traditional is not without significance.
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> In Japan art is a consolation, preoccupied with the joy of the senses: but this joy is known to be fleeting, and therefore the Japanese have retained the implications of an old Buddhist word for it, "the floating world," implications of both pleasure and regret. Howard Hibbett notes that the Chinese have used the word in the same way, as in the line by the T'ang poet Li Shang-yin: "In this floating world there are many meetings and many partings." One of Japan's greatest novelists, Saikaku, who was seldom dispirited, gave the same sense in the first of his erotic stories: "In this floating world where today we are still alive, how difficult to know whether we will tomorrow walk a lonely rocky beach, to end as sea-wrack on it!"
>
> In *Homecoming* there are many glimpses of this floating world, and many meetings and many partings. An example, considered outstanding by the Japanese, is the first half of Chapter Thirteen, in which Kyogo Moriya, the central character, having journeyed through devastated Japan to the unbombed ancient beauties of Kyoto, does little but sit quietly on the balcony of the inn. Kyogo has lived abroad for a very long time, so that he sees Japan almost with the eyes of a foreigner. Therefore Osaragi can observe with a detachment that makes *Homecoming* so perfect a bridge between Japan and America. . . . The Japanese dislike strong resolutions. Sensitive to the drift and impermanence of things, they think such endings are artificial. Instead of using a distinctly tragic or a distinctly happy ending, they prefer to suggest that life goes on, according to one's character and one's fate. If one were to question a Japanese novelist about one of his endings, he would answer: "Why should I tell you? If you do not already know, I must have failed to draw my characters strongly."

What is it, then, which lies behind the "floating world," enabling the people of the Orient to enjoy a kind of oceanic security, when otherwise without roots? It is as though an archetypal world of authentic being arches majestically, if invisibly, both within and beyond the scene of everyday life.

Kyogo Moriya, Osaragi's protagonist (he acts, through his presence, as a catalyst, rather than by "doing" anything), is a curious made-up figure, part Raffles, part Loki, and part Dr. Frigoli. He is a kind of Japanese Superman adapted to the purposes of Mr. Osaragi's tale.

The story is melodrama, but it is melodrama with romanticized Buddhist values, allowing the hero to be a lucky gambler and one hell of a fellow, as well as a strong, silent sage who operates something like an Oriental *deus ex machina.* But we are not so much concerned with Kyogo's fun and games as with the nuances of the Eastern world-view which come into the story insistently, if delicately, more or less as Mr. Strauss suggests. They come when the characters are stripped naked, isolated from conventional or traditional supports. In the West, when men reach this point of separation from the familiar, they turn Existentialist, standing up on the lonely rock of selfhood to shout defiance at the silent and impassive universe. But in the East, the response is different. There is that great resource of universal being behind the floating world, the Pure Land, to which men reduced by fate can turn. It saves them from *anomie* and loss of identity.

It is as though there were indeed authentic polarities of inward reality represented by the terms East and West. In the West, the man thrown back on himself struggles to *find* himself, to give an account of his "individuality," his inward being. He accepts the Promethean agony and undertakes the Promethean labor. He overcomes the feeling of alienation by seeking currents of reconciliation in his own life. The Easterner, on the other hand, leans back into the subtle matrix of an all-pervading life which remains behind and within the coarser matrix of culture and history. He gropes for the mystic synthesis of Karma and Nirvana. Years ago, G. Lowes Dickinson drew a similar although a less searching contrast in his little book, *Appearances.* Standing before the figure of a Buddha at Borobudor in Java, he mused:

> For a long time I was silent, meditating his [Buddha's] doctrine. Then I spoke of children, and he said, "They grow old." I spoke of strong men, and he said, "They grow weak." I spoke of their work and achievement, and he said, "They die." The stars came out, and I spoke of the eternal law. He said, "One law concerns you—that which binds you to the wheel of life." The moon rose, and I spoke of beauty. He said, "There is one beauty—that of a soul redeemed from desire." Thereupon the West stirred in me, and cried "No!" "Desire," it said, "is the heart and essence of the world. It needs not and craves not extinction. It needs and craves perfection. Youth passes; strength passes, life passes. Yes! What of it? We have access to the youth, the strength, the life of the world. Man is born to sorrow. Yes! But he feels it as tragedy and redeems it. Not 'round life, not outside life, but through life is the way. Desire more and more intense, because more and more pure; not peace, but plenitude of experience. Your foundation was false. You thought man wanted rest. He does not. We at least do not, we of the West. We want more labour; we want more stress; we want more passion. Pain we accept, for it stings us into life. Strife we accept, for it hardens us to strength. We believe in action; we believe in desire. And we believe that by them we shall attain."
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> So the West broke out in me; and I looked at him to see if he was moved. But the calm eye was untroubled, unruffled the majestic brow, unperplexed the sweet solemn mouth. . . .

Dickinson wrote this half a century ago. Since then, the West has had more than it bargained for of passion, stress, strife, and pain. And the East has stirred from its bed of passivity and begun a cycle of experimentation with Western ambition and striving. A Western man of today, of comparable sensibility and experience, would now address somewhat different accents to the image of the Buddha. He might still speak of the Promethean spirit, but as a chastened half-god, a man shaken and undermined by the very ills the Buddha warned against. And he would look, perhaps, for some faint hint of a Promethean past in the serene countenance of one who not only found peace, but gave peace its definition for half the world of men.

No doubt, in years to come, the East and the West will achieve the synthesis both great cultures long for—long for either consciously or by subconscious tropism of the human spirit. But an inevitable accompaniment of this growth toward unity, already much in evidence, is the imitation practiced by those who hope to find salvation in a formula. The terrible mistake of Japan was its attempt to beat the West at its own game—both a

material and a spiritual folly. Other Eastern peoples show symptoms of the same fatal tendency, seeking a fresh "identity" in the false images raised to Prometheus by Western allegiance to acquisition and external "progress." At the same time, world-weary Westerners are being drawn to sectarian versions of Oriental religious philosophy, as though the half-truths of passive acceptance could somehow balance the sins of Western aggression and involvement with insatiable desire. And as a complicating overlay of additional confusion, there is the criticism arising on both sides of the shallows and superficialities of the other culture. Easterners are heard to complain, *ad nauseam,* of the famous "materialism" of the West, as though there were no materialism at all in inherited theologies which have not been made current by immediate perception and newly inclusive applications. Westerners visit the Orient for a few weeks or months and return to write books about the psychological box canyons and sentimental escapisms of "Zen" and "Yoga," as though you could find representatives of authentic Eastern philosophy awaiting inspection in plainly labelled institutions along the main streets of India and Japan.

Perhaps we can say in conclusion that the East has a deep and saving intuition about the One, while the West is in process of wearing out its misconceptions about the Many—or, in terms of immediate human awareness, about the Individual—and is coming at last to a kind of self-consciousness which *needs* the intuition of the East. The Whole, the over-arching reality, has always to be discovered by the Many before the latter can truly feel at home in the world, and the Many must also comprehend the necessity for the great pilgrimage of being, out of and back to the One, and what is to be accomplished upon the Odysseys, Iliads, and Mahabharatas in which men engage as their inescapable destiny. The Many are the agents of self-conscious realization for the One.

REVIEW
DUCASSE ON "IMMORTALITY"

"THE BELIEF IN A LIFE AFTER DEATH—a Critical Examination" has just been released by Charles C. Thomas (Springfield, Ill.). This volume might well be considered part of a series, for Dr. Curt Ducasse here continues and extends reflections which have made his earlier work uniquely valuable to those interested in logical assessment of the question of immortality—and in the actual possibility of human rebirth after death. Ducasse's 1951 Paul Carus Lectures, published with the title *Nature, Mind, and Death,* can be regarded as a classic in its field. Later, in the *Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion,* Ducasse demonstrated that he could not only approach the generally vague subject of immortality with rigorous logic, but also manage this in language everyone can understand.

The present work, as Dr. Ducasse readily admits, can hardly be thought of as on the way to best-seller fame; it constitutes the fruition of efforts to show that disciplined thinking and metaphysics are by no means incompatible—something educators should know, even if the importance of the issue escapes the general reading public. The intent of the book is given in the Preface:

> What the book attempts is a philosophical scrutiny of the idea of a life after death. That is, it attempts to set forth as adequately as possible, the various questions which, on reflection, arise on the subject; to purge them both of ambiguity and of vagueness; to point out what connection the subject does, and does not, have with religion; to examine without prejudice the merits of the considerations—theological or scientific, empirical, or theoretical—which have been alleged variously to make certain, or probable, or possible, or impossible, that the human personality survives bodily death; to state what kind of evidence would, if we should have it, conclusively prove that a human personality, or some specified component of it, has survived after death; and to consider the variety of forms which a life after death, if any, could with any plausibility be conceived to take.
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> Needless to say, this ambitious program is not likely to be carried through with complete success.

Considering the scope and intricacy of the subject, however, it is difficult to imagine a work more competent and thorough. The last hundred pages, a section titled "Life After Death Conceived as Reincarnation," are concerned with the contemporary significance of this ancient hypothesis of successive lives on earth. Here we find a suggestive blending of reincarnation as conceived in Brahminism and Buddhism with the differently orientated, but remarkably similar, conceptions of Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus. Then, after tracing the echoes of reincarnation philosophy from the time of David Hume to the present, attention is given to tentative investigations now being made by ESP researchers throughout the world. Dr. Ducasse, concedes, as he must, that while there are notable cases wherein "ostensible memories of earlier lives" have been verified, this is not proof that reincarnation should be considered a universal process. But he also endeavors to show that there is no necessary logical hiatus created by the absence of memory of former lives in the overwhelming majority and the spectacular and unaccountable recollections of the few. It is on this point that the present work clarifies a line of interpretation for which Dr. Ducasse is himself at least partially responsible. While it may be philosophically inaccurate to speak of the reincarnation of an individual *mind* if there is no conscious recall of experiences in former lives, this need not prejudice the view that an essential *individuality* may have been the causative factor in a succession of "minds." Dr. Ducasse reasons:

> If we wish to speak—as ordinarily—of reincarnation also in cases like that of each of the rest of us, where no such spontaneous memories of an earlier incarnation are possessed; then that which is supposed to be reincarnated in our body cannot be an earlier *mind.* It can be only the "seed" left by an earlier mind—a seed consisting of the set of what Prof. Broad would term its "supreme dispositions," and which we have described as the set of its *basic aptitudes;* that is, of its capacities to acquire under

> respectively appropriate circumstances various more determinate kinds of capacities.
>
> It is conceivable, however, that one of those reincarnated basic aptitudes should be aptitude to regain, under appropriate stimulus, memories now latent that would satisfy requirements (a), (b), and (c) above [requirements which indicate "that the earlier mind had eventually become the given mind and was thus an intrinsic early part of it"], and would therefore *be* memories of an earlier incarnation.

In discussing various difficulties of the hypothesis of reincarnation, Dr. Ducasse shows that many objections to the idea arise from the context in which it is considered. For example, it has often been argued that unless transmigration leads to the gaining of wisdom, a possible reincarnation would have no meaning—since without memory of "right and wrong actions" no moral lesson could be learned nor any wisdom gained. On this point Dr. Ducasse remarks:

> A sufficient answer to this question is that perception of the consequences of our conduct is one way, but not the only way, in which growth in wisdom, virtue, or ability, can be brought about by those consequences. An act of which we retain no memory may nevertheless have the remote effect of placing us eventually in a situation conducive to the acquiring of the wisdom, virtue, or ability, lack of which made us act as we did in the forgotten past. If, as the *Karma* doctrine of the Hindus asserts, our conduct in one incarnation automatically tends to have this very sort of consequence in one or another of our later lives, then lack of memory of those past lives does not prevent our growing morally and spiritually, in this indirect manner, owing to the nature of our conduct in unremembered earlier lives. Moreover if, as already suggested may be the case, memory of preceding lives is regained in the discarnate interval between incarnations, this would make growth in wisdom possible not only in the manner just described, but also by discernment of some of the consequences of certain of one's acts in earlier lives.

The author quotes approvingly of Prof. Broad's suggestion that if there is something in the human being which survives death, and which subsequently reincarnates on earth, it may not be considered "mind" as usually described, but rather a psychogenic factor which subsequently combines with another brain and hence constructs a new mind around the seed of one that had lived before. So that: "If transmigration is to be conceived as a process of growth, it is necessary to assume that the activities and experiences of each incarnation result not only in the acquisition of particular skills, tastes, habits, knowledge, etc., on the basis of the aptitudes (or 'psychogenic factor,' or 'Intelligible Character') brought from past lives; but in addition result in some alteration of that stock of aptitudes itself—enhancement of some of them, deterioration of others, perhaps acquisition of new ones, and possibly loss altogether of certain others."

Dr. Ducasse is apparently convinced that the structure of the modern temperament requires an experimental approach in the search for evidence favoring reincarnation. Like Ian Stevenson, who recently contributed a prizewinning essay in honor of William James (to the *Journal of Psychical Research)*, Ducasse foresees the use of hypnosis to explore latent capacities for "recall." A trend seems to be developing in this direction, neither prompted by the famous and debatable Bridey Murphy case, nor deterred by the questionable nature of some of the claims made for Bridey. But it seems to us that Ducasse is quite correct in another conclusion—that the essential philosophical relevance of the idea of human rebirth cannot be held to stand or fall with the success or failure of any particular technique of testing.

COMMENTARY
HELP FOR SYNANON

UNLESS the California legislature decides to pass a bill (A.B. 2626) introduced by Assemblyman Nicholas Petris (Oakland) which clarifies the meaning of Section 11391 of the California Health and Safety Code, the Synanon Foundation, now the haven of some seventy ex-heroin addicts, will be forced to close its doors at 1351 Ocean Front, Santa Monica, and find a new home—which may be difficult.

On April 14, Municipal Judge Hector Baida, of Santa Monica, granted a 90-day stay of execution of the court's ruling that Synanon must vacate its premises. He suggested that the foundation might seek legislative relief, and the Petris bill is an attempt to carry out this suggestion.

MANAS has printed two articles on Synanon—one in the issue of Sept. 14, 1960, the other in the issue of last Feb. 8. The present plight of Synanon resulted from the refusal of the Supreme Court of the United States to hear the appeal of the Foundation's attorneys, which returned the case to the lower court for disposition. Synanon has been convicted of misdemeanors on two counts—(1) "treating" drug addicts, in violation of Section 11391 of California's Health and Safety Code; and (2) operating a hospital in an area of Santa Monica not zoned for hospitals. (Synanon was held not guilty of another misdemeanor count—operating a hospital without a license!)

The bill presented by Mr. Petris spells out the meaning of Section 11391 of the California Health and Safety Code, in such a way as to make clear that this portion of California state law in no way prohibits or makes illegal the sort of self-help activity by addicts carried out at Synanon. A study of Section 11391 shows that it is intended to control the administration of drugs for the purpose of assisting addicts to endure a tapering off period, or for any reason deemed necessary by an attending physician. At the present, the practical effect of the law, as interpreted by the Santa Monica court, is to make a law-breaker out of any former addict who chooses to get well without medical supervision in an approved medical or state institution! As Walker Winslow says in this week's Frontiers article, "Unless the state legislature passes a law that enables Synanon to operate legally, all of its clean addicts will be presumed to have gotten well illegally and will have their house taken from them."

For the record, it should be noted that no drugs are administered at Synanon. "Treat," in the sense that the word has application for what goes on at Synanon, is not "treat" in a narrow, medical meaning, but covers the processes of interchange of sympathy and understanding which are the secret of Synanon's success. Treatment occurs at Synanon, but not the sort of treatment which Section 11391 Of the Health and Safety Code was written to control. Further, the idea that Synanon is somehow a hospital is tenable only by the narrow thread of support supplied by the conviction on the other count of the misdemeanor—that "treatment" in the medical sense, as in a hospital, is a Synanon activity. Mr. Petris' bill ends this semantic confusion and frees Synanon from the limbo of legislative indefiniteness.

A hearing on the Petris measure, A.B. 2626, will be held by the Assembly's Public Health Committee on May 17—the date of this issue of MANAS. California friends and well-wishers of Synanon can help by wiring the Committee (chairman, the Hon. W. Byron Rumford), Mr. Petris, and their own assemblymen. Letters to both assemblymen and state senators, although they arrive a little later, will doubtless help. They should be addressed to the State Capitol Building, Sacramento 14, California.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
THE MIND CANNOT BE TESTED

A RECENT pamphlet issued by the National Education Association indicates impressive recognition of Erich Fromm's theme—that we must transcend the mechanistic biases which assume that any human being can satisfactorily analyze or catalogue another. A New York *Times* item for Feb. 19 summarizes the findings and conclusions of the pamphlet:

> A charge that children highest in creative talent are not identified by intelligence-quotient tests [was] made in a pamphlet issued by the National Education Association.
>
> Entitled "human variability and learning," the fifty-eight-page publication is a yearbook of the N.E.A.'s Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
>
> Calvin W. Taylor, Professor of Psychology at the University of Utah, charges in one of the pamphlet's discussions that the current intensive search for "gifted" children is bypassing more of the creatively-gifted children than it is identifying.
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> He cites experiments at various places in the country that have shown that if an I.Q. test is used to select top level talent about 70 per cent of those who have the highest 20 per cent of the scores on a creativity test battery will be missed.
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> Traditional intelligence tests, he says, cover only a very few of the fifty or more dimensions of the mind that have been discovered.
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> "We should be seriously concerned with searching for other kinds of high level talent, other kinds of gifted, in addition to the current academically gifted or the current I.Q. type of gifted," declares Mr. Taylor.

Dr. Ionel Rapaport, an anthropologist studying mongolism at Wisconsin's Psychiatric Institute, believes he has collected evidence that human intelligence ranges far beyond the "verbal level." In the Chicago *Daily News* (Nov. 11, 1960) Dr. Rapaport is quoted by Joseph Haas after summarizing a study of artistic creations by persons of low IQ:

> We who live in a verbal world often forget that there is an intelligence beyond that which is measured by intelligence quotient tests. These tests determine mainly verbal skills—but there is nonverbal intelligence, too.

Dr. Rapaport has assembled a unique art exhibition of more than fifty paintings chosen from among more than five hundred works of "retarded" persons throughout the world. The most renowned of the artists is Kiyoshi Yamashita, a patient of a Japanese mental hospital, with an IQ of 68. Art critics have accorded him the title of "the Van Gogh of Japan," his reputation is widely known and his works bring high prices. But Dr. Rapaport has discovered that Yamashita is not so unique as one might think, offering his exhibition as proof. In Dr. Rapaport's terms: "This show demonstrates that the retarded have their gifted too. Perhaps these retarded, unintelligent by our verbal standards, are seeking a way to communicate to express their understanding of experience and emotion."

Well, here are further grounds for criticism of the penchant for classifying human capacity on the basis of "scientific" tests. *Harpers* for March has an article by a noted mathematician, Banesh Hoffmann, titled "The Tyranny of Multiple-choice Tests," in which he shows that the "personality" disclosed by such tests can very easily be "Hamlet with Hamlet left out." Especially is this true in respect to the easy-to-grade multiple-choice variety of tests. Five large organizations are currently "selling" such tests to educators, businessmen and government agencies. Dr. Hoffmann observes:

> There is no escaping the testers with their electrical scoring machines. They measure our IQs at regular intervals and assess our scholastic achievement throughout our school days. They stand guard at the gateway to National Merit Scholarships, and they tell admissions officers how many points' worth of college aptitude we possess. They pass on our qualifications for graduate study and entry to professional schools. They classify us *en masse* in the Army. They screen us when we apply for jobs—whether in industry or government. They are even undertaking to certify our worth when we come up for promotion to positions far outranking their own.
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> The nation, in short, is placing enormous reliance on machine-graded multiple-choice tests as a

measure of ability. But, unhappily, it can be shown that they have grave defects. Our confidence in them can have dangerous consequences, not only for education but for the strength and vitality of the nation. The whole question of multiple-choice testing needs thorough re-examination—and it is not getting it.

Dr. Rapaport contends that even the IQ test may blind us to the creative capacities of sensitive misfits. Analyzing a number of multiple-choice questions, Dr. Hoffmann demonstrates that the talents of the gifted, or even of the genius, may similarly go unrecognized if the tests are constructed by those who possess little imagination. Among the examples quoted by Dr. Hoffmann is one which is supposed to test individual capacity for "critical thinking"—with a subtitle of "Recognition of Assumptions." When he saw this test, Dr. Hoffmann realized that the "example" given of how such a test should be marked was itself faulty. So, at the outset, the job-seeking subject taking the test, if aware of the test's flaws, is placed in a position he can only resent:

> . . . with your future at stake, and with resentment mounting inside you, you must now abandon logic and embark instead on the hazardous task of trying to guess what other blunders the tester has made. You dare not assume he has made none. No matter how transparent a question may seem, you must stalk it warily, wondering what possible mental quirk may have influenced the test-maker's choice of answer. And while you are agonizing over the answers, less capable competitors in the promotion race who failed to spot the error are going blithely ahead, quite possibly picking wanted answers, and certainly confident that they are taking an objective test.
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> What would happen if you protested? Judging by what has happened in the past when individual questions have been criticized, I believe the test experts might deny the question was bad. Certainly, they would point out that in all the years the test had been in use nobody else had complained about the question and that, in any case, statistics proved the test to be an excellent instrument for determining who is able to think critically and who is not.
>
> In effect, you would be told that you must pay a penalty for being exceptional. You are a statistical misfit in an age of mechanized judgment.

Dr. Hoffmann's stress on the need for continued criticism of commercially-conceived "intelligence testing" is an impressive warning against paving another section of the road to Orwell's 1984:

> Can anything be done about the multiple-choice tests? Must we simply accept them passively? It is not difficult to find prominent educators and other commentators who have launched wide-ranging *general* protests against them. William H. Whyte in *The Organization Man* and Professor Jacques Barzun in *The House of Intellect* are but two of the more recent.
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> These writers and others have made many charges against the tests. For example:
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> The tests deny the creative person a significant opportunity to demonstrate his creativity, and favor the shrewd and facile candidate over the one who has something of his own to say.
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> They penalize the candidate who perceives subtle points unnoticed by less able people, including the test-makers.
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> They are apt to be superficial and intellectually dishonest, with questions made artificially difficult by means of ambiguity because genuinely searching questions do not readily fit into the multiple-choice format.
>
> They too often degenerate into subjective guessing games in which the candidate does not pick what he considers the best answer out of a bad lot but rather the one he believes the unknown examiner would consider the best.
>
> They neglect skill in disciplined expression.
>
> They have, in sum, a pernicious effect on education and the recognition of merit.

The mind of man is not a commodity and cannot be analyzed in terms of its most important components, either organically or functionally. And this is why educators who accomplish work of real significance fail to place any important reliance upon "tests."

FRONTIERS

Crime or Disease?

THERE was a time in the middle ages when lepers were given the "death mass," belled so that they would always warn people of their proximity, and driven outside the city where they begged by holding baskets on long poles out to passers-by or over the walls. Later on huts were built for them, adequate rations of food were supplied by the King, and with the lepers treating each other, leprosy very nearly disappeared from England. The lepers of our day, it has always seemed to me, are the narcotic addicts and perhaps their plight is worse. Wherever they turn for help they are greeted by the cynical slogan, "once a drug addict always a drug addict."

As everyone who reads the press knows, one of the chief concerns of the legislative branch of government, both state and national, has been to supply more severe prison sentences for narcotic addicts and to loosen the interpretation of the law until most addicts can be declared peddlers and thus receive even more severe sentences. Where hospital plans are offered, and found acceptable to the correctional and law enforcement officers, they emerge most often as minimum security penal centers. While most physicians believe, and most law enforcement officers verbally allow, that drug addiction is a disease, the law as it stands now forbids the doctor to treat the disease, or even momentarily to alleviate the suffering it produces, unless the addict is quite wealthy. Even then the doctor is told what he can and cannot do.

Thus in the most civilized country in the world we see the diseased man not only being punished for his disease, but cut off from cures as well, by restrictive laws that handicap or outlaw those who want to help him. At present it is impossible without extreme legal harassment to conduct research that is not within the framework of all that is old and has failed. The monopoly that law enforcement controls on every facet of drug addiction has become so blatant as to engage the interest of two of America's most conservative and powerful organizations, namely the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association. *Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease*, issued by the University of Indiana Press, with an Introduction by Alfred Lindesmith, is comprised of the interim and final reports of these bodies after a study of considerable scope. Mr. Lindesmith is possibly the nation's outstanding authority on drug addiction and presently heads the sociology department of the University of Indiana.

It is interesting to note that even before the AMA and ABA could issue their report, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had issued a reply through the U.S. Treasury Department, the cover of which could easily be mistaken for the report of the joint committees. So patent was the imitation that the Bureau of Narcotics was ordered to withdraw its report. Both covers are reproduced in *Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease* and there can be little doubt of the intent to deceive. Later in the text of *Drug Addiction* there is a well documented example of where a Narcotics Bureau publication gave a grossly distorted picture of the British method of handling narcotic addiction.

Even though the AMA and ABA have leaned over backward to give the Bureau of Narcotics its just due, and even express the hope of working closely with it, the fact that they have in the main received only opposition from that organization tempers the enthusiasm of the text. Physicians don't like to have someone practice their medicine for them, and deny them research outlets, and attorneys don't like seeing sick men treated as criminals, especially when the Bill of Rights may be waived in their case, as it might have been in California, where the Governor has had to threaten veto so that drug addicts may have the same civil rights as murderers and robbers.

The Federal Bureau of Narcotics gives the number of drug addicts in this country as being about 45,000. In 1961 this would stand at one addict for every 4,000 people. In 1914, when

opiates could be bought across the counter, there was an estimate of one addict for every 400 people. Right after the Civil War the figures were probably higher than that. Harry J. Anslinger, U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics, gives credit for the reduction in addiction to the "non-medical act of 1992" that deprived physicians of the right to prescribe for addicts and to the "Narcotic Control Act of 1956" that gave longer prison sentences to peddlers and managed to make almost every addict a peddler. What he fails to mention is that all narcotic control legislation since 1914 has been aimed at making narcotics illicit and expensive, thus turning drug-users into thieves who felt compelled to steal to pay for the drugs their sick minds and bodies demanded. If this is success, let's have less of it. Probably less than a half of one per cent of the money appropriated for narcotics control has been spent on research and treatment of narcotic addicts and this would include the costs of the two largest institutions, the U.S. Narcotic installations at Lexington and Fort Worth.

Until this present report was published, there has been an almost total reliance on information released by bodies that are under the control of and control the status quo as it applies to dealing with drug addiction. This has been no secret. Dr. Lindesmith draws attention to this in his introduction to *Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease* and has done so in other writings. As a pioneer, he must be heartened to write an introduction to a book that verifies most of what he has said in the past.

The truth, as this book points out, is that narcotic addiction is a disease and that as a disease very little is known about it. In short, the basic research is not yet in that stage where prognosis can be made or treatment goals be set. But both the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association agree that prison sentences and static hospitalization are not the solution. The interim report recommends additional research in five major areas:

(1) Experimental facilities for out-patient treatment of drug addicts to explore the possibility of dealing with at least some types of addicted persons in the community rather than institutions.

(2) An extensive study of the relapse and causative factors in drug addiction.

(3) The development of sound and authoritative techniques for the prevention of drug addiction.

(4) A critical evaluation of present legislation on narcotic drugs and drug addiction.

(5) A study and analysis of the administration of present narcotic laws.

Since all five of the suggestions are obviously aimed at keeping sick addicts out of prison and checking the law enforcement's monopoly over a field that doesn't rightfully fall within its scope, they can only help the addicts who are bedeviled even when they want to get well. Perhaps there are some few addicts who sustain life and become law-abiding citizens under the British law that allows a physician to prescribe a hopeless addict's minimum needs. Really intensive medical treatment might help others.

In the last six months I have had experience with an organization in Santa Monica, California, that has had spectacular success by taking addicts in to live behind open doors. Currently the Synanon Foundation has seventy clean addicts whose abstinence ranges from a few weeks to over two and a half years. In fact, thirty-one have been clean for over a year and twenty are holding jobs out in the community. During its two and a half years of existence Synanon has had continual trouble with the law, even though none of its members has been arrested or broken a law. So far as I or any other sane observer can see, Synanon's only crime has been keeping seventy ex-addicts out of the hands of enforcement and correctional officers who think they could have handled them better. Unless the state legislature passes a law that enables Synanon to operate legally, all of its clean addicts will be presumed to have gotten well illegally and will have their house taken from them.

Another interesting point is that up until now very few of the officials or official groups concerned with rehabilitation have visited Synanon—the only place where people seem to get well without drugs or any special fanfare. Yet it seems likely that if Synanon Houses spread around the country, as I am sure they will, they may very easily take care of a quarter of the nation's drug addicts without cost to the taxpayer. Charles E. Dederich, the founder of the Synanon Plan, holds it out to any locality that is interested. This plan opens up a whole new concept of narcotic control and it will have to be recognized by public officials before too long.

My feeling when I read *Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease* was that a new era for narcotic addicts was opening up and that in a few years a drug user would know if he was being treated for a crime or punished for having a disease.

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