RECENT months have brought some thoughtful letters of criticism to MANAS, most of them concerned with matters discussed in relation to war and the threat of war. One correspondent, a medical pathologist with a background in physics and zoology, as well as in the study of radiation, questions, first, the approach to war as though it were the "primary issue" in life. He writes:

This seems to me to be adding fuel to the fire. Why is it necessary, in discussing the question, "What Are We Going to Do?", to turn to the morbid picture of military problems? The answer to the question, "How and Where Do We Start?", seems further to play upon our fears. Something built upon fear, even in trying to solve the fears, seems to me to be no beginning. I find that Gandhi was able to be successful because he was able to build on something besides fear. Perhaps I am wrong in this idea of Gandhi, but it seems to me that his life was devoted to something else—a positive approach which he could live with a moral feeling of accomplishment. This is different from continued questions of military activity. We should remember that people learn by what you do, not by what you say. When we talk about an end to the military, but continue to support it and pay lip service to it, others somehow develop the feeling that the military has a place.

And in Review of June 4 [this correspondent writes from abroad] you again return to the problem of science and genetics and the development of the arguments against the atom bomb. You build your arguments on the conclusions of the report of the geneticists' committee of the National Academy of Scientists, which says: "First that radiations produce mutations, and that mutations are in general harmful. Certainly no competent person doubts this." I guess I am not competent, but I feel that the statement that mutations are in general harmful is a little strong. Certainly, with all radiation, no matter how small, harmful mutations will take place. To this I will agree. Then the quotation goes on to the conclusion, "From the point of view of genetics, they are all bad." This is going too far! It denies, I think, that evolution is beneficial. Do you feel that so far as evolution is concerned, we should maintain our status quo?

Let us look first at this last question, as being less important, perhaps, than the rest of the issues raised. As we understand it, mutations are the mysterious alterations in biological types which, in some cases, result in evolutionary development. No one, so far as we know, has been able to trace to their source the cause of the beneficial mutations which, according to this theory, bring about evolution. We have read some interesting speculations in a journal of heredity which proposed that cosmic rays might be responsible. It is known, of course, that X-rays produce mutations; the classical experiments of Muller with fruit flies have shown this. But Muller's general conclusion—again, as we recall—was that artificially induced mutations are usually productive of monsters, when they are not lethal. In short, the mechanism of beneficent or "evolutionary" mutations remains unknown. Possibly, the statement of the geneticists' committee report was made in this context, to the effect that all the mutations scientists are so far able to induce are harmful. It seems fair to say, further, that the mutations expected to result from the radiation produced by thermo-nuclear fission will be artificially induced, by a means not essentially foreign to those employed in the laboratory. It follows that, within the experience of geneticists who have worked on these problems, the mutations so obtained will be harmful, and not beneficial. Further, since statements by committees of scientists are usually of a conservative character, having to accommodate to the opinions and views of all the members involved, it seemed reasonable to quote the report of the National Academy as being beyond dispute.

Perhaps we should admit, however, that the citation from the geneticists' committee is not half so convincing to us as the view that no
evolutionary good could possibly come from such malign preparations for destruction. The objections of the geneticists, on this view, serve as a handy rationalization or confirmation of what is no doubt a kind of mystique—a feeling that such death-dealing weapons violate every aspect of natural life. Since such scientific citations play an admittedly expedient role in our argument, it is important to listen to dissenting readers.

As for what this correspondent has to say about Gandhi, we heartily agree. Gandhi taught an affirmative philosophy. There seems to have been no fear in the man, and this is not possible without an affirmative philosophy. Gandhi did not talk about the importance of "survival." It was Gandhi's view that the first consideration of human beings should concern what they allow themselves to do to others, not what others do or are doing to them. He believed that nothing could justify violent or inhuman actions against other people. This means, to put it simply, that moral reality and values are prior to physical reality and values. Gandhi believed this with invincible conviction, and he communicated his conviction to others, in varying degree. One of the consequences of Gandhi's conviction was his doctrine of non-violence, which became a socio-political credo and a program of social action. Gandhi's ideal man is the man uncoerced by anything except his own sense of moral validity. This conception of man, obviously, fitted with his objective of freedom for India and the Indian people. A foreign invader and ruler had distracted the Indians from their task of learning to be morally free. The displacement of the British from power was only an incident—a preparatory incident—in the liberation of India and Indians, as Gandhi looked upon these matters. The fact that this single step of progress coincided with the nationalist aspirations of many millions of Indians was a happy historical accident. This is the way, perhaps, in which whole societies progress, as contrasted with individuals. Gandhi's vision conducted the Indian people to a new stage of collective responsibility. As long as they were able to participate in the vision, they moved forward. The difference between a great man and his followers is that the great man is able to maintain his vision without requiring a particular focus provided by the juncture of historical events. When the juncture passes, the vision fades, and this is the tragedy and the crucifixion of the leader. If Gandhi had not died of an assassin, his heart might have been broken by the indifference to his vision which came after Independence for India.

Gandhi's vision was not, of course, a private revelation to him alone. Other men shared it with him, and still share it. And the same process continues, although with less high drama. Each man tries to make his share of the vision collaborate with the progressive tendency in history. He tries to fit it into the openings of people's minds as best he can. Today, many people fear. This fear becomes an access to their minds: not the best access there is, but an access. When you address a man in the terms of his fear, you get his attention. You may have to say to him, somewhere along the line, that the only real antidote to what he fears is the acquirement of courage. Now what the man who fears wants is an adjustment of circumstances. He wants those dark shadows removed from his horizon. He wants a new deal. These longings become obsessive. One view of the problem is that you can't get him to listen to you at all unless you start out by talking about what seems important to him—in this case, his fears. There is the further consideration that if you don't ever get his attention, he may be moved by his fears to do some terrible thing. He may take a step that he cannot retrace.

How will you move this man to look up from his fears, to contemplate the possibility of a life free from the dynamics of fear? If we knew the answer to this, we should be the wisest of men. For the time being, our correspondent's suggestion seems the best so far: "We should remember that people learn by what you do, not
by what you say.” Men who live good lives without giving any hostages to fear are probably contributing the most to the future peace of mankind.

Another correspondent quotes—without especially agreeing with what is said—from a letter to the editor in the Saturday Review. The SR reader said:

It seems N.C. [Norman Cousins, SR editor] makes of the four Golden Rule men (SR June 21) heroic examples of Individual Man resisting the overwhelming blind forces that beset him. I think that men like to think of themselves in such glowing terms. But professional pacifists, such as they are, are not always heroes with glorious ideals. Too often their obsessive interest in religion, preventing war, and championing non-violence, like the interests of anti-vivisectionists in stopping experiments on laboratory animals, is only the working out of their own emotional maladjustments.

Here is a fine example of the misuse of “psychology.” But first of all, the facts in this letter are wrong. The men who sailed the Golden Rule are not "professional pacifists," whatever that may mean. The two elder members of the crew of four, both about fifty, both happen to be practicing architects. Another is a school teacher, and the fourth has been in the service of the American Friends Service Committee for many years, although recently he worked for the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors in Philadelphia.

Is it, on the other hand, so bad to think of yourself in some kind of "glowing terms"? Patrick Henry climbed a stump and shouted, "Give me liberty or give me death!" and we put these glowing sentiments in our elementary school readers to inspire like feelings in the young. We don't, at any rate, call him "obsessed" or "neurotic," although the man may have had quite a case, for all the history books say.

Now come four men who said something like this, in Gandhian terms. Patrick Henry challenged the authority of the King of England. The men on the Golden Rule challenged the authority of the Bomb. The King of England hoped to terrorize the American colonists. The Bomb, or the men who make it, or plan to use it, hope to terrorize the world or a large part of it—to make the world "behave."

So these four men challenged the authority of the Bomb. They didn't do it in a Quaker meeting, where most everybody would agree with them. They went out on the high seas where somebody could hear them, which is about the only place that is sensible to go, if you intend to make a challenge. What's maladjusted about that?

You could say that they were maladjusted to keeping still about how they felt about the Bomb. You could say that people who tell the truth are maladjusted to lying. You can throw that word around with all the certainty of a Scotch Presbyterian who is sure of no one's salvation but his own. You can even compare people you disagree with to that poor fool and anti-vivisectionist, Bernard Shaw, to consolidate your point.

And if a man should care enough about what he believes in to take a public stand of some sort, you can say that his interest in what he believes is "obsessive."

We found a passage in the Encyclopædia Britannica, in the article on William Lloyd Garrison, which seems pertinent, here:

On the 1st of January 1831, without a dollar of capital, and without a single subscriber, he [Garrison] and his partner Isaac Knapp issued the first number of the Liberator, avowing their "determination to print it as long as they could subsist on bread and water, or their hands obtain employment." Its motto was, "Our country is the world—our countrymen are mankind"; and the editor, in his address to the public, uttered the words which have become memorable as embodying the whole purpose and spirit of his life: "I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard." . . .

Garrison sought the abolition of slavery by moral means alone. . .
Garrison's opponents probably said worse things about him than that he was "obsessive" or "maladjusted." But Garrison is today remembered, while his opponents are forgotten. Maybe Garrison had moments when he thought of himself in glowing terms. We don't know about that. We don't care about that. According to the Britannica, "His services . . . were recognized and honoured by President Lincoln and others in authority, and the whole country knew that the agitation which made the abolition of slavery feasible and necessary was largely due to his uncompromising spirit and indomitable courage."

It is easy to see that something was the matter with Garrison. He and Knapp started out without a dollar—everybody knows you have to have money to do anything important—and the two men slept on the floor of the room where they got out the paper. Well-adjusted people know better than that. And Garrison was obviously a "professional" anti-slavery advocate. He had to be—he gave all his time to it.

You can find plenty of parallels in history to convict the crew of the Golden Rule of all the foolish, offensive, and unconventional things that men like Garrison were guilty of. They even believe in "moral means alone" to defeat evil, the same as he did. The only real difference, so far as we can see, is that while Garrison was against the institution of slavery, the men on the Golden Rule were and are against the institution of war. Maybe this makes Garrison right and them wrong. You can't be absolutely sure. But we may be able to be sure a hundred years from now.

Another correspondent wonders about "pacifism" and whether it is necessary to be pacifist "all the time." Why not be a pacifist just some of the time? A convinced and absolute pacifist might find it easy to make fun of this question, yet it is far from being unreasonable. Even Gandhi said that it is better to be a soldier than to refuse to fight from fear. Gandhi believed in resisting evil. Gandhi was more concerned with defining evil correctly and opposing it successfully than he was with establishing rules for human behavior. He cared more about truth and courage and integrity than he did about non-violence, although, for him, these attitudes merged into one.

But the question raised by this correspondent is one which can be considered, for the moment, without involving the subject of "Pacifism." For this purpose it is necessary only to rephrase the question thus: Why not reject some wars while being willing to fight in others?

This would probably be the preference of a lot of people. The only difficulty with this point of view is that it is made legally impossible for citizens of modern power States by the draft, or the requirement of universal military service. The State does not permit the citizen to distinguish between the good and the bad wars he is asked to fight in. Eugene Debs was put in prison for doing just that, at the outset of World War I.

Actually, it might be said that the uncompromising demands of the State upon young men of draft age has been in some measure responsible for the familiar conception of the "pacifist." It is difficult to imagine a modern society without universal military conscription, but if such a society is conceivable, it would have to include every stripe of opinion concerning war. Some might argue that the idea of such a society is wholly utopian—that it could be applied only to people who were able to maintain their freedom through some sort of moral prestige. For, manifestly, a voluntary army could never answer to the imperatives of the total conflict—military, economic, technological, and scientific—which modern war involves.

The question—Why not fight just in some wars?—is therefore itself somewhat utopian.

Modern democratic States, however, have made provision for the limited exemption from the draft of young men who claim conscientious objection to war on the grounds of religious training or belief. To enjoy this "privilege"—the Supreme Court of the United States has defined
conscientious objection as a privilege, allowed by the Congress through legislation, and not a constitutional right—a young man must convince his draft board that his moral (religious) scruples against war are absolute. If a willingness to fight in some wars, but not in others, is detected in him, he is almost certain to be classed as a "political" objector and ordered into the army. Thus the policy of the State, which is easily understandable from the point of view of the State, has contributed to the definition of the "pacifist" position. A young man making up his mind has no in-between latitude. It is all wars or no wars, a purely either-or decision for him.

This loss of the prerogative of qualified decision is no doubt a factor in the creation of pacifists out of some young men. They may say to themselves that the wars which produce a situation that drives men to extremes are obviously very bad things, and since every war does this, every war is a bad thing. Reasoning thus, they are driven to take the absolute pacifist position. Other feelings, no doubt, play a part, in many cases a more dominant part, but it seems an inescapable conclusion that the sharp definition of the pacifist in modern terms is very largely a result of State policy.

The man in no danger of being drafted, or who happens to approve of the war going on at the time he is called, can of course feel that he still exercises his power of decision. The fact is, however, that his decision in this case permits conformity to the requirements of the State. But if he should decide otherwise—determined to differ from the State—he would end up labeled as a felon, serving a term of two or three years, possibly five, in a federal prison for violation of the draft act. In the abstract, and in principle, this possibility should not be enough to cause him to define his position in "absolute" terms, unless he really feels that way. But when the socio-moral situation is of this order, the issue of war itself, and not the issue between "good" and "bad" wars, is likely to obtain the highest priority in a man's thinking.

There is a curious contrast between the East and the West, in certain historical respects. By East and West, here, we mean geographical, not political designations. For the West, the major moral problem is the emerging necessity to control the multiplying powers of the State, not the least of which is the military power, which is growing so rapidly as to exceed rational comprehension of what is involved in "military supremacy." Meanwhile, in the East, the birth of several new national States has produced an opposite concern—the endeavor to gain State power in order to catch up as equals or rivals of the Western nations. The East, however, is not without national leaders who see at least some of the dangers inherent in an excess of military power. Certainly Prime Minister Nehru can never forget what Gandhi thought of military establishments.

To settle these questions, the world needs experience, thinking, and inspiration. Whether the world has enough time left to get the experience, to do the thinking, and to awaken the inspiration, remains to be seen.
REVIEW
A FREUDIAN WISH

IT is a pleasure to be able to read, in the pages of Réalités, a French monthly printed in English, a discussion of war by Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. As Denis de Rougement says in an introduction to these letters by men of genius, intellectual discourse at this level has nowadays been largely replaced "by that brutal argumentation which passes for thought in the totalitarian age—whether the arguer is attacking or defending dictatorships."

The letters were written twenty-five years ago, at the invitation of the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation. In neither communication is there the slightest breath of nationalism. Neither writer has any concern for "public opinion"—that is, for how the correspondence may be "received." The letters represent the best "realism" of the greatest men of their generation.

Einstein's views are probably the more familiar of the two. He proposes, as the means to peace, an international authority which would demand "the unconditional surrender by every nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty of action, its sovereignty that is to say." Einstein felt that a supranational organization would have to have the power "to render verdicts of incontestable authority and enforce absolute submission to the execution of its verdicts."

It is the failure of the world to establish this sort of authority over the nations which leads Dr. Einstein to speak of the "strong psychological factors at work, which paralyze these efforts." Accordingly, he addresses a question to Dr. Freud: "Is it possible to control man's mental evolution so as to make him proof against the psychoses of hate and destructiveness?"

Freud's answer to this question is a masterpiece of what Aristotle would have called "practical wisdom," as distinguished from thinking of a theoretical kind. Freud's theories come into his answer, of course, but the reader who is not a student of Freud soon realizes that he is encountering one of the most civilized minds of the twentieth century. Even the reader who deplores Freud's oversimplification of an all-embracing sexual dynamic in human behavior will be obliged to recognize that here was a man who, despite his technical "materialism," was capable of an ethical vision far transcending the outlook of many of his more conventional critics.

Two points stand out in Freud's answer. First, he shows that the power of the State, or of a combination of States, to repress violent action, is itself an expression of violence. "It too," he says, "is violence, quick to attack whatever individual stands in its way, and it employs the selfsame methods, follows like ends, with but one difference: it is communal, not individual, violence that has its way." Freud objects to the assumption that the organized power of the State embodies "right." The "right" of the State is only "the might of a community." He points out that the growth of State power through war has brought as its sole result to the peoples of the world, that, "instead of frequent, not to say incessant little wars, they now had to face great wars which, if less frequent, were so much the more destructive."

The psychological compulsions to war which Einstein asks about, Dr. Freud explains in an analysis of the conflict and interrelation between the erotic instincts and the "death instinct." He writes at some length on this subject, turning, finally, to the question of what is to be done. The ideal condition, which he admits is a utopian idea, "would obviously be found," he says, "in a community where every man subordinated his instinctive life to the dictates of reason." But he also says to Dr. Einstein:

In your strictures on the abuse of authority I find another suggestion for an indirect attack on the war impulse. That men are divided into leaders and the led is simply another manifestation of their inborn and irremediable inequality. The second class constitutes the vast majority; they need a high
command to make decisions for them, which they usually bow to without demur. In this context we would point out that men should be at greater pains than in the past to form a superior class of independent thinkers, unamenable to intimidation and fervent in the quest of truth, whose function it would be to guide the dependent masses.

Freud's chief interest, however, is in the question of why men become pacifists at all:

Why do we, you and I and many another, protest so vehemently against war, instead of accepting it as another of life's odious Importunities? . . .

The answer to my query may run as follows: Because every man has a right over his own life and war destroys lives that were full of promise, it forces the individual into situations that shame his manhood, obligating him to murder fellow men, against his will: it ravages material amenities, the fruits of human toil, and much besides. Moreover wars, as now conducted, afford no scope for acts of heroism according to the old ideals and, given the high perfection of modern arms, war today would mean the sheer extermination of one of the combatants, if not of both. This is so true, so obvious, that we can only wonder why the conduct of war is not banned by general consent.

Freud admits that these views may be open to debate, but adds that the point of greatest interest is the unqualified hatred of war felt by both Dr. Einstein and himself. They, (we), he says, "cannot do other than hate it. Pacifists we are, since our organic nature wills us to be so." Why should this be? The development of pacifists Freud attributes to the general cultural development of mankind, of which he says:

The psychic changes which accompany this process of cultural change are striking and not to be gainsaid. They consist in the progressive rejection of instinctive ends and a scaling down of instinctive reactions. Sensations which delighted our forefathers have become neutral or unbearable to us; and, if our ethical and esthetic ideals have undergone a change, the causes of this are ultimately organic. On the psychological side two of the most important phenomena of culture are, firstly, a strengthening of the intellect, which tends to master our instinctive life, and, secondly, an introversion of the aggressive impulse, with all its consequent benefits and perils. Now war runs most emphatically counter to the psychic disposition imposed on us by the growth of culture; we are therefore bound to resent war, to find it utterly intolerable. With pacifists like us it is not merely an intellectual and affective repulsion, but a constitutional intolerance, an idiosyncrasy in its most drastic form. It seems that the esthetic ignominies of war play almost as large a part in this repugnance as war's atrocities.

How long have we to wait before the rest of men turn pacifist? Impossible to say, and yet perhaps our hope that these two factors—man's cultural disposition and a well-founded dread of the form that future wars will take—may serve to put an end to war in the near future, is not chimerical. But by what ways or by-ways this will come about, we cannot guess. Meanwhile we may rest assured that whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war.

What shall we say about this? Perhaps the most pertinent comment is to the effect that Freud, who is often referred to as the man who exposed the tremendous power of the irrational in human behavior, is here seen as the man who speaks hopefully about the influence of leaders, independent thinkers able to subordinate the instinctive life to "the rule of reason," and who looks for actual psychic transformations in man's nature which will in time make all men pacifist.
COMMENTARY

POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE

We are beginning to get some new definitions of politics and some new conceptions of political action. But, as a matter of fact, some of the thinking along these lines probably ought not to be called "political" at all, since it has so little relation to conventional political ideas.

One source of this political "new thought" is Jayaprakash Narayan, the Indian socialist leader who some years ago renounced his twenty-year role as leader of the Socialist Party of India to join the Bhoodan (land gift) movement headed by Vinoba Bhave. "The faith and hope that the people seem to repose in politics," Jayaprakash said, "appear pitiable to me."

J. P. (Jayaprakash Narayan) decided to devote his energies to what he calls Lokniti (the politics of the people) as distinguished from Rajniti (the politics of the State). He finds that the party system perpetuates centralized power, "seeking to reduce the people to the position of sheep whose only function of sovereignty would be to choose periodically the shepherds who would look after their welfare." Recalling Gandhi's statement that the panchayat "government" (patriarchal community rule) can function only under a law of its own making, J. P. explained his alliance with Vinoba's Bhoodan movement by saying:

Decentralisation cannot be effected by handing down power from above to people who have been politically emasculated and whose capacity for self-rule has been thwarted, if not destroyed, by the party system and concentration of power at the top. . . .

I decided to withdraw from party-and-power politics not because of disgust or any personal frustration, but because it became clear to me that politics could not deliver the goods. The goods being the same old goals of equality, freedom, brotherhood, peace. . . .

These statements appear in a long letter by J. P., serialized in several recent issues of Sarvodaya, a magazine devoted to Vinoba's work.

The politics of the people, carried on in the spirit of Sarvodaya, J. P. concludes, "can have no party and no concern with power. Rather its aim will be to see that all centres of power are abolished. The more this new politics grows, the more the old politics shrinks—a real withering away of the State."

How might these tendencies find expression in an industrial and technological society? A partial answer to this question is to be found in a new paperback, Facing Reality, just published by the Correspondence Publishing Co., 2121 Gratiot Ave., Detroit 7, Mich., at $1. This book, while not "Gandhian" in temper, is filled with illustrations of the capacity of workers' councils to operate industrial plants and to assume the practical responsibilities of government. This was especially evident in Hungary, before the invasion of the Soviet troops put an end to the Hungarian Revolution. The authors of Facing Reality observe: "One of the greatest achievements of the Hungarian Revolution was to destroy once and for all the legend that the working class cannot act successfully except under the leadership of a political party."

These are only a few of the signs that the social order of the future may come into being only as the politics of power and centralized control is abandoned as a futility belonging with other social and moral evils left in the past.
CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
CRITICISM ON THE RUSSIAN STORY—II

Editor, "Children . . . and Ourselves": Your article in the June 25 issue contained a description of a day in a Russian schoolroom. As a music teacher and a parent of a five-year-old entering kindergarten, I wish to state my views.

There is no doubt that our school system has many faults, but they won't be cured by authoritarian regimentation such as is pictured in your article [the description of Soviet education was quoted from a Statevepost article]. True, Ivan may be years ahead of Johnny because he goes to school six days instead of five and has four hours of homework. I know children who are in so-called "Special Progress" classes in New York and Long Island, where they are loaded with so much homework that they are up until midnight every night and have time for nothing else. Perhaps such a child can match the Russian student, but is either being truly educated?

What should be the purpose of education? The accumulation of a vast collection of facts? Definitely not. We go to school to learn to think! A recent New York Times article, after a detailed study of the Russian school system, concluded that, despite their more rigorous program, the students were not particularly imaginative or creative. Their students know more than ours, but are they capable of creative thought? Max Lerner, defending our school system in the New York Post, mentioned the fact that our schools are among the few in the world where children can debate and discuss important questions, something unheard of in Russia or in most of Europe, for that matter. This is more important than all the book knowledge that can be crammed into the human brain.

What is wrong with American schools? We have the basis for the best school system in the world, but we have lost sight of many of the aims of education. Discipline has broken down, as it has in the home, and that problem will have to be solved in order to prevent the waste of valuable classroom hours. Yet, the development of obedience and respect does not necessitate rigid discipline.

I believe that it is time to stop comparing our schools with the Russians' or anyone's else. If we are to have a free, creative society, we must have a similarly free and creative school system.

The issue, here, seems to resolve around the meaning of the word "compare." From our point of view, the basic problems confronted by Russian educators are the same as our own. However, as this correspondent points out, the Russian system leans toward "rigid" discipline, while we have long been explaining the virtues of a largely elective, free-selection approach. A comparison of the results of these two systems should, therefore, be of some value.

Our correspondent recalls Max Lerner's defense of American schools as offering a rare opportunity "where children can debate and discuss important questions." But is not a solid grounding in the "liberal arts" necessary if teachers, let alone children, are to be able to discuss "important questions" intelligently? Our liking of Dr. Hutchins' estimate of present educational shortcomings stems from the fact that we believe, as he does, that freedom without intellectual background and discipline can be educationally vacuous, and even politically dangerous. You have to be something of a philosopher to discuss and debate on other than a partisan basis, and intelligent use of the tools of logic, like those of mathematics, requires intensive training. Our correspondent admits a lack of "discipline," and suggests that there is no need for rigidity for the development of obedience and respect. Yet some rigid requirements may well be a part of the learning every child needs.

Another correspondent presents an interesting quotation from Herbert Spencer—interesting because proponents of both schools of thought in modern education may want to claim him for authority. Spencer said:

They should be told as little as possible, and induced to discover as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; and that to achieve the best results, each mind must progress somewhat after the same fashion, is continually proved by the marked success of the self-made men. Those who have been brought up under the ordinary school-drill, and have carried away with them the idea that education is practicable only in that style, will think it hopeless to make children their own
teachers. If, however, they will call to mind that the all-important knowledge of surrounding objects which a child gets in its early years is got without help—if they will remember that the child is self-taught in the use of its mother tongue—if they will estimate the amount of that experience of life, that out-of-school wisdom, which every boy gathers for himself—if they will mark the unusual intelligence of the uncared-for London gamin, as shown in all directions in which his facilities have been tasked—if further, they will think how many minds have struggled up unaided, not only through the mysteries of our irrationally planned curriculum, but through hosts of other obstacles besides; they will find it a not unreasonable conclusion, that if the subject be put before him in right order and right form, any pupil of ordinary capacity will surmount his successive difficulties with but little assistance.

The suggestion that children should be told as little as possible and induced to discover as much as possible is an expression of the new educational outlook in America—new, that is, as a "system" since the first days of Progressive Education. But when Spencer affirms that the child can learn a good deal of what he needs to know, "if the subjects are put before him in right order and right form," he supports those who believe that a certain "rigidity" in presentation of basic subjects is in order.

Our critic of last week, a curriculum supervisor, felt that of our various critical statements, the least justified was one to the effect that the public schools had inherited "a system which, in trying to do everything at once has ended by doing nothing well, save, perhaps, in the area of personality adjustment in the lower grades." Again, a lot depends upon what one means by "well." The Rockefeller Report, to which our critic referred with high praise, remarks that "our society will have passed an important milestone of maturity when those who are most enthusiastic proponents of a democratic way of life are also the most vigorous proponents of excellence." Now "excellence" may easily refer to progress in the disciplines of learning, and to the virtues of the philosophically contained person. For those who hold that the intellectual disciplines are tremendously important, what has often been called the "scatter-gun" approach to curriculum planning seems an undesirable course. The educators who compiled the Rockefeller Report are not unmindful of the problem posed by the great latitude of the modern high school curriculum. The Report remarks:

The gravest problem today is to reach some agreement on priorities in subject matter. We have been extraordinarily tolerant, however, in the matter of electives in high school. In the great "democracy of subject matters" which we allowed to develop, it is only a moderate exaggeration to say that any subject was considered to be as important as any other subject. Deciding what is more important and what is less important among the electives is particularly vital in the case of the able student who must be challenged and held to high standards of performance.

Without presuming to lay down an inflexible set of recommendations, we may suggest what these high-priority items in a solid high-school curriculum might be for those are based partly upon a recent study by Dr. James B. Conant and partly upon the findings of a conference sponsored by the National Education Association.

In addition to the "general education" prescribed for all (four years of English, three to four years of social studies, one year of mathematics and one year of science), the academically talented student should have two to three additional years of science, three additional years of mathematics, and at least three years of a foreign language. For certain students, the study of a second language for at least three years might replace the fourth year of mathematics and the third year of science.

The discouraging fact seems to be that the differences in language and tradition among schools of thought in education lead to factionalism and partisanship. The Rockefeller Report, highly esteemed, and for good reason, by most "educationists," appears to us to be stressing the same points as those made by Robert Hutchins, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Stringfellow Barr. From the article in the May NEA Journal, recommended by our most outspoken critic, we select two sentences which echo a theme made familiar by Dr. Hutchins:
The founders of our republic envisioned a nation of educated men and women capable of grappling with difficult problems on a high plane of thought. One of the ends of education is to produce men and women who will be dissatisfied with "what is" and who will ask of life more than material goods.

Just what does it take to be able to "grapple with difficult problems on a high plane of thought"? This, as we have before argued, means a disciplined education in the manner envisioned by Jefferson. Such discipline is conspicuous by its rarity in our times. The blame cannot be solely attached to the "educationists," nor to any "system" of the past or present, yet here we have one of the essential problems in American schooling today.
FRONTIERS
More on "Vegetarianism"

OUR brief discussion of the issues posed by the vegetarians (MANAS, June 11) has elicited more correspondence. Before quoting from letters received—which include the only protest of the possible implications of our piece—we must again point out that it is not MANAS policy to try to guide anyone's eating habits! But the vegetarians are trying to be philosophical in an area most people relate only to ideas about "solid food" and ease of meal preparation. So vegetarian thinking deserves some attention.

One correspondent protests the suggestion that a meatless diet may actually be better for one's health. He writes:

In Frontiers for June 11, in extolling the virtues of vegetarianism, you were, I feel, guilty of being carried away to the point of confusing fact with fantasy. I have no quarrel with vegetarians who believe, as many do, that the killing and eating of animals is morally wrong. But, when we are told that meat is bad for us or that it contains "too many acids productive of fatigue," etc., then the personal opinions of a man or of a group are being put forth as actual fact. In reality, the overwhelming body of scientific evidence points to opposite conclusions regarding the role of meat in the diet.

Animal protein is the only complete protein, vegetable protein lacking certain vital amino (protein) acids. Vitamin B12, vitally needed to prevent pernicious anemia, is present only in animal protein and it is interesting that this is a common disease among vegetarians. Wasn't Shaw taking liver shots?

Many animals live on vegetables, but we could not possibly match the cow bite for bite in order to get the nutrition needed. Frankly, great feats of strength, valor, intellect, and longevity have been attributed to everything from indulging in or abstaining from meat and drink to cigars and women.

Every man is entitled to his beliefs and they must be respected, but we must also remember that many dogmas still taught by modern religions are the out-growths of long forgotten tribal customs.

The remark concerning "too many acids productive of fatigue" was not originated by MANAS, nor endorsed, since we do not have the knowledge necessary for either accepting or denying its validity. It is interesting, however—and we pointed this out—that two of the greatest long-distance swimmers in history have seen fit to attribute their phenomenal endurance to a non-meat diet. The Australian, Murray Rose, is a current example, and John Weissmuller tells in his book on swimming instruction how his difficulty with swimming long distances was overcome by going six months without meat. These statements by Rose and Weissmuller were not paid testimonials.

The strongest social argument we know of for lessening of meat consumption is provided by Roy Walker in a pamphlet, Bread and Peace (C.W. Daniel Co., Ltd., Essex, England). After quoting Fairfield Osborn, various British authorities, and William Vogt, Chief of the Conservation Section of the Pan-American Union, Walker summarizes:

We cannot feed the present world population in the way that Britons and Americans are now accustomed to being fed but we can and must feed all the people, and even the larger populations that may arise later in this century, if we heed Plato's advice.

Sir John Russell gave an analysis of his figure of 1.6 acres. Beef, .8; lamb and mutton, .3; pig meat, .2. That is 1.3 acres! The remaining .3 provides all the bread, butter, milk, cheese, fruit, and vegetables! And, as the last League of Nations report states categorically, "it is possible to construct diets meeting all known nutritional requirements on the basis of whole-grain bread, fruits, vegetables, and milk."

A few months ago the Secretary of the Bombay Humanitarian League put this question: "Roughly speaking, what is the area of irrigated land needed to support an adult human being on a diet of fruits, nuts, and cereals, with fruits as the predominating and staple diet?" Mr. C. V. Castle, farm adviser for the State of California, replied that "using yields as would ordinarily be obtained on irrigated lands in California and using 2,500 calories a day, I would say that one-third of an acre would be required."

Other correspondents are pleased by our discussion of vegetarianism:
Editors, MANAS: Some of Dr. Prasad's remarks on vegetarianism (MANAS, June 11, 1958) strike me as being particularly significant. He stresses "the need to look upon life as an integrated whole and coordinate different activities in such a way as to fit in with and help in the upward growth of man." Is it not in seeing things whole that we become whole, in integrating life that we move toward integrity?

I believe this question of meat-eating to be a fundamental one.

Do not most persons go through their entire lives without once considering seriously the implications of their eating meat? They enjoy the taste of it but put out of their mind all thoughts about the foulness, cruelty and exploitation by which the stuff arrives on their dinner plate. People are revolted at the idea of cutting up animals—until they call it meat. When eating, it is unpardonably bad manners to talk of butchering and may even be the ruination of the meal for some squeamish diners. Meat-eaters have a sort of gentlemen's agreement not to mention the slaughterhouse and its gore when at table, as embezzlers do not care to discuss the source of their funds.

Countless healthy, vigorous, creative vegetarians are sufficient indication that their carnivorous brothers want flesh rather than need it to maintain bodily well-being. But is this want a wholesome one?

I believe a person who is concerned about life will, among other things, take care not to consume more of the creation than is needful, either in quantity or in quality. In a land where there is an abundance of nourishing fruits and vegetables, man's killing and eating of animals is a crime against the universe.

While some men, soldiers and butchers, are willing to kill for a living, and the rest are willing to purchase their services, we cannot expect Peace on Earth, Utopia, the Kingdom of God, or whatever we choose to call that state of genuine human betterment toward which it is man's high purpose to strive.

When we think of how little kinship most people sense with their fellow humans, let alone with the animals, it is not surprising that they feel they live in a somehow alien world, and behave accordingly. Perhaps it is largely this mature sense of kinship which our values lack, and which could hasten, in Dr. Prasad's words, "the upward growth of man." The sense of kinship in man,—who shall set its limits?

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Editors, MANAS: The MANAS article on vegetarianism (June 11) has quoted Fairfield Osborn as having said that "the uncomfortable truth is that man, during innumerable past ages, has been a predator—a hunter, a meat-eater and a killer." Vegetarianism indeed rests on the fundamental questions which Osborn's observations raise: Has man the right to kill? We can all take life, but can any of us give it?

Vegetarianism, in its true sense, is the expression of the highest morality, reverence for life, and it points to an ideal state of abhaya—freedom from fear. It also rests on a spirit of compassion, on a sense of pity as opposed to cruelty, and a sense of beauty as opposed to ugliness. It is at once highly ethical and aesthetic. (Some American friends ask me what is so aesthetic about eating boiled beans and mashed potatoes, but, answering on their own level, I tell them they are only ignorant of the wonderful variety of vegetarian food.)

Arguments in favor of vegetarianism have been advanced on medical, hygienic and physical cultural grounds. But these seem to me to miss the basic point, namely, that vegetarianism is not simply abstinence from flesh-eating, but stands for a definite code of conduct and an attitude of mind. There is a peace about the vegetarian way of living because it is based on reverence for life, on ahimsa or non-violence. On the other hand, meat-consumption by preference represents, as does war-killing, dehumanization of feelings in man.

By the last statement, however, I do not imply that all vegetarians are morally or culturally superior to non-vegetarians. There is little doubt that vegetarianism is a better way of living, but it does not necessarily follow that vegetarians are superior people. Not every one in academic robes is a scholar. There are indeed vegetarians who would not touch meat, fish or fowl with a pair of chop sticks, but who would shoot animals and birds for "sport." Sometimes even the sincere become lethargic in their idealistic aspirations. Hindus, for instance, worship the cow and this is symbolic of their traditional reverence for life; but the cow does not get the best of attention in modern India. The Hindu ideal is truly humanitarian and wonderful, but in many cases a coat of lethargy seems to have settled on the ideal and cow-worship seems to represent only a habitual performance of a rite.

I should perhaps point out here that not all Indians, not even all Hindus, are vegetarians. To quote Mr. Sri Prakasa, Governor of Bombay, from his...
address to the World Vegetarian Congress held in Madras, India, last year, "there are (Hindu) communities in India which regard meat-eating as absolutely improper, irreligious, immoral, while others think just the opposite and see nothing bad in it. We in India as a whole are really non-vegetarians, though some friends from other lands may not know about it."

Vegetarians the world over are of two classes. There are those who "eat grass" as a result of moral and sentimental persuasions while others are vegetarians by circumstance, products only of environment and necessity. It is the vegetarians of the first type who really constitute the atoms for peace, for these are not mere habitués.