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THE PROPHETIC AGONIZERS

RECENTLY, in one of those conversations from which no conclusion is expected, but only the small relief from pain that sometimes comes by talking about it, a discouraged reformer said to a sympathetic friend: "You have *no idea* how little these people understand what must be done! They live from day to day, accepting their burdens as they do the weather, and their longing for a better life emerges mostly as the wasted emotion of thinking about what they cannot have, except by some kind of miracle. They will not organize. The simple procedures of shaping the vehicles of political action are too much for them." It was this sort of discouragement, most likely, which turned Mussolini from an ardent socialist into an angry fascist. No doubt the arbitrary absolutes of the Communist party line are a related phenomenon. Without just exactly the right provocations from circumstances, and an understandable course of action which relates directly to the change of those circumstances, revolutionary or radical reform movements are exceedingly difficult to get off the ground by democratic means. The impetus for action has to get to the people in terms of some deep existential value; they have to feel that they are violated as human beings; and then there must be an activist program which gives expression to the strong emotion so generated, and at the same time represents the promise of a radical change, of the establishment of new relationships in which the violation will no longer be possible.

This is the juxtaposition of ideas and feelings which makes the revolutionary myth come alive in the hearts of men, lifting them above themselves and releasing dynamic social forces which cannot be stopped or opposed by ordinary repressive means. Usually, there is some deception in the formula, since the feeling which produced the action seldom survives a successful revolt or political gain. The hour of "revolutionary love" is short, the brotherly comradeship of the rebels in self-effacing struggle soon a memory of lost glory. Then comes the puzzling and even degrading disenchantment of another dull and unimaginative status quo. If you have the courage and the honesty to measure revolutionary achievement in *human* terms, you may experience the dismay and frustration which makes some men of good will enter monasteries, and others relax as script writers for the film industry. It is only the wise, we suppose, who are able to leave dilemmas of this sort unresolved, and continue to ponder the mysteries of the human situation. But then, on the other hand, there have been measurable benefits. People who go to work as teachers in new schools, who engage themselves in better housing and other programs of public works are able to live lives of genuine fulfillment. These things needed to be done. The children now have better opportunities. There is more equity in the law and more justice in its administration.

Certain mysteries, however, remain. These mysteries exist by reason of the differences among human beings. We might explain these differences—or rather describe them—by saying that in some men the existential dilemmas lie close to the surface of conscious life, subjecting them to continuous and often torturing questions, while in others they are buried so deep that these questions do not arise in their own terms, but emerge, if they are heard from at all, as forms of uneasiness which are at once made to animate the propensity for finding scapegoats.

There are always lies in the vulgarized myths by which men justify themselves and their private and public behavior. The difficulty is that if you expose the lies, you seem to attack the myth, and then, the myth being a prime article of faith, no one will listen to you, or just the few. In fact, if

you invite only close attention to the course of society under the existing version of the myth, you may get little more than cold indifference. Take for example the opening article in the *Center Diary,* a newsletter published for the members of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. In this article, Robert M. Hutchins, president of the Center, says:

> During a recent talk to a meeting of relatively conservative businessmen, a Center consultant was asked what appeared to be a number of versions of the same question: Why study democratic institutions? We have home rule in our cities, we can make our positions known on bond issues; we elect our state and national officials; we have the right to speak up; we have more freedom than anyone else on earth, we can "throw the rascals out" when it appears wise to do so, we can change our jobs and our homes almost at will; our interests can be defended as loudly and as strongly as we can arouse concern for them. What is more, we are prosperous. What is the need for study? And if there is no genuine need, then isn't it true that the Center is really a "propaganda outfit"? . . .
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> Meanwhile, it is interesting that the question itself was being asked only two weeks after the assassination of the President, when political writers were speculating that the lesson to be learned and the danger to be feared was that the political climate had become so polarized that political debate was next to impossible.
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> It came at a time when California and Arizona leaders were locked in a battle over river water rights which had already involved the Supreme Court of the United States and the Secretary of the Interior and could not be settled on a state or local basis. It came at a time when committee chairmen in Congress from the South almost single-handedly were preventing legislative action on civil rights and tax-reduction bills for which the President had pleaded, when private interests in California were preparing to mount a campaign against a state law that did little more than make specific in the field of racial equality what the Supreme Court had already made implicit; when state legislatures almost everywhere were being forced to comply with Supreme Court edicts concerning reapportionment.
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> The question was based on the assumption that the democracy of America was functioning in 1963 as it had in its eighteenth century New England cradle; but the history of 1963 seemed to be questioning the assumption.
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> People who have lived in old houses that have frequently been remodeled are familiar with light switches that are no longer connected to light fixtures; windows that open only into closets; doors that no longer open into anything; and paths that stop abruptly nowhere in particular. If the conditions within which democracy must exist have really changed, then the function of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions might well be to determine which light switches are really working, which have been disconnected, and which others cannot be disconnected without destroying what has been built.

This is the Center's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua,* and it is a good one. It has meaning, however, only if you care. The situation of the Center is something like that of Jane Addams, when she visited a fashionable women's club in New York, and, looking out of a window, saw the rubbish-filled backyard of a next-door tenement where an incredibly dirty little girl was playing amid the filth. "Oh dear," said her embarrassed hostess. "We've been meaning to build a higher wall to cut off that view, but we just haven't done it yet."

This brings us to a consideration of the people who care. Who are they? *Why* do they care? Why are they so few? Dare they recognize one another? If they do, in what terms of common recognition should they pursue a dialogue? How can they explain themselves without exhibiting an intolerable "superiority"? How can they increase their number, so as to be more effective?

But perhaps these, or some of them, are muddle-headed questions. What is lacking, quite plainly, is the element of *caring,* to which, when obtained, must be added the wisdom of understanding. Men who want to change the world or improve their society strike their heads and beat their wings against a hard wall of indifference.

And so we turn to the prophetic agonizers of history, the men who hardly found an audience almost no one, that is, to listen to their

profoundest thoughts. They are best, of course, at understanding the great mistakes of mankind. Their peculiar distinction lies in being ahead of their time. They did not wait for the intolerable pressures of an extreme historical situation to make them *think.* Like monads with burnished surfaces, they-carried around in themselves so much of the symmetry of human experience that the pain of ignorance was with them always. Whatever their personal circumstances, they hurt with the tragedy of other men. Setting aside the question of why this should be, let us listen to one of them, Henri-Frédéric Amiel. On Feb. 16, 1874, Amiel entered in his *Journal Intimé:*

> The multitude, who already possess force, and even, according to the Republican view, right, have always been persuaded by the Cleons of the day that enlightenment, wisdom, thought, and reason, are also theirs. The game of these conjurors and quacks of universal suffrage has always been to flatter the crowd in order to make an instrument of it. They pretend to adore the puppet of which they pull the threads.
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> The theory of radicalism is a piece of juggling, for it supposes premises of which it knows the falsity; it manufactures the oracle whose revelations it pretends to adore; it proclaims that the multitude creates a brain for itself, while all the time it is the clever man who is a brain for the multitude, and suggests to it what it is supposed to invent. To reign by flattery has been the common practice of the courtiers of all despotisms, the favorites of all tyrants; it is an old and trite method, but none the less odious for that.
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> The honest politician should worship nothing but freedom and justice, and it is his business to preach them to the masses, who represent, on an average, the age of childhood and not that of maturity. We corrupt childhood if we tell it that it cannot be mistaken, and that it knows more than its elders. We corrupt the masses when we tell them that they are wise and far-seeing and possess the gift of infallibility.
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> It is one of Montesquieu's subtle remarks, that the more wise men you heap together the less wisdom you will obtain. Radicalism pretends that the greater number of illiterate, passionate, thoughtless—above all, young people, you heap together, the greater will be the enlightenment resulting. The second thesis is no doubt the repartee of the first, but the joke is a bad one. All that can be got from a crowd is instinct or passion; the instinct may be good, but the passion may be bad and neither is the instinct capable of producing a clear idea, nor the passion of leading to a just resolution.
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> A crowd is a material force, and the support of numbers gives a proposition the force of law; but that wise and ripened temper of mind which takes everything into account, and therefore tends to truth, is never engendered by the impetuosity of the masses. The masses are the material of democracy, but its form—that is to say, the laws which express the general reason, justice, and utility—can only be rightly shaped by wisdom, which is by no means a universal property. The fundamental error of the radical theory is to confound the right to do good with good itself, and universal suffrage with universal wisdom. It rests upon a legal fiction, which assumes a real equality of enlightenment and merit among those whom it declares electors. It is quite possible, however, that these electors may not desire the public good, and that even if they do, they may be deceived as to the manner of realizing it. Universal suffrage is not a dogma—it is an instrument; and according to the population in whose hands it is placed, the instrument is serviceable or deadly to the proprietor.

This short essay is filled with transparent truth. It may not be the whole truth, but what is there is true. It is truth that Ortega made into a full-length book over thirty years ago—a book that has been ignored except by people inactive in politics. What else can you say about it? You can say it is truth that a political movement can't use and must shun as though it were absolute subversion of the hope of progress. There can be only one conclusion that has integrity: our conception of the progress possible through politics must be altered and the conception of the political means altered to fit the new idea of progress. We must get rid of the lies in the myth so that the truth in it can work for good.

The honest politician, says Amiel, "should worship nothing but reason and justice." But this is impossible, unless the people to whom the politician must appeal share the same conviction.

Some more of Amiel's truth—vindicated by brutal historical events since he wrote it down 101 years ago—is pertinent here:

> The only counterpose of pure equality is military discipline. In military uniform, in the police court, or on the execution ground, there is no reply possible. But is it not curious that the *regime* of individual right should lead to nothing but respect for brute strength? Jacobinism brings with it Caesarism; the rule of the tongue leads to the rule of the sword. Democracy and liberty are not one but two. A republic supposes a high state of morals, but no such state of morals is possible without respect; and there is no respect without humility. Now the pretension that every man has the necessary qualities of a citizen, simply because he was born twenty-one years ago, is as much as to say that labor, merit, virtue, character, and experience are to count for nothing, and we destroy humility when we proclaim that a man becomes the equal of all other men, by the mere mechanical and vegetative process of natural growth. Such a claim annihilates even the respect for age; for as the elector of twenty-one is worth as much as the elector of fifty, the boy of nineteen has no serious reason to believe himself in any way the inferior of his elder by one or two years. Thus the fiction on which the political order of democracy is based ends in something altogether opposed to that which democracy desires: its aim was to increase the whole sum of liberty; but the result is to diminish it for all.
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> The modern state is founded on the philosophy of atomism. Nationality, public spirit, tradition, national manners, disappear like so many hollow and worn-out entities; nothing remains to create movement but the action of molecular force and dead weight. In such a theory liberty is identified with caprice, and the collective reason and age-long tradition of an old society are nothing more than soap-bubbles which the smallest urchin may shiver with a snap of his fingers.
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> Does this mean that I am an opponent of democracy? Not at all. Fiction for fiction, it is the least harmful. But it is well not to confound its promises with realities. The fiction consists in the postulate of all democratic government, that the great majority of the electors in a state are enlightened, free, honest, and patriotic—whereas such a postulate is a mere chimera. The majority in any state is necessarily composed of the most ignorant, the poorest, and the least capable; the state is therefore at the mercy of accident and passion, and it always ends by succumbing at one time or another to the rash conditions which have been made for its existence. A man who condemns himself to live upon the tight-rope must inevitably fall; one has no need to be a prophet to foresee such a result.

These declarations by Amiel, because of their Doomsday flavor if for no other reason, may be less acceptable than the passage quoted earlier; yet there is certainly enough truth in them to merit further attention.

Why, for example, is the reader made uncomfortable by what Amiel says? There are possibly two good reasons for discomfort. First, if these things are true, we cannot do anything about them. How do you go about advocating "humility"? (Then there is the horrid thought that Amiel was once right, but has become wrong, because now the primitive, adolescent "truth" of the young is more faithful to human ideals than the tired compromises of their elders—a desperate inversion, truly, of the natural order.) The other reason, which has more force, is that the elevation to authority of any group—because of the wisdom it is alleged to possess—is precisely what the eighteenth-century revolutions were determined to avoid. That is, those revolutions moved against the very nearly absolute corruption of the aristocratic ideal, and the two hundred years since has not been long enough in human experience for this ideal to regain respect. On every page of the book of American *mores* is inscribed the judgment that the aristocrat, the member of any elite—one who says or thinks he knows more than other people—is by definition a potential threat, a person who must never be allowed any authority. So there can be no overt doctrine of the Superior Man in our democratic society. Amiel was a thoughtful individual, but he is of no use to us! But this, too, is doctrine, implying its own source of authority.

In passing, let us note that while custom and tradition allow no acknowledged superior men, there are all sorts of tacit or clandestine dogmas on the subject. We honor gangsters, millionaires, movie actors, international spies, tough generals

and successful politicians. We even make a place in the restaurant business for total impostors, if they are brash enough in their claims. No schooling in humility here.

These are some of the reasons why prophetic agonizers are denied a hearing in the public philosophy of our society. Their truths, however profound, will not fit into the popular myth.

But we have said that our notions of politics must be altered to *make* them fit. What would this involve?

Two things. First, the men who have wisdom—after all, they do exist; they are writing some excellent books—must reject power. And they must reject great wealth. They must be like the Brahmins who carry beggars' bowls. They must refuse, that is, to profit by their wisdom, in either political power or financial gain. After all, no man has ever been able to get rich telling the exact truth. Why should the present be different? And it is exceedingly difficult to tell the exact truth about the social system if you have a personal stake in its operations.

In short, the natural aristocrats must prove their identity by performance. They must show that they are not autocrats or authoritarians in either idea or deed. And if they do this they will *have* humility. They will wear the illustrious insignia of Socratic ignorance. The present writer was once privileged to witness a clinical session in psychiatric education. After the doctor conducting the class had completed an interview with an almost totally withdrawn schizophrenic youth, one of the eager interns in the audience exclaimed: "But doctor, *how do you get him to do what you want him to do?"*

The reply was almost passionate. "You *don't* get him to do what you want him to do," the teacher said. "You don't *know enough* to get him to do anything." He continued:

"We here all have a medical education. In medicine you are taught to do something to the patient, like setting a broken leg; or give him something, like a pill; or take something away from him, like an inflamed appendix. *Not in psychiatry!* In psychiatry, your job is not to nudge the patient on from behind or pull him one way or the other. No one knows enough for that. Our job is to remove the obstacles which lie in front of him. Then, maybe, he will find his own way."

So much for the right sort of humility—not the self-abasing, miserable-worm-and-sinner variety, but the humility which honors the human essence in all men.

The other side of humility is human dignity and the potentialities of man. What is wanted, here, is a repetition of the unspoken answer of Christ to the Grand Inquisitor (in *The Brothers Karamazov).* To have a successful democracy, you have to have people who begin to believe in the heroic element in themselves. Finding it and giving it expression may be both rare and difficult, but if it is not even believed in this expression becomes absolutely impossible. Both young and old need a doctrine which instructs them in the fact that a Galahad sleeps in every man, and that a kind of ignominy remains until he is aroused. What shall it be—the Promethean legend of the fire-bringer? Of proud Rama, who recovers his soul from the demon ruler? Or shall it be of a Leibnizian monad lit from within, cycling through eons of experience until it bursts aflame with knowledge and truth? What about the half-God and full-God, Arjuna-Krishna, alone in the chariot confronting a host of delusions? Or shall we say, simply, that there is a wondrous *self* in every human being, a self that flowers and comes to view only as sought and invited by the one who is at last ready to forget his hates and fears?

REVIEW
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY

[The following communication from the editor of *American Image*, a psychoanalytic journal for culture, science and the arts, takes us properly to task for an inadequate presentation of a criticism of psychoanalysis appearing in O. Hobart Mowrer's *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion.* Our review of *The Myth of Mental Illness*, by Thomas Szasz (Feb. 5), included two paragraphs from Mowrer which charged the analytic process with providing the analysand with excuses for immaturity and irresponsibility. Dr. Mowrer apparently intended to provoke thought by a heavily-loaded argument, and we should not have termed it "an effective critique," but rather a challenging criticism." Dr. Slochower's corrective letter though, seems much more than a protest, containing a useful if brief explanation of the ideal relationship between psychoanalysis and responsibility.]

YOUR observations in MANAS are generally on such a superior intellectual plane that it is difficult to understand how a comment in your Review of the Feb. 5 issue could find entry into your journal. Here (p. 4), you characterize a statement from O. Hobart Mowrer's *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion* as an "effective critique of classical Freudian therapy." In the passage referred to, Mowrer presents the astounding argument that classical psychoanalysis drives "individuals towards *both* sociopathy (psychopathy) and paranoia." According to Mowrer, it does this by placing blame on the harsh moral demands made by parental authorities and thereby exonerates the individual from personal responsibility. Were one to take Dr. Mowrer's notion of psychoanalysis seriously, then its therapy could have no function, since obviously we cannot change the past and cannot provide the patient with other parental figures.

However, this argument is readily disposed of in actual therapeutic practice in which patients have been and continue to be *freed* of paranoia and psychopathy. The theoretical problem of how psychoanalysis combines psychic determinism with self-determination involves the philosophical question of the relation between determinism and freedom.

Classical philosophy from Aristotle to Spinoza, Kant and Hegel has shown that freedom (to be distinguished from chaos and anarchy) is meaningful only on the basis of determinism. For Spinoza, slavery is the state when one is determined (pushed) by forces which are external and alien to one's own basic nature. However, freedom is not absence of determinism, but *self*-determination, limited by cognizance of the powers within one's own self and of those in the world of nature. A bird is "free" to fly, provided the laws of gravity and motion are not suspended; a poet can write effective "free verse," provided his poetry is contained within certain rhythmic patterns. On the social plane, Karl Marx made the same point in urging that only by recognition of economic determinism can man move from merely interpreting the world differently towards changing it into a classless society. The same problem appears in theology—from Aquinas to Maritain and Tillich—which has the task of showing how man can be held responsible in a world, ruled by an omnipotent and omniscient God who is the world's First and Final Cause.

Now, among the fallacies underlying arguments such as those of Dr. Mowrer's is the notion that psychoanalysis is *exclusively* a genetic theory. To be sure, psychoanalysis does take cognizance of genetic factors and thereby tends to reduce a patient's *feeling* of his guilt (as distinguished from *ontic existence* of guilt). But, it does not say to the patient: You are what you are because your father was a wretch and your mother a witch. It does take seriously what the patient may *interpret* the parental figures to have been. But its aim is to liberate the patient from persisting in his infantile reactions to such alleged experiences towards realizing that he is *now not* an infant, and what may have been appropriate behavior and emotional reaction earlier is now not appropriate (this occurs in the process of

resolving the transference). Psychic determinism explains the present only partly in terms of the past and psychoanalytic therapy is predicated on the principle that the past need not be forever repeated and that it does not determine the future. In short, here determinism is not fatalism.

The theoretical backing for this point has been reinforced by the development of ego psychology with its notion that genetic determinism and neurotic conflict are supplemented by the existence of "a conflict-free ego-sphere." This is also implied in Freud's principle that sublimation provides *neutral* displaceable energy.

In sum, the situation in psychoanalysis is rather the reverse of that which Dr. Mowrer states it to be and which your comment supports. And Dr. Mowrer's position is becoming more and more an isolated case. Both Protestant and Catholic psychiatrists from Oskar Pfister to Braceland and Stock, and religious thinkers, such as Seward Hiltner and Paul Tillich, see a compatibility between psychoanalysis and freedom or faith. The recent publication of *Psychoanalysis and Faith—The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pister* (Basic Books, 1963) are a dramatic example of the warmth and mutual respect between a Swiss theologian and the author of *The Future of an Illusion.* The men mentioned show that psychoanalysis can free men from an idolatrous form of religiosity, and thus become a strong ally of a truly religious life. Indeed, psychoanalysis offers the chance of a free choice resting on actual realistic conditions, and thereby opens up alternate possibilities in the future. It does this by holding, with Spinoza, Hegel and Marx, that freedom is contingent on the *recognition of necessity,* that awareness of the determining factors (psychoanalysis stressing *emotional* awareness and working through) enable man to become the regulator of these factors.

HARRY SLOCHOWER, PH.D.
New York Certified Psychologist

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Dr. Mowrer's approach to the problem of the assumption of individual responsibility by the analysand has received an interesting statement in a passage we have quoted before, from Herbert Fingarette's *The Self in Transformation:*

> Moral man must *accept* responsibility for what he is at some point in *his* life and go on from there. He must face himself as he is, in toto, and as an adult, being able now in some measure to control what happens, he must endeavor so to control things that he is, insofar as possible, guiltless in the future. The neurotic, of course, cannot ordinarily do this without the preliminary aid of therapy.
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> This may seem a harsh view of life, an arbitrary and inhumane one. In fact it *is* harsh to a degree, but it is *not* arbitrary or inhumane. . . . It will always appear unjustifiable so long as one looks to the past for the reason. It is to the *future,* however, that we must look for the justification of this profound moral demand. It is not that we *were* children and thus nonresponsible but rather that we are *aiming to become* mature persons. This *ideal,* and not the past, is the ground for the harsh demand that we accept responsibility for what we are, even though we are in many ways morally evil and even though we could not help ourselves.
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> The matter is as simple and direct as in the case of a "natural disaster." I am a member of the community. I face the disaster and say, "I had no control over what happened. (Indeed I am in this instance guilty for none of it.) Nevertheless, I accept responsibility for it; I will clear up and repair this area. What else can I do except run away from reality like a child?"

COMMENTARY
OF INTEREST TO INDIANS

A FEW weeks ago (in the Feb. 26 issue) we ran a brief editorial notice giving the view of an Indian reader that many of his countrymen would subscribe to MANAS if they could afford it. He pointed out that even if they paid at only the three-year rate of $4.00 a year, this sum would amount to about a third of the monthly salary of a primary school teacher in India. So we suggested contributions from readers to make up the difference between a $2.00 rate and the regular $5.00, since we too are poor and cannot afford to reduce the subscription price. The response has been impressive. We now have funds enabling us to accept twenty-one subscriptions from India, at $2.00 each. This rate will hold until the contributions received for this purpose are used up. Prospective Indian subscribers should send their orders to our agents in India—International Book House, 9 Ash Lane, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay 1, India—who have been informed of this arrangement.

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We don't suppose that anything dramatic will come of our publishing (in Frontiers) a Japanese schoolteacher's agonizing communication to Mrs. Barbara Reynolds. The letter is a choked sob, its strength the strength of desperation. It helps one to realize, however, that behind the quiet faces of people you pass on the street, there may be the turbulence and suffering of thoughts like these.

What remains a mystery to us all is the means by which such private realities may be made into public recognitions—how, that is, this man's longing may find a means of expression which will not lead to frustration and disappointment. He speaks of the need of simple acts of kindness, such as giving a glass of water to a neighbor or finding a lost stick for a blind man. This, indeed, we all can do, and we may come at last to the extremity in which no acts have humanizing meaning save such simple, unexpecting kindness. Spina, the protagonist of Ignazio Silone's trilogy, chose this course at the end of a long failure at political organization of his Italian countrymen. He found that the very currency of intellectual communication was so debased by hypocrisy and betrayal that only wordless simplicity could make a beginning at restoring the faith of people in one another. And he began such a life (movingly described in *The Seed Beneath the Snow).*

It is good for such discoveries to be published. Just possibly, because Silone wrote his trilogy, many people have found the real-life activities of Danilo Dolci in Italy immediately understandable and worthy of support. Mrs. Naeve's book, when it comes out, may similarly serve.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

EDUCATION IN RELIGION

A BULLETIN issued by the California State Board of Education (Dec. 12, 1963) provides a good point of departure for further discussion of the relationship between religion and general instruction in the humanities. There are, we feel, universal considerations in the traditions left by great teachers. Apparently, this bulletin was in part designed to reassure Christian citizens who have thought that the recent Supreme Court decision favored "atheistic" instruction. On this point it reads:

> If the state is forbidden by the Constitution to promote the Christian religion, it is also forbidden to promote a godless religion of secularism or atheism. It would seem to follow, therefore, that no teacher is at liberty to teach a point of view denying God any more than a teacher is at liberty to promote a particular religious sect.
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> The objection of the Supreme Court was to religious service, but Justice Clark makes it plain that the Bible may be available in libraries and may be used as a reference book whenever it is appropriate. He says that one cannot study history without referring to the Bible nor can one study mankind without referring to religion. So, while it is clearly unlawful to use the Bible in a devotional service in the schools, it is expected that the Bible shall be open to all students.

The last paragraph summarizes:

> Our schools should have no hesitancy in teaching about religion. We urge our teachers to make clear the contributions of religion to our civilization, through history, art and ethics. We want the children of California to be aware of the spiritual principles and the faith which undergird our way of life. We are confident that our teachers are competent to differentiate between teaching about religion and conducting a compulsory worship service. This point of view, we believe, is in accordance with the tradition handed down by our fathers and reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court.

Useful discussion, it seems to us, could begin here. Beyond these generalizations lies the problem of seeing how fundamental religious affirmations *do* relate to the ideas upon which the U.S. Constitution was based. For example, there is no doubt whatever that Jesus of Nazareth affirmed that respect for higher authority than the state was essential to human fulfillment. The "kingdom of heaven" is beyond any promises of rewards or threats of punishment used by the state to regulate human behavior. In the Bill of Rights, there is recognition that the majority unites, not to rule the minority in such matters, but to guarantee the integrity of individual conscience—to guarantee that, in some respects at least, each man may be allowed allegiance to his own conscience and, in Emerson's words, to speak "the utmost syllable of his conviction." In this sense, there can be no doubt of the fact that the men piously referred to as "the Founding Fathers" did place emphasis on a higher order of values than any the state could provide—a view confirmed by the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.

On the question of a nonsectarian approach to religious education, we call attention to a discussion in Theodore Brameld's *Education for the Emerging Age* (Harper, 1961), Dr. Brameld begins by summarizing five different approaches to the place of religious education in the public schools. First and most familiar is belief in indoctrination in the Christian tradition. This approach, manifestly, "fails badly to meet the criteria of democratic teaching implied or specified in the cluster of propositions that concluded the preceding chapter." Proponents of indoctrination do not see the ethical and spiritual reasons for maintaining separation between church and state.

The second approach, that of "released time" for education in religion, recognizes something of the necessity for church-state separation, but presses to *separate the children* from one another. Dr. Brameld comments:

> "Released time" arranges children into separate little parades and marches them off to their respective synagogues and churches to receive the respective version of the one true religious doctrine. Meanwhile, children who don't happen to fit into any one of the parades are also divided from the rest if only by being left out.

The third approach attempts to teach "moral and spiritual values" in a purely secular fashion, but here the obvious drawback is another kind of divisiveness. Dr. Brameld continues:

> It creates a distinct dualism between the "moral and spiritual values" that the public school legitimizes and those that it does not. Through the channels of their homes and churches, children oftener than not become aware of the "spiritual" in a theistic sense as well as of the "moral" in a secular sense. Yet no deliberate attempt is made to consider whether and how the two types of values might be compared and then carefully appraised.

A fourth approach requires the teacher to instruct about religion in purely "objective" terms—giving attention to every religious outlook and providing them equal shares of attention. Dr. Brameld observes:

> In asking teachers to exclude all consideration of their own religious preferences, it asks them to act in a way that contradicts the very psychology of learning and teaching that advocates of this plan for the religious area themselves constantly urge in studying the other areas. I refer, of course, to the functional psychology that regards the learning-teaching process as an organismic whole.

The fifth alternative is to eliminate carefully any and all references to religion (and, of course, no Bible reading or prayers), and to avoid teaching anything which could be considered to fit under the heading "moral values." Dr. Brameld says:

> The main trouble with the fifth alternative is that, though theoretically consistent, it creates an even more glaring dichotomy between education and Life than do the preceding alternatives. By denying students opportunity to learn what they can of one of the most ubiquitous of all institutions fashioned by man, it therefore indoctrinates largely by default. This is, by constricting curriculum study to institutions other than religious ones, it tends to produce a one-sided view of civilization exactly as sectarian indoctrination does in the opposite way.

Will a sixth alternative emerge as we consider the needs of education for the coming age? Dr. Brameld believes so, and we in turn feel that his own proposals provide material for discussion and pioneering experiment. We plan to undertake some of this discussion next week.

FRONTIERS

The Soil of Hiroshima

[Arriving in the United States on April 25 are twenty-five *Hibakusha* (survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), members of the World Peace Study Mission organized in Hiroshima by Barbara Reynolds, who will accompany the Mission on its tour of the world. (Mrs. Reynolds is the wife of Earle Reynolds, an American scientist who in 1955 sailed the yacht *Phoenix* into the test zone as a protest against such preparations for nuclear destruction.) After visiting various cities in the United States, the Mission hopes to travel to England, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and mainland China. The visiting Hibakusha include Japanese scientists, doctors, housewives, religious leaders, working people, labor representatives, peace leaders, writers, social workers, and students, coming on "a mission of peace, educational exchange, friendship, and hope." Financial assistance is needed for this project, and readers who would like to help by arranging meetings and speaking engagements are invited to write to World Peace Study Mission, 325 Lafayette Street, New York, N.Y. 10012. Some of the group will travel across the United States by bus caravan, bringing display exhibits and holding open-air meetings as well as indoor film showings and meetings in smaller cities and towns.

In conjunction with the Mission, Alan Swallow, of Denver, is publishing a volume, *Friends of the Hibakusha*, to supply background on the enterprise and to help with the cost of the journey (part of the sale price will be used to defray travel expenses). Edited by Virginia Naeve, this book ($2.00 a copy) will contain a variety of material about the Hibakusha. Below we print a contribution to Part VIII—"Random Observations on the Japanese Peace Movement from Insiders and Outsiders"—a letter to Barbara Reynolds by a thirty-four year-old teacher of sociology in a Japanese high school.]

Now, I want to talk about our weak Japanese consciousness of helping each other, which you mentioned the other day. If you allow me to refer to an old Buddhist dogma, a distinguished Sinshu leader, Sinran, said that every living creature which has feelings—meaning every human being—is father, mother, brother, sister to everything born in this world. This dogma has been taught as social morality and has helped a great deal to make strong the Sinshu sect. And of late, among the Sokagakkai, in whom the power is developing formidably fast, the members chant *Na Myo Horen Gekyo* [an ancient Buddhist text], and, believing in Nichiren [their founder] they have strong organization to help each other.

But both the Sinshu sect and the Sokagakkai members flatter themselves that they are the elect. The Buddhist dogma that all the people across the surrounding four seas are brothers is not understood among the public, although there are some priests who practice this sort of thought.

What I call into question and regret is the difficulty of helping each other—simply natural and right conduct by human beings. The greatness of Dr. Reynolds and you, Mrs. Phoenix {the name of the boat in which the Reynolds challenged nuclear testing in the Pacific by sailing into the forbidden testing area}, is that you don't ask others to do what you should do, and that you do look at my real self, while I, to my shame, find no power.

What will become of Japan?

We fear to be involved in the whirlpool of the twentieth century and lose sight of Japan.

In spite of being a poor nation, we are building many big buildings day after day (yet our brothers and sisters live in what are called irregular barracks along the river). We are building de luxe hotels at great cost in order to have the Olympic Games in Japan.

Vessels with missiles are breaking the ocean-swells, and jet fighters are dancing madly in the air without learning from the frequent accidents. By and by, we Japanese may see "blue earth," but I can not be pleased by this scientific development, as though it were human development. For, my friends, my brothers and sisters make a life under the cold rain to sell their blood. One of them, Mr. Yoshimoto, stops his work, whatever it might be, when he sees a plane, and his eyes chase after it. When he sees a de luxe car pass by at full speed, he spits at it, puts his foot on the spittle and-looks

down hurriedly. This weak Mr. Yoshimoto was once a soldier in the Japanese air force, but now he asks others to pull a cord tight around his arm to thicken the persimmon-colored water in his veins after frequent visits to the Blood Bank, where he gets 400 yen as the reward for 200 cc of blood. Another A-Bomb patient, sixty-four years old, prays for rain. For his job is to mend umbrellas. The fine weather this year makes him complain, and if he meets me, he asks, "When do you think it will rain?" At his house his lame wife lies on the bed with a leg stuffed with metal. He often asks me whether he should enter Sokagakkai. Prime Minister Ikeda says our living standard has become equal to that of the European and American people. Is that true?

Look at the flood of human beings who struggle in the stream of poverty, ignorance and crime—at the misery of people who have to survive under such circumstances. Has this country no money? Is the city government without budget? These things are not the explanation. The truth is that there's no love towards mankind. There are no Christs nor Sakya Munis. . . . We have disciples of Christ, followers of Sakya, descendants of Marx—and now Sokagakkai calls to them—but one of my acquaintances, a religionist, called them powerless men who have lost their spirit to stand. Communists call them a burden on the society around them. But they are nothing but human beings.

But here I must say, to be clear, that I am not an affectionate person at all, though I show sympathy towards them. There are no people who love themselves more than I do.

Once I saw a light burning in one of those who are supposed to be spiritless. I made Mr. Yoshimoto talk about his past. Quivering in his yellowish skin, a spirit came into his eyes, and he cursed war and the A-bomb.

When I heard of the division of Japan's Gensuikyo [an anti-bomb council] by political dispute, I understood the peace the Gensuikyo staffs talked about, and felt indignation anew. How silly to suppose that the nuclear tests done by Russia are for Peace! Can we say that because Russia is a Peace Power, the nuclear weapons it produces mean peace instead of murder? These people easily change the meaning of peace according to their own profit.

I know the time when the stones of Hiroshima shout. Allow me to talk about by own affairs. My younger sister, too, disappeared into the soil of Hiroshima. Which nations of the world know anything about the people who disappeared into the soil? I love this soil of Hiroshima. When only eleven years old, my sister returned to the soil. Mrs. Reynolds, I cannot help shedding tears. The soil everybody treads on, takes in his hands, might be my sister. This is a secret of my heart, this talk of my love towards others and myself. Sister! What should we, who are alive, do to keep this soil from getting radiation again?

I myself have to make an effort to keep this land from being swept by the high waves of the East and West camps, even though I might be changed into a stone lump in the breakwater. I should devote myself to this duty. It's high time, I guess, that I started the duty. I swear to establish a peaceful land, quietly and steadily, with these poor people, without being used by anybody, without doing anything false such as fighting against a certain country. Could this be done, millions of lives and my sisters will sing carols with us.

"We will never make mistakes." What an empty sound this has! This is the greatest lie that has been told by human beings, though I can recognize its value as its being the example of lies mankind told. If we really swear so, we should stand up to evolve peace movements more seriously. Look at Japan in reality, on the one hand, and, on the other, at Japan according to her Constitution, supposed to be without weapons, without capacity to fight. Even if President Kennedy advised us to be armed, if all of us

resisted that advice strongly, how could righteous people all over the world keep quiet about it?

I stop here. I am one of the hired Japanese. Instead of proposing the big ideal of collecting righteous people and making an effort to rescue mankind, I would rather make a movement for trivial things such as giving a glass of water to a neighbor or finding a lost stick for a blind man. I want to claim our right to breathe pure air without being threatened by death. Every morning I swear by the rising sun, "I must not sink this sun."

I am afraid we can not any more help the peace movement towards its end with the A-Bomb and Hydrogen-Bomb ban movement we are having now in Hiroshima, or by the experiences of A-Bomb survivors, or with prayers by paper cranes. I want to organize the young generations.

HATORI HARUTO

Hiroshima, Japan