ASPECTS OF PEACE-MAKING

The question of whether the forms of "action" developed by the peace movement are "effective" is endlessly argued and no doubt should be. What is not always recognized is that this argument actually takes place against a background of considerable uncertainty concerning what "effective" means, or ought to mean. In the terms of the politics of the past, an effective program is one that leads to power. Today, however, it is by no means clear what pacifists would do with power, supposing they could obtain it. Pacifists "in power" seems very much a contradiction in terms, yet any action which is a protest against the exercise of power by governmental authority may be taken to imply that the protesters have in mind a better way for that power to be used.

The problem is so broad that a specific issue is needed to focus it for examination. For this purpose we borrow from an analysis of the Easter Aldermaston Marches which have taken place in England every year since 1958. These marches, which start at Aldermaston, the location of the British Atomic Weapons center, and go to Trafalgar Square in London—a distance of fifty-three miles—are an action project of the British peace group, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). CND represents two general backgrounds of conviction: one, a basic pacifist rejection of military means to settle international conflicts, the other, a strong feeling that it is folly for Britain to attempt to be a nuclear power. The second Aldermaston March (of 1959) generated worldwide attention, demonstrating the existence of a great groundswell of anti-war feeling in England. It ended with a mass meeting of some fifteen thousand people in London. This dramatic protest made it plain that governments can no longer wholly ignore the tide of public opinion in opposition to war.

The leading editorial in the April 13 Freedom, an anarchist weekly published in London, begins:

What can be hoped for as a result of a successful—as we assume it will be—sixth annual "Aldermaston" march this Easter, can perhaps be assessed by drawing up a balance sheet of what has been achieved by the previous five.

The Freedom writer, his eye fixed upon the anarchist ideal of a free, voluntaristic human community, heads his article: "Aldermaston—a Human Success Story but a Political Failure." He explains this judgment:

It seems clear that the ruling classes of the world are not deterred (or disarmed) by good people trampling 53 miles in their thousands, supported by possibly millions more who will be with them in spirit, even if the few days respite from life's routine will be spent in other ways.

The Freedom writer develops at some length his reasons for calling the march "a human success story," but at the moment we are more concerned with his criticisms. Toward the end of the discussion, he says:

If CND is to become effective as well as being impressive it must either transform itself into a revolutionary movement or enter the political arena as an organized party. Naturally, we anarchists would prefer to see the former happen...

Way back, at the first March in 1958, we quoted from the Manchester Guardian the following comment:

"Sprinkled more thickly than report has given out are the obstinate ones who insist on thinking. An Oxford undergraduate complained of 'All this guff of Britain giving a moral lead'. He admits the truth of the 'moral stuff,' adding, 'but what we want to know is what political action we can take to change the Government's policy even by a very little—and nobody here has said a thing about that'."

CND is no nearer to being able to give an answer in 1963 than it was in 1958. It would be churlish to deny that CND has done valuable
educational work in making a large number of people aware of the consequences of nuclear war, and persuading them to support any constitutional steps to abolish these weapons. Its failure is that after six years it still talks in these terms.... Governments are not influenced by orderly protests, and disciplined marches. The only language they understand and take into account is that of revolution, of direct action which disrupts the status quo.

The militant vocabulary of this anarchist writer ought not to distract the reader from considering the problem he sets. For if, indeed, the objective of the peace movement—which is genuine world peace—should be realized, the changes that will in consequence have taken place will be nothing if not revolutionary, regardless of the words used to describe them. What is at issue, here, is whether or not the Aldermaston marches ought to be spoken of as in any sense a "failure," despite the fact that this movement has not yet succeeded in altering the defense policy of Great Britain.

It must be noted, however, that the CND leaders discuss their objective in the following terms:

The renunciation of an independent deterrent, and of Britain's part in a NATO deterrent, is something Britain can do. It is something which a rapidly growing proportion of the British people—far, far greater than it was when we first marched—think we should do. It is something we, collectively, can will to happen this year.

This, you might say, is a brave declaration, but its publication causes critics to speak of the "failure" of the marches. As the Freedom writer puts it:

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has succeeded in expanding in spite of dismal failure so far as its objectives are concerned simply because it advocates the most popular and uncontroversial of all causes and because it seeks to achieve its aims by "respectable" means.

It is at this point that we wish to introduce other considerations, amounting to an expansion of what in the Freedom article is called "valuable educational work."

In a "normal" society, provision is made for the planning of constructive change. Business organizations, for example, establish "research and development" agencies to anticipate future needs and to plan adaptation to them. For society at large, we may think of the great universities as performing this function. Professors and workers in research project the future development of the country and make recommendations to government, either directly or by generating public opinion in support of their findings and proposals. In a "normal" society, we find this procedure quite natural.

But we do not have a "normal" society, today. We have a society gripped by extreme crisis, and there is no scholarly consensus as to what ought to be done. Those who, in ordinary times, perform the work of research and development, are today either silenced for their radical opinions, or they have been given extremely limited tasks to perform—tasks which have little to do with meeting the larger demands of this moment of history. The anxieties stirred by national and world emergency have transformed the forum of debate about change and progress into an arena of partisan emotions. To borrow from popular imagery, the Ship of State has turned into the Car of Juggernaut.

This does not mean that "progress" can no longer take place. It does mean that the progress, if we are able to achieve it, will come in unconventional ways.

Take the struggle to prevent war. The conventional institutions of our society have shown themselves to be incompetent—even uninterested—in working realistically for peace. There are hardly any serious theoretical studies concerning the possible make-up or requirements of a peaceful society. In a presumably democratic society, this can have only one practical result: the people, who delegated this sort of planning to their representatives, will have to call back to themselves the power and the responsibility they delegated, and attempt to perform the functions of
peace-planning and peace-making themselves—on the theory that if they don't, no one else will, and the world will be engulfed in an all-destroying war.

You could argue that, in psychological terms, something like the following is taking place: The experts, the authorities, the technicians of every sort, have become so deeply involved in the traditions of their specialties and the complexities of their techniques, that they are unable to react to the simple moral compulsions which affect the common people. They have become subject to a particular form of cultural lag as well as victims of institutional egotism. They cannot relate their professional skills to the popular morality of rejection of war. Accordingly, the professionals keep on insisting that the war-peace equation be formulated in terms which they are familiar with. And the ordinary people, who are now becoming aroused, keep on insisting that those terms, while reminiscent of the high institutional achievements of science, industry, and technology, do not touch the problem at all.

As this break-down of conventional modes of social action spreads, lay groups of variously disturbed and aroused individuals seek to evolve avenues of initiative for popular action. They often feel called upon to fulfill the role of theoretician, long-term social planner, and man of immediate political action all at once. Naturally, there is some confusion. What happens often appears to be untidy, and even abortive, from other points of view. Naturally, there are some "failures." It also follows that disciplined minorities with background in a centuries-old revolutionary tradition, finding themselves bypassed by the waves of moral emotion, will see things wrong with the popular movement to outlaw war.

But what may really be happening, in such an interval of history, is a gradual but ever-hastening revision in the intuitive assumptions of an entire civilization. A revolution is taking place, but it is not, or not yet, a political revolution. It is a revolution in basic attitudes about desirable good and tolerable evil. These changes in attitude are being woven into the fabric of daily life and daily thinking. They accompany events that shake human beings out of accustomed attitudes and complacencies. And such changes take place also when there are new principles of life and human relationships for people to attempt to put into action. Politics may confirm such changes, but politics cannot bring them about. Politics is too theoretical, too "mechanical," too "contractual" to accomplish this alchemy of the human spirit. Politics is the rationalization which takes place after the fact.

There will be those, no doubt, who say that such reflective analysis may be all very well, and even accurate in spots, but the modern world has no time for the slow processes of evolving a new stance in socio-political relations. Well, we do not know how to reply to this except to say that far-reaching changes such as the actual transformation of a warlike world into a peaceful one must of necessity involve transitions which are organic to the subtle processes of human awakening. How can people be urged or whipped into acknowledgement of these needs before they are able to see them for themselves?

We imagine that, as in the natural world, there are seasons of growth for human beings. There is a time for ploughing, a time for planting, and a time for cultivation. The harvest cannot be reaped until all the prior generating functions have been fulfilled. While our age knows little or nothing about such processes, except in the gross terms of history and the anatomy of past revolutions, we ought to admit that they must exist, and that, for the purposes of world peace, the changes in attitude will have to take place in individuals before they can be reflected in the institutional behavior of large political units. One small aspect of this kind of transformation became visible in the conduct of the Aldermaston Marches, and is given appreciative description in the Freedom article:
"Aldermaston" attracts this writer too from the purely organizational point of view. Many anarchists react to the over-organization which characterizes the authoritarian society we live in, by going to the other extreme and assuming (or hoping?) that in a free society, because there could be a real community of interests, the day-to-day affairs of the community could be settled as if by magic, without organization. This is the dream-world utopia of the individualist, the island inhabited by the smug introvert who believes in the self-sufficiency of the individual as the key to happiness. The reality is that the moment two, let alone 20,000, people decide on common action, they must "organize" their actions. "Aldermaston" is a major feat of organization, and the fact that it has been so successful so far, with a minimum of centralized organization, should be for anarchists a source of considerable encouragement. Writing of the second march in 1959, Colin Ward was even then drawing attention to the effectiveness of this non-authoritarian form of organization:

"When you think of the enormous authoritarian structure required to move a regiment of soldiers 50 miles and then think of the limited resources of the organizers of this march, its ad hoc system of baggage wagons, dispatch riders and support vehicles, and its reliance on the purely moral authority of its marshals over a crowd of people who were the very antithesis of an army, you can imagine what an immense fund of good will and responsibility has been drawn from this "unruly mob . . . this rabble," as a correspondent of the Daily Telegraph called us, even to the extent, unprecedented in an English crowd, of leaving no litter behind.

It would be foolish to make very much of this point, yet it constitutes an oblique reply to those who are suspicious of the "moral" motivations of the peace-makers. Is it too much to insist that a peaceful world, if we ever get it, will be the creation of people whose hearts and feelings of moral responsibility are involved?

We conclude with a pertinent quotation from a recent radio talk by Hallock Hoffman:

Disarmament is a necessary condition for a sustained peace. It is not the key factor in establishing peace. It, like the world government necessary to maintain disarmament and guarantee nations against future resort to arms is an inevitable and essential element in a peaceful and orderly world. We will come to disarmament and world government some day if we do not blow ourselves up in the meantime. But we will not start disarming or setting up the world government until we have done something else first.

The X-factor, the prior and necessary element for beginning to make the world peaceful, is a change in the attitude of the citizens of any one of the great powers. It is easy enough to describe the attitude, and to suggest the results that would follow from it. It is much harder to figure out how to bring about the change, although it is possible to speculate on the causes of such a change.

The X-factor, the peace attitude, consists of non-anxiety, of relative fearlessness, and of cooperation-seeking. We all know individuals who have such an attitude. There are quite a few around, and they please whatever company they are in. It is even possible to guess at the means by which individuals come to have such attitudes, although there is not enough evidence yet to be sure we know just how they are created.

Reasoning along these lines makes us extremely reluctant to accept the designation of "failure" for any of the major pacifist or peace-making undertakings of the present. Peacemaking must eventually involve a lot of people; for this reason the peace attitude must become widespread, and no factor which contributes to this development can be said to fail.
REVIEWS

THE EGG THAT WAS REALLY A RIVER

No legend is entirely incredible. If it ever existed at all, it must have circulated among people who for some reason accepted it and thought it worth circulating. More than that: to have circulated in the first place, it had to begin somewhere with someone who believed on some grounds that it explained what otherwise seemed inexplicable. We are likely to find the legend of the labors of Hercules incredible; the early Greeks did not find it so; but if they could be revived for only a day to hear us report on the doings and misdoings of Telstar, with its half-Greek name, how they might rock all Olympus with their laughter! So, for lack of a more imposing definition, let us consider a legend as a popular truth nearly but not quite smothered by a fancy. And for a case in point, let us take the following:

In far off times the Universe, according to a popular Chinese legend, was an enormous egg. One day the egg split open; its upper half became the sky, its lower half the earth, and from it emerged Pan Ku, primordial man. Every day he grew ten feet taller, the sky ten feet higher, the earth ten feet thicker. After eighteen thousand years Pan Ku died. His head split and became the sun and moon, while his blood filled the rivers and seas. His hair became the forests and meadows, his perspiration the rain, his breath the wind, his voice the thunder—and his fleas our ancestors.

This is the opening paragraph of Michael Sullivan's An Introduction to Chinese Art (University of California Press, $8.00). Sullivan, working on the assumption that "a people's legends of its origins generally give a clue as to what they think most important," follows the clue of the Pan Ku legend. He finds it expresses a typically Chinese viewpoint—namely that "man is not the culminating achievement of the creation, but a relatively insignificant part in the scheme of things; hardly more than an afterthought, in fact." He finds Pan Ku's egg a suggestive symbol for "a uniquely Chinese feeling of oneness with nature which, in the course of time, was to find its highest expression in philosophy, poetry and painting."

Sullivan, who has spent most of his life studying Chinese art, pursues this viewpoint through fifteen major reign periods. He begins with the Shang-Yin period of about 1600-1003 B.C. and ends with the Republican period of 1912 to the present. Over this sweep of centuries he traces the offspring of Pan Ku's egg. He combines intellectual and art history by showing us, through maps, diagrams, and one hundred half-tone plates: (four of them in color), just what the Chinese artists meant by and achieved with their sense of natural attunement. Remarkably enough, too, he never argues the viewpoint; he accepts it as "given" by the art; he contents himself with disclosing it.

MANAS readers will find this viewpoint, in Sullivan's hands, a significant disclosure. To say that Sullivan writes knowledgeably; that his style is lucid, lively, and often witty; that his commentaries really accompany rather than distract from his illustrations; that he can make the discovery of, say a bronze Buddha or a silk-scroll landscape an event on the page and in the reader's mind—all this, though true enough as far as it goes, is still not sufficient to account for the power of the book and the sense of growing awareness it conveys.

What is this awareness? Is it available only to sinologists, art historians, collectors, and other cognoscenti? Let us, for an answer, see it in action. Let us examine a passage picked almost at random:

The vigour and power of survival of the T'ang style is nowhere more vividly shown than in the guardian figures outside the recently-discovered caves at Mai-chi-shan in Kansu (Plate 87). But perhaps the most impressive—and deceptive—of Liao-Chin sculpture is the set of pottery figures of lohan (arhats) which were found some years ago in a cave at I-chou near Peking. One is in the British Museum, five others in western collections. The vigorous modelling, the dignity and realism, and above all the three-colour glaze, all suggested a T'ang date at a
Buddhas and bodhisattvas are still fully modelled—represent an evolution beyond the T’ang style. The number still stand in the temples of North China, tradition. The figures in wood and plaster, of which a archaistic revival or a prolongation of the T’ang taken its toll of the flesh, but the spirit has emerged of an old man, the outcome of that struggle; it has seen in the bony skull, lined features and deep-set eyes we turn to the figure in the Metropolitan Museum, we to the face of the young Arhat in the Nelson Gallery (Plate 88) is expressed all the inward struggle, the will to triumph, the intensity of concentration of the meditative sects of which Zen was the chief. When we turn to the figure in the Metropolitan Museum, we see in the bony skull, lined features and deep-set eyes of an old man, the outcome of that struggle; it has taken its toll of the flesh, but the spirit has emerged serene and triumphant.

But not all sculpture of this period was an archaistic revival or a prolongation of the T’ang tradition. The figures in wood and plaster, of which a number still stand in the temples of North China, represent an evolution beyond the T’ang style. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas are still fully modelled—even to the extent of a fleshiness that can be displeasing, but what they have lost in dynamic energy they gain in a new splendour of effect. They stand against walls covered with huge frescoes painted in the same ample and spectacular manner—such as can still be seen today in the upper hall of Hua-yen-ssu (Plate 86). In fact, so closely does the style of the one echo that of the other that Sickman’s vivid description of the sculpture could apply equally to the painting: "An almost uncanny impression of movement, as though the gods were stepping forward with an easy, stately pace, or had just taken their seats on the lotus throne, is produced by the great agitation and restless movement of the garments and encircling scarves. These latter accessories are especially important in creating an almost spiral movement in three dimensions as the long, broad ribbons trail over the arms, loop across the body and curve around the back. In the actual carving the folds are deep, with sharp edges, so that the maximum contrast is obtained between highlight and shadow. Frequently the ends of garments and scarves are caught up in whorls and spirals obviously derived from the calligraphic flourishes of painting."

This suave and restless splendour was clearly designed, like that of the Baroque art with which it has so much in common, to capture the attention of the worshipper through its emotional appeal. It is no accident that it finds its most splendid expression in the figures of Kuanyin, the comforter, the giver of children, the preserver from peril of all those who call upon her name (Plate 89). She looks down upon suffering humanity, not with Christian compassion indeed, but with a calm and lofty detachment. In their wisdom the Buddhists know that prayers are not "answered," but that the very act of praying gives us surecease from our burdens, and in this majestic figure the Chinese sculptor has created a deity whose capacity to receive adoration, and therefore to bestow comfort, is infinite. In its sweeping movement and fullness of form this style, both in sculpture and in painting, is a late echo of the manner of Wu Tao-tzu, who indeed has as many followers and imitators as Michelangelo. Among the most talented of these were Wang Kuan and, at the end of the tenth century, Wu Tsung-yuan, called "Little Wu" for his resemblance to the style of the master, whose handscroll of the Taoist Five Heavenly Rulers survives in several copies; the best of them, in a Japanese collection, is a magnificent exercise in the sweeping ink line known as pai-hua.

This long passage has been taken from the middle of An Introduction to Chinese Art. Quoted, perhaps unfairly, out of context, where the Tung style is explained, the Liao and Chin periods identified, and the plates presented, it nevertheless allows us to feel some of the total cumulative effect—the "awareness"—sought for and embodied in Chinese art. Perhaps we can best describe this awareness in terms of a need which Western society so often forgets, or ignores, or misdirects. This is the human need—perennial and insatiable—for contact with the nonhuman. We in the West think we can meet this need by glutting our environment with "things" and our minds with "thoughts of things." But even when these "things" are super-gadgets, glittering and omnicompetent machines, triumphs of engineering know-how, we have not met the need we know must be met.

What makes Chinese art a liberation, even in a book, is its embodiment of a contact with the nonhuman. This quality alone keeps the art from being "abstract." In one sense, of course, all art is "abstract"—and "concrete" as well. But contact with the nonhuman, when it occurs in art, any art,
must be "concrete" or it will not be. To treat any subject artistically—including that form of the nonhuman we call "Nature"—means for the artist an acceptance of each act contributing to the treatment as both necessary and unrepeatable. Others, of course, want to enjoy the complete treatment, the terminus of acts, the achieved work. In trying to do this, they may question the necessity and unrepeatability of any single act or of the entire work. For the artist, however, these matters are now beyond question: the work has left him; it has its own life; it must make its own way.

So with the awareness of Chinese art in Sullivan's book: P'an Ku's egg splits and flows into many forms over the centuries, always different and yet the same. This panorama of forms, when identified and discussed by Sullivan, becomes a river—a river he finally identifies with Chinese civilization itself, in words that well up from a strong love:

For the past fifty years the long river of Chinese history has been passing through the rapids; its surface has been tossed and broken, its banks strewn with the wreckage of old forms and old traditions. But now, as she emerges into deep water once more, the flood of Chinese civilization begins to resume its steady flow into the future. The landscape has changed; but it is the same majestic river whose course we have been tracing down the centuries.

RALPH S. POMEROY

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COMMENTARY
ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER

ONCE YOU begin to think seriously about working for peace, it is difficult to call a halt to the process. However you define peace—whether you regard it simply as the end of military violence between national states, or as a condition following the establishment of ideal social and interpersonal relationships—it becomes plain that extraordinary changes in human behavior must come first.

For many people, the prospect of such changes is upsetting—even more upsetting, perhaps, than the prospect of war. This is the discouraging side of labors for peace. You start out with the simple fact that peace is desirable; everyone, surely, wants peace; and then you find, as did Thomas à Kempis before you, that apparently very few want those things that make for peace. Or, as W. H. Ferry said recently, that the price is higher than most people want to pay.

Now comes a choice. Either you decide, in view of the opposition, to let your peace efforts remain inconclusive, or you join the few who try to understand what effective peacemaking must involve. It is clear, for example, that serious peace-making has far-reaching political implications. In the definitions of current political thinking, peace-making has an unmistakable anarchist coloring. If you read Thoreau and Tolstoy (and you can hardly fail to read them if you want to know the thinking about peace that has been done up to the present), you will find yourself drawn into the most controversial issues of political philosophy. It is quite possible, of course, to work seriously for peace without reading Thoreau and Tolstoy, or those who have thought in their tradition, but this means only that you will be to some degree anarchist without knowing it.

A passage from Nonviolent Resistance, a new pamphlet by Nicholas Walter, published by Schools for Nonviolence (30 cents, 4 Benhams Place, London, N.W.3, England), puts this aspect of peace-making in historical perspective:

The Boston Peace Convention of 1838, passed a resolution that "no man, no government, has a right to take the life of man, on any pretext, according to the gospel of Christ," and it issued a Declaration of Sentiments, including the following: "We cannot acknowledge allegiance to any human government.... Our country is the world, our countrymen are all mankind...." Here is pure Christian anarchopacifism, derived straight from sixteenth-century anabaptism—no wonder it excited Tolstoy so much. But these gentle, unwarlike unworldly cranks were right in the front of the battle against slavery.... When Dymond said in 1826, "Now is the time for anti-slavery exertion; the time will come for anti-war exertion," he was knowingly challenging his State— and ours. As Bourne said in 1918, "We cannot crusade against war without crusading implicitly against the State." Pacifism is ultimately anarchism, just as anarchism is ultimately pacifism.

It is because most pacifists never realize this that they are constantly surprised by the hostility they provoke. Most pacifists are really sentimentalists—hoping to get rid of war without changing anything else, so you can hurt people as long as you don't actually kill them. It was because the greatest of all pacifists—Tolstoy—saw through this sentimentalism that he became an anarchist as well as a pacifist. (He never called himself an anarchist, since he used the word to describe those who relied upon violence, but his bitter condemnation of the State makes him one of the greatest of all anarchists, too.) His remark that "the most frightful robber-band is not as frightful as the State," is simply an echo from Augustine's City of God without Augustine's pious reservation: "Without justice what are States but great robber-bands?" And because Tolstoy utterly denied the justice of the State's power, he had to proclaim the duty of "non-resistance" (that is, non-violent resistance) to the State's demands. . . .

[Tolstoy said] in his Letter to the Swedish Peare Party (1889): "Those in power neither can nor will abolish their armies." And the solution? "The people must take the matter into their hands." How?

This is where religious pacifism and political anti-militarism came to the same conclusion, for what Tolstoy was advocating was in fact a non-violent strike against war—individual civil disobedience on such a scale that it becomes mass direct action the revolutionary technique proposed by the proto-
anarchists (such as Winstanley and Godwin) and the later peaceful anarchists (such as Proudhon and Tucker), an anarchist insurrection without the violence that disfigures the proposals of Bakunin and Kropotkin.

Working for peace also has religious-philosophical implications, but these are not disturbing in the same way. Instead of leading to what we think of as "political action," they bring the inquirer to questions about religious orthodoxy, moral problems of personal consistency, and the whole range of self-examination and soul-searching. Such pursuits, if they are spoken of out loud, do not arouse hostility so much as they encounter indifference. It is possible, again, to work for peace without raising these matters with oneself, but then the individual quietly involves himself with various "heresies" without realizing it, and he may be puzzled by the way in which he is avoided by his more orthodox brethren.

We are now in a position to look at the most important philosophical fruit of the peace movement. If the would-be peace-maker resolves to continue to think seriously, he must now examine the popular fear of anarchism and the private reluctance to undertake self-examination. For these, it seems clear, are the basic obstacles to peace.

You could say, attempting a short answer to such questions, that the unwillingness of people to stand alone, to rely on their own resources in both outward community life and in their inner, spiritual life, is the root problem.

Perhaps so, but this is no more than a moralist's resolution of the issue. With this finding you can only exhort people to be more self-reliant and shame them with charges of timidity. But only pacifists whose need for further questioning is obliterated by self-righteous emotions can be satisfied with such methods. And, be it noted, self-righteousness is not uniquely a religious affliction. It overtakes political people as well. It may overtake anybody who tries to Find the Way.

Our space is running out so we will end by saying that to come this far in the analysis of the problems of peace-making is to arrive at a central dilemma of the human situation: Most people feel to the depths of their being a great need for protective institutions to shield them from the frightening unknowns of both human behavior and the vast world outside; yet at the same time they hunger for the freedom that a life without those protections seems to promise. Today, it is no longer an academic question, but a practical one, to ask: How much risk can we tolerate in order to increase our freedom? Why are some men more ready to face the "risks" than others? Is there an undogmatic metaphysic which might contribute some order to such questions? Have there been any "social" experiments or experiences which might help? Does the scale of our problem change its nature, or would judgments based upon past experience apply?

We need all the resources of psychology and philosophy to begin constructing the most elementary working hypothesis to meet these questions.
CHILDREN

. . . and Ourselves

THE CHRISTIAN BIBLE

[In search of an inviting yet clearly defined approach to the relation of education to religion, we come to one basic idea—that the human mind, whether of a child or an adult, can learn nothing new, discover nothing worth knowing, if the experience of religion is sectarian. One may believe, of course, but that is an entirely different matter.

Authority in respect to the great scriptures of the world is most likely to have a debilitating effect upon the creative resources of the individual mind. Authority and literal interpretation of the scriptures are, of course, invariable companions, and it is on this ground that the most stringent criticism against Christian theology may be formulated. To make such criticism, though, is to diminish neither Jesus of Nazareth nor the symbolic meaning of any significant portions of the Old Testament—both of which can best be appreciated, in our opinion when literal belief as well as temporal authority are removed from a consideration of Christian teaching. No one has made these points more clearly than Joseph Campbell in The Hero with a Thousand Faces.]

AFTER noting that "in modern progressive Christianity the Christ is primarily a historical personage," Joseph Campbell remarks:

Wherever the poetry of myth is interpreted as biography, history, or science, it is killed. The living images become only remote facts of a distant time or sky. Furthermore, it is never difficult to demonstrate that as science and history mythology is absurd. When a civilization begins to reinterpret its mythology in this way, the life goes out of it, temples become museums, and the link between the two perspectives is dissolved. Such a blight has certainly descended on the Bible and on a great part of the Christian cult.

To bring the images back to life, one has to seek, not interesting applications to modern affairs, but illuminating hints from the inspired past. When these are found vast areas of half-dead iconography disclose again their permanently human meaning.

There is clear historical evidence to show that the term Christos was a designation in use among Greek philosophers five centuries before Christ. This term, though variously employed, typically represented the highest spiritual capacity of every human being—a divine principle, universal in that it was held to be the root and the sustainer of each man. Therefore, in these terms, "Christ" becomes the Christ within. (Christ is the spirit which makes ethical growth possible. Christ cannot be localized in any one person.)

If we turn to the word "God," we find something of similar significance, and note a correlation between what may be said about the word "Christ" or "Christos," and about the word "God." First, we discover statements in Genesis which suggest that "God" was also meant to have a universal meaning, that "God" was not supposed to represent a being, but to indicate the creative potency of nature—or of, we might say, the Universal Mind, which galvanized matter into new forms, preparing the way for a new cycle in evolutionary experience for all the beings involved.

It has been pointed out that the word often rendered as "God" was a plural, not a singular term in the original Hebrew. Theos, too, stood suggestively for a collectivity, representing the total deific power in Nature. But just as Christ was made by theological Christians to play the role of a single Being, so God was made into a single locus of power. We find in Genesis 1:26, however, that "God" said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." The plural here is very apparent—a symbolic reference to Beings who have divine creative power, gained in former evolutions. We find the same suggested in other places. After the account of the "fall" of man in the Garden of Eden, there is this statement: "And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us!"

In the New Testament are many symbolic ideas—for example, the "virgin birth." Both Buddha and Krishna, as well as Christ, mystical tradition says, were born of virgins, suggesting that great beings come to earth under conditions which are different. There is no real basis in the scriptures for the ridiculous idea of physical virginity preceding birth. Matthew suggests that there was an unusual relation between Joseph and his wife, after the conception of Jesus. The symbolism here leads in many directions, indicating, perhaps, that purity—as
any man of philosophic mind is sure to feel—is never a technical thing. Purity is of attitude, and " chastity" and "virginity," in any meaningful sense, have to do with a psychological condition. There is also the suggestion, in the discussion of Mary, that from the lowliest may come the greatest—that we may not judge, on the basis of association or past action, the quality or nature of any being. In The Dhammapada, Buddha speaks of a "lily blooming from a rubbish heap," and we find H. P. Blavatsky saying that precious metal may be found in unlikely places. All this takes us back to the Christos—and to recognition that every man, regardless of his apparent limitations, will discover in time his true heritage.

"Judge not that ye be not judged" is only part of Christ's message. Judge not, because no man may be judge, carries the full meaning.

In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ asserts the psychological content of his teaching. For example, referring to the Commandments, he says (Matt. 5:21,22): "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment; But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment." In other words, it is the psychological attitude which makes culpability. Christ calls upon man to recognize that he is not just a creature who must follow certain laws or be punished, but that he is a divine being—if he will only become aware of it. Therefore he must guard his innermost thoughts: "When thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and, when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret." This is an invocation of the Higher Self—the only prayer which combines responsibility and freedom.

It may be precisely because the traditional religion is literalistic, rather than philosophical, that even those in the clerical calling seldom realize the extent to which the Sermon on the Mount, at least as we find it in St. Matthew, is an expression of integrated philosophy. The teaching is identical with that of the Buddha in the Dhammapada.

Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth:
But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil....
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate shine enemy.
But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which spitefully use you, and persecute you.
For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same?
And if ye salute your brethren only, what do you more than others? do not even the publicans so?
Judge not, that ye be not judged.
For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.
And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? (Matt., chaps, 6, 7.)

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All that we are is the result of what we have thought: all that we are is founded on our thoughts and formed of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain pursues him, as the wheel of the wagon follows the hoof of the ox that draws it.

All that we are is the result of what we have thought: all that we are is founded on our thoughts and formed of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness pursues him like his own shadow that never leaves him.

"He reviled me, he beat me and conquered and then plundered me," who express such thoughts tie their mind with the intention of retaliation. In them hatred will not cease.

"He reviled me, he beat me and conquered and then plundered me," who do not express such thoughts, in them hatred will cease.

In this world never is enmity appeased by hatred; enmity is ever appeased by Love. This is the Law Eternal. (The Dhammapada.)
"Ways of Being"

EVEN among MANAS readers, we suspect, only one or so out of dozens will be able to define "ontology" (practically everyone needs the dictionary to refresh the meanings of such technical terms), but the claim of modern interest in the questions ontology represents is manifestly growing. This is the area of metaphysics which, for the ancient Greeks, concerned the nature of Being rather than the secrets of cosmology, and today, a fair number of philosophical inquiries are clearly ontological in scope—that is, they are quests for a deeper knowledge of the nature of being. Viktor Frankl's "logotherapy" is based upon ontological insights. Fromm's "Man is not a Thing" is a statement of the primacy of ontology over technology, etc.

Prof. Herbert Schneider's Ways of Being—Elements of Analytic Ontology consists of five (Woodbridge) lectures, delivered at Columbia University in 1962 (published by the Columbia University Press). The introduction to this slender volume immediately establishes rapport with classical Greek attitudes and suggests why this orientation needs both clarification and renewal:

When one surveys the beings of earth and sky, past and present, the visible and invisible, the intelligible and the unintelligible, the moving and the timeless, and then reflects on how the brightest stars in all their twinkling and how light itself on all its travels remain asleep, unimpressed by this overwhelming company, one begins to sense the privilege man has of being awake to so much of the world and of being able to wonder how much more may be going on unknown to him and how much more the past and future hold in store. One shrinks to speak above a whisper of "what there is" in the world and one does not dare to say "totality." One is tempted to stare at the incredible void and fulness in which man plays his little part. To orient himself, to make a useful map of the realms of being, seems a useless, impossible venture, especially now that the world, perhaps even the physical universe, is expanding at an explosive rate. The excitement of being awake in such a world makes it difficult to tell the plain truth. To be awake is problematic enough, but to try to tell in an orderly way how these sleeping beings all around us manage to be, and also how they have managed to bring man into being and into an awareness of being, this seems too fantastic a tale.

However, the attempt on man's part to orient himself in the world is as old as history, and apparently older. Each generation goes at it afresh, producing little of enduring worth, except that each generation has a little better sense of the magnitude of human ignorance. To conclude from all this that existence is meaningless would be evidently false. . . .

Prof. Schneider's approach to an affirmative metaphysic is understandably cautious, but such a metaphysic nonetheless begins to develop in the course of his first lecture, called "Logic and Ontologic." Here, after analyzing the attempts to define individuality by reference to matter or function, Dr. Schneider comments:

This synthetic idea of individuality has come down in classical tradition as the doctrine that an individual is a concretion or a concreted universal. In contemporary idioms an individual is usually identified as an "instance" or "case" of a class or function. Against this whole tradition I shall try to defend individuality as a category of ontological analysis, individuals are not formed by uniting un-individuated elements, for they are themselves ultimate elements of being.

Being is individuated. This fact cannot be explained by any of the creation myths which represent individuals as products of a process of concretion. There is a persistent doctrine that "in the beginning" there was homogeneity, flux, ocean of being, cosmic womb or egg, whence issued individuals. There is supposed to be a creative process of emergent evolution which culminates in individuated beings. Or there is still "In the Beginning" the creative Word which decides, "Let there be this and that." To be sure, individuals come into being or become, some of them quite slowly. But such becoming is a process of transformation, from individual unto individual. . . . It is more reasonable to accept individuality as a basic fact, than to invent stories about its origin.

This last sentence is strongly reminiscent of the ideas of an out-and-out affirmative metaphysician, John McTaggart. A remarkably
lucid statement on this subject is found in one of his letters:

The self answers to the description of the fundamental differentiation of the absolute. Nothing else which we know or can imagine does so. The idea of the self has certain characteristics which can be explained if the self is taken as one of the fundamental differentiations, but of which no explanation has been offered on any other theory, except that of rejecting the idea of the self altogether, and sinking into complete scepticism. The self is so paradoxical that we can find no explanation for it, except its absolute reality. (Quoted in G. Lowes Dickinson's memoir on McTaggart.)

Prof. Schneider's last chapter essays synthesis of a number of fundamental philosophical concerns. After discussing the symbolism of the word "God" and the apparently contrapuntal emphasis upon "facts" in our particular age, he indicates why a search for Reality can be properly approached in neither way:

Reality by any other name is respectable and will prevail whatever happens to mankind. But it is easy to confuse such existential primacy and priority with the doctrine that "truth will prevail" or that human values are everlasting. The things that man should hold sacred may have little or nothing to do with any ultimate destiny of man in the world or of the world itself. The real is the measure of illusions and has priority over them, but the real is also the measure of true sentences and has priority over truth. This omnicompetence of the real, however, should not receive such titles as either God or "brute" fact. Facticity, to use the French term, is a poor object of worship and an inappropriate object of scorn. The world does not ask to be accepted any more than God asked Adam and Eve to worship their creator. There is a human decency in a civilized respect for paternity, but the world, the real world is far from being a heavenly father. There is no doubt something awesome and awe-inspiring about finding oneself in the real world; it is more intelligent to stand in wonder at it than to try to explain it or to escape it. But all these questions of how human beings should behave in the face of the world are questions of morals and manners, not of reality.

MANAS readers have perhaps wondered at our apparently persistent antipathy to the idea of a "personal God." Well, though Dr. Schneider's distinction may seem to be highly theoretical—his refusal to allow the term "God" to be related to the "Real," etc.—the fact remains that unless a man has a conception that the highest is beyond any finite relations, he is apt to get into psychological trouble. If, for one thing, God is conceived as a "Being," however wonderful, it is possible for the individual man to establish some kind of personal relationship with Him, and the personal relationship implies that God can either do something for you or against you. Since he will obviously do more for those who at least believe in his existence, we soon arrive at an open door to partisanship and faction, because we are bound to feel that we serve God better—and are known by him to serve better—than agnostics, atheists, or more lately, Communists.

Such oversimplifications can be extremely dangerous, and we agree with Prof. Schneider that the study of ontology should be a pursuit of the future as well as a heritage from our Grecian past.