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WHAT IS TRUTH?

NOWADAYS, the man who gathers his resources and determines to spend his life in the pursuit of truth is likely to find himself continually disturbed by interruptions. At first, he may decide that these intrusions are no more than the common trials of the would-be philosopher. He will, perhaps, gain consolation from Spinoza, who observed that the most precious thing that exists—the truth—can hardly be won with ease.

But this, in the present at any rate, may be no more than naïve reassurance. The kind of interruptions we have in mind are those which require something more than a high-minded transcendence. They are interruptions which set a challenge to the familiar portrait of Man Seeking Truth, or, more simply, Man Thinking.

The idea of seeking truth contains implicitly the idea of, some day, reaching and having it. Then what? What is it to *have* the truth? Truth, it seems obvious enough, is an end which gains most of its value through communication. Its glory and vindication come from being shared. Truth is precious because of what men can do with it. It relates the hitherto separate and unrelated. It gives light where there has been darkness. The full and rich being of truth comes into existence only as men see by its light.

Someone has said, with impressive simplicity, that truth is *correspondence.* There is a faithful correspondence between the true idea of a thing, and the thing itself. Truth is thus a kind of measurement of some mensurable attribute of reality or being. But as an ideal which has commanded the aspirations of all the great of the human race, truth is the dawning awareness of meaning which results from *seeing* the correspondence.

An essential element in the value of truth, therefore, is its communicability. A truth that cannot be told, or, when told, cannot be accepted or understood, should probably have some special name. It is not what men mean when they talk about finding or revealing "the truth." This distinction is not, of course, a new idea. Kant referred to it when he spoke of the inaccessibility to human consciousness of the *Ding an sich* (the thing-in-itself, independent of our modes of cognition), and the ancient Hindus spoke of *Paramarthasatya* (absolute truth) and *Samvriti* (relative truth). But these are metaphysical aspects of the question, and here we are concerned with another sort of problem (although, doubtless, the metaphysical explanation is behind all phases of meaning) . Let us illustrate:

In the *Progressive* for October, Clyde R. Miller, writer, lecturer, and the founder of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, has an article entitled, "The Man I Sent to Prison." The man was Eugene Debs and it seems from Mr. Miller's article that he did indeed cause Debs to go to prison. Later he decided he had made a terrible mistake and persuaded Warren G. Harding to pardon the Socialist leader. But Miller did send Debs to prison because, after listening to his speech in Canton, Ohio, in 1917, he called a federal attorney and told him that Debs had violated the Espionage Act. Against instructions from Washington (the Attorney General apparently did not want Debs indicted), Miller, then a reporter for the Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, got his paper to press for the prosecution of Debs. Debs was tried and convicted and sent to the federal pentitentiary in Atlanta. Miller was the chief witness against him. In court he told how, before the speech, he had interviewed Debs in the lobby of the Courtney Hotel. The testimony helped to convict Debs. Miller recalls the meeting:

He was a tall, lean man with a gaunt face and sparse, graying hair. He wore a black alpaca coat and sleazy gray trousers. As I introduced myself to him I was impressed by his friendliness, and, above all, by his eyes, which seemed to radiate tenderness.

I liked him immediately. This man, I felt, is not only the embodiment of courtesy and kindliness, but he has a sense of right and wrong. I found it impossible to believe that he did not want the utter destruction of those dirty Huns.

Yet when I asked how he felt about our being in the war he replied that he was *against* it. Bewildered that so kind a man could countenance the Kaiser's brutality, I exclaimed: "Mr. Debs, how can you say a thing like that? Surely, you are not going to say that in your speech this afternoon!"

"I certainly am."

His explanation was simple and—I felt—completely mistaken. The war, he said, was a contest for empire: a contest between powerful imperial forces in Germany and precisely the same kind of ruthless, rich, and greedy men in England. These creatures and their respective allies would increase their wealth by exploiting peoples of the world. The pawns in the contest were the millions of young men in the various armies—young men who had not the faintest understanding of the real issue of the war.

"It is appalling," said Debs, "to think of young American boys trained to plunge their bayonets into the quivering flesh of German lads whom they have never met; appalling to think of German boys trained to kill young Americans, to stab and to blow them to pieces. I'm against this war with every drop of blood in my body."

This struck me as horrible heresy. I repeated, "Surely, Mr. Debs, you don't intend to say this publicly?"

"Why that's what I'm here to do."

He did just that.

Debs did just that, and he shocked the nation and young Mr. Miller, who called the district attorney and made sure that Debs went to prison. But before Debs was taken away, Miller met him outside the court room:

"Mr. Debs," I said, "I think you got exactly the sentence you deserved, but I'm sorry it's you because you're such a decent guy."

He put his hand on my shoulder and said, "Look, I'd like to say something to you. I want to thank you for your testimony. What you told the jury was accurate and clear. Second I want you to know that I admire you for your sincerity. I would only add this.

"You look upon the world and see certain things that you regard as facts and you have come to definite conclusions about them. You are willing to go to France and risk your life. Well, I look upon the same world and see things I regard as facts, and I have come to conclusions diametrically opposed to yours. You are going to France and you may never come back. I'm going to Atlanta and I don't know whether I'll live out my sentence.

"But what do you say we make a deal? If you get back from France and I get out of jail and we ever meet, what do you say we get together and tell each other who was more nearly right or wrong about this war?"

"Fair enough," I said, and we shook hands on it.

After six months in France, Mr. Miller says, he changed his mind:

I learned more about how wars are made than in all my years in college. I learned how propaganda worked. I decided Debs was right and I was wrong. I came back to America feeling I had done Debs a great injustice and should try to get him out of prison.

And he did. The story of President Wilson's refusal to pardon Debs, and President Harding's willingness to do it, because, he admitted, Debs was right, is also told by Mr. Miller, making a useful note on the relation of politicians to "truth." Harding told Miller he knew we should not have entered the war, but that he voted for it anyway. "I couldn't have voted against the war and still have been reelected Senator," he explained.

For argument's sake, let us stipulate that Debs and Harding had the truth about the war, and that Miller was wrong the first time and right the second time.

What, then, is the point?

Well, Debs went to prison. Maybe that made his truth a little more communicable to people who wondered why a man like Debs was willing

to go to prison when he didn't have to. He could have kept still. And Miller went to France and saw what he needed to see to change his mind. Debs's proposition about the war needed to be worked out in practice for Miller to grasp its truth. Experience, as we say, is a hard school, but it was the one Miller and a lot of others had to attend to find out the truth about the war. And of course, many more people who were in the war didn't find out what Miller learned.

Harding, on the other hand, didn't need the war to see the truth. But Harding wanted to be a Senator, and a President, more than he wanted to communicate that particular truth. So he voted for war.

There seems to be some very complicated uncertainty principle at work, here, in connection with what you might call "social" truth. Is "social" truth the kind of truth that comes into being only after it is understood by a sizeable number of people? Some of the factors to be considered in this question are the reluctance of individuals to stand alone in their opinions the way Debs did, the compromises of office-seekers such as Harding, and the compulsions to conformity created by political pressure and such legislation as the Espionage Act. Can you, after all, isolate the "abstract truth" of such situations from the various factors which determine what people think, and how they behave, regardless of how they think?

But any learning process, we say, includes the experience of making mistakes. Was, then, Miller "morally" wrong the first time? In any event, he was moral enough to learn from his mistake, and courageous enough to admit it. What role does "truth" play in such transactions?

However we decide on this question, the element of motive seems decisive. The determination to do the right thing may not lead a man to do the right thing, but it often helps him to find out, eventually, what he *ought* to have done.

There are those who say to themselves, today—with fairly obvious justification—that this sort of "learning from experience" is well and good when you can afford it, but that a nuclear war is too dangerous a way for modern man to get the education he needs. So, there are a lot of pacifists in jail, these days, testifying to the truth as they see it. And the present generation of "Millers" is mostly torn by conflicting loyalties and confused.

Let us look at another illustration of this sort of problem. The *Saturday Evening Post* for Oct. 12 has an article by John Kobler on Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a French Jesuit priest and paleontologist who died in New York City eight years ago, leaving a heritage of religious philosophy and philosophizing science so warmly attractive that the subsequent sale of his books (he was forbidden to publish during his lifetime by the Society of Jesus) has run into nearly a million copies. Best known of his works is *The Phenomenon of Man*, completed in 1940, published in 1959 with an introduction by Julian Huxley. For Teilhard, Evolution is the key to all existence, and consciousness the primary reality. "Man," Kobler quotes from Teilhard, "is not a static center of the world, as he long assumed, but the axis and arrow of evolution, which is something much finer." The heat-death of the universe, anticipated from the second law of thermodynamics, held no terrors for Teilhard. Mr. Kobler summarizes:

> God, he believed, could not have intended such an end for creation. There must exist some other kind of energy capable of producing higher forms ad infinitum and thereby preventing universal decay. Teilhard looked for such an energy on the "Inside of Things," by which he meant consciousness, and he ascribed an inherent consciousness to even the lowest forms of inorganic matter. Operating on the Inside, on consciousness, he concluded, was a "radical" or spiritual energy, separate from but related to tangential energy {the latter operates on the Outside of Things and is the concern and study of physical or "natural" science}. Reversing the laws of thermodynamics, he formulated the "Law of Complexity-Consciousness."

> According to this law, complexity increases on the outside until stopped by the loss of tangential energy. But on the Inside, radial energy, which is inexhaustible, drives the organism toward higher levels of both complexity and consciousness. In the evolution of animals, complexity-consciousness reached the level of instinct and awareness, in man, the level of thought, moral judgment, freedom of choice, spirituality. "Animals merely know," said Teilhard, "but man knows he knows."

"God" figures, of course, in this scheme, but Teilhard lost out with the Roman Church, not because of what he included in his theories, but for what he omitted. The Holy Office banned his works from Catholic bookstores in 1957 and in 1962 issued a formal warning against exposing believers to the perils in the teachings of this priest. Many Catholics have ignored the warning. And Teilhard, while obedient to the restrictions placed upon him by the Church during his life, kept a bust of Galileo in his room. "The Church owes him," Teilhard explained, "at least that much."

Although Catholic doctrine now permits belief in a religiously interpreted evolution, from the orthodox view Teilhard's account of evolution left much to be desired. Kobler gives the views of his critics:

> Nowhere, they protest, did he clearly acknowledge spontaneous creation, that act in which God created the human soul. Again, if evolution is carrying humanity infallibly to absolute perfection, if the process was ordained . . ., what place remains for Divine Grace, without which no Christian can achieve salvation?

There were other offenses. When Teilhard proposed in an essay that "original sin was not a historical fact but merely a theory to explain the existence of evil," Rome ordered him to stick to scientific inquiry, preferably at some distant spot. Teilhard then went to China, where he helped to discover the fossil remains of Peking Man. Another upsetting proposal was that "No evolutionary future awaits man except in association with other men. . . . The most humanized groups appear always, in the end, as the product not of a segregation but a synthesis." This idea was not liked by people who were unwilling to exchange their hope of individual salvation for the goal of a common human achievement. "Some imbecile may drop the bomb," a French theologian remarked.

So, as long as he lived, Teilhard was effectively silenced by the Church. Frustrated in his writing, denied teaching posts of honor and influence, after World War II Teilhard went to Rome, hoping to obtain a relaxation of the ban on his work. He returned from an interview with the General of the Society of Jesus, as Kobler says, "in tears." "They don't want me to write," he said. "They don't want me to think. They want me to disappear."

Passing by the special pathos in this situation, which arose from Teilhard's personal problem in being both Catholic priest and scientist (or man-in-search-of-truth), let us look at its implications for the finding and communication of "truth." For the purposes of argument, again, let us stipulate that Teilhard found and had some truth. And let us note that, despite the long discouragements suffered by his mind, and the confinements imposed upon his ideas, this truth is getting out.

How and why is it getting out?

One reason it is getting out is that Teilhard's romantic career makes a good story for the *Saturday Evening Post.* Another reason is that the free air of his thought appealed to a lot of Catholics who knew him personally and for practically a generation these people kept circulating manuscripts of his writings among his admirers in France and elsewhere. They tore little holes in the filter of theological orthodoxy and let Teilhard's ideas seep through more or less whole into the larger world of independent thought. And this world, partly because of the intrinsic merit in Teilhard's thinking, partly because of the hunger of the age for a science with non-materialistic assumptions, and partly because of the excitement in sharing in the daring of a "free-thinking" priest, is finding the ideas good.

Well, do the facts in these two stories—of Debs and Teilhard—justify drawing some conclusions? They justify saying, we think, that the search for truth without any attention to the problem of its communication is a pretty sterile approach to the project. They justify recalling the judgment of Socrates that the morally neutral truth is hardly worth pursuing, in contrast to the desirability of the truth about man. They justify and support the claim, often made, that the truth worth knowing is *indivisible.* In other words, knowing how to communicate the truth is a part of knowing the truth itself.

Where does this take us? It takes us and drops us right in the middle of a vast and bewildering web of relativities—the total human situation. No wonder the scientists like to remain specialists. No wonder so many philosophers have hoped to prove the pluralist case. No wonder the course of the great religious reformer almost always turns out to be the path to martyrdom. No wonder the tribe of anarchists—who have 51 per cent of the truth—never dies out. And no wonder the political and philosophical system-builders almost always succumb to the temptation to come up with an infallible formula for defining and testing "reality" or "truth," so that they can feel comfortable about suppressing the agitators and disturbers of the peace.

The great questions are exactly the same as they were when the enterprise of Western civilization began. Let us put them in reverse order: What is the form of the social organization or institution which will interfere the least with the unprejudiced search for free communication of truth? What are the essential elements in the nature of man that might establish, maintain, and *never compromise* on the principle of freedom which the institution is structured to serve?

These are the questions which cry out for answer in the remaining years of the twentieth century.

REVIEW
INTEGRITY OF MIND

IN 1934 Yale University Press issued a small book by John Dewey called *A Common Faith,* made up of the Terry Lectures given by Dr. Dewey at the University. This book went through twelve printings and in 1960 was published as a Yale paperback. It is a summation of Dewey's thought on religion, and a better discussion of the subject, in the light and the temper of its author's generation, would be difficult to find.

Dewey established a curious relation with the religious thinkers of his time. The stubborn honesty and the clear originality of his thought are such that no intelligent reader can fail to be gripped by what he says. It is impossible to "skim" John Dewey. A single encounter with his paragraphs makes you realize that here is a man who takes nothing for granted, who repeats no second-hand insights, who has thought hard and long about everything he says, and who lights up the spaces between the areas of concentration of other men.

It was natural, therefore, for people concerned with religious education to respond to Dewey's spirit and intentions. It must have been an interesting phenomenon: John Dewey, the iconoclast of all possible theologies, winning the respect, the attention, and in some measure the allegiance, of people engaged in the transmission of traditional religious faith, because of his obvious commitment to and understanding of the educational process, because of his warm regard for human beings, and because of the religious *spirit* which pervades his thinking.

The truth that was in Dewey won them over, but eventually, another aspect of the truth that was in him frightened them away. For Dewey, they discovered, was determined to do entirely without the familiar sort of God, and any form of the supernatural. There followed a period of disenchantment with the great educator in religious circles, and some bitter books were written to justify the rejection of what he stood for.

What did he stand for? The answer to this question, embodied in *A Common Faith,* belongs in the library of all those who try to come to grips with the central questions of human life. (Yale paperbound, 95 cents.) It is of course a most uncommon faith, since it calls upon all the reserves of independence of mind to adopt it, but anyone who conscientiously applies the principles declared and illustrated in this book will find himself able to say, when it comes his time to die, "I have done my best."

It is not that the reader will find it necessary to reach Dewey's conclusions. These are valuable, as any honest man's heartfelt convictions are valuable, but the really precious elements in Dewey's thinking are his criteria for finding truth. These are at once rigorously impartial and passionately pro-human. Not many men will find in themselves the character and the commitment to put them to work as he did.

Dewey begins by distinguishing between all the religions which represent "a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight," and the meaning he gives the adjective "religious," by which he means an attitude that may be taken toward "every object and every proposed end or ideal." The "religious," in human life, is a spirit of seeking the ideal—ideal, in this case, meaning a good envisioned by the imagination, which is sought in order to bring it concretely about or to put it into practice.

Dewey shapes his critical account of particular religious faiths as follows:

> The intimate connection of imagination with ideal elements in experience is generally recognized. Such is not the case with respect to its connection with faith. The latter has been regarded as a substitute for knowledge, for sight. It is defined in the Christian religion, as *evidence* of things not seen. The implication is that faith is a kind of anticipatory vision of things that are now invisible because of the limitations of our finite and erring nature. Because it

> is a substitute for knowledge, its material and object are intellectual in quality. As John Locke summed up the matter, faith is "assent to a proposition . . . on the credit of the proposer. Religious faith is then given to a body of propositions as true on the credit of their supernatural author, reason coming in to demonstrate the reasonableness of giving such credit. Of necessity there results the development of theologies, or bodies of systematic propositions, to make explicit in organized form the content of the propositions to which belief is attached and assent given. Given the point of view, those who hold that religion necessarily implies a theology are correct.

This is the point of view which Dewey absolutely rejects. He rejects it because, on the showing of experience, it becomes a barrier to individual search. The substitute for knowledge becomes the successful rival of the independent quest for knowledge and of such knowledge as may be obtained in this way.

Dewey wants and requires faith, but it is a faith in intelligence and the promise of the human use of intelligence, not faith in a supernatural authority which replaces ardent search on the part of man. "There is," he says, "such a thing as faith in intelligence becoming religious in quality—a fact that perhaps explains the efforts of some religionists to disparage the possibilities of intelligence as a force. They properly feel such faith to be a dangerous rival." Dewey ends his first chapter thus:

> If I have said anything about religions and religion that seems harsh, I have said those things because of a firm belief that the claim on the part of religions to possess a monopoly of ideals and of the supernatural means by which alone, it is alleged, they can be furthered, stands in the way of distinctively religious values inherent in natural experience. For that reason, if for no other, I should be sorry if any were misled by the frequency with which I have employed the adjective "religious" to conceive of what I have said as a disguised apology for what have passed as religions. The opposition between religious values as I conceive them and religions is not to be bridged. Just because the release of these values is so important, their identification with the creeds and cults of religion must be dissolved.

In the progressive secularization of Western culture since the Renaissance, Dewey sees a proof of his contentions. Since the intellectual forms of the Christian faith broke down in comparison with the emerging facts of life and nature, religion became something separate and apart from other aspects of existence. This made possible the development of other sorts of "authority," and other, morally neutral credos for human behavior. The "religious" spirit became some sort of specialty, attached to articles of faith which have an origin alien to the daily experience of man. The irreligion of the worldly life, therefore, Dewey blames on the failing claims of supernatural religion. There is this alternative:

> All purpose is selective, and all intelligent action includes deliberate choice. In the degree which we cease to depend upon belief in the supernatural, selection is enlightened and choice can be made in behalf of ideals whose inherent relations to conditions and consequences are understood. Were the naturalistic foundations and bearings of religion grasped, the religious element in life would emerge from the throes of the crisis in religion. Religion would then be found to have its natural place in every aspect of human experience that is concerned with estimate of possibilities, with emotional stir by possibilities as yet unrealized, and with all action in behalf of their realization. All that is significant in human experience falls within this frame.

Throughout this book Dewey speaks as an educator. He understands as few others have how people learn, and this knowledge of the *teacher* is the ground of Dewey's certainty in what he affirms and in what he rejects:

> We do not know the relation of causes to results in social matters, and consequently we lack means of control. Of course I make no claim to knowing how far intelligence may and will develop in respect to social relations. But one thing I do know. The needed understanding will not develop unless we strive for it. The assumption that only supernatural agencies can give control is a sure method of retarding this effort. It is as sure to be a hindering force now with respect to social intelligence, as the similar appeal was earlier an obstruction in the development of physical knowledge. . . .

> All modes, of human association are "affected with a public interest," and full realization of this interest is equivalent to a sense of a significance that is religious in its function. The objection to supernaturalism is that it stands in the way of an effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relations. It stands in the way of using the means that are in our power to make radical changes in these relations. It is certainly true that great material changes might be made with no corresponding improvement of a spiritual or ideal nature. But development in the latter direction cannot be introduced from without; it cannot be brought about by dressing up material and economic changes with decorations derived from the supernatural. It can come only from more intense realization of values that inhere in the actual connections of human beings with one another. The attempt to segregate the implicit public interest and social value of all institutions and social arrangements in a particular organization is a fatal diversion. . . . The surrender of claims to an exclusive and authoritative position is a *sine qua non* for doing away with the dilemma in which churches now find themselves in respect to their sphere of social action.

Dewey as critic is beyond criticism. As advocate of a positive faith, he may suffer from the vigor of his historically necessary iconoclasm. Suppose, for example, he had been nurtured by a culture saturated with Emersonian Transcendentalism, or non-institutional Buddhism, or Upanishadic pantheism, or Neoplatonic rationalism. In principle, his stand against supernaturalism suffers no violation from these "faiths," since they allow no authority outside the individual searcher for truth or self-realization. Here the question has to do with the boundaries of the "natural" and whether or not they may in time be extended beyond the present confines of accepted knowledge of the universe. It is just conceivable that the supernaturalism which has emasculated the religions of modern times is itself a corruption of ancient insights into the nature of things—a corruption so devastating in its effects that modern man has now to start entirely afresh in his "religious" discoveries, using all the safeguards against self-deception that Mr. Dewey has proposed. But the "heritage of values" which is ours to transmit to future generations surely includes a vast treasure-chest of "clues" to be examined, tested, and possibly to be verified in the laboratory of our own individual and social life.

COMMENTARY
"MEN AND NATIONS"

BY happy coincidence, there has come into our hands a book which frequently parallels the purposes of John Dewey in writing *A Common Faith,* yet differs from Dewey in certain vital respects. This book is *Men and Nations* by Louis J. Halle, published in 1962 by the Princeton University Press.

Dewey, it will be seen from this week's Review, found fault with the traditional religious view that the "ideal" toward which men strive has somehow a reality pre-existent to its discovery by men. The educator felt that so long as men believed in the "anticipatory vision" vouchsafed to the founders of religions, the intellectualized version of the vision would be made into dogmas, that these dogmas would be upheld by their supposedly supernatural origin, and that the resulting theology would be taken as a "substitute for knowledge."

But what if the "anticipatory vision" is freed of its supernatural associations? What if it be conceived of as a form of Platonic insight into the ideal nature of things? Dewey of course was no Platonist. He believed that intimations of the ideal would occur, and its form take shape, out of acts of strenuous search by aroused human intelligence. Yet it seems clear that his deep opposition to the metaphysics of Platonic idealism came almost entirely from a study of history, which showed him that the manipulation of beliefs about the "ideal" has enslaved men's minds.

Adopting a non-theological approach to the human situation, Mr. Halle devises a rudimentary Platonic idealism of his own, and then, so far as we can see, puts into operation all of Dewey's safeguards against dogmatic or priestly interpretation. His proposition is that nobody really knows what man ought to be, and that the business of human life is to find out. He shares with Dewey the view that unsubstantiated beliefs about the good life, when acted upon, lead to disaster, but he has not Dewey's fear of the idea of *logos*—a spiritual principle of formation which seeks realization in finite forms.

Some paragraphs of quotation will give an idea of the temper and content of this book—but not its development, which is closely and cogently argued, with full attention to the difficulties so far-reaching a thesis must confront. In his first chapter, Mr. Halle writes:

> We men identify the ideas of propriety that each of us respectively entertains with the *Logos,* each of us basing his allegiance to them on the belief or assumption that they represent what is right in terms of what God or nature intended. "There is," says Cicero, ". . . a true law—namely right reason which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. . . . It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and unchanging, binding at all times upon all peoples. . . . The man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of man, will thereby suffer the severest penalties."
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> Cicero identified his own views of human propriety with this natural law on the assumption that the logic of his own mind was the "right reason" which corresponded to it. The difficulty is that the logic of other men's minds has represented "right reason" other-wise, thereby arriving at other views of human propriety. The *Logos* itself may be the same at Rome as at Athens, tomorrow as today; but the identification of it by the men of Rome has been different from the identification of it by the men of Athens, and the identification made by the men of one age has been abandoned in favor of another identification by the men of the next.
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> This experience suggests that, unlike Cicero, we should distinguish between the ideas we have in our minds and the *Logos* itself. The *Logos* remains largely unknown: the ideas in our minds represent only our partial apprehension of it, or our supposition of what it must be. The idea of the Athenian (as described in Pericles's funeral oration), the idea of the Roman (as represented by Cincinnatus at the plow), the old Teutonic idea of man as a warrior, the Quaker idea of the peaceable man—each of these may, by comparison with others, have points of greater and points of lesser correspondence to the original idea

(i.e., the *Logos).* But they are not the original idea itself.

It is difficult to praise this book, for the reason that appreciation of such works should be precise, not merely enthusiastic. It is essentially a book of philosophy turned to application to the problems of men and nations. The extraordinary thing about it is the self-validating quality of the arguments presented. No fair-minded man can ignore Mr. Halle's thesis, and no worker for peace can reject his conclusion.

We have been asked to announce that the Fall 1963 (third) edition of the International Peace/Disarmament Directory, giving the names and addresses of 1750 organizations and 450 periodicals, is now available from the publisher, 711 South Duke Street, York, Pennsylvania. The price in the United States is $1 a copy; a special price of 50 cents a copy is made to purchasers in Asia, Africa, and South America. There are substantial reductions on bulk orders—6 copies for $5; 10 for $7.50; 25 for $15; and 50 for $25.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WORLD COLLEGE IN GESTATION

AN experiment in a new sort of international education is described in a recent (July 12) New York *Times.* This project was sponsored by the Friends World College Committee, and conducted under the direction of Dr. Harold Taylor, former president of Sarah Lawrence College.

World College began with a six-week session, in cooperation with twenty-five member countries of the United Nations. Students were selected, one from each participating country (including the United States), and the instructors were similarly chosen, Dr. Taylor being the only American member of the faculty. Apart from their obvious interest in global education, the teachers were knowledgeable in such fields as disarmament, colonialism, world history, national cultures, anthropology, comparative religion, international communication, and contemporary world literature.

The curriculum for the World College may be said to be in the process of development on a cooperative basis, between students and faculty. We quote from Dr. Taylor on the planning to date:

> In the present situation, the major effort to develop a non-nationalistic, non-colonial, non-military world authority has been directed through the United Nations, an organization of Western, not to say, American origin, but of world significance. The question is now two-fold: Will that organization develop fast enough in its role of international, legal and political authority to cope with the necessity of controlling war? On the other hand, what other kinds of institutions can be formed for the redirection of aggressive national ambitions into some form of world order?
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> If we project into the next twenty years the present history of internationalism in intellectual and cultural affairs, it is clear that we can look to the establishment of a variety of new forms of institutions for world education. Not only will Western countries enlarge their own conception of the proper content of a university curriculum to include more and more non-Western materials—in history, social science, philosophy and the arts—but the conception of culture itself will expand to embrace elements of a world view.
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> We have organized a pilot project. We are trying to develop a pure concept of world education and of world culture in which national differences in philosophy and cultural attitude are not only accepted as valid, but can become the substance of education itself. The original invitation to the Governments requested each to select and support one student to attend the college for a period of six weeks, leaving to each country the decision as to how the student should be chosen—graduate or undergraduate, man or woman, with the requirement that the person selected should be between the ages of twenty and twenty-six, should be seriously interested in world affairs, and should be able to read, write and speak English with competence.
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> The selection of the countries to be invited was in itself an interesting exercise in political and cultural analysis on a world scale. Since the accommodations of the Friends World College campus limit the number of students to twenty, with additional room for the faculty, the selection had to be made in a way which could represent world cultures without giving special weight to any particular ideology or cultural bias. The Soviet Union and the United States were, of course, the major starting-points, and both the American authorities, including Ambassador Stevenson, and the Soviet officials in the cultural exchange offices were enthusiastic about the idea and have given help and sponsorship. For the United States, the National Student Association has been appointed as the selection body. The Soviet Union already has thirty-nine students in this country and we are counting on one of them as the Soviet representative.
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> It is our hope that through the experiment we may be able to establish some patterns of curriculum and of education which will go beyond the work of international seminars and institutes which are already in existence in this country and elsewhere, and develop a program of interest to educators and scholars in other countries for the creation of a series of world colleges. Plans for the International Cooperation Year in 1965, stemming from the Indian resolution in the United Nations Assembly of December 1962, could very well include the establishment of a number of world colleges in a variety of countries. The world's governments, acting

through the 1962 UN General Assembly, called upon private organizations in a world wide effort "to direct attention to the common interests of mankind and to accelerate the joint efforts being undertaken to serve them."

Since MANAS, for better or worse, has acquired a reputation for discussing ideas rather than events, we shall here append a little speculation. The success of World College, it seems to us, is not likely to depend upon the amount of publicity enjoyed in its first year, nor on the "good" things said about Dr. Taylor, the American Friends, or the students and faculty. Nor will the "better understanding" occasioned by tolerant exposure to different cultures and ideological backgrounds necessarily signify that something germinal is occurring in the World College setting.

A "something new" we should *like* to see would amount to the gradual emergence of a redefinition of politics, religion, philosophy and psychology—an emergence of man's innate capacity to break out of encapsulated ideas about human society and institutions.

The auspices, of course, are good, since World College represents no single organization or school of thought. The students and faculty are not enjoined to produce a "blueprint" for new ways of crossing national barriers. But if the minds there engaged are inwardly striving to reach an attitude beyond the provincialism of nation and state, that nucleus will of itself be a demonstration that larger groups of people can do what a smaller group has found natural and inviting.

Something of this spirit was conveyed in a Lowell Thomas broadcast on the World College:

> The purpose of this institution launched today is to study the world as a whole—in the larger sense. Dr. Taylor says there will be no attempt to justify any one political system. They will simply discuss the problems of human needs, physical, spiritual, and psychological. The broad aim of this World University, to help make our world habitable. As he put it:
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> "The ultimate evil is to destroy life. The ultimate good is to enhance life."
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> "The function of education," he explained, "is to meet human needs; to have a concern for the welfare of others; so to live that you can enrich the life of another person."

FRONTIERS

The Self and Society

SOME sixty pages of the Summer (1963) *Texas Quarterly* present a symposium ambitiously titled, "Individualism in Twentieth-Century America." While mainly "background material" is offered, and little appears that has not been said before, the approach is close enough to fundamental concerns in psychology, religion, and politics to afford a basis for some discussion. Gordon Mills, who arranged and edited the six scholarly contributions, makes introductory comment of a sort generally pertinent in the case of Big Jobs on such a subject:

> In one respect, the exchange of ideas that occurred in the symposium is surprisingly limited in scope. For example, no one seriously discussed individualism in religion, or in sex and marriage relationships, although these great areas of personal and cultural life are all undergoing important changes. This fact, however, is clearly only a reflection of the professional interests of the participants, and must not be complained about. Perhaps there should have been twelve participants rather than six.
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> A great many of the roles we play require choices about individualism, each in its own way and degree. As a mild exercise, I wrote down the following list of areas in which individualism becomes an issue: marriage, child-adult relationships, family, club, social class, religion, political party, military services, sanity. (If, while you are trying to sell your house, the kindly but mentally unstable lady next door persists in hanging out a washing in her front yard every day what are you going to do?) This list could be greatly extended.

David Potter's summation on "American Individualism" may stimulate one or another of our contributors to supplement the "symposium" with letters or articles in MANAS. Prof. Potter writes:

> When Hannah Arendt published an article questioning whether the integration of public schools ought to be attempted by the exercise of public authority, the result was not, as one might have hoped, a rough-and-tumble scrimmage between her and persons who disagreed with her. It was rather a shocked silence, a polite looking in the other direction as if no one had noticed. It was, indeed, the same reaction as if she had belched in church. Miss Arendt had questioned a point on which liberals have established a dogma to which they require conformity, and they were shocked in a prudish way to hear this dogma questioned in mixed company.
>
> Must we not expect that even the new style of defense of individual rights will sometimes be conducted at the expense of what might best serve society as a whole? The new individualism firmly repudiates all the nineteenth-century freebooters who used to exploit the public economically, but it still thinks, and perhaps ought to think, in terms of man as separate rather than of man in the group. Thus, when it is confronted with what we call crime—the large-scale incidence of violence in our society—it seems more concerned with the rehabilitation of the deviant individual who has committed the violence, than with safeguarding those anonymous persons upon whom the violence is committed. When confronted with the sale in every drug store of magazines which exploit sex, it does not really ask whether it would be better for society if the drug stores did not purvey this material. It does not ask whether the publisher who makes a fast buck by this shoddy commercial enterprise is different from a patent-medicine manufacturer who also makes a fast buck by selling nostrums and is regulated, hopefully, by the Pure Food and Drug Act. It asks instead who will dare to violate freedom of the press in maintaining an informed public opinion.
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> Perhaps these are the right questions to ask. Certainly I would hesitate to say that they are wrong. What I do mean to suggest is simply that, although the old individualism of self-reliance and the new individualism of nonconformity are in may ways profoundly and basically different, they may still have some things in common, which is not surprising considering that they both have given a priority to the interests of man alone, over the interests of man in the community.
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> What they have in common, oddly, is that they are both democratic forms of individualism, and being democratic, they cannot resist some kind of conformity for the democratic man holds some group—if not the public group, at least a group of his own choice—in too much respect to set it at defiance, as an elite individualist like H. L. Mencken would have done. What else they have in common is that they both believe that society exists for man and not man for society—even that man is innocent but

> society is corrupt—and therefore that the private values, whether in the old-fashioned form of economic acquisition, or in the new fashioned form of freedom of self-expression, must be upheld even though the social values be impaired. Yet within the framework of this primary belief there is also the secondary belief, equally deeply rooted in the democratic faith, that the values of society must not be impaired too much—for society, after all, is really a large number of individuals, and the welfare of many individuals must not be made subservient to any doctrinaire notions about the absolute rights of any one individual. As Riesman stated it, "Such terms as 'society' and 'individual' tend to pose a false as well as shifting dichotomy."

From the MANAS standpoint, it is difficult to take a Pollyanna view of loyalty oaths, but it does appear that five years of furor and controversy on this subject have served to generate serious questioning about the relationship between "individual" and "society." If a loyalty oath is employed to secure the utmost of conformity in opinion, through threats to reputation and job,—among teachers especially,—then a "democracy" may begin to resemble the dictatorships whose censorship we rightly deplore—as for example in Russia or China. Ideally, the people of a democracy exhibit communal faith in the power of truth to emerge in free discussion; it is not necessary to be afraid of an idea, or even of its most fervent exponents. On this view, "society" cannot possibly be impaired by allowing a Communist soap-boxer to speak freely in a public park, nor by a Communist party-member whose qualifications entitle him to present the Marxist ideology in a university course.

Behind this vital socio-political issue is, of course, a philosophical one—the question of what the philosophers call "ontology," the science of the nature of being. Emerson's "ontology" is fundamental to individualism:

> Evermore it is the order of nature to grow, and every soul is by this intrinsic necessity quitting its whole system of things, its friends, and home, and laws, and faith, as the shellfish crawls out of its beautiful but stony case, because it no longer admits of its growth and slowly forms a new house. In proportion to the vigor of the individual, these revolutions are frequent, until in some happier mind they are incessant and all worldly relations hang very loosely about him, becoming, as it were, a transparent fluid membrane through which the form is always seen, and not as in most men an indurated heterogeneous fabric of many dates, and of no settled character, in which the man is imprisoned. Then there can be enlargement, and the man of today scarcely recognizes the man of yesterday.

A contemporary complement of these ideas is supplied by a quotation from Viktor Frankl:

> Mental health is based on a certain degree of tension, the tension between what one has already achieved and what one still ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one should become. Such a tension is inherent in the human being and therefore is indispensable to mental well-being. We should not, then, be hesitant about challenging man with a potential meaning for him to fulfill. It is only thus that we evoke his will to meaning from its state of latency. I consider it a dangerous misconception of mental hygiene to assume that what man needs in the first place is equilibrium or, as it is called in biology, "homeostasis," i.e., a tensionless state. What man actually needs is not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of him. What he needs is not the discharge of tension at any cost, but the call of a potential meaning waiting to be fulfilled by him.