EDUCATION FOR PEACE

A CORRESPONDENT active in the anti-war movement writes in comment on the project of peace education:

> Peace research is moving into new directions of exploration into structural violence, movements of peace education, and relationships with activists. All this is important and good. Education for peace has to be a continuous process of enlightening the individual both in school and out of school; a process of education for life and through life, as Gandhi would put it. If the nature of that process is educational, the first step would have been accomplished. Education then becomes the medium and not the goal, since when taken as a goal it is turned into an instrument for bartering. . . . Instead of wasting our heads over routine learning in educational institutions—which in any case are crumbling—it would be more worth while to look for pointers toward tomorrow which would give us not merely new ideas to experiment with, but would re-emphasize the role of education in the remaking of man.

Attitudes toward peace-making have changed considerably during the past fifty years. One way of getting at this change would be to recognize the growing awareness of what this correspondent calls "structural violence." He means, we think, the violence-producing tendencies which are implicit in widely accepted social structures and relationships. In short, the actual requirements of peace may be much more far-reaching than many people have supposed. The problem of identifying structural violence was put simply centuries ago by Thomas a Kempis, when he observed: "All men desire peace, but few men desire those things that make for peace."

Back in 1925, a writer for *G.K.'s Weekly* made a comparison between Gandhi and Henry Ford as peacemakers which illustrates what is meant by structural violence:

> Gandhi's pacifism . . . is all of a piece with his other ideals. There is no conflict between his pacifism and the other things he believes in, for if men could be persuaded to follow him entirely peace would certainly reign on earth. But with Ford it is different. His pacifism is not something that arises from his belief in industrialism and his acceptance of human distinctions, but exists in spite of it. It can only be explained on the assumption that Ford suffers from the alternating consciousness from which businessmen and industrialists invariably suffer; for it has nothing to do with the major activities to which he devotes the most of his life. On the contrary, they do not move in the direction of pacifism but of war. This follows naturally from his ideal of industrial expansion, for such expansion not only brings industrial nations into collision with each other but leads them to exploit small and alien peoples. There is no doubt about this. The quantitative standard of production which on the one hand leads society to degrade men to the level of machines, is on the other a source of international mischief by the need it creates for foreign markets to dispose of surplus production. What are all our foreign politics about but the complications resulting from overproduction, foreign loans and oil? The latter today is a serious question. Every additional motor car Ford makes increases the demand for oil, and much of foreign politics today is concerned with struggles for the possession of oil fields. Yet Ford is a pacifist and I do not suppose it has ever occurred to him there is anything contradictory about his position. Our war-mongers talk a great deal about the peril of the East. But if there is any peril it will be because the East adopts Western ideas. There could be no peril if it follows Gandhi.

This analysis of nearly fifty years ago is even more applicable today. There was structural violence in Mr. Ford's business, and it is evident in many of the industries in which most Americans now make their living. It follows that Ford and other industrialists can easily be charged with being contradictory in their lives. But it may be more important to recognize that Ford the pacifist industrialist was a very rare sort of industrialist. Conceivably, for a businessman of his eminence to be a pacifist, even a mixed-up pacifist, is a good

thing. You could say that if people had to eliminate all the contradictions in their lives before they could qualify as pacifists, there would be practically no pacifists at all. And if people didn't have any contradictions in their lives, there would be no need for pacifist research and education. Actually, the disclosure of contradictions is a main project in peace education, and Ford's example is a good illustration of the problems involved.

Another example of structural violence is supplied by Richard N. Goodwin in the second installment of his three-part *New Yorker* series on "The American Condition" (*New Yorker,* Jan. 21-Feb. 4). In this case responsibility is general and more widely distributed:

> The personal experience of almost every white, the continual reminders of social intercourse contain evidence of a nearly universal prejudice that, since its objects are black is known as "racism." Many who share this feeling would not deny economic equality to blacks. Justice does not rest on affection, or there would be very little of it. However, racial feeling loses its mildness when this majority ideology is acted upon by the poor and uneducated. There is a direct line between an exclusive all-white New York club and a street fight on the edge of Bedford-Stuyvesant; between the expensive resort at Bar Harbor and the local construction union that refuses to admit black workers. In the context of the black historical experience, exclusion from any aspect of society implies an assertion of black inferiority. This may not in fact be the motive for exclusion, yet the meaning of a social act is determined not by subjective intentions but by the present conditions of the society. Individuals who exclude blacks in the exercise of their liberty to select associates are acting to sustain values that may not be involved either in the particular issue or in conscious motives. The only beliefs that exist for social man are those contained in behavior. One can hold an inner conviction of equality and abandon that conviction through failure to respond to a denial of equality just as the most peaceful of men can be an accomplice in violence. Although such values can often be maintained in a relatively civil and innocuous fashion at the upper levels of the social structure, they are translated into a more violent response at lower levels. For at those levels people do not have the resources to escape the problem, and the associations that are important to them—unions, housing projects, schools—are also essential to black opportunity. The varied manifestations of black separatism, social and aesthetic are a psychically necessary response to racial division. Individuals must evolve some form of association with others—with those who share the common life. They must find a place within a society. If blacks are rejected by the larger American society, they have no choice consistent with freedom except to form a society of their own. . . .

This is a brief treatise on social psychology including reflections on human nature. Mr. Goodwin supplies raw material for education for peace:

> It seems that man is so fragile that he can often attain a belief in his own worth only by contrast, by degrading all that lies without. Racism, then, is terror not of the black—the other—but of one's own existence. It can be overcome only by widening the community—something that is possible only in a society that is enlarging the possibilities of all its members. That enlargement cannot be accomplished through an effort of will or an increase in production. It requires far-reaching changes in the material structures and relationships that dominate modern life. Black freedom is tied to the freedom of all.

If the creation of social structures which are implicitly violent results, at least in part, from terror "of one's own existence," we probably have a long way to go. Quickie indoctrination in some plausible revolutionary or reformist ideology is not going to work. Effective, long-term peace-making will then involve deep reconstruction of the idea of self, and this can be recognized as the central task of human existence, not peripheral at all.

But if you set the problem in these terms, is it still "peace-making"? The modern world seems to be filling up fast with groups ardent for "self-knowledge," and while there can be no harm in the spread of this goal, the tendency to quietistic withdrawal is often evident. The peacemaker is no quietist. He is researcher, educator, and often activist, all in one. His concern is the welfare of all, even if the strength to achieve the common good must come through the growth of individuals. Yet, through the years, the peace movement has been beset by paradox. Attempts

at peace education have characteristically suffered from split-offs into other areas of reform. A person begins by being opposed to war, then finds that making an end to war requires the virtual transformation of society and the regeneration of human beings, so that the focus of his effort changes. Sometimes he may stop talking and thinking about peace altogether, for the reason that, according to the ideology or theory of total change he has adopted, a remedial war may seem inevitable or necessary. Even the words we use reflect the complexity of working for the cause of peace, since, after a time, a worker may declare that peace is an effect, not a cause. This seems true enough, but it leaves out the fact that, for a great many people, the horror of war and the desirability of peace mark the first beginnings of serious thought and feelings beyond the limits of self-interest. The peace movement, you could say, is the recruiter of numerous persons who are in process of moral awakening, and who are not well served by rapid "politicalization" in terms of some problematic ideology. Their deepening thoughts about the means to peace should not have a divisive effect on the broad and unconfining simplicity of the peace movement, but should instead lead to a body of ideas alive with fresh growing tips, and with roots which reach naturally into every aspect of inquiry and research. For the peace movement will not bring peace except as the world grows wiser, more civilized, and better educated in the means and ends of human reconstruction.

In January of this year, the Indian Council of Peace Research held a symposium at the Gandhi Peace Foundation in New Delhi. Some forty participants attended, coming from various countries. Among those from the United States were Elise and Kenneth Boulding and Charles Chatfield. In connection with the objective of education for a non-violent social order, the conferees listed the following contributory causes of violence:

1. The acquisitive instinct

2. Consumerism leading people to desire ever more and more of material goods

3. Gross economic differences between sections of population in one nation and between a small group of nations in the world and a majority of countries which are desperately poor

4. National pride

5. Religious intolerance

6. The sense of social superiority, implicit for instance in the caste system

7. Racial chauvinism

8. The unbridled competitive spirit

What can be said about these elements of human behavior?

As for the "acquisitive instinct," it is of special interest that Walter Weisskopf, an American economist of Maslovian persuasion, remarked in his contribution to Herman Daly's book, *Toward a Steady-State Economy* (see last week's Review), that in Western thought "a unique historical phenomenon, the acquisitive attitude, was interpreted as a universal human inclination." The point, of course, is that in numerous societies, acquisitiveness has played little part in establishing cultural patterns. We hardly know *why* modern man is so susceptible to the fierce compulsions of the acquisitive drive. This is a question that will bear investigation; but acquisitiveness is also a trait that will either wear itself out or be overcome because it is so manifestly non-productive of either individual or social good. Already a substantial number of the coming generation in the United States, and doubtless elsewhere, are making it plain that they want no part of an acquisitive society. They are thinking and feeling in other terms. Consumerism is also condemned as an artificial doctrine which feeds the fires of acquisition. Critics of the stature of Ivan Illich are effectively showing the anti-human and anti-social consequences of the goals of the consumption society. One could say that fewer and fewer people need to be told of the waste, folly, and debilitation involved in the

conception of human beings as primarily "consumers."

Never before in history have so many social critics, scholars, and other observers written so persuasively in protest against the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and between the wealthy and the underdeveloped nations. This ominous trend is now well known, and widely recognized as a prime example of "structural violence." Action, it is true, is laggard, but awareness is necessary preparation for remedial action. Greater attention to the course followed by Tanzania might prove fruitful for countries now striving toward industrialization, eager to catch up with the so-called "advanced" nations. If these developing countries can find balance by learning the advantages of a modified, intermediate technology instead of trying to imitate the excesses of the West, the entire world will gain by their example. Meanwhile, a growing number of economists—of whom E. F. Schumacher is probably the best known—are doing what they can to stimulate corrective action.

"National pride" is another sort of problem. There can be no doubt that national pride leads to war. Pride is not unconnected with inherited vision. Speaking of this feeling, Richard Goodwin recalls (in his *New Yorker* article) that Abraham Lincoln spoke of the Civil War as a test of whether a nation "conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal . . . can long endure." Then, after noting the isolationist policies of most of America's history, Goodwin says:

> Our pride in military exploits outside the continent has centered on the idea of winning—of victory and success—rather than on our ability to occupy, subdue, and rule. Even a revisionist explanation of American history as one of aggressive imperialism does not refute the assertion that citizens have believed our acts to be consistent with the American idea. The two wars, before Vietnam, that were our least explicable ones—the War of 1812 and the Spanish-American War—were at the time justified in traditional terms. . .

Goodwin finds a witness in De Tocqueville, who wrote:

> Much . . . of the self-importance which the American assumes, particularly abroad, is traceable less to his mere citizenship than to his conscious identification with the success of democracy. . . . The course of his pride is legitimate and a noble one. It involves not only his own position but also the hopes and expectations of humanity.

While not exactly praising "pride," Goodwin is not indifferent to its apparent services:

> The American idea is one of the elements from which the individual constructs himself. It enters into that personal framework which transforms an amorphous social impulse into a particular social person—one who exists in a particular place at a certain moment in the historical flow. When the idea weakens or starts to yield, the framework that sustains individual power is menaced. The need for community and for family is more deeply rooted than the need to feel oneself part of a nation, their loss is far more devastating to the possibilities of individual freedom. Yet for modern society as a whole the loss of faith in the national idea, the growth of sensed disbelief, can have more tragic consequences. For the physical nation entraps us. Our lives are directed and confined by its economic structures and political institutions. It has pervaded our experience since early youth and been imprinted on habits of thought and behavior. There is no "substitute community" for the nation, because all other associations are contained within it. The idea of America is menaced less by the presence of contradiction than by our awareness of contradiction. Thus, one could identify with the American idea in the presence of slavery until historical change made men aware of slavery as an unavoidable evil. Similarly, through the early part of the boom after the Second World War there was a great deal of poverty and racism in America, yet not until the late nineteen-fifties did the public become aware that these conditions existed and that they were inconsistent with our view of the nation. The idea is threatened when we become aware of the contradiction, aware that it is a contradiction, aware that it is remediable, and aware that we are failing to remedy it.

Quite plainly, Goodwin is saying that the national idea is the bearer of certain ideals—standards of behavior which generate strong feelings of moral obligation when we are able to

see that we are in fact violating what they stand for. When we can no longer avoid recognizing the "structural violence" in what we have done, and are doing, the good in the national idea presses changes upon us.

It is natural to say that the changes are too little and too late. The outrage in the times makes this evident. Yet what do we really *know* about the subtle processes through which people reverse the patterns of their collective behavior? We know little enough about radical changes in individual behavior, and except for changes which are "manipulated," group changes are still more obscure. We need to reflect on Goodwin's suggestion that the national idea "is one of the elements from which the individual constructs himself," and then to consider that the making of "selves" is an organic process, a growth involving a vital sort of psycho-moral metabolism, and that it doubtless has its own rhythms and rates. The idea of the self has its internal necessities, too, which may not relate easily to anyone's program of education for change. Some crucial mysteries are involved in these matters. We need to think more about how the national idea is formed, how it may be broadened, modified, and its substance refined and extended to be more inclusive. This probably cannot be accomplished by the sudden introduction of leaping abstractions, however benevolent and inspired. For a new idea to take hold in peoples' lives, it must be capable of intimate application, it must be humanly workable, and not remain only a formula for uprooting people's lives. Self-definition is involved, as Mr. Goodwin shows, and this means providing more than propaganda and moralizing; needed is a sort of nourishment that the growth we seek requires. While this nourishment would naturally include great and revolutionary conceptions, all past experience would suggest a certain humbleness in such work. We understand so little about ourselves and others.

The remaining items in the list of the sources of violence seem equally dependent for change on the idea of the self. Meanwhile, of the fact that the world is in flux, morally as well as politically, there can be no doubt. New and more humanistic views of man are in formation, and there is increasing rejection of war by the young, who find it atavistic, criminal, and without conceivable justification. And while there may be little certainty as to how education for peace ought to proceed, it remains possible to gather, order, and present the best thinking of the world's most civilized and thoughtful men and women, who have been, every one of them, profoundly on the side of peacemaking and peace.

REVIEW
THE USE OF A MAN

TOWARD the middle of Thoreau's *The Maine Woods*—the book which Loren Eiseley used to such good effect in *The Night Country*—we began wondering what we could say about Thoreau in this book which would be to the point. *The Maine Woods* is an edited or arranged volume in which three of Thoreau's visits to Maine—in 1846, 1853, and 1857—are combined by Dudley C. Lunt to make a single report (Bramhall House, 1950). The story of these wanderings, by canoe, batteau, and on foot is mostly precise and colorful description. There is not so much philosophizing as in the rest of Thoreau's writing, yet his skill in picturing, his accuracy, and the wealth of detail about life in the woods, on the streams and the endless lakes where one can easily become lost, will engross any reader who wants to look at the world through the eyes of Thoreau.

But this is the point: what sort of man was Thoreau? How did he see? What moved him to say, in those few passages where reflection takes charge, what he wrote? Thoreau, to make a short answer, seems a man who accepted the unfinished character of the human condition with grace and wonder. He does not kick against the pricks. His willingness to be a man in the world pervades everything he did. And since willingness is a matter of sensing the octaves of existence, rejoicing in its harmonies, and stretching after its elusive meanings, when Thoreau lets his mind run free, splendors result.

He knows the difference between certainty and mystery. He never pretends, and it is for this reason,-perhaps, that he has so much impact. No little niceties intervene to let us take him in small doses. He speaks his mind, between his silences, and you know you are in the presence of a force which has some unmeasured dimensions.

After climbing Ktaadn, the highest mountain in Maine—less than 5300 feet, yet nonetheless formidable—he spoke of how it felt to traverse this wild country.

It is difficult to conceive of a region uninhabited by man. We habitually presume his presence and influence everywhere. And yet we have not seen pure Nature, unless we have seen her thus vast and drear and inhuman, though in the midst of cities. Nature was here something savage and awful, though beautiful. I looked with awe at the ground I trod on, to see what the Powers had made there, the form and fashion and material of their work. This was that Earth of which we have heard, made out of Chaos and Old Night. Here was no man's garden, but the unhandseled globe. It was not lawn, nor pasture, nor mead, nor woodland, nor lea, nor arable, nor waste land.

It was the fresh and natural surface of the planet Earth, as it was made forever and ever,—to be the dwelling of man, we say,—so Nature made it, and man may use it if he can. Man was not to be associated with it. It was Matter, vast, terrific,—not his Mother Earth that we have heard of, not for him to tread on, or be buried in,—the home, this, of Necessity and Fate. There was clearly felt the presence of a force not bound to be kind to man. It was a place for heathenism and superstitious rites,—to be inhabited by men nearer of kin to the rocks and to wild animals than we are.

From the raw wilderness around him Thoreau turn. to the equal mystery of himself:

What is this Titan that has possession of me? Talk of mysteries! Think of our life in nature,—daily to be shown matter, to come into contact with it,—rocks, trees, wind on our cheeks! the solid earth! the *actual* world! the *common* sense! *Contact! Contact!* Who are we? *where* are we?

What sort of man has questions like these? Who thinks of himself in amazement at having "contact" with the world? Occasionally, when he was staying at Walden, officious visitors would tell Thoreau that because of his isolation "it was not possible to do so much good." These men, following "the beaten track of the professions," thought themselves knowledgeable in practical matters and doing good. But suppose for a moment that Thoreau could have found out—really found out—what the world is for, and what was his relation with it; suppose he gained his own access to "things in themselves" and discovered who or what indeed was the Titan that had possession of him? What would

remain of "practical" problems? They would, we think, be vastly diminished.

Thoreau asked those pressing, tormenting and exhilarating, existential questions, for which he only had hints for answers, and with the hints made a life that claims the attention of all thinking men. How did he do it? He stood aloof. He was participant but no combatant. He was never so engaged that he would stop listening for the inner counterpoint that goes with life. He heard so well that we read him again and again.

> We are not wholly involved in Nature. I may be either the drift-wood in the stream, or Indra in the sky looking down on it. I *may* be affected by a theatrical exhibition; on the other hand, I *may not* be affected by an actual event which appears to concern me very much more. I only know myself as a human entity; the scene, so to speak, of thoughts and affections; and as sensible of a certain doubleness by which I can stand as remote from myself as from another. However intense my experience, I am conscious of the presence and criticism of a part of me, which, as it were, is not a part of me, but spectator, sharing no experience, but taking note of it; and that is no more I than it is you. When the play, it may be the tragedy, of life, is over, the spectator goes his way.

Here, in *Walden,* Thoreau is telling us a little, or even much, of the nature of the Titan who has "a certain doubleness," who is both involved and uninvolved. And this bifocal vision, this double life, active and inactive, engaged and dispassionately observing, amounted, in the abstract, to the meaning of human existence for Thoreau. Thinking thus, he took a certain stance. He hungered to know, yet he was not impatient. The spectacle was sure to unroll, and he would watch and learn. This, apparently, was how he thought of his life.

One time in the Maine woods he and his Indian guide, Joe Polis, killed a great cow moose—six feet from hoof to shoulder and eight feet long. Afterward he asked:

> But, pray, could not one spend some weeks or years in the solitude of this vast wilderness with other employments than these—employments perfectly sweet and innocent and ennobling? For one that comes with a pencil to sketch or sing a thousand come with an axe or rifle. What a coarse and

imperfect use Indians and hunters make of Nature! No wonder that their race is so soon exterminated. I already, and for weeks afterward, felt my nature the coarser for this part of my woodland experience, and was reminded that our life should be lived as tenderly and daintily as one would pick a flower.

In this mood—a gentle mood, not now met with often—Thoreau has similar thoughts about trees:

> Strange that so few ever came to the woods to see how the pine lives and grows and spires, lifting its evergreen arms to the light,—to see its perfect success, but most are content to behold it in the shape of many broad boards brought to market, and deem *that* its true success! But the pine is no more lumber than man is, and to be made into boards and houses is no more its true and highest use than the truest use of a man is to be cut down and made into manure. There is a higher law affecting our relation to pines as well as to men.

> A pine cut down, a dead pine, is no more a pine than a dead human carcass is a man. Can he who has discovered only some of the values of whalebone and whale oil be said to have discovered the true use of the whale? Can he who slays the elephant for his ivory be said to have "seen the elephant"?

> Is it the lumberman, then, who is the friend and lover of the pine, stands nearest to it, and understands its nature best? Is it the tanner who has barked it, or he who has boxed it for turpentine, for whom posterity will fable to have been changed into a pine at last? No! No! it is the poet, he it is who makes the truest use of the pine,—who does not fondle it with an axe, nor tickle it with a saw, nor stroke it with a plane,—who knows whether its heart is false without cutting into it,—who has not bought the stumpage of the township on which it stands. . . .

> I have been into the lumber-yard, and the carpenter's shop, and the tannery, and the lampblack factory, and the turpentine clearing; but when at length I saw the tops of the pines waving and reflecting the light at a distance high over the rest of the forest, I realized that the former were not the highest use of the pine. It is not their bones or hide or tallow that I love most. It is the living spirit of the tree, not its spirit of turpentine, with which I sympathize, and which heals my cuts.

Thoreau was a man whose top still waves, reflecting the light of his highest use.

COMMENTARY
PRIDE AND/OR FAME

A MINI essay could be constructed out of any anthology of quotations. In this week's lead, for example, we noticed the part played by "pride" in Mr. Goodwin's conception of "the American idea," and began searching for what we recalled as a reference to pride as the last citadel of imperfection in noble minds. We didn't find it, and a helpful librarian, enlisted in the cause, explained why.

It wasn't "pride" that Milton wrote about, but *fame*—which conveys almost the same meaning. The line was found in Evans' *Dictionary of Quotations,* from *Lycidas:*

> Fame is the spur that the clear spirit cloth raise
> (That last infirmity of noble mind)

The editor of the *Dictionary* adds:

> Milton, whether consciously or not, was, in part, quoting John Fletcher: *Sir John van Olden Barnavelt* I.i. (1619): " . . . the desire of glory/ (That last infirmity of noble minds)." Others had expressed the same thought before either of them, back to Tacitus, in his *History* IV. 6., second century A.D.: "The desire of glory clings to even the best men longer than any other passion."

Tacitus and Milton have a point, but after weighing the recent effects of the "national pride" Mr. Goodwin attributes to Americans, we decided that Thoreau was more accurate. He said: "Fame is not just. She never finely or discriminately praises, but coarsely hurrahs."

Looking at our last war, it seems clear that if "pride" played a part, it also worked an ultimate corruption of the virtues it celebrated. Again, studying Mr. Goodwin's essay, it is evident that pride enables people to blind themselves toward blatant inconsistencies, so that awareness of contradiction must wait for unavoidable and devastating exposures, and then humiliation permits only sluggish response.

Doubtless pride has different levels. "Popularity," said Hugo, is "glory's small change," and with glory at its lowest possible ebb, American popularity has disappeared entirely. What, indeed, is there left to take pride in, except the sharp perceptiveness of American self-criticism?

Even the best sort of pride is no more than the egotism of self-respect. The lesson is plain: Self-respect can survive in a community of communities, but not in a nation-state.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
TWO VIEWS OF EDUCATION

IT seems periodically desirable to take note of the gap between the individual and the social approach to education. The one has to do with the intimate relationships between teachers and learners, the other with institutions, popular attitudes and misconceptions, usually involving socio-political issues. It is apparently quite difficult to combine these two approaches and to be effective in both. Teachers who work with either children or adults soon come to recognize the subtleties and ambiguities that play so large a part in the interchange of ideas and feelings; they learn that there is no "formula" for good teaching, that the responses of learners are largely unpredictable, and that silences are as important as words in helping others to make discoveries. Political action seldom comes naturally to people in whom this kind of awareness has developed; it is difficult, for example, to think of a therapist, who must have qualities similar to the good teacher, who has been eminent in a movement that is essentially political. An exception, perhaps, would be Erich Fromm, who has written as a socialist and social reformer as well as a psychoanalyst, but the social side of Dr. Fromm's work is very general. In *The Sane Society* his conception of ideal social arrangements is based upon simple communitarian ideas.

What is the difference between the two approaches? First of all, in the educational situation created by two persons who are together, the spark of delight in discovery can burst into flame without any attention to external circumstances. Winning a child's interest is different from winning an election or persuading a legislature. Immediacy of purpose and human warmth have opportunity to be directly felt. The location of responsibility is in the individuals involved. The possibilities of achievement are relatively independent of outside influences.

Outside influences may color and in various ways limit educational possibilities, but the magic of human awakening sometimes works in the worst of circumstances; the dynamics of transcendence remain mysteriously autonomous. Physical plant and curriculum have had little to do with the generation of vision in human beings. The Buddha needed only a fig tree.

In the struggle for public policies which favor the growth and learning of people of every age, these problematic and unpredictable considerations are of necessity dealt with in terms of generalizations and stipulations. The human qualities and motivations are regarded as constants, since the focus is now on what men can corporately *will* to take place. You can't ever "will" a child to learn, but you can will to build a school house, or to tear one down. You can legislate a system in or out of being, but you can't make it "friendly" by law. You can *define* it as friendly to learning in a law, but you can't make it so. You have to assume that it will be so, for the purposes of legislation.

The purposes of legislation have an obvious importance, so long as the form of societies is shaped by constitutions and by laws. Yet the fact that law can do little more than validate or articulate a state of mind or intention which already exists tends to be overlooked, since persuading people to act is more of the essence of politics than persuading them to feel and think. The fact that people can be persuaded to act *without* fully understanding or thinking about their actions is doubtless the source of the endless fallacies in the plans and projects of those who seek activist solutions for human problems.

Yet action is necessary and called for, at the social level, the question being, How do you get the *kind* of action that is needed—action accompanied by an understanding of what it will accomplish and also what has to be achieved without any political assistance, through individual effort and response?

In a paper presented at the ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners in 1971, (reprinted by CIDOC), Nicholas Bennet discussed the relation between economic development and educational opportunity. After strong criticism of the claim that technological progress brings wider educational opportunity, he said:

> Two races are being run in the world today, races in which only a small percentage of the runners will win, and the largest proportion will drop by the wayside, angered disappointed and disillusioned. The first race *is* between all the nations of the world to see who can produce and consume the most before breakdown in the environment diverts people's attention merely to staying alive. The second race is between individuals in a particular country, who are climbing rapidly the educational ladder in order to win the ephemeral prize of never-ending consumption. The second race is caused by the rules of the first, for the first necessitates the production of a high-level manpower elite, and the first is caused to some extent by the new elites produced by the second, who, having broken into the cycle of open-ended consumption, want their fellow citizens to desire the same. The rules of neither race are designed with the long-term welfare of people in mind, but seem more the result of a world out of man's control, a world being run by three self-perpetuating monsters— technology, the economy, and the educational system.

Obviously, what here goes under the name of "education" is *not* what is meant when we attempt a discussion of what takes place between a child and a devoted teacher. Entirely different stipulations are involved. Here the issue is not the mystery of awakening minds but the plain fact of economic and social systems which control people's lives by infecting them with certain delusions concerning the nature of the good life. The recognition of the demoralizing effect of these systems caused Ivan Illich to write his book, *De-Schooling Society,* since what is the use of learning to read if what you read is almost entirely a massive cultural deception? It is better to learn to read some other way, perhaps later, on your own initiative, since then there is some possibility that you will develop critical judgment about *what* you read.

There is another sort of deception involved in these systems, since they do not serve all the people, but only a few at the expense of the many. (This is less true of the "advanced" nations.) Mr. Bennet continues:

> In developing countries virtually the only educative influence that the population in rural areas will be confronted will be confronted with is the elementary school, and though statistically only a very small percentage of children will not live; as adults in the rural areas, the curriculum is almost entirely designed to help the children towards progress up the educational ladder and is not designed to help the children live more fulfilling lives in their communities. The schools in developing countries tend to introduce dissatisfaction with the traditional way of life without providing any of the skills or knowledge needed to improve this life style. The only answer given is to move out of the rural areas into the modern sector and to climb up the educational ladder into the consumer paradise.

> School dropouts who are left in the rural areas (and in most developing countries these make up the vast proportion of the population) are in general ignored by the educational system, and as they have never been taught how to learn during their brief years in school, they are unable to educate themselves further, and thus are unable to participate more fully in the change and improvement of their communities.

> Although various forms of non-formal education have continuously been proved to be more efficient than equivalent formal systems, virtually no attention is devoted to these non-formal systems. In Thailand, for example, a motivated adult completes the first four years of the elementary curriculum in one year of part-time study, three hours a day in the evening for five days a week. However, considerably less than 1% of total educational budgets, and total teacher-time is devoted to all forms of adult education, both formal and non-formal. . . .

> The developed countries have effectively demonstrated for any country or individual that is prepared to learn from the experiences of others, that open-ended development toward a consumer society not only does not produce a satisfied population, but also takes place at the risk of irreparable damage to the environment; in addition, that rapid and continuing expansion of the educational system does not lead to greater equality of opportunity, but leads to a new self-perpetuating stratification of society.

This completes Mr. Bennet's general outline of criticism of existing systems of education. He goes on, suggesting the non-formal kind of education advocated by Illich, "teaching people how to accept new ideas and change, and providing individuals with the necessary assistance when they want to pursue a specific line of inquiry." Then he says:

> Whereas for the more advanced countries the concentration of development would be on expanding the minds of men to greater levels of awareness and understanding, in the poorer countries there is still an urgent need to improve the standards of physical existence of a large proportion of the population. Yet it is still education which has the crucial role to play. Through informal life-long education the underprivileged people of the world must be taught that it is only they that can improve their own lives through using new methods and new seeds for producing more food, through building themselves larger and better houses, through controlling their own family size, through better sanitation, through the formation of cooperatives, etc. Virtually all governments' development efforts should be devoted to the motivation of the underprivileged portion of the population.

The definition of the problem by Mr. Bennet seems accurate enough, but can we reasonably expect "governments" to interest themselves in the solution he describes? If there is anything at all to be learned from the last hundred years of the behavior of nation-states, it is that the people must learn to act for themselves, independent of government. This is the Gandhian idea of Basic Education. It is a very rare government that is willing and able to create "non-formal education." Government can allow and encourage such activities, and leave them free to prosper as they may, but *instituting* them is not a natural bureaucratic function. The heart and pulse of spontaneous, non-formal education need to be everywhere, in the people themselves, of a decentralized society.

FRONTIERS
Energy: A Choice of Reading

PROBLEM: Which should have first or the most attention: A handy, sixteen-page supplement on windmills which came with the Jan. 18 *Peace News,* or the comprehensive account of "New Energy Sources" presented in *Saturday Review/World* for Feb. 9?

In his *Peace News* manual for "windworkers," Bruce Haggart tells how to construct and erect a Savonious Rotor, a Bicycle Airscrew Pump, and a Bicycle Airscrew Generator, and gives directions for generating electricity with a dynamo or an alternator, if the energy produced by the wind machine is to be stored in batteries instead of used directly to lift water out of a well or to run some kind of appliance. In his "World Environment Newsletter" in *SR/W,* Philip Quigg gives a world inventory of basic energy resources, describing what is and is not being done by national governments to replenish diminishing fuel or energy supplies, and points out that no matter what large-scale alternatives are finally chosen, it will take from ten to twenty years to establish a significant alteration in the huge energy systems now in use.

One could say that reading Mr. Quigg makes you feel more "powerless" than ever. It seems obvious that when the problem is conceived in terms of "world needs," only the vast resources of governments will be adequate to start things going in a fresh direction; yet governments are notoriously laggard when it comes to deciding among "controversial" solutions to practical problems. Mr. Quigg writes, for example:

> For twenty-five years, cheap fuel and the promise of limitless nuclear energy have deterred any concentrated research into alternatives to oil and gas or the more efficient use of coal. In retrospect, our lack of foresight seems astounding. Yet more remarkable is the fact that even now in the United States research into solar and geothermal energy, not to mention more remote technologies, is not being adequately funded. Of the projected $11 billion that the administration proposes to spend over the next five years on energy research and development, 96 per cent is to be devoted to nuclear power (more than half) and fossil fuels, plus conservation. . .

> The paucity of fundamental research and, even more, of pilot projects to test the feasibility of alternative energy sources enhances the difficulty of forecasting when and to what extent "new" sources will become significant. Billions of dollars have been spent so that we may learn how difficult it is to produce nuclear energy by means that are clean and safe. Having hardly begun to examine other alternatives to fossil fuels, we cannot know what technological pitfalls lie ahead.

This being the case, why doesn't the *SR/W* get Mr. Quigg to edit a manual on windmills instead of compiling all that bad news? Well, the *SR/W* editors probably sense quite accurately what their readers want to read about; *they* are still convinced that if anything constructive is to happen, governments will make it happen; so they want to have even the discouraging news about what governments are doing. Besides, how many of the *SR/W* subscribers are likely to go out in the backyard (if they are lucky enough to have one) and try to make a windmill from Bruce Haggart's working drawings and instructions?

We take, we suppose, an alchemical view of such unanswerable questions. First, the fact is that they might be *able* to build a windmill, on the second or third try; while, on the other hand, it is likely to prove impossible to get governments to move intelligently in relation to new supplies of energy. Moreover, people who build windmills would almost certainly have greater competence than most others in thinking about the larger social and technical problems of energy supply. They, at least, will have put themselves in some kind of gear on the subject.

But all this is somewhat unfair to Mr. Quigg, since there is value in knowing what, in the view of the best geophysical and ecological opinion, is possible and desirable, and where the probabilities lie in respect to government action. Our point is simply that windmill builders are better to have around than "silent majorities" or even fussed and

anxious minorities who are depressed by the legendary stupidity and lethargy of governments. By simple, alchemical growth of intelligence, windmill builders would know that there is nothing "astounding" about the lack of government foresight. Human beings are sometimes happily endowed with foresight, not institutions. Prometheus was not a committee.

But enough of the backwardness of the organizations and organization men. We should provide at least equal space for the mood of Bruce Haggart, who begins his "people's power pamphlet" by saying:

> There is virtually no end of possibilities in windmill types or ways which wind energy can be made to work. The devices discussed here are modest but are known to be effective. The builder will see that it is not essential that the precise procedures described here are followed—innovation and invention become second nature to those contemplating construction.
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> Essential for the maintenance-free running of wind devices are good bearings. For the size of those described here bicycle or motorcycle parts are eminently suitable. Often it seems more prudent to make bicycles from cycle parts, so strip down cars if you prefer. A subsequent manual will be issued dealing with larger wind devices where car parts become essential for sturdiness and safety.
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> No attempt has been made to give instructions about calculating the output you expect, nor has the usual measure of efficiency been evaluated. These considerations seem more fitting to marketing and alienated production systems, and as you can't sell the wind, consider anything you can build yourself from scrap materials and that gives you light and power to be alchemic rather than efficient. Do it and see, but don't expect to run factories off them.

On the question of productivity, it seems likely that all the contentions argued by practical people against Gandhi's championship of the spinning wheel for Indian peasants could be made to apply to advocacy of windmills as a source of domestic energy for people living in the West. But then, at least *some* of Gandhi's defense of the spinning would also apply. Any sort of do-it-yourself activity should be salutary in principle, in

times like these. And eventually, people who get into the habit of relying on themselves would prefer papers like *Peace News* for their periodical reading matter. And that is a consummation devoutly to be wished. (*Peace News,* 5 Caledonian Road, London N1, England.)