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THE WILL TO BE ONESELF

SHOULD democracy prevail in the selection of ideas to give attention? No is surely the right answer, yet the question is raised again and again by the persuasions of human behavior. Business, for one thing—and in our lives business is a very big thing—is ruled by wants and interests, and the manufacturer or merchant who proceeds in neglect of what his customers think they need will not long remain in business. Yet there are those whose interests are at another level. We are thinking, for example, of Thomas Huxley, the famous evolutionist, who began life as a surgeon, became something of a marine biologist, then an educator, and after publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 was its chief advocate and champion.

Huxley invented the term "agnostic" to define his philosophical outlook, but late in life, two years before he died (in 1895), he declared in *Evolution and Ethics* a position which seemed to reverse opinions he had held for many years. He had maintained that metaphysical and religious beliefs could not enjoy actual certainty, that only the facts and laws of science could be termed knowledge; but in 1893, in his Romanes address, as William McDougall remarks in *The Riddle of Life*, Huxley "revoked the main feature of his earlier teaching and called upon mankind to defy the laws of a mechanical nature he had so effectively expounded as all-sufficient." Commenting, McDougall added:

> In this matter Huxley was a true child of his time. In his own person he lived the mechanistic triumph and later repudiated it as not in the end tenable for a rational and moral being; though it is probable that he himself never realized to the full the implications of the revolution in which he thus took part. For that revulsion in the name of ethics, that rejection of the mechanical theory of man, meant the rejection of all the principal conclusions which the biologists of his school had so confidently announced and the throwing open again of all the great questions, such questions as man's place in nature, the factors of evolution, the core of truth in all religions, and the essential validity of ethical principles.

McDougall, himself a scientist (a psychologist) who left the ranks of scientific orthdoxy, went on to say of Huxley:

> In essentials his new position was identical with that so well stated a little later by Robert Bridges the poet [laureate of England]: "Man is a spiritual being; the proper work of his mind is to interpret the world according to his highest nature, to conquer the material aspects of the world so as to bring them into subjugation to the spirit."

Can we say that Huxley's radical change in his opinions is evidence of the "spiritual being" in the great scientist? That some inner voice came to direct his thinking? If so, then we are confronted by the fact that the number of humans who respond to such a voice seem to be very few, and that we have no theory to explain the existence of this small minority of humans who declare views against the dominant opinions of their time. Yet they persist; they keep on coming into the world in ones and twos, and it sometimes seems that we would have no literature worth consulting or remembering—or printing in books—were it not for the ideas these individuals declare. We owe to them the drama of our moral history.

What are their qualities? Integrity, vision, and driving energy, one might say, yet these are terms which all need to be filled in. We should add that there may be great diversity in their views, although a wonderful family resemblance in their convictions.

An entry in his journal shows what conquering "the material aspects of the world" meant to Thoreau:

> "I must not lose any of my freedom by being a farmer and landholder. Most who enter on any profession are doomed men. The world might as well sing a dirge over them forthwith. The farmer's muscles are rigid. He can do one thing long, not many well. . . . I can leave this arable land and grass ground, without making a will or settling my estate."

Two days after he moved into his house at Walden he wrote:

> "I wish to meet the facts of life—the vital facts, which are the phenomena of actuality the gods meant to show us—face to face, and so I came down here. Life, who knows what it is, what it does? If I am not quite right here, I am less wrong than before; and now let us see what they will have."

In 1846 Thoreau spent a night in jail for refusing to pay the poll tax—he thought the money would give support to the war with Mexico—and might have stayed there longer if a fond aunt had not paid his tax, at which he was mightily annoyed. August Derleth, one of Thoreau's biographers, says in *Concord Rebel:*

> The imprisonment left an indelible impression on Thoreau. He could be amused by it later, but he thought about the principles involved a long time, for it was almost two years before he wrote about it in the essay which was eventually to be titled *Civil Disobedience*. It was not such a paper as would inflame to mass rebellion, but only an account of the individual of integrity, who has no recourse but to oppose the oppression of the State by means of passive resistance.
>
> "Action from principle . . . changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary," he wrote when in retrospect he considered his arrest and the reasons for it. "If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go: perchance it will wear smooth. . . . But if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. . . . I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. . . . If a plant cannot live according to its nature, it dies; and so a man. . . . I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject.

Thoreau's quest was to learn and do what he was on earth to do, and for this he was often more spectator than actor; but the watcher self seemed to him a universal self—no more "I" than "you." This, we might say, was the spiritual being in Thoreau, to whom he paid faithful heed.

He would go on journeys to learn about the world, and how best to live in it, yet his most instructive journeys were in the environs of Walden, or even staying at home. He said in his journal:

> A man is worth most to himself and others, whether as an observer, or poet, or neighbor, or friend, where he is most himself, most contented and at home. There his life is the most intense and he loses the fewest moments. Familiar and surrounding objects are the best symbols and illustrations of his life. . . . The poet has made the best roots in his native soil of any man, and is the hardest to transplant. The man who is often thinking that it is better to be somewhere else than where he is excommunicates himself. If a man is rich and strong anywhere, it must be on his native soil. Here I have been these forty years learning the language of these fields that I may better express myself.

He regarded distractions from the enterprise of his life with extreme distaste. In 1859 he wrote to his friend, Harrison Blake: "I feel and think rather too much like a business man, having some very irksome affairs to attend to these months and years on account of my family." He had found that by working only two or three days a week he could support himself well—well enough for his simple requirements—and he would do no more save under particular obligation. He wrote in "Life Without Principle":

> Let us consider the way in which we spend our lives.
>
> This world is a place of business. What an infinite bustle! . . . There is a coarse and boisterous money-making fellow in the outskirts of our town, who is going to build a bank-wall under the hill along the edge of his meadow. The powers have put this into his head to keep him out of mischief, and he wishes me to spend three weeks digging there with him. The result will be that he will perhaps get some more money to hoard, and leave for his heirs to spend foolishly. If I do this, most will commend me as an industrious and hard-working man; but if I choose to devote myself to certain labors which yield more real profit, though but little money, they may be inclined

> to look on me as an idler. Nevertheless, as I do not need the police of meaningless labor to regulate me, and do not see anything absolutely praiseworthy in this fellow's undertaking, any more than in many an enterprise of our own or foreign governments, however amusing it may be to him or them, I prefer to finish my education at a different school.

Of one of his own professions, Thoreau wrote to Blake: "The lecturer gets fifty dollars a night; but what becomes of his winter? What consolation will it be hereafter to have fifty thousand dollars for living in the world? I should not like to exchange *any* of my life for money." What, he kept on wondering, is the *reason* for my being in the world? This is a spiritual inquiry.

William Blake, who lived half a century earlier (1757-1827), was as determined as Thoreau to live his own life and to listen to his spirit. In his forty-sixth year, after living for a time with a patron, William Hayley, who had brought him prosperity in the form of hack-work commissions, Blake decided to return to London and endure the hard times of a life of freedom. "He thinks." he said, "to turn me into a portrait painter as he did poor Romney, but this he nor all the devils in hell will never do."

Blake was both poet and artist, above all a craftsman. He believed in a spiritual world above the natural world. He said in a letter in 1805: "O, what wonders are the Children of Men! Would to God that they would consider their Spiritual Life, regardless of that faint shadow called Natural Life, and that they would promote each other's spiritual labours, each according to its rank."

In his essay, *Blake's Fourfold Vision* (Pendle Hill Pamphlet No. 86), Harold Goddard writes:

> Blake's life and writing fall naturally into the phases of Innocence, Experience, Revolution or Rebellion, and Vision.
>
> All lives begin in innocence and pass, often at a criminally early age, into experience, which means disillusionment, and then into rebellion, which is an attempt to deny the disparity between our dreams and the hard facts. Rebellion in most of us is short-lived. Reality—so called—is too much for us. We think back into acceptance of things as they are. "The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation," says Thoreau. "What is called resignation is confirmed desperation." We repress our instincts, and along with them the darling wishes of our hearts, and they revenge themselves on us later in life in discontent, illness, nervous breakdown, insanity and suicide. . . . Some rebel for a little while; a few rebel all their lives and become, according to temperament, conviction and circumstances: warriors, dictators, reformers, politicians, satirists or criminals. Swift was such a man. Byron was another. Napoleon was a third. Only a handful, after facing experience and trying rebellion, transcend them by discovering a secret, a *tertium quid*, a third way, entering into an illumination that is an acceptance of life without defeat by it, or rather a triumph over life without a denial of it. . . .
>
> Blake's phase of open rebellion was brief. Like most lovers of liberty he welcomed the American revolution as a turning point in history. He sympathized with the early phases of the French Revolution, wore a red cap and consorted with radicals like Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft and Tom Paine. Paine owed his escape from the English authorities and probably his life to Blake's intuition and quick action. But the September massacres disillusioned him as they did Wordsworth, showing him that there are animal as well as spiritual instincts in man. After a period of groping in darkness Blake emerged into his final phase, becoming a pioneer in a thickly-forested primeval region compared to which the social-political world is open country. . . .I mean the region of the soul. . . .
>
> This is the region that Blake in his Prophetic Books set out to chart, and whose demonic and angelic inhabitants he determined to know:
>
> I rest not from my great task!
> To open the Eternal Worlds, to open the immortal Eyes
> Of Man inwards into the Worlds of Thought, into Eternity
> Ever expanding in the bosom of God, the Human Imagination.

His was a labor of emancipation. He lived in the eighteenth century and knew at first hand the god of the time—Reason. Reason has its uses—it teaches thinking and calculation—but it also confines the human spirit. Blake called Reason Single Vision; we call it mechanistic thinking; and

he saw its defects long before anyone else. He labored all his life, using lines of lyric verse, and where words failed, lines of the engraver's tool—a "piper whose musical notes materialize as clusters of flying birds—or ripening grapes." But his persuasion would hardly be heard until our own time and its growing contempt for "linear thinking."

In the eighteenth century, as Goddard says—

> Reason was god: reason, law order. "Order is Heaven's first law," wrote Pope. Even the artists seemed bent on finding rules to obey. Philosophically, Kant ended the reign by his *Critique of Pure Reason* (for his Practical Reason wasn't reason at all). Politically, Robespierre reduced it to an absurdity by deifying Reason as a woman, amid the excesses of the Revolution. The critical intellect is a knife. (It was Iago who said, "For I am nothing if not critical.") Ages of reason whet that knife. Ages of war and revolution strike with it. After Aristotle, Alexander after Voltaire, Robespierre, after Karl Marx, Lenin. Over and over it has been so. Reason—revolution, repression—explosion; law—war. Can nothing break that tragic swing of history?

Blake entered the lists in behalf of a higher vision—which he had enjoyed in several ways—when he was thirty-one, by contrasting external sight with inner vision. First, the credo of the rationalist:

> None could have other than natural or organic thoughts if he had none but organic perceptions.
>
> Man's desires are limited by his perceptions; none can desire what he has not perceiv'd.
>
> The desires and perceptions of man, untaught by anything but organs of sense, must be limited to objects of sense.

Then he gives the prophetic poet's faith:

> Man's perceptions are not bounded by organs of perception; he perceives more than sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover.
>
> If any could desire what he is incapable of possessing, despair must be his eternal lot.
>
> The desire of Man being infinite, the possession is infinite and himself infinite.

Blake comments:

> If it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic Character, the Philosophic and Experimental would soon be at the ratio of all things and stand still, unable to do other than repeat the same dull round over again. . . .
>
> He who sees the Infinite in all things sees God. He who sees the Ratio only, sees himself only. Therefore God becomes as we are, that we may be as He is.

Least of all was Blake an orthodox Christian. He said in "The Everlasting Gospel":

> Thou also dwell'st in Eternity.
> Thou are a Man, God is no more,
> Thy own Humanity learn to adore,
> For that is my Spirit of Life
> Awake, awake to Spiritual Strife.

The gifts of the spirit, Blake declared to the Christians (in *Jerusalem*), are mental gifts, and treasures in heaven are mental studies. And in *Milton* he said:

> I will not cease from Mental fight
> Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand
> Till we have built Jerusalem
> In England's green and pleasant land.

Jerusalem was the place of the free and the peaceful.

Blake's mind was afire with his inward vision; he seems to be crying, Can't you see, can't you *see?* For he could see, and why not others?

Thoreau and Blake, or Blake and Thoreau—Goddard found parallel after parallel between them. So may any reader who goes to the texts instead of the snippets of quotation we have space for here. And these two, after all, have here been made to stand for the highlights of history over many centuries. Statistically few, humanly great, from the anonymous authors of the Vedic hymns to the Greeks, to the poets of the nineteenth century, to the intuitive essayists of the twentieth, whatever their cipher—among them best of all, perhaps, Simone Weil—these speakers for the spirit keep on appearing, in ones and twos, to make, at last, a triumphal chorus. To ask why they come, and from where, is equivalent to asking why there are not more of them. Perhaps it

is enough to say that they live heroic lives—that this, indeed, is the insignia of the spirit in man. We leave to Ortega, found in his brief essay, "The Hero," the account of their presence:

> Such men aim at altering the course of things; they refuse to repeat the gestures that custom, tradition, or biological instincts force them to make. These men we call heroes, because to be a hero means to be one out of many, to be oneself. If we refuse to have our actions determined by heredity or environment it is because we seek to base the origin of our actions on ourselves and only on ourselves. The hero's will is not that of his ancestors nor of his society, but his own. This will to be oneself is heroism.
>
> I do not think that there is any more profound originality than this "practical," active originality of the hero. His life is a perpetual resistance to what is habitual and customary. Each movement that he makes has first had to overcome custom and invent a new kind of gesture. Such a life is a perpetual suffering, a constant tearing oneself away from that part of oneself which is given over to habit and is a prisoner of matter.

Yet it is a suffering in which a certain joy is found, if that is possible.

REVIEW
CONFLICTING TRENDS

EARLY in his introduction to *Rethinking Liberalism* (Avon, 1983), the editor, Walter Anderson, attributes the decline of liberalism to the fact that "America has given up on the welfare state." One hardly knows whether or not this is good news, especially if one thinks that liberalism ought to mean the doctrine that human beings are and ought to be free to make their own patterns of life. If the writer had said that Americans have given up on the warfare state, encouragement might be found in that, but giving up warfare in behalf of welfare is plainly not the policy of this country or any other, so that the only conclusion is that there will be less and less welfare as time goes on, and doubtless more war.

Liberalism, in contemporary usage, replaces the Renaissance meaning of the term with a quasi-Marxist significance. The state is relied upon to produce conditions approaching economic justice, on the theory, one supposes, that without at least a minimum amount of money no one can be regarded as "free." But in a time of general economic decline, the state can no longer perform this function. Then, as Mr. Anderson says—

> It is a crisis of the nation-state itself. Liberalism as we have known it since the 1930s is essentially a statist philosophy, a way of mobilizing national power. That was what the Roosevelt administration did with such impressive success on both the domestic and foreign fronts, bringing the United States into a position of unprecedented prosperity and world eminence. Yet now, even while national governments continue to wield such awesome military might—perhaps in part because they *do* wield such might—the nation-state is no longer so readily assumed to be the ultimate political invention. The whole system of sovereign nations has come under question. Jonathan Schell in *The Fate of the Earth*—a book deservingly recognized as one of the most important of our time—comes bluntly to the conclusion that the system itself is the root of the problem:
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> "The terms of the deal that the world has struck with itself must be made clear. On the one side stand human life and the terrestrial creation. On the other side stands a particular organization of human life—the system of independent sovereign nation-states. Our choice so far has been to preserve that political organization of human life at the cost of risking all human life."

Meanwhile, the dream of "a more abundant life" for all fades into the dust of other utopian dreams. As even the formerly affluent middle class is now recognizing, the "abundance" is simply not there, and as this realization spreads upward—it has long been a bitter fact of life for the poor—the "public philosophy" of the country is increasingly subject to revision. The rise of independent "movements" is a sign of coming changes. A chapter by Mary Ellen Leary is devoted to the driving energy of the environment movement, the women's movement, the "hippie" rejection of affluent life, the migrant worker movement, and the Ralph Nader movement for consumer protection and rights. Mary Leary says:

> The power of the movements lies in their willingness to engage the questions that frighten politicians, to invoke ideals as well as ideas, heart as well as mind. As campaigns become ever more automated, they have a human face. . . .
>
> The environmental movement, the least personalized of them all, rests on a basically humane concern about human survival on a deteriorating earth, on an awakened conscience concerning responsibility toward future generations. The power of the freeze movement lay in its ability to address that larger concern in a way that had personal and individual immediacy for many people.

Another contributor, Theodore Roszak, points out that both the planet and the human person are threatened by the same enemy—"the *bigness of things."*

> The bigness of industrial structures, world markets, mass political organization, public institutions, military establishments, cities, bureaucracies. The same inordinate scale of industrial enterprise that must grind people into statistical grist for the marketplace and the work force simultaneously shatters the biosphere in a thousand unforeseen ways.

Paralleling the decline in faith in big institutions has been the weakening confidence in orthodox medicine and its hospital-oriented procedures. Writing on public health, Richard Grossman speaks of the numerous patients who put their complaint "in the more human terms of feeling dehumanized, depersonalized, and made dependent on drugs, surgery, and costly machines by health-care providers whom they view as authoritarian and commercialized." Commenting, Grossman says:

> In a recent book, sociologist Paul Starr describes the current American health-care system as "an industry run increasingly by corporations and the state in as yet unsettled relationship with the medical profession." This is a shockingly accurate description, made all the more shocking by the absence in it of any reference to human beings in any but a collective sense. While it sharply identifies the "curse of bigness" that now characterizes most of the public and private institutions dominating medical and health activities, it also implies that the challenge to that bigness might come from a progressive amalgamation of three areas of activity which already exist, partly in spite of the established system and partly in an uneasy membership in that system: (1) the self-help movement, especially those examples of it that are organized around medical or health issues, (2) the "social medicine" orientation in the training and practice of primary-care physicians and nurses, and (3) the holistic model of health in medicine, which enlarges the repertoire of medical arts applied to therapeutics and emphasizes the lifelong health education of the individual. . . . The result of the complex social transition that could take place if these forces unite might well create the populist, decentralist reform of health policy, providing a plurality of approaches to healing and health care, personal involvement, an emphasis on practices that people can understand, and a minimum reliance on large institutions and costly medical care.
>
> One must hope that in moving toward this transition, those who count themselves progressive reformers in health and medicine will recognize and work with the natural affinity they have with those whose principal targets are the environmental, occupational, and social causes of illness: the environmentalists, the health and safety labor groups and those fighting against housing, nutritional, educational, and economic injustices. For indeed, as John Ehrenreich says, "To ask what kind of medical care we want is . . . to ask some very basic questions about the kind of society we want to live in."

It may be something of a trick to recognize in these broad generalizations the feelings and hopes we have as individuals, yet taken all together such attitudes seem well described.

A recent book which attempts similar generalizations applying to a series of present tendencies is John Naisbitt's *Megatrends* (Warner Books, 1982). Briefly, the transitions this writer identifies, while sometimes running together, are: the development of high technology, with emphasis on information instead of industrial products, the movement toward a global economy instead of a national economic system, with a contrasting development of self-reliance and small-scale innovation, and increasing reliance on independent initiative and action, with collaboration based on mutual exchange of information and experience instead of top-down decision starting at the top of pyramidal authority.

Among the sources used by Mr. Naisbitt and his staff are the local newspapers of the country during the past twelve years. Inevitably, press reports of opinions, attitudes, and responses to happenings at the local level around the country—they monitor 6,000 newspapers from month to month—present the froth of mood and reaction along with deeper tendencies, the project being to discern the "muscle" of actual changes in human decision beneath impulsive and casual behavior.

Some tendencies seem more ominous than others, as for example, the sixteen-year decline of SAT scores (in tests taken by high school students to qualify for college). One analytical report asserts that many Americans are moving toward "virtual scientific and technological illiteracy." Is this evidence of inadequate education? Or is it rather a comment on the irrelevance to students of what is being taught? Mr. Naisbitt says:

> Technology will help us manage the information society only to the extent that its members are skilled in utilizing it.

> A powerful anomaly is developing: As we move into a more literacy-intensive society, our schools are giving us an increasingly inferior product. SAT scores have been going down each year for more than a decade. In 1980 scores hit an all-time low: 424 for verbal and 466 for math, down from 473 and 496 in 1965, the year before scores plunged.
>
> It is more and more apparent that young high school—even college—graduates cannot write acceptable English or even do simple arithmetic. For the first time in American history the generation moving into adulthood is less skilled than its parents.

Meanwhile, in striking contrast to this discouraging course, resurgent self-reliance and self-help are developing in many parts of the country. People are learning to fix up their old cars, grow their own food, bartering instead of buying and selling. *"The macro-economics of the industrial-welfare-state,"* Mr. Naisbitt says, *"is yielding to the micro-economics of the information self-help society. . . .* with people relying on themselves outside the structure of institutions, individualism will flourish."

COMMENTARY
BLAKE AND THOREAU

A FUNDAMENTAL problem—often encountered in MANAS—in using material by writers, poets, and artists like Blake and Thoreau is that they sound like people from some other world. Who can be expected to take them seriously?

There must be people out there who do take them seriously, since Blake is one of the few eighteenth-century writers and artists who are still being published in the present, while Thoreau enjoys a like popularity. There is an increasing number of those who believe that the world is such an ugly place today because of its neglect of the ideas of the poets and philosophers. Readers go back to them for refreshment, courage, and inspiration. That, indeed, is why we go on publishing what they have said.

Thoreau's clarity was such that he made the behavior of his acquisitive contemporaries seem ridiculous. "I should not like to exchange *any* of my life for money." Is this a good thing to repeat to our growing children when we send them off to school or college? What do we want them to learn about the importance of making money?

Here we are, members of a once prosperous nation which now owes so much money that there seems little likelihood of ever being able to pay it back. How do we explain that to the young? Do we say it is bad management, or that our gradual impoverishment is the result of pursuing the wrong things in our lives? Can we turn ourselves around without first turning the whole society around? "We must be practical," people say. Yet how practical is it to keep on doing things the same way only because the world goes on making the same mistakes?

Related questions are raised by Folkert Wilken in his discussion of the traditional conflict between capital and labor. Their troubles are built into the way they relate to their opposition. Both capital and labor are now organized in terms of militant self-interest, leading to habitual or instinctive adversary policies. Organizations perpetuate such policies because it is their nature to do so. Only individuals institute changes in outlook. Partisan groups cannot be expected to work toward real cooperation. Yet there are *small* groups of workers and owners in which cooperation works quite well, so long as there is mutual trust.

Individuals and small groups—that is where changes begin: changes that can be eventually carried on to completion.

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We are now able to announce that we have an approved Spanish translation of Carlos Fuentes' Harvard Commencement address and are proceeding with production of the Spanish version made by the author. We are particularly gratified by this arrangement since it seems important for Spanish readers in the United States to know what Mr. Fuentes, as a Mexican spokesman for Latin America, has said to the American people about the policy of intervention. Meanwhile, it is of interest that his address is being widely reprinted in English, and that a tape recording is now available from the Cambridge Forum, 3 Church St., Harvard Square, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

MAKING SENSE OF THE EARTH

A NOVEL approach to Geography is provided by *The Practice of Geography* (Longrnan, 1983, $29.95), edited by Anne Buttimer, of Clark University, Worcester, Mass. Twelve contributors give their ideas on the meaning and scope of geography, a number of them telling the story of their lives in relation to the profession of teacher. Jacqueline Beaujeu-Garnier, for example, "the first lady professor at the Sorbonne," begins by saying that for her "Geography is more than a profession—it is a way of understanding the world." Another contributor, Clarence J. Glacken, who taught geography at the University of California in Berkeley, found his way to that department by way of the study of history under Frederick J. Teggart. After completing his doctoral dissertation, *The Idea of the Habitable World,* he took part in a scientific study of the Ryukyu Islands in the Pacific, which include Okinawa, and on the way he met Carl Sauer, who later invited him to join the department of geography at the University of California.

Prof. Glacken's autobiographical sketch became for us the most interesting part of this book, by reason of the threads of influence affecting his life. First there was Teggart, an extraordinary teacher, who led Glacken to recognition of the importance of the history of ideas. The quality of this man emerges in Glacken's account:

> In Teggart's course we learned about cyclical theories, ideas of a golden age, and eternal recurrence in the ancient world; the providential interpretations of history in the Middle Ages; and the full-fledged emergence of the idea of slow, gradual, continuous, and inevitable progress in modern times. . . . His stature as a scholar intensified my interest. He was an eloquent lecturer and wrote beautiful simple English innocent of jargon. (The jargonification of English was then in its infancy.) . . . *Theory of History,* (1925) I still regard as an outstanding and fundamental analysis of the nature of history and historiography.

Teggart took seriously the role and responsibility of the scholar in the modern world. After the first world war, he wrote in *The Processes of History* (later reprinted in *Theory and Processes of History,* 1941):

> It is obvious that war has played a most significant part in the advancement of mankind, but the benefits it has conferred have been confined to the break-up of crystallized systems of organization and of thought. Since man has not become sufficiently self-conscious of the natural processes which dominate his life, he continues to submit to the fixative influences of group discipline, and throws all his weight in favor of maintaining the *status quo.* It follows that, in the past, the gateway of human advance has been the violent conflict of the representatives of old and new ways of thought and action, whether old and new be embodied, for the occasion, in states, in groups within a given state, or in single individuals. It must, therefore, be regarded as a shortsighted view which imagines the conflict thus precipitated as in itself a desirable thing, though, heretofore, man's ignorance of himself has made such conflicts inevitable. . . .
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> War has been, times without number, the antecedent of advance, but in other cases, such as the introduction of Buddhism into China, the same result has followed upon the acceptance of new ideas without the introductory formality of bitter strife. As long, indeed, as we continue to hold tenaciously to customary ideas and ways of doing things, so long must we live in anticipation of the conflict which this persistence must inevitably induce.

Teggart was a seminal thinker and an inspiring teacher, as the account given of his classes in Berkeley, by Robert Nisbet, in *Portraits of Great Teachers* (edited by Joseph Epstein), will show. Glacken's reading also was important in shaping his attitudes as a teacher of geography. Key books for him were E. A. Burtt's *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* and Lowes's *The Road to Xanada,* on Coleridge. Next he went on long travels to obscure parts of the world.

> In retrospect, I look upon my travels as a species of field work. There are many different conceptions

> of it, the most popular being the contrast between the library and outdoor tramping. In the light of subsequent interests, this was field work in an entirely different sense, a preparatory experience.
>
> I do not think I would ever have developed my intense enthusiasm for the history of ideas without it. It would have been a world of abstractions. When I later studied the history of environmental ideas, especially the influences of climate, I remembered vividly many Mediterranean scenes or similar ones that had inspired such theories since antiquity. When I read Marsh's *Man and Nature* much later, I had a deep personal feeling for areas he had written about—parts of Italy, treeless slopes of Greece, goat grazing in Cyprus, the shores of Asia Minor.

As a Fulbright scholar to Norway he had the advantage of guidance by Fridjov Isachsen, "who seemed to know every square foot of Norway, physical and cultural." Writing of his life in the 1960s, he said:

> As my studies continued through the years, I became convinced that, although many ideas owed their origin to this brute force [the impact of the environment], three stood out in the history of Western thought: (a) the idea of the earth as a divinely designed planet; hence, the unity and harmony of nature—I argued that it ultimately led to ecological thought; (b) environmental determinants or influences on culture; and (c) human beings as geographic agents, transformers of nature.
>
> Since Teggart's lectures, I knew the powerful influence of teleology and teleological explanation in Western thought with all the variants like the design argument and the doctrine of final causes. I did not realize until I had studied the matter in depth how all-pervading teleology has been in the history of Western interpretations of nature, either in an extreme anthropocentric form in which the Creation was made for and exists for man or associated with the idea of a chain of being with man at the top, but not necessarily the lord and master of Creation. It is found in Cicero and in John Muir's *Mountain of California.*

Toward the end of his essay Prof. Glacken remarks:

> An American university professor will assume at his peril that students lack critical abilities. Over the years I have had many friendships with graduate and undergraduate students which have enriched my life immeasurably. Perhaps these are as close as anyone can get to the fountain of youth. Fewer opportunities for these encounters are what I miss most after retiring from active academic life.

We have devoted almost all our space to Prof. Glacken for the reason that his contribution seems to reveal most of the ingredients that go into good teaching. In her introduction, Anne Buttimer shows that this is what she sought or hoped for from the contributors to *The Practice of Geography.* As she puts it:

> When a geographer wishes to make sense of that vast panorama of fact and fiction, pattern and event, on the surface of the earth, what goes on in his consciousness? How does a geographic sense of reality emerge, and how does it distinguish itself from that of the geologist, poet, painter, or historian? . . . What seems to distinguish the geographical sense of reality for most of these authors is the attempt to grasp both synchronic (spatial-structural) and diachronic (temporal) aspect's of world reality at once.

In any event, Glacken, we think, answered all her questions.

A final note: The terms "teleology" and "teleological" used by Prof. Glacken will be familiar to most readers, but for some it may be only a word known to the learned. Yet it stands for the very heart of human life—a sense of *purpose* in both nature and ourselves. We look for our own meaning within our lives and feelings, and it is natural to seek corresponding meanings in the world around us, yet the latter are difficult to discover, as both Tolstoy and Camus remarked. Perhaps, when we grasp the true meaning of our own lives, the meaning of nature or the world will become equally transparent. It is the teacher's responsibility to at least suggest this to his students, to make of it what they will.

FRONTIERS

Reforms Based on Human Dignity

WHILE it is generally understood that Gandhi wanted India to move toward decentralization of political authority by strengthening village government, with radical reduction of the authority of the state, the decentralization he had in mind applied equally to industry. In this, as in other ways, Gandhi anticipated the concerns of reformers a generation after his time. He did not use the language they use, but his meaning was clear, as an article in *Gandhi Vigyan* (for July, 1983) shows.

Gandhi, the writer, Arvind Khare, says, proposed a "factory democracy" to parallel village democracy. The basis of this ideal was "Trusteeship" for the mill owners. Trusteeship meant using the wealth and means of production for the common good, and he expanded this idea to include "capitalists being trustee for the welfare of the workers." He said in *Young India* in 1927: "In my opinion, the mill hands are as much the proprietors of the mills as the shareholders, and when the mill owners realize this there will be no quarrel between them." Khare continues:

> He elaborated this idea in 1937 in *Harijan:* "My advice to the employers would be that they should willingly regard workers as the real owners of the concern which they fancy they have created." . . . It is vital to the well-being of industry that workmen should be regarded as equal to shareholders, and that they should have every right to possess accurate knowledge of the transactions of the mill." It is evident that he wanted workers to participate in day-to-day matters, including matters of common interest.

Knowing, however, the tendencies of human nature, he believed that labor should have its own organization saying: "Labor can always vindicate itself if labor will understand and recognize that capital is perfectly helpless without labor, labor will immediately come into its own."

Yet Gandhi was equally aware of the possibility that labor might misuse its power and in time "adopt a capitalist mentality." It might, he said, "become even more tyrannical than capital." The solution would lie in the spirit of non-violence. He sought a two-way mode of cooperation between labor and capital. How is this to be obtained?

Involved is an expansion and application of the meaning of non-violence, leading to the re-education of both employers and employees. This is clearly implied by Gandhi, although not, so far as we know, developed in any detail. A passage in *The Liberation of Work* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) by the German economist, Folkert Wilken, serves well for this purpose. While Wilken does not refer to Gandhi, the preface to his book by E. F. Schumacher is sufficient indication of its Gandhian content. In a chapter on trade unions, Wilken says:

> One cannot hope to deal with the harm caused by an anti-social system by attacking only its obvious symptoms, but allowing its underlying causes to persist. From this situation industry can be freed only by the alteration of its basic principles, by confining the anti-social market mechanism within narrow bounds, and replacing it with social institutions which transform the enterprises into a communal unit. The worker never really loses his longing for a true social transformation. The renunciation of his deepest instincts has degraded him to the level of a wage-grabber, who is not interested in industry, or even in his trade union. This fact ought to show the Unions where their real duties lie, if they wish to take the initiative in bringing about a timely new social order in industry.

The goal, in short, is a characterological change—change in the attitude and motives of entrepreneurs as well as in the workers. Wilken suggests that this will be more of a revival than a change for the worker.

> In his heart, he does not really want the continual fight for higher wages, nor to work as little as possible. What he wants is a place in society befitting his dignity as a free man. When the workers gain this place, they will give of their best, of their own free will. But if they have to work for a system in which a host of egotists pursue their own selfish interests, the worker' natural instinct for responsible cooperation becomes dormant. But this sense of responsibility, which alone can make a person really

> free, must be awakened and developed, if the workers are to take an *active* part in the establishment of true social reform in industry. . . .

Wilken sets his discussion of these questions at a level which contrasts the usual confrontation of acquisitive parties with a meeting of minds concerned with cooperation for common goals.

> Human dignity is based on two fundamental principles. One is the *sense of individuality,* which according to Goethe is man's most precious possession. It is only experienced, however, when a person plucks up the courage to take the plunge towards full *responsibility* for his own life, and thus accepts the duties which incidentally devolve upon him, and when he also makes those *moral efforts* which strengthen and develop his individual personality. The second principle of human dignity does not depend upon him alone, but on the attitude of other people toward him. Human cooperation is therefore indispensable to human dignity.

The influence of the unions is crucial:

> It is an inveterate evil of the traditional structure of the trade unions, that in order to exist they must struggle to recruit members, and to make membership appear in the most attractive light. They are therefore under constant compulsion to prove the necessity of their existence. They have to institute periodic proceedings for increased wages and shorter hours. By doing this, they are appealing to the egotistic interests of the workers. Thus, they never appeal to the *social ideals* dormant in the workers. They cannot, for they do not consider it their duty to further such ideals, and have no clear picture of the practical realization of those ideals. They therefore wish to persevere in their war for higher wages and less work. To these aims they owe their birth, a hundred years ago. But then, those aims were justified by the conditions of the time, as they are always justified when there is capitalistic exploitation of labor.

The peculiar virtue of Wilken's book is its systematic examination of psychological and moral issues involved in any significant reform in industrial practice. Quite obviously, the adversary relationship of capital and labor must be replaced by a spirit of cooperation. The examples of firms in which this objective has been partially achieved are intensely interesting, since they show what may be accomplished in this direction in spite of the opposite tendencies of "business as usual." A restoration of trust and the feeling of working together is not impossible, especially when it is begun by the initiative of an employer with vision.