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THE NARROW LOGIC OF CONFORMITY

ACCORDING to the title of the cover story of *U.S. News & World Report* for Sept. 6, the United States is in the process of spending "sixty-one billion dollars [$61,000,000,000] for a two-hour warning against sneak attack!"

There are several ways to regard this story, just from the headline, without reading it. Your first reaction can be to "want out" from a civilization which takes in its stride a story like this one, as the most exciting news of the week. Not so many years ago, sixty-one billion dollars was more than the annual national income of the country, but now we are prepared, almost casually, to spend that much money in order to be told, two hours before they arrive, that atomic missiles are on their way!

Or, a reader may see in this story a "brave-new-world" type pat on the back. We are the people who can afford this sort of defense. Any war *we* get into will be the biggest yet, no half-way affair. Such things are to be expected.

A third reaction to the *U.S. News* article would be to get involved in the fascinations of the rather impressive technology of the warning system—comprising three lines (thousands of miles) of radar detection to alert U.S. defensive forces if an attack comes "over the top of the world"—and failing to notice, meanwhile, the general insanity of a world in which such projects are matter-of-factly undertaken, with hardly a qualm.

We read enough of the story to determine that, according to General Earle E. Partridge, commander-in-chief of North American Air Defense, the sixty-one billion dollars covers the installation and operating costs of the detection system for fifteen years, or about four billion a year. Gen. Partridge is apparently a thoughtful, conscientious man who has a big job and who suffers no heady optimism from the immensity of the program he directs. Even with warnings, he says, we might miss a good many enemy bombers, which would get through. The Russians, he says, have the same kind of a defense system.

The thing that is disturbing about a story of this kind—which is thorough, effective, and competent journalism at its own level—is the fact that it lacks even the faint breath of questioning. The absolute necessity of such defensive mechanisms is completely taken for granted. Sixty-one billion dollars for a radar detection system seems to follow from the existing international situation as logically as B follows A in the alphabet.

It is not that the right of anyone to believe this needs to be questioned. People have the right to believe all manner of ridiculous things. The disturbing element lies in the Authoritative Voice which promulgates this view, as though any other view would be treason and heresy. After all, a very small voice of common sense could easily ask if that sixty-one billion dollars might not be better spent in bringing some of the usufruct of American prosperity to the ill-housed and underfed peoples of the world. A small part of this unimaginably large sum, for example, in the right hands, would be enough to transform the conditions of southern Italy described by Danilo-Dolci in MANAS for Sept. 25. And there are hundreds of similar areas where a little of America's wealth, now spent for defense, could work miracles of constructive change along the lines of the Point IV program.

This is not of course a new idea. President Eisenhower said four years ago: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are

cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children." The point is that *some* reports of projects like this radar alarm system—which is costing us sixty-one billion dollars—never raise the memory of such utterances by the President and by many others. *Why?*

A simple and familiar explanation is that the men who publish such reports are wicked men who care nothing for world peace, who profit from war and from preparation for war. But this explanation is both too simple and too familiar. It gets us nowhere in understanding the compulsions under which they operate.

These men are neither wicked men nor self-seeking schemers who expect to gain from world disaster. They are captives of a logic which grows out of the past and which rests on all the well-established assumptions of the status quo in politics and economics. They also exercise considerable power in the management of our society and are able to shape in some measure the decisions made by the leaders of our society. They are men, in short, who take themselves and what they regard as their public responsibilities quite seriously.

From experience they have learned to respect certain practical realities, such as the fact that a mass population of 170 million people cannot be ruled with an unsure hand in a questioning spirit. Suppose, for example, that you, along with many other good Americans in the days before Pearl Harbor, felt that Hitler had to be stopped, and that the way to stop him was to get into the war at the earliest possible moment, by whatever means that could be found. The problem, then, was to create a uniform and compelling emotion among the people of the United States, so that they would agree to go to war. At such times, a lot of people just won't *see* what has to be done. That is when the propagandists wheel into action. Given their assumptions, and given the sluggish responses and unwillingness of a mass population to go to war, how can you blame them? It is a question of means and ends. If you believe in the end, you have to accept the means necessary to gain the end. This is the double morality of war and no man who knows anything at all about how wars happen will deny that this double morality exists or that it is inevitable if you are going to have war.

The men who take responsibility for the policies of the United States, as publicists, are bound to stretch the logic of past experience—which is the logic of the status quo—as far as they can, even until it snaps, if snap it must. They know no other way. They are bound to inculcate as much respect as they can for Authority, and for the Experts who undergird the Voice of Authority. Accordingly, you can expect such men to view with extreme disfavor any criticism of the U.S. policy of testing nuclear weapons. When people get worried about the tests on humanitarian or even simple medical grounds, the voice of authority will be heard as the voice of Reassurance and Friendly but Firm explanation from on High.

Questioning or critical expressions, they believe, will shake the security of the nation. They are of course right. A population conditioned to good behavior and "loyal" assent to the decisions of its political and economic managers, when once stirred to questioning, becomes unmanageable. And when the old habits no longer seem reliable, when authority loses its prestige and its air of infallibility, this unmanageability is likely to turn into wild and desperate actions which no one can control. The uncertain and rebellious "self-reliance" and "independence" of people who have never acquired the discipline of self-reliance and independence soon become very dangerous forces—dangerous to themselves and dangerous to everyone else. Men with executive responsibility know this, and their knowledge easily leads them to become Machiavellians. This happens to all men who seek to control the behavior of mass populations, and their "politics"

has very little to do with their becoming Machiavellians. Their politics only affects the labels and slogans they use and the outward form of the techniques they employ in manipulating public behavior and public opinion.

Such methods work in a practical way and up to a point—to the point where either the practical ends which the managers are obliged to pursue by the internal logic of their assumptions become manifestly *insane,* or, as may also happen, the people themselves are rendered so ineffectual by systematic control of both their lives and their thoughts that something must be done to restore at least a few of the qualities of free human beings, if the system is to operate at all.

The Russians are encountering problems of the latter sort, growing out of the careful and rigorous manipulation of political opinion, but these are problems which belong to the Russians and from the point of view of this article are best left to the Russians to solve.

In the United States, the difficulties of a population which is having trouble accepting the Voice of Authority may be traced to a class of causes peculiar to the American ideology and economic system. The book reviewed recently in MANAS (Sept. 25), *The Hidden Persuaders,* gives a clear account of those causes. They grow out of the desire, determination, and necessity of American manufacturers to sell more and more goods to the American people. And the sales managers and advertising agencies who accept the responsibility of delivering a greater volume of sales to their employers, the manufacturers, operate under practically the same compulsions as the politicians and publicists who believe it their duty to persuade the public that we *have* to test nuclear weapons, that we *must* spend sixty-one billion dollars in order to be warned two hours before enemy bombers drop nuclear war heads on our vital industrial centers. To tell these sales managers and advertising men that they may be making a mistake would be like attacking their religion or their patriotism.

Now and then some menacing doctrine bubbles up from the underground of those few human beings who distrust the ads, who live on the fringes of conventional behavior; and, occasionally, there seems to be sound good sense in what these "radicals" dare to affirm. They may, for example, be against chemical fertilizers, and be able to haul before you fruits and vegetables (and even meats, since there are now meat producers who use only organically grown foods for their stock) which look better, taste better, and, as seems clear to a growing minority, *are* better, because they are grown in soil that has been restored to natural fertility by "organic" methods. Or they may declare that white sugar is nutritionally a bad risk, that white bread is a poor food, and that hydrogenated fats (see MANAS for Sept. 4) contribute to susceptibility to heart attack.

Almost automatically, when such criticisms or charges appear, the Big Battalions respond in defense of the status quo. Men with standing and authority rise up to say, "This is *America;* our diet is *all right."* The higher the echelons of authority, the less likely are the "radicals" to receive any serious attention. If the claims brought forward seem vulnerable to refutation on scientific grounds—or if they happen to be wrong, as is bound to happen frequently—the defeat administered is devastating. But if, unhappily, some element of substance is present in the claims, then ridicule and lofty contempt are in order. (*U.S. News & World Report* recently gave a page or so to Reassurance that the consumption of fats by Americans is by no means "dangerous," reproving the "alarmists" for stressing a presumed relationship between a diet rich in fats and the high rate of heart attack in the United States.)

What is at issue in all these controversies, large and small, is the system of logic which is endangered by criticism. The stand-pat, status-quo logic depends for its strength on the protection of its assumptions from any close examination. If, for example, you grant that the

only hope of the American people for "survival" lies in the very best military protection that money and engineering know-how can provide, then you have no logical ground for complaining about the sixty-one billion dollars being spent for an air-raid warning system which begins practically at the North Pole. Or if you believe that the American consumer has no business doubting the findings of nutritionists whose work and researches are supported by grants from the large manufacturers of brand-name food products, then you will have little sympathy for people who tell you that many of the foods available in the supermarkets are either very low in nutritive value or positively bad for you, because of natural elements removed or unnatural elements added.

You could call a situation like this the result of a great conspiracy, and some people do call it that, but the underlying causes of this widespread fear of questioning and nonconformity lie much deeper than any planned campaign of deception and control. Tremendous economic empires and dependencies rest upon the continuing confidence of the public that the political and industrial authorities know what they are doing, that the welfare of the nation is guarded by devoted men who are fitted for their high responsibilities by long experience and extensive technical education. National pride enters here, for if all that we believe about America's great achievements can be questioned, to what or whom shall we turn for guidance? Thus there is both the will to believe on the part of the millions, and the will to make belief easy and "reasonable" on the part of the few. A great psychological collaboration is thus at work, at a level of integration so complex that any alternative to the continuance of that collaboration seems to threaten an intolerable insecurity.

There is further complication that small resistance movements to the over-all pattern of authority often fall victim to the same authority-believer relationship. Resisters, nonconformists and radicals tend to form little groups which duplicate in little the larger pattern. The most striking example of this, of course, is the Communist Party and the various Marxist splinter groups of the past thirty-five years. There are two justifications for exacting conformity to a "line" in revolutionary politics. First, the objective of power requires organization and discipline. You don't rise to power by sponsoring debating societies which allow energy to be frittered away in useless speculation and argument. The struggle for power in a technological society involves the propagation of myths and over-simplified slogans and the creation of loyalties which have military intensity. The second justification for conformity in a revolutionary political movement lies in the fact that the operation by a centralized authority of a technological system such as exists in the United States is inconceivable without some kind of absolute dictatorship. It would be wholly unrealistic for a revolutionary group to contemplate the seizure of power in America without planning an administration supported by martial law for at least a generation. The Russians very rapidly found this to be true of a much less industrialized society, and Lenin apparently saw it from the beginning.

Where do all these problems begin? They begin with the individual, and not, as so many suppose, with economic or political conceptions. The issue is not socialism versus capitalism. The big question is whether or not free decision by individuals is possible in a technological society; and if it is possible, *how* it is possible, and how much of it is possible.

This is really the question which is behind the wonderings of the most thoughtful men of our time. It is the question which haunts Roderick Seidenberg throughout *Post-Historic Man.* It is the question which has led to a revival of anarchist themes in the pacifist movement. It is the question which made Gandhi say that his idea of "socialism" was a system which approached as closely as possible the anarchist ideal. The same question underlies the thinking of Lyman Bryson

in his book, *The Next Amer*ica. It is the inspiration for the Communities of Work which have sprung up in France and other European countries since the war. It is responsible for the amazing interest in the Hopi Indians and their determination to pursue their way of life with as little interference as possible from the encroaching civilization of the white man. It no doubt plays a part in the revival of interest in mysticism and other apolitical philosophies. It is back of multiple evidences of renewed assertion of the importance of individuality, whether by people like Scott and Helen Nearing, who more than twenty years ago returned to the land and proved that efficient human beings can enjoy a natural, productive life in the interstices of the delusions, the techniques, and the patterns of an acquisitive society, or by Robert M. Hutchins, who accepted a chunk of Ford Foundation money and started the Fund for the Republic to defend the rights of individuals under the Constitution of the United States.

Finally, there are the writers of books "in search of the self." For about five years, now, the old Delphic maxim has been finding unabashed admirers in the ranks of psychologists and sociologists and psychotherapists. These men are in quest of original foundations for a philosophy of free individuals.

The intuitions of those who are studying man himself seem soundest of all. For how are you going to generate the strength and the confidence to go against the grain and challenge the assumptions of the vast system of conformity which now prevails, both East and West, unless you acquire profound convictions concerning the nature of man—convictions that support the idea of human freedom? What undertaking is more important than this one?

REVIEW
REFLECTIVE CHRISTIANITY

ARTICLES in the *Christian Century* for Sept. 11 are good examples of Christian journalism at its best. A discussion of religion and the public schools, "Are the Public Schools Godless?", by Virgil M. Rogers, dean of the school of education at Syracuse University, takes the position that consideration for people of other faiths is a prime Christian principle, and that for this reason the public schools *ought* to be secular. Mr. Rogers says that the schools afford ample opportunity for the practice of Christian virtues, without need of a doctrinal emphasis. The Christian teaching of brotherhood, for example, may be applied in the schools by helping to ease the course of integration of the races, in fulfillment of the Supreme Court decision. Mr. Rogers sees a great principle at stake in the controversy over religion in the schools:

> . . . the public schools are not the "Protestant schools." They are the schools provided by government for "all the children of all the people" by virtue of common citizenship in the United States of America. As such they and they alone are to be financed from the public treasury.
>
> They must of course be *secular*. There is nothing sinister and unclean about that word. It is not to say "godless," "anti-religious," "in league with evil," but merely "secular"—like the courts or the presidency. Jesus' own recognition of the validity of certain separations was expressed in his words, "Render unto Caesar the things that be Caesar's." Thus the American schools must be secular. It is my reasoned conviction that the day this secularism ceases, our cherished heritage of freedom is on its way out, no matter what names we pin on the pitiful skeleton that remains. . . .
>
> Labels aside, a pretty good case can be made out for the public schools as the most nearly complete embodiment of the Christian ideal existing in our society today. That ideal is, as I understand it, set forth in the "new commandment": "that ye love one another." Throughout the years this ideal has not noticeably been furthered by divisive warring to establish the particular verbalizations of some particular fragment of creed. Today's youth are as a rule alert to the point of cynicism when it comes to recognizing gaps between verbal preachment and social practice. . . .
>
> It must be concluded that the churches and the schools have separate functions, and that the churches' ends are not to be achieved by their being permitted by the state to instruct quasi-captive audiences of children in the schools. . . .

The justice and common sense of these observations are so plain that it becomes an interesting project to question why more Christians do not make them. Perhaps the letter columns of subsequent issues of the *Century* will bring clarification.

Another article of high quality in this issue of the *Christian Century* is "Knowledge: Theological and Ordinary," by W. Norman Pittenger, professor of Christian apologetics at General Theological Seminary in New York. Dr. Pittenger's concern is with the gap which separates religious (theological) thinking from ordinary knowledge. Since Dr. Pittenger brings in the differences between "modern" or "liberal" religion and orthodox or "neo-orthodox" religion in the development of his theme, it is difficult to summarize his views without considerable explanation. His point, however, lies in the following:

> . . . it appears to me—and, I think, to many others who have given serious thought to these matters—that one of the unfortunate, and indeed dangerous, aspects of our present theological revival is precisely this disjunction between the religious "story" and "ordinary knowledge." The particular point to which I should like to direct attention is the contempt now so often manifested in religious circles and theological discussions for the "reconciliation" of Christian faith with scientific and philosophical thinking. . . .
>
> All these attitudes have one thing in common. They seem to have forgotten, if they ever knew, that the demand of men wherever they may live and whatever they may believe, is for a real unity of thought and experience—a unity in which religious faith is indeed the highest integrating factor, but which includes within it all the rest of thought and experience, so that the whole man is at one in his

> response to the world. On the contrary, these contemporary ways of stating the meaning of religion seem to split man up into compartments or to suggest a dizzying variety of adjustments to the world; they might almost be said to glorify (of course for the highest ends) a kind of schizophrenia.

A down-to-earth illustration of what may happen to such Christians is given by Dr. Pittenger:

> My mind goes back to a certain congregation known to me, whose pastor (a man of deep conviction, high ideals, keen pastoral sense) succeeded in nearly emptying his church because—as one of his people, a devout and dedicated layman, told me—he preached nothing but denunciation of all human activity and enterprise as sinful, in contrast to the gospel which alone had value and worth. He failed to make sense of and give sense to that ordinary experience and general knowledge through which (as I believe) God was ever speaking to and revealing himself to those who were in his congregation.

The interesting thing, here—although one must of course agree with the common sense of Dr. Pittenger's analysis—is that human beings, while they do seek for unity in their lives, are not simple, uncomplicated unities, themselves. They bring to life at least dualities of function, motive, and realization, each pole of which has its own validity. How do you balance these things? If you affirm that the world and its "ordinary knowledge" are not "everything," you are certainly not wrong, but then you have the problem of drawing some sort of line between earthly and transcendent values. What, one wonders, would Mr. Pittenger have to say of Norman Vincent Peale's wholehearted "integration" of religion with conventional social and acquisitive pursuits? What, by comparison, is the legitimate content of the "unearthly" or "spiritual" life? What sort of "drive" led Jesus to forsake the conventions and ordinary standards of his time and to become a revolutionist in religion? Why did Gautama reject in its entirety the "ordinary" notions of truth and follow a lonely path involving not one but several abdications from the prescribed customs of Hindu culture? Surely something beyond the ordinary virtues beckoned to these great men.

It seems reasonable to say that when sectarian enthusiasm leads preachers to draw the line between earthly and transcendental concerns in a mood of fierce, emotional intensity, they turn religion into folly or madness—"schizophrenia," Dr. Pittenger calls it. On the other hand, if you don't draw the line at all, you have nothing but some kind of materialistic monism, regardless of how much you dress it up with words borrowed from supernaturalist tradition.

Possibly the most useful thing to recognize about both problems—the one discussed by Mr. Rogers and the one discussed by Dr. Pittenger—is that they are not *new* problems. The desire to seek a captive audience and to indoctrinate it thoroughly in Christian belief is at least as old as St. Augustine, who found in the gospel saying (Luke 14: 23), "Go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled," the proof-text justifying persecution and compulsion in seeking converts to Christianity. A determined and sometimes angry other-worldliness to the point of complete alienation from what we commonly think of as a natural life has had so many representatives in Christian history—from Simeon Stylites on—that it would be blind neglect not to admit that there must be some deep psychological cause for this tendency.

This, then, is the real problem—not simply to find a "middle ground" in the present, but to try to understand the basic psychological situation of human beings, and *why* these excesses in one direction or the other keep on cropping up. They are not, of course, only "religious" problems. The yearning to have others agree with us, by fair means or foul—and often foul means are given a thin whitewash of verbal piety—is so omnipresent a tendency that very few human beings are wholly free of it. We have, of course, the account of this tendency provided by the psychotherapists, but do the psychotherapists really know more about the

soul than the doctors of religion? If religion has the resources of truth, with knowledge of both good and evil, what is the *religious* explanation of this tendency? What is its bearing on the health of the soul?

Christians in particular have a responsibility to at least attempt an answer to this question, although every religion which seeks proselytes needs to give it attention.

Our own view is that any serious investigation of this problem would be bound to end in a horror of all typical "conversion" techniques, and that the absence of any sort of realistic psychology in the proselytizing religions amounts to a tragic mutilation of both the moral and the mystical faculties of human beings.

If something of this sort be true, we might press the analysis one step further by asking: What does it tell us about the nature of man? Surely the heart of religion rests in an understanding of the nature of man. Religion, on this view, must be psychological before it is cosmological or historical—or "prophetic" or "evangelical"!

Then there is that other tendency referred to by Dr. Pittenger with regret, which we might call the Savonarola Tendency. Savonarola was a fifteenth-century Dominican who rose to power in Florence in the time of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and who captured the popular imagination by his denunciations of the luxury and sensuality of Italian life. Not even the pope was exempt from his strictures, for Savonarola was a man who did not understand compromise. In our world, today, he might seem very like the preacher described by Dr. Pittenger ("a man of deep conviction, high ideals, keen pastoral sense"), who finds the ways of modern society entirely sinful, except that Savonarola became so popular that he had to be strangled at the order of the Inquisition, to prevent the possibility of a political revolution under his leadership, whereas this modern critic succeeds only in "emptying his church."

Many great religious leaders have called upon men to reform their lives, but the Savonarola Tendency seems a peculiarly Christian expression. Why should this be? Buddha, for example, was second to none in his advocacy of ascetic disciplines and the abandonment of worldly motives, yet no "righteous anger" can be found in the record of his discourses. Perhaps Christians have "overdone" the application of Jesus' whipping the money-changers from the temple and his contempt for "publicans" and "Pharisees." At any rate, there seems little difference between the basic ethics of Jesus and Buddha, while there is an extraordinary difference between the historical consequences of Christianity and Buddhism.

The conclusion that might be drawn is that Christians have something to learn from Buddhists (or rather from Buddha) concerning the meaning of the spiritual life. Are the spiritual life and the "practical" life opposed? What about the tradition of monachism, or "withdrawal from the world"? Where, indeed, does the claim that the world is "wicked" come from? Upon what should the primary definitions of good and evil be based? Are these theological or sociological questions? Or are they ethical and psychological?

The *Christian Century* is to be congratulated for printing articles in which questions of this sort are so plainly implicit.

COMMENTARY
A LITTLE QUIET, PLEASE

WE grow very tired of the impeccable truth of the logic of conformity. Those glowing claims on the labels of the cans, jars, and brilliantly packaged foods you buy at the market: the Food and Drug Administration has, no doubt, checked every comma, or every other comma, and those wonderful vitamins are no doubt in there—having been *put* there—in just the quantities named. And all the reasons they give you for buying things—good, sound, progressive reasons. But you can't possibly do all the things you ought to do as a model consumer—brave, true, and loyal to the American way. You'd go broke or collapse from exhaustion running from market to movie to beauty parlor to bar to department store to drug store to doctor and to mortuary, slowing down only when you reach Forest Lawn—"that last personal service!"

The logic of conformity is never the logic of balance for human beings. It is the logic which grows out of the purposes of those who want to use the resources of human beings for their own ends. You don't conform because it's good for you, but because it's good for *them.*

We don't believe in censorship, but, just the same, we'd like to live in a country or an age in which nothing could be printed except to help people to find their own ends.

In farewell to Carl Ewald, and for readers who are delighted by these stories, we reproduce a biographical note on the author, furnished by Alexander Woollcott in *The Woollcott Reader*, from which our selections were taken. "If, among all the works assembled in this volume," Mr. Woollcott writes, "there is one that comes closer than any other to representing the editor's notion of what such an anthology as this should look for, that one is this wise, gentle, and unpretentious work which came out of Denmark shortly after the turn of the century. For it is as simple and as modest and as perfect as a Vermeer. First published here in 1906, it would lapse out of print, then somehow be revived and go jogging along down the years. But though it made many friends, somehow it never reached any considerable fraction of the great multitude who—one knows infallibly—would find it dear and cherish it."

Carl Ewald died in 1908. Mr. Woollcott was unable to tell us whether the little boy forgot about Dirty, or what, eventually happened to him, save for the fact that in 1935 (when the *Woollcott Reader* was published) he was forty-two years old, lived in Denmark, and was "a writer with seven novels to his credit, as the odd, incautious saying goes."

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

[As we thought might be the case, our recent reprinting of selections from Carl Ewald's *My Little Boy* has brought requests for more of the same, as also happened years ago. By this time, however, we have "used up" all but one of the stories for which permission to reprint was originally granted. But even in the mainly humorous bit offered in this issue, Mr. Ewald shows the philosophic depth that makes all his writing memorable.]

MY little boy is engaged to be married.

She is a big, large-limbed young woman, three years his senior and no doubt belongs to the minor aristocracy. Her name is Gertie. By a misunderstanding, however, which is pardonable at his age and moreover quite explained by Gertie's appearance, he calls her Dirty—little Dirty—and by this name she will be handed down to history.

He met her on the boulevard, where he was playing, in the fine spring weather, with other children. His reason for the engagement is good enough:

"I wanted a girl for myself," he says.

Either I know very little of mankind or he has made a fortunate choice. No one is likely to take Dirty from him.

Like the gentleman that he is, he at once brings the girl home to us and introduces her. In consequence of the formality of the occasion, he does not go in by the kitchen way, as usual, but rings the front-door bell. I open the door myself. There he stands on the mat, hand in hand with Dirty, his bride, and, with radiant eyes:

"Father," he says, "this is little Dirty. She is my sweetheart. We are going to be married."

"That is what people usually do with their sweethearts," I answer, philosophically. "Pray, Dirty, come in and be welcomed by the family."

"Wipe your feet, Dirty," says my little boy.

The mother of my little boy does not think much of the match. She has even spoken of forbidding Dirty the house.

"We can't do that," I say. "I am not in ecstasies over it either, but it is not at all certain that it will last."

"Yes, but. . ."

"Do you remember what little use it was when your mother forbade me the house? We used to meet in the most incredible places and kiss each other terribly. I can quite understand that you have forgotten, but you ought to bear it in mind now that your son's beginning. And you ought to value the loyalty of his behavior towards his aged parents."

"My dear! . . ."

"And then I must remind you that it is spring. The trees are budding. You can't see it, perhaps, from the kitchen-window or from your work-table, but I, who go about all day, have noticed it. You know what Byron says: 'March has its hares, and May must have its heroine'."

And so Dirty is accepted.

But, when she calls, she has first to undergo a short quarantine, while the mother of my little boy washes her and combs her hair thoroughly.

Dirty does not like this, but the boy does. He looks on with extraordinary interest and at once complains if there is a place that has escaped the sponge. I can't make out what goes on within him on these occasions. There is a good deal of cruelty in love; and he himself hates to be washed. Perhaps he is rapt in fancies and wants to see his sweetheart rise daily from the waves, like Venus Anadyomene. Perhaps it is merely his sense of duty; last Friday, in cold blood, he allowed Dirty to wait outside, on the porch for half an hour, until his mother came home.

Another of his joys is to see Dirty eat.

I can quite understand that. Here, as at her toilet, there is something worth looking at. The mother of my little boy and I would be glad too to watch her, if there was any chance of giving Dirty her fill. But there is none. At least, not with my income.

When I see all that food disappear, without as much as a shade of satisfaction coming into her eyes, I tremble for the young couple's future. But he is cheerful and unconcerned.

Of course, there are also clouds in their sky.

A few days ago, they were sitting quietly together in the dining-room and talking of their wedding. My little boy described what the house would be like and the garden and the horses. Dirty made no remarks and she had no grounds for doing so, for everything was particularly nice. But, after that, things went wrong.

"We shall have fourteen children," said the boy.

"No," said Dirty. "We shall only have two: a boy and a girl."

"I want to have fourteen."

"I won't have more than two.

"Fourteen."

"Two."

There was no coming to an agreement. My little boy was speechless at Dirty's meanness. And Dirty pinched her lips together and nodded her head defiantly. Then he burst into tears.

I could have explained to him that Dirty, who sits down every day as the seventh at the children's table at home, cannot look upon children with his eyes, as things forming an essential part of every well regulated family, but must regard them rather as bandits who eat up other people's food. But I did not feel entitled to discuss the young lady's domestic circumstances unasked.

One good thing about Dirty is that she is not dependent upon her family nor they upon her. It has not yet happened that any inquiries have been made after her, however long she remained with us. We know just where she lives and what her father's name is. Nothing more.

However, we notice in another way that our daughter-in-law is not without relations.

Whenever, for instance, we give her a pair of stockings or some other article of clothing, it is always gone the next day; and so on until all the six brothers and sisters have been supplied. Not till then do we have the pleasure of seeing Dirty look neat. She has been so long accustomed to going shares that she does so in every conceivable circumstance.

And I console the mother of my little boy by saying that, should he fall out with Dirty, he can take one of the sisters and that, in this way, nothing would be lost.

FRONTIERS

The Fund for the Republic

QUITE possibly, many MANAS subscribers would be glad to receive regularly the monthly bulletins issued by the directors of the Fund for the Republic, which may be had for the asking. One need not read Robert Hutchins' book, *Democracy, Education and the Fund,* in order to convince himself that the Ford Foundation achieved an important public service when it created the Fund for the Republic and gave it free reign. The Fund's accomplishments in research on civil liberties, integration and segregation, and in related areas have been both valuable and influential. A brief statement of how the Fund fulfills its avowed purpose—to advance the principles of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence—is provided by an introductory brochure entitled, *Facts, Aims and Organization:*

> The Fund for the Republic is a nonprofit educational corporation, established in 1952 by the Ford Foundation with grants totalling $15,000,000. Its purpose is to eliminate restrictions on freedom of thought and inquiry and to promote the principles of individual liberty expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
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> Since its establishment, the Fund has been an independent entity. It has no connection with any other foundation. The policies of the Fund are determined by its Board of Directors.
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> The Fund does its work in a variety of ways. It carries on educational activities through the distribution of books, pamphlets, films, reprints of notable speeches, and other materials. It makes outright grants to individuals and organizations to enable them to conduct studies and programs in the field of civil liberties. Organizations which have received this kind of assistance include the YMCA, YWCA, Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago, American Bar Foundation, the Institute of Social Order of the Society of Jesus, Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches, Presbyterian Church in the United States, Columbia University, Stanford University, Southern Regional Council, Association of the Bar of the City of New York Fund, Inc., American Friends Service Committee, Vanderbilt University, and the University of Virginia.
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> The Fund also sponsors research projects which are carried out by individuals appointed by the foundation. The directors of these projects reach their own conclusions independently, and are responsible for the results of their work. Examples of such projects are: a survey of attitudes in U.S. colleges and universities, directed by Paul Lazarsfeld of Columbia University; a study of blacklisting in the entertainment industry by John Cogley; and a study of the influence of Communism in American life under the supervision of Prof. Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University.
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> The Fund gives a restricted number of grants-in-aid to individuals for research and writing on civil liberties topics related to other programs of the Fund. Studies authorized cover such topics as interference with religious freedom in California, race discrimination in federal government employment, discharges other than honorable from the U.S. armed services on the basis of associations prior to induction, and the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
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> As of May 1, 1956, the amount expended or committed by the Fund totalled approximately $6,500,000. Roughly one-third of this sum was devoted to educational activities in race relations in both the North and South. Another substantial proportion of the Fund's appropriations is devoted to educational programs designed to further understanding of basic documents of American history. A third major area of Fund interest is the study of problems that have arisen as a result of Communism's threat to democratic values. The Fund's largest appropriation in this latter category has been $325,000 for the study of Communism, under Prof. Rossiter and his staff.

The Fund's *Bulletin* for April, 1957 extracts from Elmo Roper's address at the Fund's American Traditions Dinner. The following passages provide a good outline of the approach followed by the Directors of the Fund:

> Our freedoms are not a set of building blocks from which the top few can be toppled off and the rest will stand. They are an organic, living whole, each dependent on the health of the others for their own good functioning. Legal safeguards alone will not maintain them. There are more effective ways to stop free speech than the threat of sending men to jail. In fact, jails have produced some pretty eloquent documents from time to time. When the passion to belong, to be alike, to swim in the mainstream

> becomes the dominating one, the more difficult but equally human desire to think one's own thoughts and live by one's own convictions atrophies. With it goes the sustaining force of free human society.
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> The pressures toward conformity in our expanding industrial society are great; they will continue to be great. But the only way we can keep our national identity, in which our technological genius and material plenty are regarded as no more important than our tolerance, our generosity, our belief in individual initiative, and our acceptance of the basic equality and dignity of man, is to keep alive a counter-current to that conformity, which constantly challenges and questions what we currently feel and believe in the name of a liberating sense of human life. . . .

The Fund for the Republic is not simply a research facility, nor does it allow such generalizations as those of Mr. Roper simply to float around in the stratosphere. When some of the nation's best college professors were being discharged for resisting the pressures designed to get them to sign loyalty oaths, directors of the Fund moved boldly into action. Some discharged instructors were furnished grants to continue independent research, while others were placed in less naïvely prejudiced seats of learning by correspondence initiated by the Fund. Most important of all, and despite the difficulty in getting adequate reporting on civil liberties issues, the public began to hear of what the Fund was doing in such instances, and to appreciate it.

As a result of these and similar operations, the Fund for the Republic, and particularly Director Robert M. Hutchins, became victims of insidious and slanderous attacks. Echoing the "patriotism" of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Fulton Lewis, Jr. devoted some sixty nation-wide broadcasts to attempting to discredit the Fund's purposes, personnel, and accomplishments. The most invidious insinuation was that the Fund was becoming a dupe of the Communist Party, or at least the tool of "fellow travelers." Hutchins and other representatives of the Fund undertook spirited defense, but innuendo and slander are hard to beat. We are therefore pleased to report the availability of accurate information on the Fund's expenditures in the monthly *Bulletin* quoted above. Copies may be obtained from the Fund for the Republic, Inc., 60 East 42nd Street, New York 17.

One area in great need of the Fund's attention concerns the relationship between civil liberty and the law. We quote from the January, 1957 *Bulletin*, which perspective on the Fund's approach to this problem:

> In what way the constitutional and traditional protections of the individual—protections which have always stood as the singular heritage of a free and responsible people—must be redefined is a highly complex problem. It is the central and basic problem of civil liberties today.
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> Traditionally, lawyers have a central function in the process of redefinition. No matter where the process begins, at some point it is almost sure to be expressed in the language of the law, whether in a legislative enactment or a judicial decision, or even in the by-laws of a private organization. This is not to say that lawyers have always been equal to their responsibilities. Too often the Bar has been pushed into law reform by the indignation of the lay public. The law appears to catch up with society only by spasmodic efforts. The legislative power is ponderous and uncertain in its exercise. And when a basic redefinition is at last achieved, as in the Supreme Court's decision against segregated schooling, it may take much more than the courts and the legal system to secure its effective application.
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> Yet the lawyer's art is important to the redefinition of minimal rights and decencies in a changing society. It is for this reason that the Fund for the Republic has put a considerable amount of effort into encouraging work in the civil liberties field by law schools and bar associations. The Fund does not attempt to influence legislation and it is not its function or its policy to intervene directly in civil liberties cases (as does the American Civil Liberties Union, for example), to furnish counsel or offer *amicus curiae* briefs. But it has supported, or helped to support, numerous special studies by law schools and bar groups; its fellowship grants have assisted individual legal scholars; it has tried to awaken a greater interest among lawyers generally in the legal aspects of the more significant civil liberties problems of the time.