

OLD AND NEW DUALISM

ONE thing that the social scientists have been doing, and doing effectively, is to call attention to the psychological effects of what has been named the "scientific revolution." To put it briefly, they—or some social scientists—maintain that the rise of scientific ways of thinking and of scientific concepts of "reality" has led to a breakdown of man's sense of wholeness—his unity with the rest of nature. Modern man no longer has a "world-view"; he can obtain, if he becomes some kind of specialist, a working familiarity with some small portion of the world; or if, as a student, he gains intellectual mastery over one of the more comprehensive sciences, such as Physics, he may develop a coherent theory of the origin of the world; but in either case he will be unable to relate *himself* if any philosophical sense to the general scheme. His hopes and fears will be aliens in the world he has pictured in his mind.

The scientist who has grown up in this general tradition of "knowledge" is usually suspicious of all so-called "dualistic" views of the universe. He regards any attempt to relate man's psychic and moral life with basic forces in nature as a kind of supernaturalism with which science can have nothing to do. The "integration" of man with nature must, he thinks, be a purely physical or material integration. Since the days of Galileo, he will explain, scientists have been struggling toward emancipation from the stultifying dualism of supernatural religion. Nature is not, he says, a passive clay that must be moulded by the Creator's hand. Nature has its own dynamism, its own creativity. Like Laplace, the modern scientist manages very well without the hypothesis of God—of a God, that is, whose activities are capable of being displaced by the scientific conception of natural law. And a God that, as science progresses, has less and less to do, is not

the sort of God that the old dualistic religions taught the people to believe in.

Physics, then, and all the branches of science which seek rigorous definition of natural phenomena, are atheistic on principle. They will accept a God who is subject to the laws of nature, for such a God can never interfere with the advance of their research. And because the two-worldism of the ancients—the idea of a spiritual world, and spiritual forces or intelligences, as well as a world of matter and mechanical forces—is closely associated with a God who *does* interfere, the scientists working in these fields are equally antagonistic toward every form of dualism in philosophy.

The social scientists, however, have another approach. As students of human beings, they try to find out what men are doing, and, if possible, why they are doing it. Although all the sciences were born from physics and obtained their first assumptions and concepts of method from the older disciplines, the social scientist has no stake in the materialistic assumptions of the physicist. The social scientist does not care so much whether the sun revolves around the earth, or the earth around the sun. He is more interested in the web of beliefs men have about the world, and how those beliefs affect human behavior. The social scientist is much closer than the physicist to the problem of human happiness and human welfare. And today, the social scientist often talks like a man who has been converted to gospel religion. He is saying, in his own peculiar and academic way, "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" He is saying, "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal."

The social scientist is adopting this view, only in a manner of speaking, and on pragmatic, not dogmatic, grounds. But when a social scientist makes a study of the Hopi Indians, or of the Murngin and Arunta, naked black tribes of Australia, and reports that these people have a serenity of spirit which the civilized world lacks almost entirely, he is telling us that the beliefs of these people are good for them, and that, by contrast, our beliefs are bad for us. He is not saying, "Let us go live with the Hopi, or with the Arunta," but that they have something which we do not have, and which we ought to get. He says it, of course, in a "sociological" way. A passage by Edward F. Haskell of the University of Chicago (in the *Scientific Monthly* for June, 1942) will illustrate. After telling how every phase of the Arunta's life in his society is integrated with his conception of nature—of animals, plants, terrestrial regions and celestial bodies—he adds:

. . . it is not the primitiveness of a world-view *per se*, but its integration—a condition usually, though not exclusively, associated with primitiveness—which is constantly associated with religiousness, with serene confidence in the world and the future, with mental security and peace, with uncompromisingly social behavior. . . . peoples who act in accordance with integrated world views have the following vital characteristics in common: they have deep faith and strong confidence in their world and their future, and their respective communities exhibit extraordinary unity, direction, and power. Since all the above-mentioned peoples exhibit these important characteristics, and since no people whose world-views are not integrated exhibit them, I call not only some, but all, of them *religious* views; and the force not only of some, but of all, *religious* force.

All words, and among them "religion" and "science," are materials with which we think. If we are to build an efficient world-view these unit words must correspond to important unit actualities. For us, important actualities are mental peace and united, powerful, efficient action. For the sake of effective thought, therefore, the word "religion" should apply to integrated, universal views, whatever their logical categories and not, as at present, be artificially restricted to views which include man-like, anthropomorphic gods.

The notion of two contrasting entities, science and religion, is harmful to modern civilization: It leads to fruitless preoccupation with pseudo-problems such as the lengthy discussions, in churches and philosophy classrooms, of the supposed conflict or harmony between science and religion. Another writer in the same issue of the *Scientific Monthly*, Dr. Charles E. Kellogg, although not a social scientist, but a soil scientist associated with the U. S. Department of Agriculture, makes an interesting charge against scientists in general, suggesting that their rejection of the dualistic integration of life and beliefs, such as Dr. Haskell is talking about, in no way protects them from another kind of dualism:

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Many scientists [Dr. Kellogg writes] have accepted an amazing dualism. They live in two worlds; their work is one, and their ordinary life is another. It is truly remarkable how they separate this workaday world in which we all live from their scientific world. The separation even extends to their fundamental concepts of philosophy and logic. The critical faculty employed so carefully in the laboratory, in field work, or in the library may never once be applied to other judgments—even to modern radio and magazine advertising. Although advertisers of scientific apparatus are very cautious in their claims lest they irritate the scientists, the names of the same scientists are regarded as an excellent "sucker list" for all sorts of other things!

Does a scientist fundamentally change when he goes to the movies, or enters military service, or supervises the education of his children, or seeks a remedy for a head cold, or walks through a labor picket line, or considers the qualifications of men for public office, or realizes he is broke? Is the scientist, after all, a sort of robot whose training and thinking are confined entirely to one small portion of his nervous system that has no relation to the rest of it? Of course not, but sometimes it seems so.

The situation, then, amounts to this: the disciplines that we possess—and "we" here means

almost all of us, scientists and the rest, who are not really different from each other—have no real focus for our lives as a whole, but only for the most fragmentary activities. We have no world-view which includes *ourselves*, and we are too sophisticated to join with the Murgnin or the Arunta or the Hopi, who do.

But the social scientists, if we wish to honor them for their efforts, are at least helping to set men free from any sort of religious or scientific preconceptions. They look at the preconceptions we have, not from the point of view of their theoretical "truth," but to see how these ideas affect personal and social relationships. In consequence, they are making it clear that the pseudo-scientific "one-world" theory is no better than the primitive "two-world" theory, so far as our capacity to live intelligently is concerned. This is a great liberation. It may be as great, finally, as the Copernican Revolution, which discredited the authority of Christian dualism.

We used to think that a man without a country was homeless and miserable. Now, it seems that a man without a philosophy which unites him with all countries, and all nature, is in a far more serious plight.

Letter from **GERMANY**

BERLIN.—"Free German Youth"—three words only, and yet two lies in them: these youths are not free, and the organization is German only by composition, not in its aims and ends. Today—May 30—half a million members of this "FDJ" (*Freie Deutsche Jugend*) are rolling back home again on thousands of trucks and railroad freight cars, after having been concentrated for several days in Berlin for a meeting which received advance publicity throughout the world.

Looking back at the cold and rainy Whitsun holidays, one wonders at the enormous effort that has again been expended—for almost nothing. Whether or not West Berlin would be "conquered" by the FDJ was clear even before the big meeting at the diplomatic level began. The circumstances of our time do not allow even most adults in Germany any independent action—and how will youth be able to build its own future? There once *was* a free and independent German Youth Movement, between 1908 and 1914, and for a while between 1919 and 1933. Those times are gone. It is the bitter fate of the youth of our generation in Germany not to mold aims and decisions, but to carry out the decisions of others.

The bright blue shirts of the FDJ which were seen all over the Eastern part of Berlin could not hide two facts that sprang to the eyes of the close observer: (1) the utter meaningless of this meeting, and (2) the unmistakable weakness of the Eastern side of the world. If one compares the big meetings of the Nazis with the meeting of the FDJ, one can—by noticing the similarity of their outer form—only say that by contrast the Nazis had rather clear ideas about what to do and what to strive for. They prepared for war and they aimed at the greatness of the German Reich. They failed because of their ruthlessness and the antiquity of their ideas. But the FDJ has failed before really beginning its struggle. Its ideas and slogans—National Front, German Unity, Peace—are either false (peace cannot be brought about with a prevailing militant spirit; and the formula "peace" is only a sign of the weakness of the Eastern side) or they are obscurantism. What meaning has "National Front," when shouted by the side which stands on the basis of class struggle? Or "German Unity," when it is meant only as a unity

under Russian protectorship, as a new "people's democracy"? The comparison with the Nazis and their clear-cut ideas turns, indeed, very unfavorably against the FDJ. One cannot be successful with obviously self-contradictory ideas. After skimming all lies and impossibilities from the slogans of this meeting, there remains nothing more than a big, *meaningless* show. (In German: "*sinnleer*"—empty of sense.)

The *weakness* of the Eastern side was revealed by innumerable facts. For one thing, the Eastern leaders and police anxiously tried to prevent the FDJ from entering the Western sectors of the city. At railroad stations the loudspeakers blared: "All FDJ leave the train. Here ends the 'Democratic' Sector!" (The passengers smiled at these words.) Despite such efforts, many youths crossed the sector border. Afterward it was found that twenty-eight youths and thirty-nine "people's" policemen had deserted their ranks forever and declared themselves refugees. Others spoke to their friends over RIAS (Radio in the American Sector). There was no sign of earnestly trying to "conquer West Berlin." Berliners in general showed themselves impassive to the "youthful *élan*" (one Eastern paper lamented the fact that Berliners did not greet with enthusiasm the youth who saluted with flags and hands from the oncoming trains).

It is further interesting to note how much the past totalitarian education of the Nazis now supports the new totalitarian machine, by having created a complete emptiness in the minds of the youth. The Nazis could not supply human ideals, and they did not train the mind to reflect, so that people were accustomed to superficial phrases. All this fits wonderfully into the education of the new totalitarian regime. The two systems work—so to speak—hand in hand.

But, fortunately, the end of the new totalitarian regime can hardly be far off. (People in general give it not more than two more years to exist.) The big youth meeting of Whitsuntide 1950 in Berlin was no success, but a failure in its meaning. It openly exhibited the blind alley in which totalitarianism has arrived, today.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

A MATURE MIND

A READING of something written by Morris Cohen invariably has the constructive effect of reminding the reader of how great a difference there is between the technical side of scholarship and scientific research and the mood or spirit of the quest for truth. Morris Raphael Cohen, unlike many writers concerned with scientific inquiry, was an exemplar in the practice of both these aspects of science, and his influence for good, in consequence, has been both deep and wide.

A major point of David Lindsay Watson's *Scientists Are Human* is that the ethical outlook of the individual scientist may have an important effect upon not only his human relations but also the validity of his conclusions in research. The work of Morris Cohen seems to be a clear vindication of Watson's claim, for the generosity of Cohen's spirit certainly enriched everything that he did. He will be remembered most, perhaps, for his volume, written with Ernest Nagel, *Logic and the Scientific Method*—a book which ought to be required reading for all students of science, or all students of anything, for that matter. Like other men of self-reliant mind, Cohen is never a doctrinaire thinker. Nor is he overly impressed by "authorities." A passage in an essay on Moses Maimonides illustrates his general attitude in thinking and writing. After explaining that he cannot read Maimonides in the original Arabic, he tells the reader why he will nevertheless discuss the work of the great Jewish thinker of the Middle Ages:

. . . I have two qualifications: (1) I am aware of my ignorance and (2) am not afraid to disagree as far as I understand. When I was a student of the Talmud some years ago I remember coming across a passage to the effect that the funeral orator must remember that there is a day of judgment for the orator as well as the deceased. For some reason or other this has made an indelible impression on me and I can never indulge in the usual eulogies but am bound to express my differences.

Without having any special evidence on the subject, other than in his writings, we suspect that Morris Cohen was a tremendously effective teacher who caused his students—he was for many years

professor of philosophy at New York's City College—to learn how to think for themselves and to know when they were doing it and when they were not. In his own field, he had a way of cutting through grandiose abstractions and of dealing with traditional concepts of philosophy in terms of the practical experience that is open to every man. In *Reason and Nature*, for example, which appeared in 1931, he examines the popular separation between "deductive" and "inductive" reasoning, arriving at a conclusion so lucidly accurate that the reader wonders why he did not think of it himself:

That all knowledge begins with the perception of the individual and then goes on by abstraction to the universal is a widespread dogma. It probably arises from the fact that a good deal of our education consists in being taught to name and recognize certain abstract phases of existence, and as we cannot suppose that animals and children before they learn to talk have such general ideas, we conclude that they can come only after the perception of particular things. But careful attention to the actual growth of knowledge shows that it is mainly a progress not from the particular to the universal but from the vague to the definite. The distinction between the particular and the universal is generally implicit and only comes to explicit or clear consciousness in the higher stages of knowledge. . . .

We are impressed with a stranger's beauty, agreeableness or reliability before we can specify his features or traits. It is therefore quite in harmony with fact to urge that the perception of universals is as primary as the perception of particulars. The process of reflection is necessary to make the universal clear and distinct, but as the discriminating element in observation it aids us to recognize the individual. The progress of science, at any rate, depends upon our ability to see things not in all their concrete fullness of individuality but only as the embodiments of those universals which are relevant to our inquiry. A student will make little progress in geometry if his attention is solicited by the special features of his particular diagram rather than by the universal relations which the diagram imperfectly embodies.

Some thinkers are called "hard-headed," and there is an element of hard-headedness in all that Cohen has to say, but he has a pervasive humor and elevating tone which make "wise-headed" a more appropriate term. We have at hand for review a new

book, *Reflections of a Wondering Jew*, issued by the Beacon Press (\$2.50), in which Cohen's practical wisdom is clearly displayed. It is, perhaps, a slight book, compared to his more philosophical works, yet this collection of essays, addresses and reviews is so attractive that it constitutes a pressing invitation to investigate the author's thought more thoroughly.

In this book, Cohen speaks as a Jew—to other Jews, for the most part, for he was active in a number of Jewish organizations. We find him as he was among those to whom he felt a special obligation, and here again, in the field of what might be called adult education, his practical wisdom shows itself. He has as little use for Jewish chauvinism and nationalism as he has for anti-Semitism, and one could wish that he had lived to see the birth of the new nation of Israel, and that his voice could be heard above the din of controversy in the Jewish community of today. He was one of the best champions the Jews ever had in the United States, for he sought justice throughout his life, and he practiced common sense while seeking it. The following, from a chapter on "Jews in Commerce and the Professions," will illustrate Cohen's mood:

I was lecturing at one of the eastern universities, and was staying overnight with a friend, a dean of the university. The next morning, in the intimacy of the breakfast table, he turned to me and said, "Why do you Jews crowd so much into the professions? Why don't you go into industry and agriculture?"

Well, as a Jew, I naturally answered by asking him, "Is that what you think of my lecture last night?"

My host laughingly said: "That is not fair: One swallow doesn't make a summer. You are an exception."

Being too polite to contradict my host on that score, I admitted that my mother and father did think I was an exceptional child and curiously enough still think so. But I asked: "How many parents do you know that do not think their children are exceptional?"

The conversation changed, the way it will, but a little later I asked my host: "By the way, what is your boy doing at Princeton? Has he decided whether he is going into the teaching of philosophy or into ~e ministry?"

My host replied: "No, he has decided to take up law. You see, his mother's father and his uncles are in a law firm, and the family has been in the firm for quite a while. His mother thinks it would be a good thing for him to continue in the family tradition."

Whereupon I asked: "Well, have you ever thought of sending him into industry or agriculture?"

The dean was a little embarrassed, but he said, "Yes, my son does go to the farm and does considerable work there in the summer."

Whereupon I remarked: "Don't you suppose a good many Jews would like to be connected with a legal firm which would enable them to go and cultivate a farm in the summer?"

In conclusion, something should be said about the origins of this man, of whom Harry Overstreet, author of *The Mature Mind*, has remarked: "I have never known any one more single-mindedly devoted to the rational pursuit of truth." Early in his life in New York's East Side, Cohen came into contact with Thomas Davidson, the extraordinary Scottish teacher who, more than half a century ago, started a school known as Breadwinner's College. Cohen began his teaching career as a volunteer in Davidson's school for the working classes. This, we think, speaks the highest praise for any man, for what is more important than to want to be a teacher of those who want to learn, but have been denied the opportunity? It is this basic quality in Morris Cohen that is disclosed in *Reflections of a Wondering Jew*.

COMMENTARY

THE POWER OF MILITARISM

THE proposal to extend the Selective Service Act for another three years gives particular pertinence to a pamphlet just issued by the National Council Against Conscription, *Militarism in Education*. There is no excuse for the renewal of the draft act, save the desire to perpetuate the atmosphere of military crisis in the United States. The quotas of the various branches of the service have all been adequately filled by volunteers, so that the insistence of military leaders upon an extension of the draft must be recognized as another attempt to maintain the potential power and authority of the military over American life.

The new NCAC pamphlet, issued under the sponsorship of such persons as Albert Einstein, Pearl Buck, Pitirim Sorokin, Alonzo F. Myers, and other eminent citizens, deals with the increasing influence of the military upon the educational institutions of the United States. The pamphlet may be obtained for 25 cents from the NCAC at 1013 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

Perhaps the most insidious aspect of this development is the evident dependence of many small colleges upon financial assistance obtained from the Army or the Navy. Colleges and universities received this assistance not only for training units on the campus, but also for extensive programs of military research. The Army research budget for 1947 included \$70,000,000 for studies in colleges; in 1948-49, Navy research amounted to \$20,000,000, covering about 500 projects in colleges and universities. According to the *New York Times*, in 1949 the Government spent a total of \$160,000,000 "for research to be conducted on the nation's campuses." It follows that the military services control more and more of the scientific research programs, by controlling the money which supports those programs. When, in 1949, a Congressman suggested that it might be advisable

to lessen the military controls over university research, an Army spokesman replied: "We lean a little bit toward keeping them tight."

The implications of the growing power of the military, in education as elsewhere, leave little doubt as to the kind of a society that will result, if nothing is done to reverse this trend. As a leading educator remarked several years ago,

The United States seems headed for war, and our only salvation lies in education. But for the first time in history this nation has more soldiers than teachers. Such a ratio points toward open conflict.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

Editors, MANAS: I have been following with great interest the column, "Children—and Ourselves," and feel that discussion of a problem I have had to meet might be helpful to others as well as myself. My son in high school just lately informed me that I had failed him in not explaining to him "about sex," but had left it to the science teacher to tell him. He reminds me it is a main topic of conversation around school, and he thinks if parents did more talking at home, it would be better.

I've never been embarrassed at the prospect of discussing sex matters with my son, and I don't think he has felt any lack in respect to knowing the *biology* of sex,—but rather he has wanted help in considering what criteria or values to follow in his own school life. There, perhaps I have failed to help, for I usually speak in generalities about "a sense of fitness" or "the natural time when one is ready to assume the responsibilities involved in marriage." Neither this method, nor that of "warning against pitfalls" seems adequate. Perhaps I have failed in not suggesting other possible approaches to this problem, and I would be glad for some suggestions.

IT seems rather obvious that this particular parent has nothing to worry about in "failing" her son. The filial complaint was probably little more than an opening for introducing the subject. A real failure in parental responsibility would preclude any such forthright approach, and in this particular instance the most likely cause for the comment was that a "natural time" had finally arrived for an interchange of thoughts.

The charge against parents of "failure to impart" is often without foundation, or, perhaps more correctly, it is based on a myth. The myth is that parents are always embarrassed about sex and don't properly inform children because they dislike talking about it. Yet, although it is foolish to think anyone is obligated to say anything about anything unless the subject arises, the "myth" has some foundation. Many parents have developed a sin-complex about sex, either through exposure to theological fulminations or because of unassimilated or poorly conceived personal

experiences. Children of such parents either acquire the complex themselves or resist it. If they acquire it, sex matters, obviously, will never be discussed, because it is a commandment of the complex that they shouldn't be. When the child resists the parents' determined aversion to mention of anything sexual, he does so first by withholding his private fund of feeling, opinion—or curiosity.

Psychologists have long recognized the deficiencies of "sin-conscious" parents as educators. Most teachers, through psychological training, have an anti-parent bias on matters of approach to sexual problems, and in their classrooms a few hints are dropped to the effect that parents' attitudes are often too "hush-hush." This last development is a bit unfortunate, because the real issue is not one of reticence versus volubility at all, but rather of whether the area of sex is, for the parent, sacred or merely "nasty." Both of these persuasions lead to reticence, so that reticence itself is not a good indication of the real situation. Similarly, does the psychologist-inspired teacher believe that sex is a purely biological matter which needs a clinical approach, or does the teacher encourage discussion with the purely intermediary aim of helping the child escape from distorting influences in a guilt-ridden society? As we have suggested before, obscenity comes from the inevitable fascination which unhealthy classifications of sin provoke, and many teachers want children to feel free to discuss sex whenever and wherever they want to, so *that they may be "clean minded."*

A growing number of young people, today, carry around with them the conviction that all subjects, including that of sex, should be subjected to frank and open discussion. Basically, we think they are right, and that the parents or priests who maintain that discussion of anything pertaining to sex is an influence toward erotic conduct are wrong. It is certainly true that the type of talk which seeks only to savor one's own personal experiences or those of another stimulates sensual urges. But this is not Discussion. Discussion

means the rational discipline of evaluation, and evaluation means raising one's mind above immediate experience or personal feeling to seek a relationship between one's feelings and "the Good, the True, and the Beautiful," as Plato has it. The trouble with children's talk about sexually exciting things is simply the same trouble most of their parents had before them, for the Christian theology has been no help at all in encouraging people to discover *how* to talk about sex problems constructively.

"Sex education" is one of the largest unsolved youth problems—particularly, perhaps, in America, where there is leisure for thinking and experimenting but practically no tradition of philosophical evaluation of anything. American traditions as to what is "proper" have altered so many times and with such rapidity in the course of our short history that expressions such as a "balanced life," or the "golden mean" help us not at all. In one sense, this is probably just as well, because the "golden mean" way of determining satisfactory moral conduct is doomed to inadequacy from the start. As an example, let us imagine a parent who tries to help his child see the folly of extreme sexual attitudes.

It is easy to point out why a completely negativistic attitude towards any happiness which may accompany procreative functions is unhealthy and, in a sense, unfair to life itself and the dignity and worth of man. It also is easy to demonstrate that the opposite extreme an attitude favoring casual, purely hedonistic promiscuity—fails to lead to happiness. But simply warning the child against extremes leaves him little better off than he was in the first place. He still will be unable to determine exactly what he should do and why: the "middle ground" shifts with each statistical study—and with each interpretation. How libertarian can he be and still escape the perils of extreme libertarianism? How "moral" can he be and escape having a medieval mind? What the child really needs to know is what makes some conduct in the interrelationship of the sexes

beneficial and what makes some conduct destructive. He wants an answer in terms of *why* rather than in terms of either alarming statistics or moralistic generalities.

FRONTIERS

The Struggle For Power

WHERE the question of power is not at stake, there is seldom any difficulty in deciding matters of right and wrong. Lying and stealing and killing are prosecuted without much debate, so long as the motives behind them are simple and uncomplicated. But when a man lies, not on his own behalf, but for some "cause"—when his stealing comes within the boundaries of "commercial" or "political" honesty, or when he kills as the member of an armed force legally at war—he may be praised instead of prosecuted, rewarded instead of condemned. In the struggle for power, morality, or what men say is "moral," seems far more determined by ideological considerations than by any enduring standard of right and wrong.

Every war—which is always a struggle for power—presents a problem of this sort. Another illustration is the historic struggle between capital and labor, which in recent years has become bewilderingly complex. The "simple" theories proposed for establishing harmony between employers and workers are almost always either partisan or utopian: they are partisan when they assign special virtues to either side; and they are utopian when they propose solutions which ignore the root of the difficulty in the conflict of class interests. The class struggle, whether we like it or not, is a contemporary fact. Whether it is a necessary struggle is another question; the first obligation of the inquirer is to acknowledge its existence and to study its history.

Actually, the special peculiarity of all ideological conflicts is that they have a history, and cannot be understood without historical knowledge. Simple moral problems can be decided without reference to history, but the conflicts arising out of the effort of groups of men to rise to power have to be interpreted in the light of their origin. While simple intuition tells us it is wrong to steal or kill, simple intuition does not array and evaluate the factors which are decisive in the unceasing struggle for power between organized capital and organized labor. The man who knows something of the history of that struggle—who knows the facts of, say, the Pullman strike of 1894—is likely to be less affected by anti-labor propaganda than people who depend upon the newspapers for their information.

George Pullman created the Pullman sleeping car and revolutionized the passenger transportation of the railroads of the United States. From early youth, Pullman had worked on the idea of a comfortable sleeping car—it was, as Irving Stone says, "the dominating passion of his life." All his inventiveness, his energies, his financial resources went into developing the car. As a result, by 1894, Pullman cars were in use on all the major railroads, and they were built by the inhabitants of Pullman, Illinois, a "model" town created by Mr. Pullman—and owned by Mr. Pullman. When Clarence Darrow gave up his job as attorney for the Chicago and North Western Railway in order to defend the American Railway Union and the striking Pullman workers, the first thing he did was to visit the town of Pullman. According to the publicity of the Pullman Company, Pullman was "a town where the homes, even to the most modest, are bright and wholesome and filled with pure air and light; a town, in a word, where all that is ugly and discordant and demoralizing is eliminated and all that inspires to self-respect, to thrift and to cleanliness of person and of thought is generously provided."

Darrow looked behind the publicity and found that Pullman was a town with a false front. The houses were cheaply constructed, the plumbing primitive, with one faucet of running water, usually in the basement. The rooms were small and dark. No Pullman employee could live anywhere except in the houses owned by Pullman, and they had to pay 25 per cent more rent than similar homes in neighboring communities would have cost. Some of the houses were mere shanties on which Pullman regained from 40 to 50 per cent of his investment.

After the panic of 1893, the volume of the thirty-six-million-dollar Pullman Company fell off severely. Mr. Pullman decided to retrench. He did so by cutting wage rates and changing from a day wage to a piece wage. By March, as told by Irving Stone in *Clarence Darrow for the Defense*, "skilled workers were drawing for two weeks' work, after their rent had been deducted, sums ranging from eight cents to one dollar, on which they had to feed families of four and five and six for the following two weeks." Mr. Pullman, however, would not lower the rents in Pullman town. The Pullman Land Company, he said, was separate from the Pullman Palace Car Company, "and has to earn its three-and-a-half per cent."

The Pullman workers organized and elected forty-three delegates to present their grievances. Pullman told them there was nothing to discuss, and the next day the forty-three were fired, *and* given eviction notices to get out of Pullman town. That was when the workers struck. Mr. Pullman fought back. With the federal courts, federal troops, and the President of the United States to help him, he won completely.

The story of the Pullman strike is the story of judicial persecution of working men as human beings and of working men organized in unions. If the unions had been able to exercise greater power, the outcome would have been different. The moral, for the unions, was: Get more power. The unions have been trying to get it ever since, and they have a lot more power, today, than they had in 1894.

One of the consequences of the Taft-Hartley Act has been to convince the big labor organizations that they must pay closer attention to politics. This legislation was designed to curb the power and the growth of the labor unions. The Act says a great deal about the rights of individuals, but the power of the union to fight for the rights of individual members lies in the capacity of the union to bargain with employers *collectively*. Labor, therefore, regards the talk of "individual rights" as flagwaving rhetoric. The individual may have "rights," but he certainly has no power—at least, not the sort of power that the individual working man has wanted in dealing with employers during the past hundred and more years.

This discussion is not a brief for giving the unions more power, but a brief for study of the history of capital-labor relations—for the reading of such books as *Unions Before the Bar*, by Elias Lieberman. It may be doubted that, given the same or greater power than that now possessed by the employers, labor would do any better in maintaining economic justice. As a matter of fact, it may be doubted that the concept, "economic justice," is capable of any sort of acceptable definition, except in the vaguest of terms. But a study of the issues might help to disclose what is wrong with the thinking that has been done on the problem.

Jefferson, perhaps, was close to part of the answer when he contended for a strong agrarian society. The farmer—that is, the farmer of Jefferson's time—could be both laborer and capitalist. For him, the social cleavage of the class struggle hardly existed. But

today, a return to the conditions of Jefferson's time is impossible. How, then, can the cleavage between capital and labor be eliminated? So far as we can see, there are only two possible solutions. The first is that suggested by the history of the class struggle thus far, which is that government will eventually *enforce* a peace between capital and labor. This happened in Nazi Germany and it happened in Soviet Russia. The Nazis did it by taking over the unions and controlling private business by regulation to the point of virtual confiscation. The Soviets did it by declaring private property non-existent, thereby introducing a new class-relationship—that between the political bureaucracy and the workers of every cultural level. This is the political solution of the struggle for power, attained when the State takes *absolute* power.

The other solution is non-political and has very little encouragement from history. It would result from a change in human objectives from the idea of production for profit to the idea of production for subsistence, and for the pleasure that making good things can afford to human beings. The difficulty, of course, with the nonpolitical solution is that it cannot be enforced. But this difficulty is perhaps fallacious. It may not be a difficulty at all, but rather a blessing. The history of the struggle of labor for its rights—and now, of the small businessman to survive instructs us in little more than the limitations of coercion. Every successful coercive action creates a more powerful move in the opposite direction. While the power available to the coercers, on either side, was relatively slight, a kind of "peace" could be enjoyed by the rest of society. But today, the struggle between capital and labor is already a struggle between giants, and only the still greater giant of the State has the power to settle it by coercion.

If every man who accepts this lesson of history would make it his business to enter voluntarily only into those relationships where coercion is literally meaningless—where the use of coercion immediately ends the relationship—perhaps a new tendency could be started among men, a tendency that might, in the end, create another kind of human society, a society in which the power to control the lives of other human beings is no longer regarded as the highest social good.

Has it Occurred to Us?

SUPPOSE Science is a "sacred cow," as Anthony Standen is convinced we should know? Suppose psychology is ludicrous in some of its moments, and religion unbearably childish? What if philosophy and physics are both taking themselves too seriously? We cannot live with things we think are "silly"—we need to have somewhere around us ideas we have confidence in, values that are stable, and realities we can trust.

Has it occurred to us that the attempt to rely on any of these systems exclusively always ends in uncertainty and disillusionment? Wiser, calmer, and "happier"—for there is a happiness which, though not pursued, seems to overtake the man of quiet good sense—is he who sees *some truth* in religion (any religion), who recognizes basic contributions in psychological studies, who is grateful for many scientific discoveries and for countless sincere attempts to draw into one scheme of meaning the multiple factors of our common life. It is not for specific theories, patents, or devices that such a man is indebted to the various specialists. Perhaps it is, in every case, a spontaneous tribute to human qualities: to patience, to honest endeavor, to kind intentions, to the humility natural for the learner and to the self-respect indispensable in the explorer.

One who honors these qualities, wherever they may be found, deserves and receives their fruit in human thought. With no fear of overwhelming dogmas, he will read the best of every creed, not in its official publications but in the elevating influence its friends find out. The common man has no use for the minutiae of laboratory research—the report on a thousand generations of an obscure insect gives him nothing to go on—but the unforgettable image of a conscience-ful scientist on the television screen or the open letter of the world's greatest mathematician making a plea for human peace: this is the scientific news he remembers and ponders over. Books, dissertations, theses, surveys, authoritative summaries, and the latest technical text are of moment to only a small percentage of the people of the world. Yet in solitary paragraphs here and there, in an occasional preface or a diffident conclusion, one may catch glimpses of the human mind fully awake to the great currents below the surface of talk, belief, conjecture and analysis.

What is life?—do we dare ask out loud about that which surrounds us like an ocean or like the air we breathe? What is death, aside from the details that do not describe it and the conventions that never quite erase it? Why do we go on from day to day—this unimaginable aggregate of human beings, this teeming earth that even our scientific knowledge does not encompass—together with the millions of worlds that distance has dwarfed to tiny points of light? Our lives are busy, and blessedly so, or we would perhaps have to stop entirely under the weight of questions we have not answered. But we are not too busy to notice, out of the corner of the inner eye, the hints that come our way. We say loudly, the better to drown a voice in the silence of our own hearts, that there is not time to think too much of life and death, of man and the universe, of human will and purpose.

Yet Time stops, now and then, during our lifetimes. Death, which we have not understood, takes one we loved—shall we not try again, in that ultimate moment, to look squarely at the mystery we too will some day directly encounter? Or, it may be, some magic of Nature's book of wonders holds us in thrall, and for a timeless space we regard Life, with which we ordinarily have only a nodding acquaintance, as a familiar associate in some sublime project we intend to further. Or, like a lightning flash, there strikes a vision of human suffering, next to which our own most discouraging circumstances are suddenly insignificant. We cannot help, we cannot lift the load or lighten the burden, but must it always be so? Will there never be a time when one human being can serve another's dire need? What do we need to know, how may the heart and mind be trained, since it is inconceivable that humanity should forever remain separate in its constituent parts?

Has it occurred to us that mankind, by commending, supporting, and demonstrating the truly human qualities summed up, perhaps, in *integrity*, wherever and however manifested, might draw closer together, and that wisdom, peace, and happiness will be man's in proportion to his humanity?