

DIALOGICAL MISFIRES

HUMAN beings are first of all subjects. They are also objects, but truly human behavior is the behavior of subjects. When we talk about motivation, we are talking about the causes of the decisions and actions of subjects. But when we talk about the results of motivation in behavior, our talk commonly takes the form of a description of the movements of people as objects. For the man who, as we say, wants to "get things done," there is great practical convenience in minimizing or even ignoring the mysteries of motivation which lie behind the objective aspects of human behavior. He may be willing to make gross deductions about motives from descriptions of behavior, but usually, in order to avoid the problem, he develops a theory which relieves him of all such responsibility. In the latter case, he becomes what we call a Behaviorist, one who holds that the conduct of people may be entirely explained by the external causes which determine what they do.

This isn't just a philosophical question about the nature of man. It is of course that, but it also becomes a political question through the pressure of the moral emotions. If you see a population of people ground down to poverty and despair in an environment designed to make those people into means to the ends of a powerful few, you are likely to argue that the way to get justice for them is to give them a better environment. What is the use, you say to yourself, of bothering about subjective considerations? These people, whatever they are *essentially*, have been made into objects; they exist, objectively speaking, simply to suffer the manipulations of their masters, and this situation has got to be changed. So, you become a power-manipulator and an environment-creator. The practical side of being an environment-creator requires you to persuade other people that you are right about what you propose to do. So you make up arguments. You become an "agitator." You also make promises. The mysteries of the subjective side of life are hardly relevant to what you regard as the

practical necessities of progress toward a better environment. If someone tries to slow you down by talking about "inner peace," you refute him by saying that people are not only treated as objects through coercive power, but that they are also manipulated as psychological objects by clever specialists who have learned the dynamics of mental and emotional conditioning. You may admit to yourself, and to sympathetic friends in private, that you are only partly right, but, as you point out, how can you rouse people to stand up for their rights, to make the sacrifices necessary to vast social change, unless you give them simple arguments about how to get a better life? The question that gets neglected, here, is what will happen to these people as subjects, after you have persuaded them that they are mostly objects, and after you have won the revolution and changed the environment into what you think it ought to be. If critics bring up this question, you will likely tell them that you'll have time for it later on, and that it probably isn't so important, anyway.

From the viewpoint of man as subject, then, the major cause of intellectual and moral confusion in the present is this tendency to convert a partly right theory into a completely right theory, because ambivalence and doubt are useless, or rather fatal, to the kind of revolution and reform we know something about.

How are we betrayed into this confusion? By cleaving to two ideas of the Good which are enormously self-justifying—Efficiency and Righteousness. These ideas get us both ways. Efficiency gets us through our experience in the control of objects and Righteousness gets us through our feeling about justice. In fact, you could argue that the inexhaustible self-righteousness of men who claim that human beings are nothing but objects is the best possible proof of the deep error in their claim.

Efficiency is a style in human action which tends to make us recognize it as an independent

good, while Righteousness makes egotism invisible. Enemies of efficiency and righteousness should of course be put down or liquidated— or, at least, during the tolerant phase of the rule of Efficiency and Righteousness, ignored. Self-interest and its close associate, hypocrisy, are ever-present factors in any power-control situation, but these are soon identified and exposed by the primary intuitions of subjects. Only the virtuous principles used to justify power-control can get under our guard.

Socio-political analysis covers only one phase of the confusion caused by over-simplification of the subject/object aspects of human beings. This confusion is also behind the total failure of the present dialogue between the scientist-technologists and the philosopher-humanists. Let us look briefly at the activities of the former. For the purposes of this dialogue—the one that is not succeeding—the scientist-technologists are the obedient engineers of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, who gave us our designs and plans for the Good Society, the society which today has turned out to be not so good. What did the thinkers say in the Eighteenth Century? They said: Take the control of men as subjects away from the priests of religion. They said: Take the control of men as objects away from rulers chosen by biological accident. Neither God nor his mundane appointees can have power over men. Men, themselves, ought to have power over themselves, and since the rational faculties of men enable them to see the good in deposing kings and priests, these faculties ought to be good enough to make up rules for the regulation of the behavior of human beings as objects. The subjective matters we shall ignore entirely, they said, since these are private affairs, and have too long been interfered with, anyway. Who shall preside over these arrangements? Not God, who is always turned into a façade of the power-structure; not kings, unless they can be made answerable to a rational instead of an irrational scheme of authority. Only *Nature* can truly preside, since Nature is impartial, the Earth-Mother of us all, and may, as we have learned from Sir Isaac Newton, be found out. For this finding out, we have the methods and means of Science, and these, guided by

our Rational Intelligence, will lead us to the Promised Land.

In the eighteenth century, then, the source of wisdom was held to be Nature. This was a pious idea, rich in pantheistic overtones, but the fact of the matter was that eighteenth-century wisdom came, not from external Nature but from a burst of intuitive fruitfulness out of the subjective resources of human beings. They told the world who they were. They talked about the Rights of Man and their talk was not really a deduction from the scientific account of the world. All that the scientific account of the world did for the eighteenth century was to prove the pseudo-science of theology wrong and ridiculous. It did not tell about man, although it helped to set him free.

Science, as a discipline of objectivity, made mince-meat of the false claims of religion concerning natural or external reality. And since religion was suspected of having only similar misinformation about man as subject—a kind of misinformation, moreover, which gave people like the Grand Inquisitor immeasurable power to treat human beings as objects—the inheritors of the Naturalist impulse of the Enlightenment could see nothing wrong with letting the scientists give complete definition to the nature of man, along with all their other defining activities. But we know now that these other defining activities, as the Logical Positivists have told us, somewhat belatedly, are not truly defining at all. Instead, they are only *controlling* activities. Science is a method of getting control, not an access to the Wisdom of Nature. Indeed, Nature, as we see it and use it, is not a source of wisdom but of power—the power to control.

In short, the over-arching authority which gave heart and vision to the eighteenth century has abdicated, disappeared. What have we left to give us guidance? We have only one thing that commands our attention: *Pain*.

Pain is the negative wisdom of subjects. It tells us when we have done something wrong. But it seldom tells us *what* we have done wrong. Pain is a symptom, not a diagnosis. Diagnosis requires a

theory of health, and we don't have any. So there is a tendency to let the symptoms accumulate, to develop techniques of "adjustment" to them, to rationalize them with both psychological and chemical antidotes, until, at last, they become overwhelming. Then, of course, there is the option of either submitting to the claim that *everything* is wrong, and adopting the desperate remedy of total revolution, or enduring the pain while trying to evolve a new philosophy and model of the good society. The present, you could say, is a time when we are beginning to see the last-ditch character of this confrontation.

Let us make some partly correct generalizations about our past—correct enough, that is, to explain certain influences on human decision which have brought far-reaching historical changes. Three great institutional forces have dealt with human beings as objects, reducing their role as subjects until they rise in revolt. Religion treated men as objects in order, ostensibly, to save their souls. For efficiency—clarity and precision in the regulation of morals—religion reduced the problems of subjective decision to a moral code with exact definitions of sins and virtues—the larger measure of virtue often being obtained, in practice, from how tough a man was toward the sins of others. The administrative success of religion obviously depended upon objectifying man's subjective life. When total objectivization was achieved, religion, you could say, through its representatives and authorities, gained total control—and this, while not bringing universal salvation, was the best that could be done in an imperfect world of sin.

Politics has operated similarly. The major political good is order, and order, for the world of objects, means control. When disorder arises, the administrators of the political order attempt greater control. The fact that this sometimes results in revolution and the establishment of a new order of arrangements does not change the basic trend of politics, which is to convert subjective values into objective symbols so that they can be successfully manipulated by administrators. For this reason, the region left uncontrolled by the political order—vaguely called "freedom" by political philosophers—

tends to be redefined in terms of a virtuous form of control. This control is virtuous because the survival of the political order is held to depend upon it. This is not to suggest that there can be no good political order, but to say that its good disappears in direct proportion to the reduction of the subjective autonomy of human beings.

In our time, not the autonomy of the subject, but the pleasure/pain ratio of all the people, statistically considered, gives politicians the measure of their success. Since the declared goal of the autonomous subject is "happiness," and since possessions provide pleasure, it follows that the Gross National Product is a serviceable index of subjective autonomy. Trip to the moon, anybody? (Of course, the astronauts will have to do it for you, but that's fun, too. It shows how *good* we all are.) The conversion of the idea of the good society into that of the Welfare State, a state controlled by a power-elite in behalf of computerized service to the pleasure principle, the requirements of this service being disclosed by statistical analysis of the deficiency needs and infantile longings of "the masses," brings into the picture the long-term effects of the industrial revolution on the role of subjects in our society.

We have, to be sure, described the effects of religion, politics, and technology in pretty unpleasant language. But we said at the beginning that our generalizations would be only *partly* correct, and we think they are wholly correct in relation to the criticism we are attempting—which is an examination of the consequences of objectifying the subjective qualities of human beings in order to deal with them in terms of the techniques that have proved successful in the manipulation of objects.

There should be some value in looking at the way in which organized societies feel obliged to take belated cognizance of the reality of the subjective side of human beings. For the most part, politics notices subjects only when they are unable or unwilling to meet the objective standards of behavior that the political order has decreed. Our laws make special provision for the inability of minors to conform to rules established to control or regulate the behavior of adults. We make exceptions, also, in behalf of the mentally ill. Responsibility, under the

category of political order, is defined as the capacity to behave according to the objective norms set up by the social contract. We show patience, or even "mercy," toward those who through natural limitation of youth or psychical defect are unable to behave as a human object ought to behave. The discretionary power of the administrators of the law, from ordinary policemen to the justices of the Supreme Court, has for its practical purpose the qualification of the mechanical rules governing men as objects with the light of insight into their human qualities as subjects. The *norms*, however, are the rules, not the human qualities. It is the nature of politics to insist that the rules for the control of men as objects remain the norms.

A man who insists that the human qualities of the subject should have priority over political norms is an unmanageable, alien object from the political point of view. He is an anarchist. Or if he argues that the behavior of men may properly be objectified in some relationships but not in others, he may be satisfied by a bill of rights which specifies those areas of human behavior in which objective political norms can have no authority—areas where subjects remain inviolate. But even with such political guarantees of hands-off, the political body and all the other institutions which rely upon the objectification of human behavior for their order, security, and means to progress, do everything they can to diminish the region where subjects are supposed to be free of control. When there is a war, for example, the subjective right to dissent is hedged by regulations declaring that it can be exercised only by those who admit to being definable objects in *some* terms. The law is so written to make it appear that this freedom shall be available only as a form of *permissible* political irrationality—a special privilege, that is, and not a right, of members of churches whose faiths are objectively known and classified. The Supreme Court, to the shock and horror of conventional administrators of the draft law, recently pointed out the injustice of sectarian definition of religious belief in the United States, thus strengthening the rights of unchurched philosophical conscientious objectors. On the whole, however, it is the tendency of organizations which depend upon

objectifying definitions to allow the subjective factor a role only so long as it can be defined as an expression of weakness. When objectifying definitions are questioned from a subjective position of strength, the questioner menaces authority, threatening the very principle of objective order, and he is ruthlessly eliminated. Hence the ambivalence of Western political thinkers in relation to Gandhian thought. They want his thought to be sentimental, for then it can be fitted into the slack area of an objectifying political system. Gandhi is subversive in any other terms. Taking him seriously means taking seriously the priority of the subjective reality in human beings, and this is devastating to all conventional political theory. For if you draw the line separating the objective from the subjective aspect of human behavior where Gandhi drew it, all the coercive methods of "getting things done" are dissolved into thin air, and there can be no familiar form of political authority.

A similar disorder results for organizational religion when subjects are allowed unlimited choice. The return of Martin Luther to a system of objectifying rules, after his great blow for the religious freedom of subjects, is an illustration of the ambivalence of the religious reformer who first wants subjective freedom and then wants to control it by new, objectifying definitions.

What kind of objectification is allowable in the quest for religious truth? Perhaps none (or see Plotinus on this question). In the West, the Quakers have done the least objectification among the Christian denominations, even allowing a Muslim to join their number (although not without some perturbations among the faithful). In general, however, it may be said that the differentiating identity of organized religious groups depends upon some degree of objectification of subjects, and the stronger this identity, the more it collaborates with political objectifying processes (or competes with them). Within strongly objectifying religious organizations, the mystic has a role similar to the role of children and the weak-minded in the state. The mystic is tolerated—he is even a kind of advertisement of other-worldliness—so long as he does not challenge the objectifying definitions and

rules of his order. If he goes beyond these limits, however, he is objectively defined as a religious anarchist—a heretic or *chooser*—and dealt with accordingly.

The analysis of technology in terms of its effects on the subject/object ratio is more difficult. The machine is plainly a secular, non-political object. It is a tool designed to serve the objective needs of human beings. Therefore, it is often said that the machine is wholly neutral in relation to the subject/object controversy. It is of course not really neutral, because of the publicity in behalf of its many services. For example: The machine serves subjects by providing them with "released time" for subjective, cultural pursuits. Thus it promises an end to the peonage of man to his material needs. In its most highly developed form of the computer, it helps to solve hitherto insoluble problems by enormously amplifying the technical means of problem-solving. It stores and upon instruction relates the data needed by decision-makers to make up their minds. It vastly increases, therefore, the scope of rationalization. It of course can deal only with objectified data, or, as we say, quantified values. There is, however, a magical glamor generated by the capacity of computers, making many men feel, although they may not admit it, that this enormous quantitative addition to the skills of rationalization provided by the computer somehow changes its contribution into a qualitative value—because it does *so much*. And because it promises *so much* in behalf of any problem that can be objectified, there is a natural temptation to objectify more and more of human problems in order to let the computer "solve" them. In short, it is the cultural atmosphere generated by the computer which deeply invades the already diminished region of subjective sovereignty. And, indeed, this fits very well with the basic principle of all scientific disciplines—to deal with objective reality and to convert both objectively obscure data and subjective reality into plain objective terms—as by statistics or by the mechanistic assumption in biology and psychology. The man who programs a computer has a natural, occupational tendency to regard as "real" what he can put into the machine, and to reduce in

importance what he can't. He wants the machine to do as much as it can. If the possibilities of programming do not fit the facts of the problem, perhaps the facts can be made to fit the possibilities of programming. And if grants are available for computer research, but not for other modes of inquiry, he has an added impetus to make some objectifying adjustments in the facts. Why not? After all, *everything* he is doing will help subjects to be free of drudgery. He is going to make drudgery wither away. And of course, he is right, part of the time. But like the good bureaucratic administrator, he would like to be right all the time.

This whole idea, that objectification makes progress possible, and that the more objectification you get, the more progress will result, goes back to the Enlightenment. The *philosophes* drew up the constitution of the ideology of objectification and the earnest atheists of the nineteenth century issued a magnificent progress report. Darwin accepted the program (with religious reservations that were ineffectual because they didn't mesh with the wheels of objectifying progress). Marx made a revolution with it, and his followers applied his objectifying value judgments with the same insolent fervor that inspired the rule of Geneva according to Calvin's Institutes. Freud adapted nineteenth-century mechanism to the psychic systems of human beings and the sect of orthodox Freudian objectification still survives, although psychology and psychoanalysis, being rather close to the heart of the matter of subjects, are now undergoing revolutionary reforms in their behalf.

What shall we say of the scientist-technologist-engineers in the present? We must begin by saying that they are still working on the blue-prints given them by the philosophers of the Enlightenment. What other blue-prints exist for them to work on? What other theories of progress could interest these enormously skillful and dedicated men? They—and, it should be added, we, or the rest of modern man—have no positive theory for recognizing the existence, reality, or purposes of subjects. For us, subjects gain recognition only through childlike immaturities, aberrant behavior, anarchist revolt, and cries of pain. Accordingly, you pardon and indoctrinate the

children, hospitalize the aberrant, imprison the anarchists, and muffle with tranquilizers or pension plans the cries of pain. You explain the pain by objectifying its causes and then treating or eliminating them. You don't question the assumption of progress by objectification, because then you couldn't do *anything*. That's how you get rid of people who quote Henry David Thoreau.

These, in general, are the reasons why the scientist-technologist-engineers don't hear the humanist critics of the technological society. They really think everything is, *in principle*, just great. The pain comes from as yet unrationalized, unobjectified areas they haven't got around to putting under control. And it isn't all that bad, anyhow. Of course, it isn't perfect, but. . . .

When a humanist critic speaks, the technologist hears only the humanitarian-utilitarian part of what he says. If accused of failure, the technologist points to the GNP. If, in desperation, the humanist critic goes over to the side of the advocates of the Welfare State, he becomes, alas, the ally of all those on *that* side who feel able to share in the political neglect of what happens to people when you objectify them totally—for, of course, their total good.

What is basically wrong? The root of our trouble is that we have no theory of the nature and "mission"—not the "needs," which is a paternalistic, weasel word—of subjects. If you think only of the "needs" of subjects, you pay attention only when they scream. That (the screaming) is what we are beginning to listen to now, and it isn't enough. We need a positive doctrine of human purposes that is strong enough to resist and then to reduce and rearrange all the objectifying methodological absolutes of religion, politics, and technology. Where shall we get this doctrine? Well, we have a little list. For a start we could get it from Pico della Mirandola, Friedrich Froebel, Bronson Alcott, and all those educators from Socrates on who absolutely refused to compromise on the interests of subjects. There is no other basis for a good society. Once you compromise on this principle, you don't *hear* the voices of subjects ever again. (Not until they scream, and then it may be too late.) You are too busy, too efficient, and too righteous. And, in the

end, you are as much a captive of all the good you are doing as was the Grand Inquisitor of his system of objectification, the most thorough system—make no mistake about it—of all.

REVIEW

"THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY"

THE main point to be made, it seems to us, about J. F. T. Bugental's book of this title is that it is less a description of "third force" or "existential" psychotherapy than a view in action of the attitudes of mind which characterize some of its practitioners. In the opening chapter, Dr. Bugental affirms his belief that any doctrine of psychotherapy is, in a sense, a personal doctrine—simply because "psychotherapy is more art than science." He continues:

One can commit a kind of intellectual suicide if one tries to write a definitive and ultimate statement about personality or psychotherapy. He then may either endlessly pursue a degree of completion which he will never achieve, or make a statement to which he cannot give full allegiance and find himself forever stuck with trying to defend that which his awareness strains to move beyond.

It is pertinent to interject here the observation that once we recognize the process nature of human experience and the infinite potentialities of human thinking and discovery, we give up hope of an orderly and completed system of thinking. But having given that up, we are begun upon an intellectual adventure which has within it high excitement and genuine creative potential. Many of us will find the ambiguity and inexorable incompleteness of this approach to be threatening. Certainly I experience these feelings myself. But I know too that once we change the conception of the enterprise in which we are engaged to that of exploration in an infinite system once we give up the hope of making the ultimate and definitive discovery and recognize that our transaction with our experience of the out-there is a creative, artistic one, there is more to be gained than we have lost.

In this context, therapist and patient are alike concerned with one eternal human problem. As Dr. Bugental puts it: "The central concern of psychotherapy is authenticity; at root the distresses that bring people to psychotherapy are the results of efforts to avoid existential anxiety through living in ways not in accord with the givens of life. In a sense that is very literally true, the therapist's calling is to help his patients reclaim

their lives." In this last sentence the word "reclaim" is significant, for it carries an entirely different connotation and set of associations from those of the word "reform"—especially in Bugental's thought. Like others who articulate the "third force" point of view. Dr. Bugental places his faith on the assumption that it is *natural* for a human being to seek meaning—a meaning which leads to personal commitment in responsibility. This means, in Emersonian terms, that the crucial psychological and philosophical problems are conjoined; and the true practitioner of either the psychologist's or philosopher's art is a man who refuses to separate one from the other. Dr. Bugental persuasively expresses thoughts similar to those in Emerson's *Self-Reliance*, remarking that the most debilitating form of "anxiety" comes from an unwillingness to assume responsibility for one's own destiny:

Responsibility is the experience of being a determinant of what happens. Responsibility is the affirmation of one's being as the *doer* in contrast to the acceptance of the role of the *object* done-to. We fear responsibility as we feel its weight yet are not able to insure the outcomes of that which we do. Practicing clinicians will recognize how often patients seek to disavow responsibility, how greatly they fear it. Guilt is closely linked with responsibility.

There is no freedom when one knows all the determinants of a situation; that which you can predict with perfect accuracy gives you no choice in the matter. Freedom is the freedom to choose. Freedom and choice are synonyms psychologically. It is clear that we cannot know all the determinants of any given event. It needs to be equally clear that our subjective experience of choice, of action, may become a determinant, not *the* determinant but a determinant, and sometimes a crucial determinant. Thus is born our responsibility.

It can easily be seen why the author of *The Search for Authenticity* believes that psychology can never become a "science" unless it is recognized that this *scientia* must include art and drama. For to believe it possible for a man to live without any form of anxiety or puzzlement is to eliminate the meaning of human striving.

Discussing the classical meaning of tragedy, Dr. Bugental says:

Tragedy is a word unfamiliar to much of American psychology, a word we are more accustomed to in association with literature, but it is a word that needs to be reincorporated into our psychological thinking. Tragedy is not something that is exclusively in the domain of the poets. Indeed, it is our own repression of existential reality that has obscured our recognition of this basic human experience. Tragedy is a part of living. That which we fear, that which we attempt to forestall, can, will, and does happen at times. In another chapter I will describe at greater length the nature of tragedy, but here let us recognize that tragedy lies all about us. Tragedy must be incorporated into our recognition of reality. Our attempt to distort that reality to eliminate tragedy is very much at the root of our experience of neurotic anxiety.

It is curious that so many present-day writers want to explain the difference between tragedy and catastrophe, since the distinction is clear enough to anyone whose art and philosophy are not despairing: A catastrophe is something that happens to one, making him a victim and nothing more. The authentically tragic involves the awareness and choice of the individual, first in realization of loss, and then as a spur to converting the experience of loss into another dimension of perception. The artist who portrays tragedy, whether in classical form or in modern guise, describes the passage of a man *through* the experience. This is to say that every person can be more than the sum of all that befalls him, that he is more than the sum of his parts—more than what Maslow has described as a mechanical model definable in "drive-reduction and homeostatic conceptions."

Our brief comment on *The Search for Authenticity* may be fittingly concluded with a quotation from Dr. Bugental's summation:

I have described some of the lessons my colleagues who are my patients have been teaching me. These people are engaged in that bitterest and most terrifying conflict of all, the struggle with what is unknown within one's self. As I listen and participate with them as best I can, I am again and

again deeply moved by one or another of three strong feelings.

First, and most often, I feel genuine awe at the great sturdiness of the core of hope and striving that is deep within each of us. Some people whom their acquaintances have long since written off as weak, hopeless, or cowardly are in the loneliness of their own spirits contending with such seemingly impossible odds that I wonder that they have not long since given up the struggle, that they somehow find the resources to renew the attempt day after day.

Second, I feel the thrill of adventure and discovery as my companions open to me new vistas of the functioning of human personality. In this book I have told you about these vistas.

The third of the emotions I feel is one hard to characterize clearly. Perhaps I can come closest if I speak of a feeling of reverence. It is my emotional response to my dim sensing of what it may mean to be truly a Man. So often as I listen to those who talk to me, indeed as I listen to myself, I feel a kind of rage and dismay. As I recognize what we do to ourselves and to each other—even to those we love most dearly—I want to cry out that we are still truly primitives in a jungle. Psychologically we practice such rites of mutilation and torture upon ourselves and each other.

But then a quieter mood will replace my anger, I will hear those same voices expressing their own seeking for more than the brutality, the superstitiousness, the blind lashing out of our ignorance. Then I can begin to get those hazy glimpses of the something more that is potential within us, the fantastic but real evolution that can be if only we become what we most truly are.

COMMENTARY

THE EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY

IT is the conclusion of this week's lead article that the human relationship which takes fullest cognizance of human beings as subjects is the educational relationship. All the ideals which have to do with community, society, and any sort of intercourse among human beings are implicit in the practice of teaching. For generalizing brevity, then, we may say that the good society must be an educational society, as the only society which gives primary attention to the awakening, growth, and free exercise of the powers, of human beings as subjects—as ends in themselves.

The positive principle of the political society is control. This principle has only a negative role in the educational society, which prospers partly as a result of the reduction of control. The most successful schools are the schools which are able to exercise the least control—where, that is, educational activity is so engrossing, so productive of autonomy, so effective in inspiring self-control in behalf of educational ends, that control itself, as a method of dealing with human beings, becomes vestigial. This is possible, of course, only under circumstances in which the joy of learning and the savor of the fruits of learning in responsible self-determination become foreground realities of life.

It should be obvious that this kind of priority for the educational relationship is possible only for men who believe in it absolutely. Lip-service to the ideal cannot be accepted. The promise of reaching the ideal "after the revolution," or after we have solved our "material problems," or after we have put down the "aggressor" nations, must be absolutely rejected. The "practical" objectives may have a hearing only as subordinates and tools of the educational process. For they are and must be that—in fact, education tends to be empty of content, abstract and intellectualized, unless these tools are used with a certain hard-headedness by teachers who know that the best teaching holds a

generalizing mirror up to all the particular areas of life in which men have to distinguish, order, and choose. Without these tools in education, autonomy remains a cliché, an unapplied ethical and psychological ideal.

The constitution of such a society will not attempt to mirror the largely indeterminate mandates of Natural Law, but the discernible growth-processes of Man. (The study of these processes, of course, may be our best reading of Natural Law, but we can wait on this decision.) The first principles of the good society, therefore, will come from study of the work of those who have been great teachers. When their requirements are staked out, the law-makers may be permitted to deal with what is left. The health of this Society will be infallibly measured by how little the law-makers have to do.

CHILDREN

... and Ourselves

RELIGION AND STATE—FRESH PERSPECTIVE

I

UNDER the heading, "State colleges expand courses in religion," a writer for the *Christian Science Monitor* (Dec. 2, 1965) comments on what has been called a "revolution" in university attitudes toward religion. Emilie Livezey summarizes this trend as resulting from questions posed by recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court involving definitions of religion:

Is a person educated who has never studied about religion—its comparative forms, literary significance, its impact on civilization?

If not, can state universities teach about religion without indoctrinating in violation of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution?

In the dramatically changed legal climate following recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on religious issues, these questions appear already to have answered themselves.

Indeed at a three-day conference sponsored by Southern Illinois University at Carbondale on religious studies in state universities, it was surprising to discover that the question was not whether religion will be taught but how it is going to be done.

In the early 1930's when state universities were ignoring religion, even at such private universities as Princeton, courses on religion had almost ceased to be offered.

Today the picture is very different. Princeton has a substantial department of religion, a faculty of 10 and enrollments averaging more than 1,000 a year. Stanford University now has a curriculum in religious studies manned by a faculty of four scholars.

The universities of Illinois, Minnesota, and Michigan are following the trend as well as the newer state campuses across the nation.

Further comment on these developments may be drawn from Dr. Robert Michaelsen's *The Study of Religion in American Universities*. Dr. Michaelsen, professor and chairman of a new

Department of Religious Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, recently addressed a conference attended by professors and administrators from more than fifty state universities. In Dr. Michaelsen's words: "A remarkable amount of interest in the study of religion springs to no small degree from personal probing and searching. [The student] mood is more serious than casual." That students are taking courses concerned with religious and philosophical questions in ever-growing numbers is due only partly to the fact that it is "once more becoming academically respectable to take a serious scholarly interest in religion; one could go further and say that the mood of the present is one in which there is even excitement in some academic circles over the study of religion."

A growing number of Christians, as well as "agnostics," are coming to appreciate the fact that the 1963 Supreme Court decision against religious indoctrination in the public schools invites a depth-study concerning the alleged benefits of sectarian conditioning of the young. While the Court dealt primarily with constitutional limitations on religious instruction in the public schools, it also suggested that every child should be taught genuine *respect* for religious ideals, observing: "It might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of religion." Here the emphasis is quite properly on *study*—so that the young, not being pushed toward any particular doctrine, but induced to respect the earnest beliefs of all, will be encouraged to begin the long and necessary process of building their own faith.

It is certain that Emerson would have approved the Court's decision—even when, as a young man, he was delivering sermons in New England. For the philosopher in Emerson saw that a "parroted" belief had no value at all. "If each soul had been instructed that its first duty as a moral being was to reflect," said Emerson, "to go alone before God with its prayer and its obedience, no errors would have been transmitted

with authority." What this young churchman was getting at was that, since no authority can be infallible, it is extremely dangerous ever to let either ethics or morality rest *upon* authority:

Men allow the Church to regulate their faith. . . . Calvin thinks for thousands; and Wesley for thousands. . . . Every falsehood which one of these leaders received is transmitted from church to church for ages. And see the consequences in the distracted, bleeding, I had almost said,—the hating church of Christ; the church of Christ where only the *name* is found, and *he* is much a stranger. . . .

This is not, of course, an attack upon every congregation of religious-minded people. It is Emerson's uncompromising point, however, that the beginning of man's relationship to a higher order of values must be self-originated:

I am not so unreasonable as to undervalue the privilege of truly social worship. I know that our religious feelings are wonderfully assisted by our love for each other; that among friends we worship more joyfully than among strangers, and that all strong affection leads as it were directly to religion. All I urge upon you from the text, is, that your faith must have an independent connexion with God in the first instance. Else it is not faith but a parrot's talk. But once having that union formed, all your friendships, all your affections for your brethren will increase it and be increased themselves.

Deepening interest in questions of an ethical and even metaphysical nature often develops, apparently, outside the area of formal religion. The teachers who work with the Department of Religious Studies headed by Dr. Michaelsen represent backgrounds in history and sociology, and they have familiarity with Eastern as well as Christian perspectives on religion. The assumption is that interested students are not and will not be seeking a religion, but rather greater depth and more perspective in the areas where psychology, philosophy and religion meet. A current lecture series by the UCSB Extension Division, "Ferment in Religious Thought," currently offered in three California communities, places the emphasis on the word *quest*. No speakers concerned with proselyting have been invited to participate, nor are they likely to be.

The mood indicated by the *Monitor* story may be spreading to many campuses.

The relevance of all this to the implications of the Supreme Court decision and to a new concept of responsibility in state colleges and universities is not difficult to establish, for an ideal democracy must respect and nourish the philosophical quest. And a devotee of philosophy is inevitably concerned with refining and elevating the standards of value to which his society subscribes. The man who conducts the activity of philosophy in his own life is least susceptible to the blinding influence of demagoguery and to that childish side-choosing on matters political which blurs so many issues of high import.

So it can be argued that one of the best ways to discuss religion—in or out of the schools—is in its relationship to the U.S. Constitution. This view grows out of a reading of the Founding Fathers, who held that the majority agrees to protect freedom of individual opinion because every man is *meant* to be self-governed. "Meant," in turn, is a way of saying that men do not fulfill themselves as groups but only as individuals. This suggests that the framers of the Constitution were well aware of the meaning now placed behind such terms as "autonomy" and "self-actualization." The guarantees of political liberty are ideally designed to give assurance that "one can do what one ought to will." In other words, when the individual knows that he is *more* than the state, as well as a part of it, he contributes his utmost to the development of an enlightened electorate.

FRONTIERS

Anti-War Poems

POETS, we suspect, do not make good warriors, nor will any kind of artist. They are not concerned with practical things, but only enduring things. And the enduring things of life do not have very long innings in our society, nor, if we can believe the poets of the past, in any society. Yet we must have societies, and the managers of societies explain to us that we must have war. These poets say no.

We have been reading in *Poems of War Resistance*, which is the title of the War Resisters League Peace Calendar for 1966. (Also an appointment book.) So reading, one wonders if there could be a poetry which would keep all that fine emotion against war constant—never letting up, never faltering, lasting throughout all the prosy hours and stiffening resolve against all the counter-emotions. But such poetry, alas, does not exist, or if it could, it would not be poetry but hypnosis.

Yet this poetry in the WRL anthology (there will be another Calendar volume, for 1967, and then the sum of the two years' selections will be made into a book) draws on very nearly every kind of human intelligence. There is, first, the ironic appeal to believers in Jesus, offered by William Eggleston as "Our New National Hymn," which has for its second stanza—

. . . march on Christian soldiers! with word and torch
in hand,
And carry free salvation to each benighted land!
Go, preach God's Love and Justice with steel and shot
and
shell!
Go, preach a future Heaven and prove a present Hell!
Baptize with blood and fire, with every gun's hot
breath
Teach them to love the Father, and make them free in
Death;
Proclaim the newer gospel, the cannon giveth peace,
Christ rides upon the warship his army to increase.
So bless them with the rifle and heal them with the
sword,—

For the Honor of the Nation and the Glory of the
Lord!

Then, William Everson, who felt the evil of war as deeply as any man, yet was not insensible to the good in those who responded to other feelings, wrote in the Spring of 1941 of Winston Churchill's "old imperious English speech," acknowledging its "terrible warning" and its "crying appeal," telling of the leveling of London, and while his voice bred the "slow indignation" and "rock-rooted anger that fosters resolve," Everson replied:

But draw as you do on all the right,
It yet is not yours
Though with blood you bind it,
Not yet is it yours.
For even beyond your tenor of soul,
Beyond your courage, your strength, your
incomparable speech,
Resides a morality deeper than any your cause may
claim
An insight sheer through the animal manifestations
of terror and rage,

Beyond nation, the divisions of race
The smouldering heritage of hate,
To coil at last the final unkillable knowledge
That lives among men.

Shout down the sky.
Who listen beyond the hammering tongue
For the eloquent fallacy wound at its root
Are not to be wooed.
Drawing all the detail to one iron focus
They watch with eyes wide And they wait.

There is the sharp, bitter insight of Paul Valéry: "War: a massacre of people who don't know each other for the profit of people who know each other but don't massacre each other," and Homer's denunciation, in the *Iliad* (Nestor's speech, Book IX):

"Curs'd is the man, and void of law and right,
Unworthy property, unworthy light,
Unfit for public rule, or private care,
That wretch, that monster, that delights in war:
Whose lust is murder, and whose horrid joy
To tear his country and his kind destroy!"

There are the verses scribbled by an unknown G.I. on a latrine wall in England during World War II:

Soldiers who wish to be a hero
 Are practically zero
 But those who wish to be civilians,
 Jesus, they run into the millions.

e.e. cummings is represented, and Shelley, Tulsidas, Yeats, Twain, Crane, Auden, James Russell and Robert Lowell, and William Blake. Melville and Thomas Hardy have a place, along with Li Po and Lao-tse, and dozens more. Margaret Rockwell concludes her "Hiroshima"

One August morning, still and very clear
 Came the superfortress from the south,
 Dragon with a lantern in his mouth
 To light the way to hell: proud pioneer:
 Red fig dropped slow and first, as if to feed
 A thousand angels, burst to blue-white glow—
 Then broke all fury's furnace, and below
 Tombstones bleached and tottered and the seed
 Fell down in mortal rain.

By evening

Only the screams of children, and the hiss
 And murmur of wild fire. . . . Was that the kiss
 Of some compassionate grave god descending?
 So to reveal in rage the whisper of
 The moment that would force the world to love

There are poems for each week of the year, some of them desolating in their sorrow, some of them stern, some wry, some biting. They are all against war. They have no patience with it, accept no excuse. These poems of war resistance (in calendar format) may be purchased from the War Resisters League for \$1.50 each, or \$7.00 for five, postpaid, U.S.A. Address: 5 Beekman Street, New York 38, N.Y.