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THE APOLOGETIC STATE

IF there is anything at all to be learned from the scholarly historians of ideas, it is that wherever there is a history worth examining, it is of people who had a *theory* of history, who made some kind of attempt to see a general meaning in the course of events. It is equally evident that the wars which arise from the conflict of theories of history are the bloodiest wars of all. These struggles leave people violated in home, hope, and heart. While conscience may sometimes make men cowards, partisan faith turns them into conscienceless brutes, lost to the gentler instincts of human fraternity.

So it is that reformers, sensible of the hideous behavior supernatural religion often provokes, become promoters of less demanding ideologies. Life, they say, is a matter of the satisfaction of bodily needs. Heroic destinies are for dreamers, and visions of translation into a world beyond the present one are only the handy material of priestly betrayal.

But now, after several generations of experiment with such ideas, a kind of exhaustion of secular enthusiasms has taken place, so that we no longer have any pretentious theories of history. Today, allegiance is generated only by petty doctrines of reaction—reaction in the sense of seeking to avoid the large-scale horrors which seem to come inevitably from large-scale theories. This puts the world of serious thought into a state of suspended animation, too many men seeking safety in limitation instead of achievement through daring. Twice burnt, thrice shy, has become the rule concerning ardent espousal of theories of history, you could say.

But since men are inveterate metaphysicians, and we may expect to come out of this period of sluggishness and timidity through new attempts by human beings to explain themselves, it may be well to ask what are the conditions of survival for any conceivable theory or philosophy of history. It seems clear, for example, that doctrines which involve or require military triumph for any sort of "chosen people" are simply no good. These would be programs for self-defeat, and the nations pursuing this course—mainly for the reason that any other makes too many demands on their imagination—are surely fated for ruin.

But a new theory of history will be difficult to produce. This is a barren age, impoverished and fearful when it comes to questions of meaning. For this reason, no doubt, the good causes are all some kind of last-ditch struggle, these days. The appeal of the pacifist, for example, is to the intuitive moral sense of other men, when he says to them, *Don't* rain death on all those millions who are as much captives as you are to their outworn theories of progress! And the pacifist is obliged to say this when the arm of destruction is raised, when the machines of war are all in gear, and the angers of a compliant population have been nursed to the point of resentful explosion.

Similarly, it is against the grain of the entire culture of Western civilization that the economic reformer now calls for a strict about-face in all the dog-eat-dog relationships of economic life—practically a going over to the "enemy," not because the enemy is right, but because, the economist maintains, there is nothing else to do.

And the doctors—the good ones—have nearly all become Jeremiahs crying in the wilderness. Adulteration and indulgence, they say, are wasting away the bounty of our highly productive scheme of agriculture and food-processing, while ambivalence and self-deception infect the mass psyche with aimlessness, frustration, and flooding self-pity. Shallow doctrines of "adjustment" gain an hour or two of

popularity, and are then swept down the drain by circumstantial defeats.

Of all the big diagnostic theories of man's plight, the most impressive ones amount to forthright attacks on the anti-human *systems* under which men live. These systems, it begins to be evident, have been taken as substitutes for thought, and they work out in practice as schematic rationalizations for failing to become human. Here, perhaps, in these criticisms, we have as clear and as important a discovery about ourselves as we can hope for, for several years to come. There is something about life under a system claiming to provide "truth" and "meaning" which unmans human beings. It doesn't matter which system it is. The fault lies in the acceptance of substitutes for independent thought, not in what is substituted.

For those who make this discovery, the competition between systems becomes largely irrelevant. If our analysis should be approximately correct, and this is the crucial discovery of the age, then it follows that men of talent and imagination will eventually withdraw their energies from the argument about systems and concentrate on the means to deliver men from *all* systems. And the question then becomes: How could this be possible?

After all, maybe men require some kind of system; the birds and the bees have theirs, and complex relationships among men in society are a fact in nature. To define these relationships properly would itself come very close to being the evolution of a natural system. Perhaps we should first ask where the existing systems violate nature—human nature, to be precise.

Our greatest difficulty, here, will be to avoid going back to the physiologists and the anthropologists for answers. As "scientists," we don't know enough about human nature to make any answers. And whatever system we finally choose, it will have to be one which takes this ignorance into account.

Stop! You can't have a system based upon ignorance!

But that is exactly the question needing attention. It is also the reason why men of intelligence are against systems.

Well, suppose we say that what we must have is a system that is a non-system—a system which occasionally breaks down everywhere, or at least bends itself into dysfunction wherever there is any tendency to show strain.

Human nature is filled with contradictions and paradox. Maybe a system for ordering the operations of men ought to be loaded with contradictions and paradox. If this is the case, then the significant conflicts of the future are going to be between the hard-headed men who refuse to believe it, and the harder-headed men who do.

What shall we call this system which is a non-system? For lack of a better name we call it the Apologetic State. It is a State which proclaims its shameful inadequacy instead of its glorious achievements. It is a State which erects monuments to all the Gods of Anarchy in every public square, and only by great restraint fails to require the citizens to make little symbolic acts of obeisance whenever they pass by.

This Apologetic State, being nonetheless a State, will have to have some laws. It will probably become necessary, to guard against patriotic excesses, to prohibit anyone from claiming that his Ignorance is greater or more distinguished than that of the rest of the citizens. This will keep out Speaking in Tongues, which is only an emotional parody of authentic ignorance. Heretical claims to Reliable Knowledge will have to be put down, also. Any doctrine other than the *via negativa* concerning the path to truth will be laughed out of town. There will be regular sillification programs to take the place of the old method of vilification, long abandoned because of its self-contradictory effects. The only ideas that have hope of qualifying as "true" will be ideas

which are totally subjective both in origin and in recognition and verification. The test will be whether they can be made to lead to judgments about other men and their beliefs, and then to action against other men. If an idea can have this result, it is *ipso facto* false. After all, it has gained an "objective" aspect and is therefore of course untrue.

But good heavens, someone will say, what will you do about *education* and similar practical matters?

Aha! That is precisely the point. Education is *not* a practical matter. Practical matters are easy to deal with. Everyone knows that. Haven't you heard about technology? Automation? Cybernation? And that splendid tomfoolery by means of which the practical men of the world prove their transcendental vision—free rides to the atmosphereless, utterly uninhabitable moon?

No, education is a serious affair, and gloriously impractical. The universities will have over their portals the words, *Conviction without Prejudice,* which of course sets for both teachers and students a quite impossible project. And to make it even tougher, any professor who begins a lecture by saying, "Of course, I have my biasses . . ." will be immediately discharged.

What about the curriculum? You can't have a university without a curriculum.

After some thought, we have concluded that since the curriculum must be drawn from the cultural tradition, it should be based on the Diamond Sutra. You have to start somewhere, and the Diamond Sutra seems least likely to lead to *hubris* or other attitudes subversive of the Apologetic State. Early in the text, for example, the Lord Buddha says:

> Do not think, Subhuti, that the Tathagata would consider within himself: "I will deliver human beings." That would be a degrading thought. Why? Because really there are no sentient beings to be delivered by the Tathagata. Should there be any sentient beings to be delivered by the Tathagata, it would mean that the Tathagata was cherishing within his mind arbitrary conceptions of phenomena such as one's own self, other selves, living beings and an universal self. Even when the Tathagata refers to himself, he is not holding in his mind any such arbitrary thought. Only terrestrial human beings think of selfhood as being a personal possession. Subhuti, even the expression "terrestrial beings" as used by the Tathagata does not mean that there are any such beings. It is used only as a figure of speech.

In the concluding portion of this scripture, the Lord Buddha observes:

> While the Tathagata, in his teaching, constantly makes use of conceptions and ideas about them, disciples should keep in mind the unreality of all such conceptions and ideas. They should recall that the Tathagata, in making use of them in explaining the Dharma always uses them in the resemblance of a raft that is of use only to cross a river. As the raft is of no further use after the river is crossed, it should be discarded. So these arbitrary conceptions of things and about things should be wholly given up as one attains enlightenment. How much more should be given up conceptions of non-existent things (and everything is non-existent).

Asked by Subhuti what name would be given to this scripture, the Buddha replied:

> This Scripture shall be known as the *Vajrachdika Prajna Paramita.* By this name it shall be reverenced, studied and observed. What is meant by this name? It means that when the Lord Buddha named it Prajna Paramita, he did not have in mind any definite or arbitrary conception and so he thus named it. It is the Scripture that is hard and sharp like a diamond that will cut away all arbitrary conceptions and bring one to the other shore of enlightenment.
>
> What think you, Subhuti? Has the Tathagata given you any definite teaching in this scripture?
>
> No, blessed Lord! The Tathagata has not given us any definite teaching in this Scripture.

The appropriateness of the Diamond Sutra as the basis for public education in the Apologetic State should be obvious. This text has to do with the question of final certainty, whether religious or scientific. It makes a suitable Apologetic Epistemology. But what about Affirmation? Don't we need that, too? Well, you could take over all the operational conclusions of the logical

positivists, since they admittedly don't *really* mean anything, anyway.

All right, then, . . . what about . . . God . . . ?

This was bound to come up. Our only answer is that if you can get God past the Diamond Sutra, it will probably be all right. Or, if a small compromise on this point seems desirable, an Apologetic Church might base its Apologetic Creed on an idea expressed by Earl Wise. "Quakerism," he said, "cannot prove that there is that of God in every man, it can only say that when men behave as though there were, the weight of evidence amply justifies the belief." And he added: "It [Quakerism] cannot prove that love will solve all problems, it can only note that love has a much better record than hate."

An Apologetic State, just because it is so uncertain of itself, will have to allow occasional pockets of color out of past tradition to be preserved with the status of myth or fable. These may be held to be "mythically" true, but become false if taken literally.

If anyone asks how it happens that the Buddha, who lived about 2500 years ago, could have anticipated the sophisticated needs of the modern Apologetic State, we can only say that this problem will have the close attention of one of the departments of the Apologetic University. Study will result, almost uncertainly, in apologies to the Buddha for the conceit of supposing that anyone who lived before the Renaissance could not be as sophisticated as we are.

How will so uncertain an affair as the Apologetic State ever get *established?* But don't you see, since it is an *apologetic* state, it *can't* be established, and doesn't need to be. It will simply creep into being. This will come about strictly by the means anticipated by Plato at the end of the *Republic:* one by one, Kings (Citizens) will become Philosophers (Socrates). What will persuade them to do this? A total exhaustion of alternatives and the pain of doing anything else. It will be discovered from history—as the only thing that men finally do learn from history—that the old-style power state can do everything for the people but help them to become better men. And that by doing "everything" else, it invariably becomes a threat to men who are or try to become better.

It goes without saying that the occasional laws which will be recognized by citizens of the Apologetic State will first gain currency as the private rules of individuals. Then, most likely, these individuals will form small clusters and work together well because they live by the same rules. In time, a larger community will result; and finally, the Apologetic State.

There will be some trouble, of course. It takes much courage to be a Socratic. It takes patience to see the God in Man. It takes self-reliance to admit the insecurities of all external measures for Security. It takes, in the final analysis, all the qualities that the Grand Inquisitor accused Jesus of having, during those nights in a Spanish dungeon. But these things do not seem so difficult, once it is recognized that there is nothing else left to do.

The Apologetic State is of course only a transition phenomenon. It will wither away. It is something of a joke to call it a State at all. The name will last only as long as men remember what they used to expect of the State and how silly it was to expect it. The State will be forgotten in direct proportion as men expect of themselves what they used to expect of the State.

But the nice thing about the Apologetic State is that you don't really need it to belong to it. Like germ cells of the whole, citizens of the Apologetic State are politically toti-potent in principle. They carry its laws around in themselves. A person can start his citizenship any time he wants to. The rules and doings of the old-style states, which are still all around, are only raw material and the external environment in which the Apologetic State must begin to exist.

Will the Apologetic State need a Constitution? Well, it can have one. Instead of being based upon intuitions of Natural Law—intuitions which are then rewritten into measures of coercion—the Constitution of the Apologetic State would be based on a Relativistic Epistemology, which would go something like this: Since awareness of the meaning of the world depends upon awareness of the meaning of self, and *vice versa,* and since there is no telling when or how a man's awareness is increased, it is most unlikely that any man will look at himself and the world in the same terms as any other's—therefore, we cannot adopt any generalizations about meaning and reality which ignore the inevitable differences among human beings in this all-important respect. And since all the judgments of human beings about anything of importance are deeply affected if not wholly determined by their ideas of self and the world, it being natural and right for this to be so, there shall be no fixed code of morality concerning human behavior, but only a few general ideas of the common good—ideas which are fully informed by recognition of the profound inwardness of individual thought and decision.

These are the negatives of the Relativistic Epistemology, appropriate for guidance of the constitution-makers. Its affirmative implications would not be the business of the Apologetic State, which is one of the reasons for its consistently apologetic mood, but of educational institutions and teachers, entirely separate from the State.

What will the Apologetic State do about Evil?

It would be silly to attempt to answer this question until we see how big a problem evil is, under the Apologetic State. There would be some, of course, and people would undoubtedly learn from it—which is, after all, about all you can do about evil. You certainly can't stamp it out without doing away with good, and who would want that? Its failure to put down evil would be one thing the Apologetic State could be excused from apologizing for, since everyone would know that no State, no more than Sisyphus, could get *that* rock up the hill. Adopting the slogan, Every man his own Sisyphus, would make for having smaller rocks, which wouldn't hurt so many people when they rolled down.

What about Nationalism? Well, we'd probably have that, too, for a while. To wear it down we could hold international competitions in Apology, something like the Olympic Games, in which the various States would see which one could be the most apologetic. The winner, of course, would have the freest people, since the winning State, not accomplishing much of anything, would have the most to apologize for—telling all the things it doesn't do, because the people are doing them without help from the State. The Competition would stop when the States stopped showing up for it, mostly because they didn't exist any more.

And that, for the moment, just about takes care of everything.

REVIEW
TWO PIONEERS

A BOOK which sets out to honor Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in his seventy-seventh year (*Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Souvenir Volume,* published by Darshana International, Morabad, India) has in it a biographical essay on Richard Maurice Bucke, by Blodwen Davies, a Canadian writer. There is some point to including a discussion of Bucke in such a volume, since this Canadian psychiatrist, who lived in the last half of the nineteenth century, explored a terrain of thought which has much in common with the regions to which Dr. Radhakrishnan has devoted his life.

Radhakrishnan stands before the world today as an eminent philosopher and statesman. His appointment, in 1936, to the Spalding Chair of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford University, as the first man of Eastern birth to hold such a post, was no doubt an honor, as academic distinctions go, but it was also evidence of a dawning perception in the West that an Indian scholar might after all be better qualified than a European to transmit and teach to students at Oxford the philosophical and religious lore of the Orient. (For reasons never clearly explained, this Chair, intended by its founder always to be filled by an Eastern scholar, is now held by a European, which amounts to a curious betrayal of trust by the University.) Called to the service of his country after Indian Independence, Radhakrishnan served from 1949 to 1952 as India's ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Then, in May, 1962, he was elected President of India, thus fulfilling, as the publishers of this volume not unjustly remark, Plato's dream of a philosopher who would become "king."

Half a century before Radhakrishnan was born, Richard Maurice Bucke was brought by his family from England when only a year old to live on a forested homestead in upper Canada (where London, Ontario now stands). The boy worked on the farm and never went to school, but he had his father's library of nearly six thousand books in seven languages to feed his mind. Both parents died in Richard's youth and at sixteen he became a wanderer, a casual laborer of the American West, which was now opening up to settlers and wagon trains. One winter, snowbound in the Nevada mountains, he was the sole survivor of a party of four miners looking for silver. Both his feet were frozen and one had to be amputated. At twenty-one, brought to an early maturity by his experience, Bucke returned home to Canada and used a legacy from his mother to pay for a medical education at McGill University. Graduating as a gold medalist, he took post graduate work in England and the Continent, deciding to specialize in mental health. After some years of private practice, he became superintendant of the largest mental hospital in Ontario, within a stone's throw of the homestead where he spent his childhood and youth. As Miss Davies relates:

> This was in the year 1877 and Bucke's ideas were revolutionary. He removed shackles, the doors of cells were opened and he eliminated all forms of restraint, because restraint, he said, caused the need for restraint. He gave the patients work to do, for work, he said, was a great therapeutic factor. He gave them music and sports, companionship, garden parties to which the outside world was invited, and all the skills available from medicine and psychiatry.

It was after Bucke read and later met Walt Whitman that something happened to his mind—or, more probably, to his entire being. That something, it seems clear, was what A. H. Maslow calls a "peak-experience." He was visiting in England and with some friends had been reading poetry, especially Whitman. Speaking of himself in the third person, Bucke later wrote:

> His mind, deeply under the influence of the ideas, images and emotions called up by the reading and talk of the evening, was calm and peaceful. He was in a state of quiet, almost passive enjoyment. All at once, without warning of any kind, he found himself wrapped around as it were by a flame-colored cloud. For an instant he thought of fire, some sudden conflagration in the great city, the next, he knew that the light was within himself. Directly afterwards came upon him a sense of exultation, of immense

> joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination quite impossible to describe. Into his brain streamed one momentary lightning-flash of the Brahmic Splendor which has ever since lightened his life; upon his heart fell one drop of Brahmic Bliss, leaving thenceforward for always an aftertaste of heaven. Among other things he did not come to believe, he saw and knew that the Cosmos is not dead matter but a living Presence, that the soul of man is immortal, that the universe is so built and ordered that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of each and all, that the foundation principle of the world is what we call love and that the happiness of everyone is in the long run absolutely certain. He claims that he learned more within a few seconds during which the illumination lasted than in previous months or even years of study, and that he learned much that no study could ever have taught.

Bucke, you could say, was an autodidact—a self-taught man. His convictions were forged, not absorbed from others. While he read a great deal, life was the source of what he felt he knew, and his reading gave only perspective and a broadening influence. He recognized the same sense of inward reality in both Whitman's writing and Whitman the man, and formed a theory comprising contrast between self-consciousness (ordinary human consciousness), and what he called "cosmic consciousness," the latter expression becoming the title of a book offering illustrations from world history of those who, in his opinion, had given expression to it. These included Buddha and Christ, Paul, Plotinus, Boehme, Blake, Whitman, Carpenter, and many others.

Cosmic Consciousness first appeared in 1901 and was in large part ignored by the world of learning. The book was an attempt to outline a psychology of transcendental or "peak" experience. The data it collected might find hospitality among the handful of scholars who had sympathy for the earlier work of George T. Ladd, or who shared somewhat in the unconventional daring of William James, but very different trends were coming to dominate scientific thought at the turn of the century. Bucke was plainly a maverick who was roaming beyond the carefully fenced pastures of a "scientific" psychology—a psychology which in twenty years or so would be entirely dominated by the theories of John B. Watson, to whom the word "consciousness" itself was entirely meaningless. Bucke's book might now and then earn a footnote in catalogs of psychological exotica or in complacent notices of the sort of thing which serious psychologists must give no serious attention to, so that, instead of becoming the outline of an area for scientific exploration, his work was made a source-book for "metaphysical" sects—those cultural growths which always appear as unofficial, compensating institutions when the orthodox learning of a civilization ignores the dynamics of subjective forces, laws, and phenomena. Bucke was adopted as a doughty ancestor of the New Thought movement, along with Ralph Waldo Trine, and his title, alas, was turned into a cliché of penny-a-thought "mystics" and *soi-disant* "spiritual teachers."

It took two world wars, bloody political demonstrations of the futility of mechanistic materialism, the widespread *malaise* of a philosophically aimless and materially overfed technological civilization, the critique of a threadbare and over-simplified rationalism by Freud, and the radical revision of Freud by his late successors in psychotherapy, before Bucke could be at last recognized as a serious man by Western thinkers. While the term "cosmic consciousness" will probably not enjoy much revival—Bucke's title, for one thing, is both too metaphysical and too imprecise, and for another has too many bad associations in the literature of the sects—the direction of his thought is more and more recognized by the new psychologists of the present as basic to any serious attempt to understand the whole human being. While Blodwen Davies may go further than these cautious investigators of subjective reality, one of her paragraphs seems an apt summary of Bucke's importance:

> What Bucke called cosmic consciousness was not something that came in a package. It is expressed in the evolution of the race. The capacity of the person involved is the measure of the illumination. Men limit their vision by the size of the cup they bring to the spring. The cup is not the measure of the spring's abundance. We have as yet no recognized means of discovering, educating, conserving and applying genius. We are anxious to gather up the crumbs that fall from the table of genius, if they can be turned into power, wealth and gadgetry. We do not yet think of genius as the expression of the Buddha consciousness or the Christ consciousness potential in every man. The West conceives of genius as something to push "progress" along under pressure; in terms of gross national product.

What is Radhakrishnan's role in all this, and why is a memorial to Bucke appropriate also as a memorial to him? Well, you could say that Dr. Radhakrishnan is one of those individuals who are masters of two cultures—of both East and West—and has been able, therefore, in his books and his major work on *Indian Philosophy* to provide in the language of the West a symmetrical account of an enormous body of testimony concerning matters which Bucke, as an isolated individual and Westerner, sought to understand. Authentic scriptures seem to be written from the "peaks," and India has many great scriptures.

COMMENTARY
TASKS FOR EDUCATION

THE idea of "a *compensatory* conception of education," mentioned in this week's "Children," might be developed in many directions. Redressing the balance after the distortions produced by "the general drive for enhanced productivity" is doubtless desirable, but other needs should also have attention. For one thing, it would be good to expose the delusions of grandeur which tend to afflict people who know so much about industrial productivity and so little about natural felicity.

But most of all we should like to see the schools make it their business to compensate for the ideological oversimplifications of our political system. This would mean searching out and trying to understand the "organic" sort of relationships among human beings which are often the best of human life, yet, in the nature of things, cannot be politicalized, least of all compelled. There is a sense in which the hunger for warm, non-contractual relationships, for hierarchy and individuality, and for the natural virtues which belong to this aspect of life, becomes, when frustrated, a source of irrational, anti-democratic emotion. And simply because such feelings are reactionary, and not a positive expression, they are easily exploited by demagogues who promise what is impossible to achieve by political means. The Fascist reaction which haunted a large part of Europe during the first half of the twentieth century needs more of an explanation than the assignment of magical persuasive powers to men like Mussolini and Hitler.

In the 1930's and 1940's there was no greater evil on the socio-political scene, in the eyes of liberal-democratic critics, than the "Organic States" of Western Europe. The critics were right, of course. Organic States are ruled by infallible "leaders" and are sustained by a passive balance between fear and blind, emotional loyalty in the people. You could say that totalitarian politics involves the perversion, the inversion and vulgarization of private feelings and religious emotions. It attempts to make politics of a kind of devotion or allegiance which, when it is *required*, and then *used*, becomes about the most vicious political weapon in history. And just because, in the supposedly most enlightened of centuries, this happened to European civilization, it becomes the business of education to find out why. It is not enough just to add epithets of political infamy to our vocabulary.

For example, Review for Dec. 30 quoted from Kenneth Rexroth the following sentence:

> Like Yeats, Stephan George, T. S. Eliot, Unamuno, Ezra Pound, von Hoffmansthal, Lawrence was a dedicated spokesman for what Joseph Freeman thirty years ago called the fascist unconscious.

Tempering this judgment, Rexroth added, "Note that the 'f' is in lower case," meaning, we suppose, that the "fascist" element in these men was a pre-political current of thought. Yet the comment remains obscure, although it seems obvious that the writers and poets named were probably concerned with values that were habitually neglected by the politics of their time. Pound, of course, made himself notorious by his support of the Axis Powers, and Eliot gave comfort to a kind of papa-knows-best conservatism, but it would certainly be useful criticism to explore what Mr. Rexroth is talking about without, at the outset, deciding that these men were guilty of Original Political Sin.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
TRAINING FOR CITIZENSHIP

AN article by Harry Gideonse in the *News Digest* of the International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom attempts to show that the education most needed today is "compensatory" rather than doctrinal. Technologically, we continue to gain cohesiveness as an integrated society, but the resulting routinization of human life neglects the aims which are most apt to give a sense of continuity in individual development. As Dr. Gideonse puts it, it should be clear that the educator is charged with more than "running" a school or college. He is also responsible for the "channeling of all the formative influences brought to bear on youth so that we shall develop men and women fit for the intellectual and moral responsibilities of free society." In our time we are particularly obliged to consider the contributions of unorthodox or radical thinking. A full teaching dedication, in Dr. Gideonse' words, "clearly calls for a program that will *offset* many of the cultural influences that are increasingly exercised by the society itself." He continues:

> The call for a *compensatory* conception of education in which our formative or educational agencies would deliberately develop an educational program designed to *offset* some of the lopsided educational consequences of the general drive for enhanced productivity should be carefully distinguished from the present concern throughout the world about the relation between educational policy and economic growth. It is true that economic growth depends upon investment in man as well as in physical and technical equipment, and it is clear from recent research in the causes of economic productivity that investment in education has been a major cause of economic development in the past—in fact, recent research points to American educational outlay in the past as probably the largest single component of all investment. In a rapidly changing economic order educational development directly related to accelerated productivity is—although desirable in itself—simply an accelerating force in the promotion of the cultural by-products of productivity.
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> The "compensatory" or offsetting idea may have a constructive vitality in the educational future of free society. If education in all its ramifications restricts itself to analytical intellectualistic and vocational concerns, it will intensify the centrifugal forces now at work, but if its conception is broadened to include a major preoccupation with offsetting some of the unplanned and unintended cultural by-products of an increasingly specialized rational pursuit of economic productivity, it may be the cornerstone of a social structure designed to insure intellectual and moral fitness for the responsibilities of free society.
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> Such fitness will not be found in exclusive pursuit of material security. The maturity of a free man is anchored in his moral and intellectual capacity to cope with the insecurity that is unavoidably interwoven with the pursuit of values which are all in some measure and to some degree in conflict with one another. The ability to cope with tension and polarity of values has been recognized as the criterion of a free man by social philosophers as widely divergent as Alexis de Tocqueville and Martin Buber, and in walking "the narrow ridge" education can play a positive rather than a passive role.
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> We live in a time of danger and also in a time of great hope. Whoever offers us complacency blinds us to the danger and denies us the hope. Let me summarize and repeat: Every society gets the kind of youth it deserves. Young people do not make the world in which they grow up. Adults make the world in which young people grow up. These are simple words. They describe a terrifying characteristic of our present society.

This development of thought reminds us of a broad definition of statesmanship provided by Robert M. Hutchins during a public debate with the "radical conservative" Brent Bozell. The topic was controversial, concerned with the proper authority to be exercised by the Supreme Court. Here are Dr. Hutchins' comments (*Dialogues in Americanism,* Henry Regnery, 1964):

> The essence of a community is learning together. And a political community arises when the citizens are learning together how to achieve the good of the community and how to govern themselves. A democratic political community arises when all the people are citizens. A democratic community has as its construction a charter of learning. That is what

our Constitution is. We the people are continuously to learn how to form a more perfect union, how to promote the common defense, domestic tranquility, how to establish justice and how to preserve the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.

Mr. Bozell suggests that I am some kind of romantic educator in proposing, doubtless from force of habit, that the Constitution is a charter of learning. But what else can you make of it? What does one do with Mr. Chief Justice Marshall talking about "we must never forget that it is a constitution that we are interpreting"? What is one to do with the absence of *stare decisis* in constitutional cases, a topic on which I take it everybody is agreed? It is precisely because nobody in his right mind (to say nothing of the Founding Fathers who had very good minds indeed) could suppose that the conditions of later years were going to be those of 1787 to 1789; that precisely because of this they could not have done that. They were too intelligent to do that. We *must* regard the Constitution as a charter of learning.

When I say "a charter of learning," I don't mean that it is a blank check to spend our national resources, intellectual or other, in any way; but the Constitution cannot bind to specific forms of action that in the nature of the case were unforeseen at the time the Constitution was adopted. I refer again to Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who talked of "the seeds the Fathers planted."

To come down from these levels of abstraction to the predicament of the contemporary teen-ager, we may recall a passage from an article by Roul Tunley in the July 13, 1964, *Nation,* titled, "Do We Hate Our Children?" Mr. Tunley contends that, with all our efforts to "curb delinquency," we lag behind some twenty other nations in understanding of the young. It would appear, he writes, "that we don't like our children very much." And how can such a contentious statement be justified?

While [Mr. Tunley writes] we hold out the glittering prize of maturity, we tell our teen-agers that they mustn't really touch. In fact, we withhold the advantages of being an adult longer and longer. All in all, we place a large segment of our youngsters in an almost intolerable situation. And although they may be living in the most privileged society in history—certainly the best fed, best housed and the best automobiled—I doubt that the most important privilege of all, *proving oneself a man,* is as easy to obtain here as it is in other countries. Under the circumstances, it is surprising that there is not a great deal more delinquency.

How, really, does a young person prove himself a man? Since no "rites of passage" from adolescence to adulthood illuminate this question, Dr. Gideonse' discussion has contemporary relevance. He concludes his article, "Moral Values in the World of Tomorrow," as follows:

Every society gets the kind of young people, the kind of youth it deserves. A social order should be judged—as Justice Brandeis used to say—not by its wealth or its productivity but by the kind of men and women that it makes. And, in Justice Brandeis' words, if we are to be guided by the light of reason *"we must let our minds be bold."* Or, in the language of Alexis de Tocqueville, in the defense of freedom, "I fear boldness much less than mediocrity of desire."

FRONTIERS

"The Self and the Other,'

HERBERT READ, in iconoclastic mood, and under the inelegant title, *To Hell with Culture,* repeats a criticism of the Western mind-set which always serves as a good point of departure for evaluation. "The cultured Greeks," writes Sir Herbert, "had no word for culture." He continues:

> They had good architects, good sculptors, good poets, just as they had good craftsmen and good statesmen. They knew that their way of life was a good way of life, and they were willing if necessary to fight to defend it. But it would never have occurred to them that they had a separate commodity, culture—something to be given a trademark by their academicians, something to be acquired by superior people with sufficient time and money, something to be exported to foreign countries along with figs and olives.

From the fifteenth until the nineteenth century, a continuous process of separation divided the practical "work of the world" from both culture and philosophy; and during the period of the Industrial Revolution the divorce decree became final. In respect to philosophy, the obscure specialties of academicians widened the gulf between man's thoughts and aspirations and his struggle for security or status. From "culture" we have now inherited what might most properly be called "cultural delusions," and from philosophy, the strange supposition that the life of mind can be somehow departmentalized—made into a kind of "dessert." *If* we have sufficient possessions to provide economic security and a satisfactory status, we may then, it is thought, enjoy the luxury of philosophy. Yet a present consideration of the state of the world should make it clear that having possessions is not only to be in bondage to them, but also to suffer alienation from the roots of individual growth.

Reflecting on the national reaction to the late President Kennedy's assassination, Milton Mayer analyzes the response of one segment of the American public (*Progressive,* December, 1964):

> There has never been a people at once so fortunate and so unhappy. For the possessed are dispossessed of their confidence, and their anxiety drives them to refuge in a past that never was. Before Dallas we were (as of course we are again) pent up with no way to break, like a woman unable to expel at birth. Ours was, and is, the same hopelessness to cope that invites the relief of war in which, for four years (or three days) a people can smash the insolubles and let go, giving themselves over to whoop and holler and death and then tears.
>
> We are a murderous people who love all kinds of freedom and our disorder is deep. We are rich and fat and strong and we will let no tyrant provide *us* with bread and circuses; we will each of us, in fine freedom, provide his own. In our singular historical and geographical accident, we are weaned on the inalienable right to euphoria, on the pursuit of kicks. We are the most lawless—and nonrevolutionary—people in the world. And becoming more so.

Quite often the character portrayals of novelists reflect the common predicament experienced by men and women who try to discover themselves, who are lonely in the crowd, and who are tortured by an unexplained sense of alienation. A passage from William Lundgren's *The Primary Cause* is illustrative:

> Sometimes the answer slipped unasked into her mind emerging to float with beautiful simplicity a moment there, concise in form, yet enormous in significance, the polished truth of everything she'd ever known about herself, the last conclusion drawn from all she could remember about everything that she had ever seen, or been, or done. She would hear as she was hearing now some song or scrap of melody, or catch some vagrant scent reminding her of yesterdays, and in an instant sense the breadth and color of the past, all its custom, meaning, shape, and form, its manner, dress, and mind. Then she would see a tumbling array of memories through which she moved from the present back into the past, yet never really getting there, not even knowing how she had found her own way back to the present once again. What she had been was sometimes clear enough, but how she had changed, what things had made her what she was today remained a mystery. She could sense only vaguely some great truth about it all that lay beyond the things she could recall. And she longed to seize this truth and bring it out of her, to see and to analyse and understand so that she might,

> even if only for a moment, know and understand herself.
>
> To see it all you had to disassociate yourself, she thought, and stand somewhere apart, above and beyond its immediate and maddening complexity. That happened sometimes, or it almost did, but how or why, or what she did to achieve this vision of herself and of the times and places in which she had lived, she did not know. She always stopped just short of making the last effort, suspecting that if she consciously tried to work the miracle, she would lose herself completely in a withdrawal from the world in which she wanted only to find her way to something of her own.

Here is a person who stops "just short of making the last effort" because every intimation of self-knowledge carries with it the fearful portent of losing contact with life as it is supposed to be. But the central problem does not change. It is the same as it was thousands of years ago. In the days of the Upanishadic teachers, men wondered how the individual may "individuate" and *gain* life while relinquishing the values of the personal ego. In the *Prashna Upanishad* are these verses:

> In the heart is the Self. Here are a hundred and one channels. From them a hundred each, and in each of these, two and seventy thousand branch-channels: In these the distributing-life moves.
>
> He whose radiance has become quiescent is reborn through the impulses dwelling in mind. According to his thoughts, he enters life. And Life joined by the radiance with the Self leads him to a world according to his will.
>
> He who, thus knowing, knows Life, his being fails not, and he becomes immortal.

How are we to gain conviction of this grand perspective? Not alone from the ancients, nor alone from inspired moderns, nor any more from both than from ourselves. However, when an ancient or a modern speaks out of his time and place—when he bridges the gaps of centuries, cultures, and religions—he articulates a language of liberation from the psychic circumstances of birth and culture. When he is neither Greek nor Hindu, neither twentieth-century psychologist nor seventeenth-century mystic, he reaches a range of response beyond conditioning and learning. His philosophy is not a system but a vaulting of the imagination, made unafraid of the grandeurs of the unprovable, made hospitable to myth and metaphor. He is, at least to some extent, a metaphysician; for, as Frederick Mayer puts it: "Metaphysics has certain positive functions in philosophy; it illuminates our poetic quest, for, consciously or unconsciously, the concept of reality is basic to philosophic speculation." Dr. Mayer continues:

> Like Faust we want to understand the essence of the universe even if this is an impossibility. Naturalism in religion is an inadequate perspective. Beyond naturalism lies the perennial attraction of Mysticism. Mysticism is simply an attempt to find a principle of oneness in the universe and to overcome the fragmentary status of our own egos. In the mystical perspective East and West meet in a common quest and a common pilgrimage.