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# PEACE AND JUSTICE

SINCE its origins in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there has been a deep schism potential in the Peace Movement. The differences, which often develop into outspoken conflict, are between the advocates of peace and the workers for justice. The thought-processes which lead to this division go something like this:

You start out as a person resolved to put an end to war. You have seen that even so-called "just wars" soon get out of hand, and that the killing becomes a compulsive end in itself. Men are maddened by war. The population is brutalized, its ways of feeling and thinking vulgarized. Increasingly, war is a slaughter of innocents. While wars may be planned cold-bloodedly, the men who fight must have their passions inflamed, their intuitive moral sense silenced and ignored. A vast perversion overtakes the public channels of communication. All the humane instincts are suppressed. And on the battlefields, the ruthless killing goes on and on. Men are pitilessly mutilated. The necessities of military policy penetrate all aspects of life with their mindless absolutes. Irrevocably, insupportably, war worsens mankind.

The popular movement against war is shaped by feelings of this sort. Then, as you move from spontaneous revulsion and anguished sharing of the pain that war brings, attempting to understand *why* men are willing to fight with one another, you discover the enormous complexity of the problem. The brave and splendid emotion with which you started out begins to wither under disappointments which wear away the hope of a simple solution. You keep looking for generalizations that will cover most, if not all, of the factors leading to war. But no longer, now, is the grand, humanitarian rejection of brutish killing the only influence which shapes your thought. Inclinations of temperament, intellectual background and endowment, feelings about good and evil, and competing theories of human good involving the issues of social and political philosophy, affect your conclusions. Difficult questions present themselves, such as: How much of my energy should go into "Popular Front" efforts to stop war, and how much should go into work which may be more "fundamental," such as attempts to show the need of changing the conditions out of which wars spring? Is war the *real* issue, or is it only the ugly mask of deeper ills? And then, with a dark and desperate insistence, may come the query: Perhaps we really need *one more war* to create the conditions that will end war forever. For there can be no peace without justice. If men are denied justice, they will sooner or later fight to get it.

Here is another brave and splendid emotion: The love of Justice. It is the emotion which creates the schism in the Peace Movement. On the one hand, there is the contention that, so long as war continues to be a tool of even the best of social ends, those ends will be degraded, perverted, and finally lost. And on the other is the claim that a peace which does not establish justice is a fraud, a self-defeating device compounded by self-serving Machiavellians supported by shallow-minded innocents. Of modern thinkers, only Gandhi has offered a theoretical resolution of this dilemma, and acceptance of it still seems to remain far in the future. For the most part, Gandhi's ideas on this question are rejected as either too radical or as ineffectual and utopian.

Let us look at the schism in the peace movement in the United States, almost at its beginning. An eighteenth-century claim for justice as the foundation of peace was made by John Woolman, and while his utterances have more of a Biblical than a social flavor, historians see in them the counterpart of later arguments. In *Peace or*

*War* (Norton, 1936), Merle Curti, chronicler of the American Peace Movement, writes:

> In the eyes of one of the wisest and most farseeing representatives of Quakerism, John Woolman, violence and wars are bred by the spirit of possessiveness and the lust for riches. However clothed in words of justice, the bargains and proceedings inspired by appetite for profits may be, they are none the less the seeds of war which may quickly swell and ripen. "The rising up of a desire to obtain wealth," he wrote, "is the beginning. This desire being cherished, moves to action, and riches thus gotten please self, and while self has a life in them it desires to have them defended." This identification of wealth-seeking with war and violence led Woolman further to declare in words that anticipate the modern economic interpretation of war: "Oh! that we who declare against wars . . . may examine our foundation and motives in holding estates! May we look upon our treasures, and the furniture of our houses and the garments in which we array ourselves, and try whether the seeds of war have any nourishment in these our possessions, or not."

By the twentieth century, this view had been institutionalized as the standard view throughout the socialist movement. As the French socialist and martyred pacifist of World War I, Jean Jaures, said: "Those who, in all good faith, imagine they are defending peace when they defend modern society against us, are really, without wishing it or knowing it, defending the standing possibility of war."

Curti takes account of this view in his foreword, showing that it made little headway in the United States:

> . . . even the most sturdy artisans of peace were by and large unwilling to advise certain sacrifices which some foes of war regarded as indispensable and basic. Largely middle-class in origin and development, the peace movement early set itself against any reordering of society for the purpose of eliminating such causes of war as social injustice, class conflict, and the profit motive. It is important to inquire why peacemakers did not come to regard such a sacrifice as necessary.
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> Although friends of peace, with rare exceptions, failed to accept the socialist diagnosis of the cause and cure of war they were sufficiently in advance of the great majority of Americans to be regarded as fanatics and visionaries. In time of war, if they stood their ground, they were persecuted as cowards and traitors. Thus they had to be heroes, and heroes they were. Seen from the perspective of the social historian the quest for an ideal of these pilgrims of peace is moving and dramatic: for theirs is a story of tragedy offset from time to time by minor comic notes, a story of bitter conflict, defeat and discouragement; a story also of courage, of hope, and of hard-won victories.
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> The American pageant of peace cannot be understood without taking into account the stage on which it was enacted. What Americans did to limit or to uproot the war system was at every point affected by the traditions and ideals of American life which were dominant in varying degrees at different times. Their work was influenced by such historic processes as the conquest of the frontier, the coming of the immigrants, internal conflicts between industrialists, planters, farmers, and other workers, and the development of technology and an urban society.

This was written in 1936. Less than ten years later, toward the close of World War II, another kind of commentary could be written. The Civilian Public Service Camps in which conscientious objectors to war were interned for the duration were a kind of "hot house" for the development of pacifist thinking. Three basic currents of ideas joined in the minds of the men in the camps and those in prison. First, there was the traditional religious pacifism of the peace churches, which found its most articulate form in the views of the Quakers. Second, there was the strong anti-war feeling of the young socialists who had been so much influenced by Gene Debs and his horror of war that they chose to be conscientious objectors. Finally, there was a deep disillusionment with the outcome of the great Russian experiment in socialism, under the monolithic, terroristic rule of Stalin. As a result of these currents of thought, a new type of radical pacifist began to emerge—men with a broad, unsectarian religious inspiration (the effect of the liberalized, social-action Christianity of the preceding twenty years was evident here), a full appreciation of the socio-economic factors behind

the war-making of the great states, and at the same time a deep skepticism of *any* kind of massive, state-sponsored solution for the problems of peace and justice. (These men were reading Albert J. Nock and Herbert Spencer on the State, along with Gandhian, Christian pacifist, and socialist anti-war literature.) Today, the term, anarcho-pacifist, is often used to describe the synthesis of attitudes which resulted in large part from the World War II experience of conscientious objectors. It may be of interest to read what was written about these men in a small paper published in one of the camps. In the March 30, 1945 issue of *Pacifica Views* (a weekly published in the CPS camp at Glendora, California), speaking of the combination of religious pacifism and radical thinking, a writer observed:

> In this synthesis of extremes, we witness the birth of a New Minority. Its members are destined to remain an enigma to the public for some years to come, and they will probably be a source of confusion to both Peace Church pacifists and old line radicals.
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> What is he, this New Minority Man? Is he a new breed of radical who uses the language of politics, yet scorns its conventional grooves? Is he the exponent of a revolutionary religion, some bizarre sectarian product of the war's hysteria?
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> No, he is none of these things. And when the Majority finds out who he really is, he will not be popular. For he is working for objectives which are both moral and practical—an impossible synthesis, the Majority will exclaim. His ends will easily be identified as revolutionary, but his reasons for working to ward them will unite moral content with critical penetration. . . . He is the New Revolutionary who does not conform at all to the popular ideas of what a revolutionary ought to be.
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> The political radical is commonly ignored as one who cannot adjust to "society" and who, therefore, is trying to adjust society to himself. He is, in the popular mind, a have-not saying "Gimme." His violent demands enable the majority to overlook the moral implications of his cry for a change. Morals, on the other hand, are held to be the province of religion—a nice thing, but impractical. Pacifists are "nice" religious people, and *very* "impractical." The pacifist is not supposed to want anything except personal exemption from war. His refusal to fight is taken as *prima facie* evidence of his ignorance of all social and political matters. He is, in short, believed to be the exact opposite of the radical. How surprising and how fine it is, then, for the pacifist to be discovered working alongside the radical who talks of specific revolutionary changes; and how fine a thing it is, also, that those "radicals" who were supposed to care nothing for "moral values" are now revealed in company with pacifists all laboring together to end war, oppression, and inequality.

It was out of this ferment of new thinking, which came into focus in the War Resisters League, in an organization named Peacemakers, and, years later, in the Committee for Non-Violent Action, that the radical pacifist magazine, *Liberation*, was born. In large measure, it was the "graduates" of this experience and the searching questions it brought who shaped the initial strategy and tactics of the Civil Rights Movement, so that there are clear lines of connection between the generation of war-resisting youth of the 1940's and the radical youth of today. The latter are characterized under the heading, "Revolt without Dogma," by Jack Newfield in the *Nation* for May 10:

> A new generation of radicals has been spawned from the chrome womb of affluent America. Any lingering doubts about this evaporated last month when 20,000 of the new breed pilgrimaged to Washington, D.C., to demand a negotiated peace in Vietnam.
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> These were the boys and girls who freedom-rode to Jackson; who rioted against HUAC; who vigiled for Caryl Chessman; who picketed against the Bomb; who invaded Mississippi last summer; and who turned Berkeley into an academic Selma. They are a new generation of dissenters, nourished not by Marx, Trotsky, Stalin or Schachtman but by Camus, Paul Goodman, Bob Dylan and SNCC—the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
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> Their revolt is not only against capitalism but against the values of middle-class America: hypocrisy called Brotherhood Week; assembly lines called colleges; conformity called status; bad taste called Camp, and quiet desperation called success.
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> At the climax of the Washington march, arms linked and singing *We Shall Overcome*, were the

> veterans of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, freshmen from small Catholic colleges, clean-shaven intellectuals from Ann Arbor and Cambridge, the fatigued shock troops of SNCC, Iowa farmers, impoverished urban Negroes organized by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), beautiful high school girls without make-up, and adults, many of them faculty members, who journeyed to Washington for a demonstration conceived and organized by students.
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> During the rally they heard the visionary voices of the new radicalism: Staughton Lynd, a young professor at Yale, who explained why he wasn't paying his income tax this year; Paul Potter, the brilliant president of SDS, who told them they must construct a social movement that will "change our condition"; Bob Parris, the poet-revolutionary of SNCC, who urged, "Don't use the South as a moral lightning rod; use it as a looking glass to see what it tells you about the whole country." And there were Joan Baez and Judy Collins to sing the poems of Bob Dylan.
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> This is literally a New Left—in style, mystique, momentum, tactics and vision.

Actually, the question of the use of violence—conventional, military violence as a revolutionary weapon—is hardly at issue with these people. What is at issue is how to get the kind of a society they are after, and it is fair to say that nobody, at this point, really knows.

Let us now bring our notes on the schism in the peace movement up to date. In England, critics of Britain's Ban the Bomb movement maintain that the loss in influence of CND (Committee for Nuclear Disarmament) came as a result of the flattening out of public interest in the simple anti-war position. As Theodore Roszak remarked in his *Peace News* article (reprinted in MANAS for Jan. 13), "In Britain the turning point seems to have come soon after the defeat of the unilateralists in the Labour Party and the Committee of 100's Whitehall sit-downs in 1961; in America soon after the test-ban treaty which turned the edge of the growing Women's Strike for Peace movement." Ted Roszak urged that workers for peace involve themselves in social issues which can be seen to be related to war, quoting the following proposal from Theodore Olson:

> The grave social problems that are physically apparent—plus those less tangible ones that can be summarized as "the. meaninglessness of modern life"—must be seen as soluble. If they can be perceived as soluble by actions the people can themselves initiate and undertake, then something fundamental will happen to the cold war. It is the very nature of the cold war to be totalistic, to demand primary allegiance. Once people start putting other concerns first—concerns that are more important because more closely related to the primary relationships of life, then the cold war falls into perspective. It is seen as what it is—a threat to these more important values. Because the cold war, for both ideological and economic reasons profoundly inhibits any real change on genuine social issues, any attack on these issues is an attack on the cold war.

This argument brought a rejoinder from A. J. Muste, who said that "on strictly logical grounds it would be just as correct to say that only a massive attack on the cold war which by definition so profoundly inhibits social change will make possible a real attack on other social issues." He added:

> There is nothing in political experience to suggest that in the absence of a powerful pacifist or anti-war component in the movement for social change, and specific education in the issues of nationalism, militarism, the meaning of war in the nuclear age, and so on, war will in fact be abolished. That will come about only if a creative peace movement comes into being and people's minds and feelings are somehow reached on the issues in this field as they have been on the race issue.

The monthly magazine, *Liberation,* is today a forum of vital discussion of such issues in the peace movement. Its May issue has two long articles on the relation of "radicalism" to the struggle for peace, and in an editorial comment on the Washington March, David Dellinger says:

> The character and success of the Washington March, the nature of the advance criticisms and the fact that they come from distinguished and devoted associates (from Bayard Rustin I have learned many things, in the course of sharing prison cells and lonely, difficult battles), makes me realize how

> important it is that we give full and thoughtful attention to the problems they raise. The believer in revolutionary nonviolence faces many difficult decisions in trying to be both adequately revolutionary and genuinely nonviolent.

In an article in the same issue, Sidney Lens makes this appeal:

> The peace movement has been emphasizing the arms race as a social evil, but it has been shy in trumpeting the reasons for the arms race. It was much easier to rally forces by placing the emphasis on disarmament and test bans; this did not disturb the national ego. A sincere woman worried about the health of her children could be brought into the peace movement by SANE or Women's Strike for Peace when she became convinced that nuclear testing might cause leukemia in her children. From here she might move to the next phase: a belief in the need for total disarmament. But even this was, and is, an incomplete position. Testing and armaments are coefficients of an anti-revolutionary policy, which in turn is a coefficient of the over-emphasis on profit within our social system.

Here Sidney Lens repeats the theme expressed by John Woolman two hundred years before. He continues:

> This is what makes radicalism relevant—that unless we can basically change the institutions which breed these drives, the prospect for peace and plenty is illusory. That is as true as it was yesterday, although we lack the levers to make it as convincing as we did yesterday. . . . America, at the peak of its power, bursting with riches, drowning in escapism and luxuries, complacent and self-satisfied, is at the brink of greater crises than it has confronted since the Cold War began. The trend to the Left in Asia is being compounded by a similar trend in Africa, and Latin America will no doubt soon follow. America's anti-revolutionary policy runs contrary to the demands of history. It can only lead to catastrophe.

If we take this paragraph as a text embodying the view that there can be no peace without justice, then we see that the "schism" in the peace movement is bound to develop around the choice of the "levers" to be used, or devised, in order to "basically change the institutions" which make war inevitable. There is the further problem of how to increase general awareness of the fact that these institutions are indeed at fault. There can be no question but that the attitudes of those who habitually defend the institutions of Western, democratic society against all criticism have hardened into a stubborn emotional resistance and while a part of this resistance may be attributed to the general cussedness of human nature and uneasiness on the part of people who have been drilled to believe that acquisitiveness is an essential part of their "way of life," it is also a fact that the violence of very nearly all past radical action is largely responsible for closing the minds of a great many people to any kind of a "radical" argument.

If, then, the schism in the peace movement is to be eliminated, radicals will have to create a very different impression of what they stand for, in terms of the exercise of power. Actually, the full spectrum of the *meanings* of power needs exploration in radical pacifist terms. If we are talking about "changed institutions" as the goal—a goal to be reached by nonviolent means—then it seems quite certain that the "just" society of this vision will have to have very different arrangements, so far as "power" is concerned. The mass societies of the present, were they suddenly to be rendered without the instruments of centralized control backed by coercive authority, would almost certainly fall into disintegration and collapse because of the power vacuum that would result. *Reaching* the radical pacifist ideal, therefore, must include countless molecular changes in the people at large, with gradual yet effective transfer of responsibility from public agencies to private individuals. And this process, it seems clear, is not one that the "lever" concept of bringing about change will relate to easily, if at all.

The radical tradition, in short, has a manipulative psychology. It is also educational, of course, but the main project of the radical has been to accomplish his changes without waiting for the whole mass of people to acquire, by small educational increments, the motivation which

causes the radical to act. He refuses to risk the total disappearance of his objectives in the invisible and possibly motionless deeps of private morality.

Yet the dilemma remains. A society both peaceful and just will be a society of unmanipulated human beings. In principle, therefore, the workers for that society cannot compromise their action program with techniques of manipulation, nor can they use violent means. Nonviolent resistance to evil, however, is not manipulation. It is simply saying *No!* So, an obvious question must be asked: What happens to the dramatic "leverage" of nonviolence when it ceases to be resistance and is conceived as an instrument for the positive design of new institutions? Is it still a "lever" in the sense of tangible social causation? How will such efforts be distinguished from other benevolent attempts at change? Will their "radical" character remain evident? Should it?

These are not of course new questions. Throughout the peace movement there are people working on the various facets of the problem of discovering the dynamics of peaceful change in a society which is itself a complex mixture of voluntaristic, rationalistic, and coercive means—means which have blended together almost beyond recognition, so that any claim of what will "work" is at once the subject of heated debate.

The present is a time, therefore, for originality and endless experiment. The protagonists who work for a peace uncompromised by injustice have the difficult task of inventing new ways of shaping social institutions—which probably means rising to new levels of self-conscious understanding of how social institutions come into being—and of finding the right balance between the "movement" and the "educational" aspects of their undertakings.

# *REVIEW*
## "HUMANISTIC BIOLOGY"

UNDER this title, Rene Dubos (*American Scholar,* Spring) endeavors to throw light upon the confusion which may result when the words "humanistic" and "biology" are used in conjunction. The difficulty, as Dr. Dubos shows, has been that psychologists have been principally concerned with the malfunction of organisms that can be traced to psychological difficulties. But, just as the Third Force psychologists have sought to describe the attributes of a *fully* functioning or self-actualizing person, so is there a need for a particularized *human* biology which may show how what we call the "laws of nature" relate to a full understanding of man. Dr. Dubos writes:

> Increasingly during recent decades, the exact biological sciences have been focused on the phenomena that are common to all mammalian species and indeed to all living forms. This trend away from the special attributes that particularize human beings makes scientific biology appear even further remote from humanistic preoccupations. The kind of knowledge to which it leads throws very little light on the problems that are the primary concern of humanists, namely, the experiences of the throbbing human person in a particular culture. Yet, while they appear at first sight so coldly detached from living man, the findings of orthodox biological sciences have nevertheless profoundly influenced some of the largest philosophical expressions of modern humanism.
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> The conjunction of the two words "humanistic" and "biology" will probably seem artificial because very few scientists, and even fewer humanists, really believe that biological knowledge has relevance to the traits that account for the humaneness of man. Admittedly, biological determinants do not seem at first sight to play a significant role in the manifestations of life that are most characteristically human, for example, ecstasy, logic, or simply the experience of happiness and despair. Religion and ethical doctrines, philosophy, linguistics, literature, the arts, are part of the humanities because their problems obviously relate to the social and cultural history of man, but their connections with the biological attributes of *Homo sapiens* are not so readily apparent. "Man has no nature, what he has is history," wrote Ortega y Gasset.

Dr. Dubos admits "the almost complete irrelevance of present-day biology to the humanities," because of a misleading distinction between "the mechanical aspects of man's nature" and his *experiences.* Here we encounter some of the positive considerations suggested by humanistic existentialism. The "core of experience," after all, is the response of the man's total being. Being is not truly expressed by any condition of stasis, but in "becoming." It is the capacity for transforming the ingredients of physically-oriented experience into creative insight which gives the human being a special role; he is part of "the great chain of being," and the moment of creation is the moment of awareness of this fact.

Dr. Dubos discusses the various formulations of thought which have prevented a central realization—that man creates himself:

> While *Homo sapiens* has remained essentially the same, the manifestations of his life, and the structure of his societies are endlessly changing, never repeating themselves identically. The permanency comes from the nature of the raw materials out of which human beings are made, the change from the creative responses that man makes to the challenges of his total environment. To live is to function, which means to respond.
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> Biological science has been immensely successful in describing the structures and mechanisms that constitute living *things,* and through which they operate. But it has contributed much less to the knowledge of man as a functioning organism. Yet the human condition cannot be dealt with scientifically unless a systematic effort is made to describe and analyze the pattern of responses that man makes to all the stimuli that impinge on him. For it is precisely this pattern that defines the human condition. In my judgment, such knowledge could be acquired if biologists elected to devote to the study of the living experience as much skill and energy as they have devoted to the description of the body machine.

The relationship of freedom and creativity to natural law has been well stated by Eugene P.

Wigner, Nobel Prize physicist, who said in his 1963 acceptance speech:

> Physics does not endeavor to explain nature. In fact, the great success of physics is due to a restriction of its objectives: it only endeavors to explain the regularities in the behavior of objects. This renunciation of the broader aim, and the specification of the domain for which an explanation can be sought, now appears to us an obvious necessity. In fact, the specification of the explainable may have been the greatest discovery of physics so far.
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> The regularities in the phenomena which physical science endeavors to uncover are called the laws of nature. The name is actually very appropriate. Just as legal laws regulate actions and behavior under certain conditions but do not try to regulate all actions and behavior, the laws of physics also determine the behavior of its objects of interest only under certain well-defined conditions but leave much freedom otherwise.

Dr. Dubos concludes his discussion of "humanistic biology" with this summarizing statement:

> By adding to the knowledge of man's biological nature, science could help the humanist to understand better the human condition, and to define the good life. Unfortunately, while biological sciences have been immensely successful in describing the elementary structures and processes of the body machine, they have tended to neglect the study of living as experience. Indeed, it is commonly stated that biology has lost contact with the humanities because it has become too "scientific" and as a consequence no longer deals with the problems peculiar to the humaneness of man. There is no doubt, of course, about the loss of contact, but the explanation of the difficulty in my judgment is that biology is not scientific enough.
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> By neglecting the study of a large variety of man's responses, biology is betraying one of the responsibilities of science—namely, the development of objective methods for describing all aspects of reality. Today, as in the past, the most compelling and interesting problems of human life come from the manner in which man reacts passively, and responds creatively, to the challenges of his total environment. Biology will once more become a complementary aspect of the humanities if it accepts the urgent social task to provide knowledge of the raw materials of experience out of which man creates himself.

# *COMMENTARY*
## THE NATURE OF MAN

IN this week's Frontiers, Michael Polanyi speaks of the "passionate recognition of a metaphysical reality" which lay behind the Hungarian overthrow of the Stalinist regime, giving evidence that thought is "an independent, self-governing force." Ortega says something similar in the statement that "Man has no nature, what he has is history." And Rene Dubos (see Review) calls for a biology which, instead of being regarded as the determinant of human behavior, is seen simply as contributing one of the frames in which man encounters experience. Man's essential being is not in any fixed endowment, but in the "becoming" he accomplishes with the raw materials of his life.

What people do with their powers, over and beyond the gifts of nature, constitutes their real being, and when they achieve a level which provides independent identification of man and his nature, we are entitled to call this level "civilization." As the artist-teacher says in this week's "Children" article: "Because we have made this world, we call ourselves civilized people and we feel we are not animals, which do not shape the world beyond just building nests and things of that order."

This general view of man constitutes the Humanist philosophy; or rather, the basic postulate of Humanism is that man, however confined by conditions, is none the less free. That is, no outside force constrains him to be less than a man, nor can raise him to some higher estate.

Ultimately, the sole condition of human freedom is the determination to *be* free. This is a way of saying that in order to be a man, you have to believe that you are one. What then is the nature of man? If we accept the argument thus far, man is a self-definer. This is what Pico della Mirandola said at the very birth of the Humanist philosophy. Our problem is to work out ways of living in cooperation with one another while we make a succession of imperfect, contradictory, and failing definitions of ourselves, having then to cope with the results of our mistakes.

Going to war is one form of self-definition. It is a definition of man which stands self-condemned by history. The best evidence against war is not its destructiveness or the misery it brings. That we could bear, if the war would help us to become better men. But it doesn't do this. The minds of men bent on war are absolutely set against better self-definition. They are afraid it might make them weak, when it would only make them good. War has become the very worst kind of self-definition.

# CHILDREN
## . . . and Ourselves
### ART AND LANGUAGE

[We reprint here from an issue of the *Chemchemi Newsletter* a discussion of "teaching art" to children. These ideas were expressed by a guest artist at the Chemchemi Cultural Center in Nairobi, Kenya, after visiting the Kamusinga Friends' School in the Western Region of Kenya. The Chemchemi Cultural Center was founded in Nairobi with the help of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and is presently headed by the African writer, Ezekiel Mphahlele. It exists to foster African literature and the arts and offers education in art, creative writing, drama, music, and conducts seminars and workshops in these fields. A previous article on Chemchemi's activities appeared in MANAS for May 26. The address of the Center is P.O. Box 30471 Jeevanjee Street, Nairobi.]

IN teaching art at secondary-school level, it is necessary to emphasise the reasons why art is practiced and taught. This involves more than just listing the uses to which art is put, such as illustrating books, designing cups, making furniture and sewing dresses or planting and laying out gardens or city decorations for honouring distinguished visitors and so on. It is important to list these uses, but as in the teaching of mathematics, one cannot list them all because they are always changing with the times. It is therefore important to have the students understand what art is in its own right as art, if they are to understand the actual uses of art as well as its potential uses.

It must be realised that art can never be satisfactorily defined by speaking about it. In speaking we use words. In producing art, we do not use words. Therefore in speaking about art, we have to speak through the language of art—through the words of art, which are not quite the same words we use when speaking. Words are sounds defined and put down so that we see them. When we write we are conscious of the fact that we are dealing with sounds which we shape to give meaning that can be understood by other people. In other words we are speaking to other people. When we paint or carve we are not using sounds. We are using shapes which we make up so that they can be seen by other people. We put these shapes together in such a way that, as shapes, they convey meaning which can be understood by other people.

Just as we learn to speak, in other words, learn to use words meaningfully, we also learn to use shapes. In fact we learn to use shapes earlier than we learn to use words. Learning to use shapes is far more important than learning to use words. We know that there are people who cannot speak and cannot hear. These people, nevertheless, live with us and speak to us through shapes; even when they cannot see. They make shapes, and those shapes tell us what they are saying.

As with words, our willingness to express ourselves is related directly to how well we can handle words, whatever language we may be speaking. The same holds true in respect of singing. Young children express themselves in spite of their limited vocabulary. This is because they are not aware how wide the vocabulary is and are not concerned or bothered about this; for their world is a small one. They speak to their mothers, brothers and sisters or just about them, and, of course, themselves. As we grow up, we realise that there are more people to be spoken to and more things to speak about. We therefore want more words and we develop more ways of using them. If we feel that our words are limited and that our ways of using these words are limited, we are reluctant to speak. We feel that people will laugh at us. We feel that we shall not make sense. We therefore choose to listen. Even here, because we feel limited, we lose patience. We soon get bored. We therefore do not listen at all. Important things are said, but because we are not listening, they escape us. Yet people act on these things and their actions affect our lives and our living. The same thing holds true in respect of what we see. Many of us look at things but do not see them; because we never did learn how to

look. The world is continually being shaped by other people. Towns, roads, bridges, aeroplanes, cars, clothes, fields, houses, dams, and so on; these things are being built: they are shaped by men, but we do not really see them because we never really look at them. We therefore do not know whether we like them and the way they are shaped. We cannot tell whether they are shaped well. Yet we continue to use them. More important is the fact that more and more of these things are being shaped by man. Having long stopped to live in caves, that is, in houses shaped by nature, we have ever since we started building huts been shaping things more and more, until we can now say that we are living in a man-made world. Because we have made this world, we call ourselves civilized people and we feel that we are not animals, which do not shape the world beyond just building nests and things of that order.

In teaching and practicing art, what we are therefore dealing with is the making of shapes, i.e., shapes which have meaning. We are talking amongst ourselves about our shaping of the world in which we live. The important thing is therefore the making of shapes, not just making this or that shape. How are the shapes made? How are they made in such a way as to have meaning? These are the questions to be answered. We shall therefore see that although we are concerned with the problem of making shapes, we are also concerned with the significance, the importance and meaning of these shapes. Very little will be gained if we just preoccupy ourselves with making shapes only. We must also question our making of these shapes. Only in this way can we tell whether they are made well, and more importantly, whether they are being made for the right reason. In the ultimate sense it is the reason that we are concerned about. We do not just want to speak well, we want to speak sense.

The grammar of art is not simple even for the teacher of art because it has not been developed with as much care as has been the grammar of language. There are very few books on the grammar of art. There are very many books on art generally. These are very good books for those who already know art. People who already know grammar do not need grammar books to read literature. They may need a dictionary just to find out the spelling and the exact meaning of a word. With art there remains the problem of developing a grammar, a vocabulary and exercises to be done in order to build up a command of language sufficient enough for people to speak with confidence. Because of this, the teacher must build up both the grammar and the exercises while at the same time serving as the dictionary to which the students refer for exact meanings of lines, colour, and shapes with which they work. The art teacher's work is therefore that much more complicated because of the limited resources that are at his disposal. *It is therefore clear that the art teacher can only teach through actual practice.*

It is not advisable to point always to paintings and other works of art which are already complete and established as works of art. The reason why it is not advisable to do this is because it is not possible for the average art teacher to break a masterpiece down into its component parts—in other words to analyse it clearly. Further, as a masterpiece, it represents experience already complete and maybe an experience in no way related to the experience of students. Masterpieces of art are relevant to the extent that they serve to illustrate to students not only that works of art can be produced but also that they are the challenge that faces all practicing artists, students and teachers alike. For they are living examples of the results that can be obtained when energy has been focussed so fully during artistic activity that the end product is complete, that it does not allow criticism to be levellel against it from any front whatsoever. Because of this, it is a work of art to be celebrated. It stands as a measure of what is possible of achievement by men, whatever the work they may be engaged in.

Understanding art is one thing. Producing art is quite a different thing. One does not have to produce great works of art before teaching art to those producing it. The coach in sport is not necessarily a great sportsman. He is a man who knows what and how great sportsmen are made. In order to teach art, one has to understand art to the point of understanding what its importance is to people and what constitutes a great work of art. We shall therefore see that it is not important to paint pictures, make drawings, carve pieces of sculpture, if this is just done as an end, regardless of standards. To produce good art, one must have a good reason why art is worth the trouble of sitting down and actually doing something.

More important, however, is the fact that it makes it possible for us to do something about our limitations rather than resign ourselves to these limitations. In other words, it makes it possible for us to act on our behalf, because we, as people, always want to feel that we are living fully, in spite of the performance of other people. So long as we feel that we have put our best foot forward in life, we feel that life is worth living, and we feel ourselves to be alive. A man can be rich but not feel himself to be fully alive. A man can be poor and not feel alive because his poverty is a handicap. But when a man is poor, and feels himself to be alive, he looks at his poverty and undertakes to do something about it instead of lying down and crying about his poverty. It is in so far as people live fully that they see life as something that must be celebrated, regardless of their standard of living. Because a man is poor, it does not mean that he must be filthy or must not sing or dance or clean his home and his surroundings. It does not mean that he must despise himself as a human being. It is in so far as people live fully that they do not live in fear of death itself.

# *FRONTIERS*

## Decline of Ideological "Science"

TWO articles in the March 1965 *Journal of Parapsychology,* reprinted from the Nov. 26 Moscow *Literary Gazette,* taken together, are of great interest in showing the changing temper of Soviet scientists. The first article, by A. Kitaygorodsky, attacks parapsychology—the study of extra sensory perception—with all the weapons of nineteenth-century materialism. He writes much in the manner of the Behaviorist psychologists who dominated the scene in America some thirty years ago, although the Soviet writer's manners are poorer and he often tries to settle matters by simple exhortation, amounting to saying, "Comrades, I *ask* you . . .!" Psychokinesis, or altering the motion of material objects by thought, cannot be possible since such intruding causation would "annihilate any scientific experiment." Telepathy, he says, is a false claim because it has no rationale in physical laws; clairvoyance need not be considered because it is the means of "receiving signals direct from the Angels and the Lord." High scores in ESP card recognition are "simply a matter of dishonest researchers or mediums." Kitaygorodsky's clinching argument is this:

> We face the choice either of approving the alleged "scientific" explanations which thoroughly destroy the concept of the universe, or recognizing the dishonesty and delusion of certain persons engaged in the experiments.

The similar but more measured objection of Joseph Jastrow appeared in the *American Scholar* in 1938:

> ESP is so contrary to the general scientific world picture, that to accept the former would compel the abandonment of the latter. I am unwilling to give up the body of scientific knowledge so painfully acquired in the Western world during the last 300 years, on the basis of a few anecdotes and a few badly reported experiments.

The other article in the Soviet *Literary Gazette,* by A. Roshchin, a psychiatrist, is a reply to Kitaygorodsky's remarks. At the outset, Roshchin calls attention to the plentiful data assembled from many experiments, leading to "the irrevocable conclusion that at least one of the 'supernatural' phenomena listed by A. Kitaygorodsky (for instance, telepathy) does actually exist." He notes the admission of the latter that "he has never undertaken a serious study of parapsychology" and remarks that "rudeness has never been a token of strength and correctness of thinking, but usually a substitute for both." The positive evidence for both telepathy and clairvoyance, Roshchin says, makes them deserve, "as many other little-explored phenomena of nature do, a more meticulous study." He describes evidence in the recognition of colors in a pitch-dark room, proposing that these experiments, carried on in the Soviet Union, establish the fact of "clairvoyance," or "one of its branches." Finally, to counter the claim that parapsychology furthers the cause of "religion," Roshchin suggests that "if science discards some facts and does not explain them, this will doubtless be the open door through which religious faith rushes in."

"Don't Be Afraid of Facts" is the title of Roshchin's article, and it is fair to say that when the ideological prejudice behind Kitaygorodsky's blast is eliminated, and the mechanistic assumptions of physical science are set aside in a field of investigation which requires its own first principles, an independent science of psychology will be free to develop.

While today, in the United States, there is little discussion of parapsychology outside of the professional journals in the field, one seldom sees, on the other hand, the "attacks" which used to appear at regular intervals in the general scientific journals of a generation ago. The tacit consensus seems to be that it is no longer "safe" to reject evidence of what so many reputable investigators accept as fact. You could also say, in relation to this exchange in the *Literary Gazette,* that a culture which no longer insists that the

metaphysical assumptions of its scientists remain in servile conformity to political doctrine is a culture showing signs of humanist independence.

A suggestive parallel to these events appears in an analysis by Michael Polanyi in the May *Encounter*, entitled, "On the Modern Mind." While a considerable intellectual distance separates Roshchin's simple demand for unprejudiced empiricism in Soviet research from Polanyi's openly philosophical conclusions, the closing of the gap between these broad views may be only a matter of time, especially if the tensions in Soviet life continue to diminish. There is a particular fitness in Polanyi's choice of recent historical events in the U.S.S.R. to support his view of the mind. He says:

A true diagnosis of our disorders should help to overcome them. My own interpretation of the modern world would do this by recognizing thought as an independent, self-governing force.

> I feel supported in this by the great movements recoiling from modern totalitarian ideologies. Stalinism is passing away and we look back on its rule with growing amazement. Russians are asking insistently how those terrible things could have happened. Concluding his memoirs in 1962, Ilya Ehrenburg speaks of "all the things that lie like a stone on the hearts of the people of my generation." The whole world is tnvolved in this: we cannot trust ourselves again unless we can understand how people, so steeped in our modern scientific outlook, could produce such an insane tyranny and support it fanatically for years on end.
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> The answer to this question is coming out by stages, darkly. At the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held February 1956, Khrushchev first denounced Stalin's misdeeds in a secret speech. A few months later Polish and Hungarian writers were openly demanding freedom of thought. These men were leading Communist intellectuals who were recoiling from the theory that morality, justice and art, and truth itself, were to be identified with the interest of the Party. Hungarian Communist writers solemnly repudiated the teaching that political expediency could be a criterion of truth and "after bitter mental struggles" vowed "that in no circumstances would they ever write lies." A few weeks later, the Hungarian people, led by these intellectuals, overthrew the Stalinist regime established by Rakosi.
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> This revolution fought to gain recognition for the reality of intangible things; of truth, of justice, of moral and artistic integrity. The Bolshevik attempt, undertaken for high purposes and in the light of a sophisticated theory, to establish an empire that denied this reality, had failed. I believe that this passionate recognition of a metaphysical reality, irreducible to material elements, marks a turning point: it will serve as an axiom for any future political thought.

"We need," says Polanyi in conclusion, "a theory of knowledge which shows up the fallacy of a positivist scepticism and authorizes our knowledge of entities governed by higher principles." His article ends with these moving words:

> We have around us great truths embodied in works born of the very freedom which we are hesitating to enter. And recent history has taught us that we can breathe only in the ambience of these truths and of this creative freedom. I, for one, am prepared to rely on this assurance for acquiring and upholding knowledge by embracing the world and dwelling in it.