

THEY KNOW ENOUGH FOR A START

THE confusions of social philosophy in the present can be traced to loss of roots in primary values. What are the primary values? They are concerned with pursuit and attainment of the good for human beings. What is that good? We are not sure. Of one thing only are we sure: The good of man cannot be coerced. Being certain about this, we say that freedom comes as close as it is possible to come to the unknown essence of the good.

But having made this declaration, we find that attempts to guarantee freedom soon turn into drives to establish particular conditions under which freedom is held to exist. The passion and the partisanship of these drives eventually require the substitution of other, instrumental values for the freedom we prize, and in time freedom is recognized only in some sectarian definition. By this means, one man's definition of freedom becomes another man's definition of slavery—the basic confrontation which leads to religious or ideological war. It follows that the characteristic state of mind of the contestants in ideological war is an unwillingness to examine the validity of their partisan assumptions about the nature of and means to freedom. For this would involve not only a philosophical disarmament while the investigation proceeds, but also a facing of the embarrassing uncertainty which haunts all serious approaches to the meaning of freedom. On these two counts, then, the ideologist is a determined, unbending, self-righteous man.

The break-down of faith in ideologies has two fundamental causes. The decline of an ideology begins to be manifest when large numbers of people who have no particular stake in its claims—they did not formulate the claims, but learned them in school, and had them explained by the daily papers and by politicians—begin to suspect that they are not altogether true. The

people hear the words, but the tired old meanings no longer touch the realities in their experience. Yet ideological faith dies hard, especially when its weakening seems to threaten the traditional meanings of life, although the threat becomes less difficult to face when new meanings are offered by thinkers who dare to go behind the old ideological assumptions. These thinkers, of course, may be shallow or profound. In fact, the competition among alternative assumptions to take the place of waning ideological beliefs is a major cause of the confusion in a transition age. Authentic change for the better, in such a period, proceeds on more than one front. One of these fronts is represented by insistently intuitive philosophical inquiry. The inquiry is carried on by men who combine both tough and tender-minded qualities in asking about the nature, purposes, and good of man. There is a functional kind of mysticism in this inquiry because these men always consult themselves, their deepest feelings—their uncompromised ideas—about what is real, right, and good in human life. While their vocabularies may vary widely, often seeming in serious contradiction, there is usually a family resemblance in their conclusions. As these men begin to speak out loud, what they say seems to fit with other conclusions drawn from the terrible facts of contemporary history. It is the perception of this fit which shapes the beginnings of a new social philosophy—a philosophy with two characteristics: (1) It is basically honest, and will tolerate no compromise, no expedient borrowings from the dying ideologies; (2) it is only a beginning, and it will not pretend to be anything more. Past experience of ideological delusions and deceptions makes the new protagonists more sensitive to betrayal of this basic honesty than to the appeals of a "progress" that they can no longer recognize as progress for man.

Abstractions of analysis such as the foregoing may be useful for understanding the historical process, but they are difficult to apply without special pleading. What we are speaking of is a mood that is found in varying quality and quantity, today, in the Civil Rights movement, the Peace movement, and the Student movement, which is sometimes spoken of as the New Left. Along with these identifications we need the qualification of Arthur Morgan's theory of residues, quoted recently in these pages. Dr. Morgan said:

Repeatedly, individuals or small groups gain a discriminating view of human conduct and by great effort rise above the mass, and then in the course of a few generations the distinctive character they achieved seems to be lost again in the mass, as a wave that has risen to a high crest sinks back into the ocean. Yet, I repeat, wherever a genuine contribution has been made to human living there tends to be a residue, and the accumulation of those residues constitutes civilization.

A particularly noticeable quality in the student movement is its lack of rigidity, its suspicion of ideological stances, and its insistence on a here-and-now integrity. In his report on the Berkeley revolt in *Revolution at Berkeley* (Dell), reprinted from the *New Yorker* for March 3, 1965, Calvin Trillin says:

Most Free Speech Movement leaders make no attempt to disguise their deep alienation from American society, but they regard allegiance to any specific alternative as utopian, divisive, immobilizing, and—perhaps most significant—not their style. . . . In place of ideology, the New Radicals tend to rely on action. "The word 'existential' is used a lot," Jack Weinberg told me. Weinberg, who is twenty-four, is a full-time unpaid activist; he wears a droopy mustache, and in the pictures taken during his imprisonment in The Police Car he somehow managed to resemble both Sacco and Vanzetti. "You could call it an affirmation of self," he went on. "Just because we can't see what the end might be doesn't mean we're going to sit here. It's a matter of screaming. We have to justify everything in terms of the act itself. The trouble with being ideologically oriented is that it's immobilizing; you have to justify all kinds of things in terms of the ideology. We're really problem-oriented. Utopia is too far away to worry about. FSM had a limited goal, but look what

happened. Look at the effect it could have on educational policy and student activism across the country. Who could have planned that?"

A graduate student in philosophy put the attitude of the FSM Steering Committee in these words:

"It's really a strange kind of naïveté. What we learned in grammar school about democracy and freedom nobody takes seriously, but we do. We really believe it. It's impossible to grapple with the structure of the whole world, but you try to do something about the immediate things you see that bother you and are within your reach."

Asked for an account of the New Radicalism, Mario Savio told Mr. Trillin:

"Certain words are more useful. Maybe they're a bit too theatrical. Words like 'moral protest,' 'existential revolt,' 'alienation'—as opposed to 'class conflict' or 'forces of proletarian revolution.' We're talking about the same objective reality, but it's a question of being more tentative. I don't know if all our problems would vanish if we had a state monopoly on production and distribution. I don't have a Utopia in mind. I know it has to be a good deal more egalitarian than it is now. Maybe the classic Marxist models and the classic Adam Smith models don't apply any more. There are a lot of people who have enough to eat who are incredibly resentful because their lives are meaningless. They're psychologically dispossessed. There's a feeling that they have nothing to do; the bureaucracy runs itself. Why are we so alienated? I would say for three reasons: depersonalization, hypocrisy, and the unearned privilege that comes with great wealth. The country's forms aren't so bad, if we would take them seriously, if somebody were willing to say that the emperor had no clothes. The worst thing about society is that it lies to itself. Look at the last election. The two subjects that were not issues in the campaign were Vietnam and civil rights. What's the choice? What can you do in a situation like that? Oh, add to the good words 'anti-bureaucratic tendency.' American radicals are traditionally anarchistic, and that tendency is very strong here."

The revolt at Berkeley took the form of a fight for free speech because the students felt that their effort to make these politically ignored issues real was being hampered and suppressed by administration interference. Speaking, apparently,

to people troubled by the extreme disorder at a great American university, a young philosophy professor, John Searle, explained:

The militants were forced into the leadership of the FSM because of the intransigence of the administration on an issue in which they were clearly in the wrong. Of course these people are absolutists. They are radicals. They perform a useful function in society as gadflies, but they have no loyalty to the structure, and once you've forced the population to adopt them as leaders, you have trouble. The problem is not how to handle them. The problem is how not to get into a position where a mass movement has to turn to them for leadership.

This is a slightly oblique way of pointing out that it is too late to make mild accommodations to the demands of the students. "Liberal" adjustments are not good enough. From now on the moral intelligence behind radical criticisms will have to be faced, or the disturbances will only get worse.

The resistance to ideological formula among the students is their way of keeping their intuitive sense of freedom in the foreground of all their decisions. This becomes, as Trillin says, a kind of "style." It is probably the best substitute they can have for a clearer conception of ends. As they explain, they are "problem-oriented." One of the leaders told Paul Goodman that he thought "abstract values" were entirely dead for his generation, although they meant something for his "father and grandfather." But there is a sense in which abstract or primary values are embodied in the "style" of the student revolt. Goodman puts it well:

. . . the event has been not that the young exiles have been politicalized but that politics have been "existentialized" and brought into the community. . . . the thoughts and feelings of the young have been more relevant to the underlying realities of modern times, the drive to rationalize, the abuse of high technology, and the hardware GNP, statism and the bomb. These abuses occur in every modern country and ideology whether U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, or even the emergent African states; and Great Society, Neo-Marxism, and even moral Pacifism do not fundamentally address them.

This essay by Paul Goodman, reprinted from *Dissent in Revolution at Berkeley*, puts the revolt in a frame of humanized understanding. He tells what it was about in relation to the University itself. The leadership, he points out, came from graduate students and teaching assistants:

One would have expected, in the era of organization man that precisely the bright graduate students, the junior-executives, would be the most conformist, to protect their status and advancement; yet we see at Berkeley that the teaching-assistants provided leaders and almost unanimously went on strike.

. . . on the one hand they [the students] distrust everybody over thirty; on the other, they want the professors to become part of the fringe community, to give it intellectual structure and self-assurance. And finally, as American citizens, they want self-rule, not only of their own social life like the medieval student government, but also to have a say in the administrative and curricular doings: that is, the distant regents are regarded as illegitimate. This novel amalgam, then, of a fringe community of the young and masters of arts; "personal relations" between the students and the professors, and student membership on the Board of Regents—this amalgam is the free university.

On the campus, this ramshackle constitution proved to have political power. The organized guerrillas sat in. Then, "when the teaching assistants went out," said a professor, "it was all over because we can't run the school without them, and if we fired them, we'd never get another good graduate in California." And then the faculty, as Professor Wolin put it "stirred to ancestral memories of the ideal of a community of scholars bound together in a spirit of friendly persuasion and pledged to truth rather than abundance."—So the governor had to send his troopers and for a couple of days Clark Kerr's multiversity ceased to exist.

The question is: if such a free university exists in the offing, to whom, to what government, will the federal government, the foundations, and the corporations channel all that money that is the fuel of modern education? It's as bad as dealing with Saigon.

Since Goodman has probably done more than anyone else to describe the problems of both modern education and modern society in

comprehensible language, we ought to take him as seriously as we can—even his jokes, since he is aware, as the rest of us ought to be, that the day may soon come when they won't be jokes but the grimmest kind of reality.

There is, however, another approach to this entire question. It grows out of the subjective pursuit of the good. Common opinion believes that the path of the mystic has little to do with humanitarian yearnings and that the mystical inquirer seldom responds to a revolutionary call. This view has been summarized by Mark Schorer in *William Blake—The Politics of Vision*:

The mystic and the revolutionary are opposed in principle for the revolutionary . . . wishes to alter institutions in order to produce a better human situation; the mystic . . . assumes that the human situation is good enough for what it is supposed to be. The typical attitude of the mystic is exemplified in the *Theologica Germanica* . . . "they know very well that order and fitness are better than disorder, and therefore they choose to walk orderly, yet know at the same time that their salvation hangeth not thereon."

It was Blake's failure to conform to this dichotomy that interested Mr. Schorer, to the point of denying that he was a "mystic," yet we should prefer to drop the dichotomy, instead of Blake's title to being a mystic, for he was certainly that. What ought to be abandoned is rather the habit of restricting the meaning of "mystic" to a certain kind of religious person.

If the new radicals have been busy "existentializing" politics, the new psychologists have been busy humanizing mysticism. "Humanizing" seems to be a better account of the work of men like Carl Rogers and A. H. Maslow—particularly the latter—since to call it "naturalizing" would tend to rule out transcendental meaning, and the self-actualizing human being may be rich in transcendental insight. However, the self-actualizer, in Maslow's definitions, is as resistant to stereotyped theological versions of meaning as the new radical is to ideological contentions and forms of analysis. The self-actualizer is also reluctant to "make

politics"—in fact, he will not make politics at all in any conventional sense—yet he is often found on fronts which are starkly in behalf of man, before they become merely political fronts. He responds, in short, to the demands of an extreme situation.

Now these, of course, are fighting words. With a fine scorn the political person contends that no one with pretensions to living a dedicated life should wait until the situation becomes "extreme," and he has a program that requires the services of all good men *right now*. Yet this harsh insistence is exactly what both the new radicals and the new psychologists resist. The radicals resist out of the same reading of ideological betrayal that Dwight Macdonald made in the 40's (in *The Root Is Man*), and the psychologists resist because of their personal experience and knowledge of the processes of human growth. Both want humanly, not ideologically or technologically, scaled action. Both want immediacy in ethical behavior, not the promise of a good that comes only at the out-of-sight end of a long production line of morally indifferent or actually evil or inhuman action. And both admit that they have no "big theories," no utopian plans. If they have any politics at all, it is a politics that bends to the requirements of ethical principles.

The position leaves much to be desired. It is vulnerable to endless practical criticism. Yet it has a shining personal integrity which is exactly what is lacking in all the other positions. That integrity is the one thing modern man cannot do without and survive. It is more important than the bomb. While the bomb cannot be abolished, it can be ignored. And only men of integrity are capable of ignoring it—of putting it out of their universe of thought and action, along with other unspeakable and unthinkable evils that human beings have devised and learned to tolerate in their effort to be "practical."

We have been attempting, here, to describe what seems the slowly emerging foundation of a new philosophy of man, on which, in time, may be erected a new social philosophy. Success in any

such undertaking will depend upon the willingness of men to cut their ideological losses and make a fresh start that is solidly based on admission of ignorance and failure. The undertaking may very well set out with texts from poets and writers, and from Socratic political theorists who understand what the poets and writers are talking about—as, for example, George P. Elliot, when he says:

Nothing is harder than to have a clear, steady and sound idea of what society is and what it should be. I must speak for myself: I realize that I could not define the word to anyone's satisfaction; like many, I sometimes in desperation identify society with the state—whence horrors ensue. The word "democratic" has ceased to have any more independent meaning than the word "united" in United States. We have no good analogy by which to comprehend our society.

The men of the eighteenth century, whose ignorance but not their vision we still have with us, did not know how difficult it is to contain "society" within a scheme of rational definitions, nor how hazardous it would be to release the energies of men without a framing conception of meaning that has a stronger principle of order in it than secular humanitarianism. Nature, the synonym of the Sacred for the *philosophes*, has turned out to have just the potentialities we choose to take out of her, and is no longer the balance principle of social order. The Nature of contemporary science is hardly a model from which sagacious law-makers can read off meanings of Natural Law.

We have now to find our own way, of ourselves. What this means for the future, in terms of social theory, in terms of workable plans, in terms of proper matrices for human growth, we hardly know at all. So we are back with Socrates, and the time has come to admit it. Admitting it turns Socratic ignorance into Socratic wisdom. In this way, the new radicals and the new psychologists are right. They will have traffic only with what they *know* is good for man. If you say that what they know isn't much, we can only answer that, for a start, it is going to have to be

enough. There is a sense in which it is more than anyone else has known for several hundred years.

REVIEW

THE MYTHS THAT KILL

ALL myths, the psychologists tell us, are projections of the desires of men. As with dramatic literature, the desires so expressed may be released hostilities or they may be released aspirations. At its best, the classical "myth" dramatizes the struggle of the human soul toward creativity, integrity and enlightenment. Consequently, as Joseph Campbell has said, there is only one great story to be told in however many ways. The idea of the "monomyth" suggests, for example, an essential identity between the representational adventures and the directly recognizable spiritual quest of a Buddha.

Another indication of identity among great myths and legends is that the obstacles encountered by a Theseus or a Buddha are never portrayed as localized "evil."

The Minotaur and Medusa couldn't help being what *they* were; but Theseus as hero, as human being, was capable of growth and change—of becoming something more than he was at any given moment. In other words, the Greek who responded to the myth was not so much interested in seeing "evil" eliminated as in seeing Theseus ennoble his identity by accepting tasks which reached beyond the limitations of most men. The Buddha did not acquire disciples by pointing to sources of evil in men or groups of men, but by pointing only to generalized sources of ignorance—within each man in varying degree and to the possibility of progressive spiritual awakenings which would banish ignorance in principle.

On the other hand, there are also "myths" of opposite psychological effect—those concerned, not with Christ, but with anti-Christ. These are the inventions of men who wish to localize evil in some force, person, group or nation. They are the myths that kill, and will continue to kill so long as we allow them to shape behavior. For to focus on "evil," locating it where we want it to be, is to

give up the search for truth, to evade the true moral problem.

In this context we present an analysis of the mythic origins of war-proneness. The following is from a Pacifica radio broadcast on "Myth Maintenance," by Dr. Marshall Windmiller, Associate Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State College:

All societies have their myths and legends. They perform useful functions. They help to unite people and provide the rationale for concerted action. They generally have some basis in fact, but more often they depart from true reality and embrace fantasy. The myth of the chosen people, that is, a nation chosen by God for a divine mission, does not lend itself to factual proof, yet it has been believed by countless peoples throughout history, and is put forth in all seriousness even today by people who should know better. One example is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. In a speech which appears in the December 6, 1963 *Congressional Record* he said: "This nation was conceived under God and its progress has been under God. There could be no greater disaster for our Nation than that it should deny in any respect, to even the smallest degree, the presence, the power, the guidance, the protection, the instruction of Almighty God." "There is unmistakable evidence," said Mr. Hoover, "of divine guidance all through the history of our nation."

The central myth of America today is an extension and modernization of the chosen people concept. Briefly stated it is this: the American people have a great mission to save the world from Communism, the modern embodiment of all evil. "Communists never rest," said California Congressman James B. Utt in the *Congressional Record*, December 6 1963. "To a Communist, betrayal is honorable, the lie a cynical weapon, and violence the fulfillment of life."

But it is not only ignorant extremists like Congressman Utt who fortify America's great myth about Communism. Many liberals and radicals on the left either promote it or acquiesce in it. A good example is the liberal Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. Morse is the most vigorous critic in the Senate of President Johnson's war in Vietnam, and of many other aspects of foreign policy. Yet he always pays tribute to the great American myth. "I yield to no one in this country," he told the Senate last July

16, "in my hatred of everything that the ideology of Communism stands for." Morse hardly ever makes a speech on foreign policy without saying something that will prove his fidelity to the great myth of anti-communism. It has become a vital part of our political process, and a central feature of our political campaigns. Loyalty to the myth has become the main issue of the current gubernatorial campaign in New Jersey, and will probably dominate the elections campaign in California next year. The leading Republican contender for Governor here is film star Ronald Reagan who is supported by the John Birch Society, and whose major qualification for public office appears to be his dedication to the myth. The highest official in California's educational system is State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Max Rafferty. He has worked hard to insure that high school students are thoroughly indoctrinated with the mythology of anti-communism. He said that the high schools should, and I quote him, "unemotionally teach how rotten Communism is."

Prof. Windmiller is here describing what has been called "political animism." Just as primitive man ascribed to natural forces a human animus, so do the myth-makers of our day attribute to the nations which embrace a certain "ideology" qualities of motivation that belong properly only to individuals. As Dwight Macdonald once put it: "The urban cave dwellers of our time feel much better about war if they can think of the enemy nation as a person like themselves only bigger, which can be collectively punched in the nose for the evil actions it collectively chooses to do." A classic statement of political animism, published in 1941 to justify collective punishment of the entire German people, was formulated by Morley Roberts. He said in *The Behaviour of Nations*: "I shall speak of the State, or national organism, as a living, breathing 'animal,' since breathing is what the word means, which belongs to a low-grade invertebrate order not yet recognized by classical zoologists, although it is possible that a few biologists in their private meditations have ventured so far into the unknown."

From this absolute premise it was easy to reject any moral distinction between Hitler and the other "organic units" of the German body politic. Always, in time of war, the tendency is to resort

to broader and broader abstractions in identifying the "enemy." Such expedient wartime use of the myths that kill has repeatedly made both wars and the subsequent terms of "peace" useless. As Trigant Burrow wrote in *The Neurosis of Man* after World War II: "In this world of dichotomy and conflict, the war we have just fought will have been fought in vain. It will have been no less vain than the many political, economic and religious wars that have preceded it." He continues:

Vain, too, will be the unilateral programme of peace that must necessarily issue out of it. Vain all our international covenants, all our diplomatic treaties. For all the peace programmes yet to be devised must remain for ever unavailing if our behaviour-dichotomies and antagonisms are ultimately traceable to a functional brain-twist resident within the organism of man himself.

The problem of man's behaviour is not a problem of politics, of economics or of morals based upon personal "rightness" with its mutable and arbitrary evaluations. It is a problem internal to man. The neurosis of man is a problem of man's self that man must take upon himself. The time has come for man to face the unilateral system of behavior that is of his own unilateral making.

Prof. Windmiller also believes that "the time has come" for the nations to accept a new kind of responsibility, and offers evidence of a trend in this direction:

We have repeated over and over again that Communism is totally evil, that it is a force which is out to destroy us and that we must stamp out Communism or anything that looks like Communism wherever in the world we encounter it. This mythology is the central tenet of what is almost a state religion in America. It is also the main prop of our economic system of the way we collect our taxes, spend our public monies, and distribute the fruits of our productive system. It provides the rationale for vast expenditures on weapons, for our senseless race to put a man on the moon, and for all of the great private fortunes that are amassed in the process. It provides the excuse for our failure to prevent the pollution of our air and water supplies, to protect our forests and wild life, to build enough transportation and enough schools, to train enough teachers and to provide for a decent retirement for our aged. We don't do these things because they require long-range

planning and long-range planning we are told is socialism, and socialism is the same as Communism. "Both Communism and socialism seek to destroy our economic system," Senator Strom Thurmond told the Senate, "and their success . . . will destroy not only our economic system, but our liberty . . . as well."

Part of the strategy is to use the myth to defend the mythology; to charge that those who protest against the war are Communists or are dupes of Communists. Will it work again?

I don't think it will work. We are dealing with a new generation. It is courageous and it is stubborn. It has been tested in the jails of Mississippi and Alabama. It can be persecuted and imprisoned, but it cannot be silenced. Moreover, this courage and determination has been contagious. It has infected the entire intellectual community, and unlike the McCarthy era, the intellectuals are not going to be silent. They are going to continue to protest, and their protests are going to become stronger, more sophisticated, and increasingly effective. Before long the structure of mythology is going to crumble, and in its place a new America is going to build something better, something more suited to the great traditions of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and Abraham Lincoln.

COMMENTARY
VARIOUS "BREAK-THROUGHS"

A PRIVATE school bulletin referred to in this week's "Children" speaks of the break-throughs which occur in the social sciences, calling them "as momentous and far-reaching as those in the physical sciences," and adding that "the new understandings about man and his behavior may prove far more significant for man's future."

There is doubtless a sense in which this is completely true: there *is* a psychological break-through now going on in the social sciences, and the results promise to be all that this writer suggests. But the larger break-throughs of the present, it seems to us, are so multiform and so insistent that their dimensions are wider than any branch of science could contain.

The student movement, the anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, the movement called Third Force in psychology, the new spirit in studies of the myth, the endless experiments going on in education—these add up to considerably more than an event in the social sciences. They amount to widely-felt stirrings of a new spirit in man.

The obstacles? The obstacles, while formidable enough are no more than the shells of existing institutions, the patterns of unthinking behavior, the securities of an unimaginative life.

A few weeks ago we met a man in his thirties who has the idea of starting a school in which the teachers will be people who want to teach, the students young adults who want to learn. No money will be exchanged. No one will pay or be paid. This young man, himself a teacher, is a talented individual who knows how to sell from door to door. He has a good line and housewives are glad to see him when he calls. He can, he says, make more than \$150 a week, without excessive effort. He plans to rent a big old house in Los Angeles and start his school. He thinks he can find both teachers and students for evening classes. There will be no credits and no degrees.

Just the rewards and excitement of teaching and learning.

The fact that an idea like this one can be put to work only in a city of some size is very nearly sufficient justification for having cities—they are foci for break-throughs. In fact, one of the most notable achievements in adult education began in more or less this way in New York City many years ago. The city is a place where, "by great effort," men are able to "rise above the mass," and to create a matrix which lifts many others. This is the way Mr. Mumford thinks about cities—the germ, you could say, of another "break-through."

Most of all, however, the break-throughs are coming as a result of many spontaneous awakenings of human beings to the vision and necessity of a better life. The awakenings lead to action—action which changes men's lives.

CHILDREN

... and Ourselves

EDUCATION AND DR. MASLOW

THE quietly pervasive influence of Abraham Maslow's innovations in psychology shows a truly astonishing range. The students and faculty of California Institute of Technology, at one end of the spectrum, eagerly sought and received (in 1964) an address on "Science and Self-Actualization." On the other hand, liberal church educators, and not alone the Unitarians, are similarly appreciating and making use of the basic propositions found in Maslow's *Toward a Psychology of Being and Religion, Values, and Peak-Experiences*. Dr. Maslow is also a reservoir of vital ideas concerning the fundamental meaning of education in universities, adult schools, and small private institutions. For example, a brochure of the Lar School, Albuquerque, New Mexico, sent to us by a subscriber, contains the following adaptation of the conception of "self-actualization":

The number of possible choices in any school situation is the measure of the possible prescriptions. A Lar School program presents innumerable alternatives. It may be as little as one hour per week or as much as forty hours per week. A program may be alone with a tutor or in a group of nine students. A program may be one day long or ten years long. It may begin at any time and end at any time. It may be interrupted at any time and resumed at any time. It may be entirely academic or entirely social. It may focus on one skill, or have general academic purposes. It may accelerate or slow down the usual pace of learning. We will, if it is needed, teach calculus to an eight-year-old or simple addition to an adult.

From a great psychologist, Maslow, we borrow another basic concept. He states that human needs exist in a hierarchy and that certain basic needs must be met before other needs can be developed and be pursued. Thus the needs for love, nurture, belonging, and security, are basic and the need to grow up, to learn and to master new skills, is built upon that foundation.

Our first task is to make the child feel safe, cared for, concerned for, appreciated and belonging. He is liked, accepted, and given a place first—not made to earn it. It is his birthright by our standard of values. Any teacher or tutor at any point who dislikes a child feels impelled to confess it, to understand it, to find the understanding or a relationship which changes his feeling toward the child, or to transfer the child to another tutor.

We will not expect that the need to learn will arise until we have attended adequately the basic needs.

The teacher in tune with the student becomes aware of the driving forces in him, the fears, the angers, the frustrations the sense of adventure, the thrill of mastery, the desire to please, the jealousy of others who do better. This sharing of feelings about learning may be called the vital relationship between teacher and learner. It is the emotional component of their relationship and the motivating force which keeps both in the relationship. To the extent that we succeed where others fail, we believe it is most of all because we create more opportunity for this relationship to flourish.

For the teacher especially, this system is a satisfying experience. More than any other professional person the public school teacher practices alone. His day by day judgments meet a pragmatic test with his pupils but they seldom need be observed or communicated to any other professional person. He is almost entirely dependent upon himself to change and grow. The teacher becomes as aware of himself in relationship to other professions as an attorney in court or a surgical nurse in the operating theatre.

A text for adult education instructors, *How Adults Learn* by J. R. Kidd, utilizes Maslow as a primary source for the view of "life-long learning": education can be intelligibly regarded only as "life-long" because motivation never rests. It continually seeks further forms of expression, and the closest one can come to stating the *purpose* of education is to describe it as a means to "self-actualization, self-fulfillment, self-expression, use of one's capacities 'to be the most one is capable of being'." On this ground Dr. Kidd proceeds to a justifiable optimism:

More and more, as objective evidence comes in, it becomes clearer that man has only begun to use the

resources of his mind and being. The author deeply believes that all human beings can be aided to become increasingly self-reliant and autonomous, that the most important single principle is that the learner be fully *engaged*, and that the main goal of adult learning is to develop men and women who are, at the same time, compassionately sensitive and tough-minded.

This is the language, clearly, of both Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. Many educators have encountered Maslow and Rogers by way of *Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming*, the 1963 yearbook of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development of NEA. From the Rose Valley School in Pennsylvania we have an example of a use of the material in *Perceiving* for a communication to parents. Maslow and Rogers, in the words of this bulletin, encourage teachers to proceed "on the fact that in recent years a new concept of the nature of man and the limits of his potential has come into psychology, sometimes called the 'third force' or perceptual psychology." The bulletin continues:

The ideas are not new, but are far from being understood in practice. As the editors point out, "we are accustomed to shifts in our thinking in the physical sciences. We expect them. But breakthroughs occur in the social sciences as well, with results that may be as momentous and far reaching as those in the physical sciences, and it is possible that the new understandings about man and his behavior may prove far more significant for man's future." The time lag between the production of ideas and their working out in practice in institutions is very great. How long is it since the laws of learning were very thoroughly explained, but how far are they from general acceptance in schools? But now, the increased tempo of events indicates that the best we know should be converted into practice as soon as possible.

The drive of the new student movement to liberate the university from sterile repetition of categorized learning certainly embodies the idea of self-actualization. The Free University of New York, in one statement, has related isolated promptings to rebellion or protest to a philosophical evaluation of the total university experience:

Students have been systematically dehumanized, deemed incompetent to regulate their own lives, sexually, politically and academically. They are treated like raw material to be processed for the university's clients—business, government and military bureaucracies. Teachers, underpaid and constantly subject to investigation and purge, have been relegated to the position of servant-intellectuals, required, for regular promotion, to propagate points of view in harmony with the military and industrial leadership of our society.

The American university has been emasculated. Its intellectual vigor, exuberance and excitement have been destroyed. What remains is a dispassionate and studied dullness, a facade of scholarly activity concealing an internal emptiness and cynicism, a dusty-dry search for permissible truth which pleases none but the administrator and the ambitious.

In a *Nation* (Aug. 16, 1965) article titled "Academy for Mavericks," Howard Junker indicates the far-reaching implications of such influences:

Now that American students are beginning to develop a sense of themselves as an oppressed minority with a national identity, now that students know how to organize themselves, the notion of a Free University will spread. FUNY is an alternative manner and kind of education, capable of being put into practice not by negotiating with the enemy but by independent resolve. Freedom, at least to learn and teach, is sometimes available for the asking.

FRONTIERS

"The City"—through Mumford's Eyes

EVEN if you are one of those who early in life became a convert to Ralph Borsodi's *Flight from the City*, and are convinced that the chief thing to do about the city is to abolish it or get out of it, Lewis Mumford's six half-hour films on *The City* (produced by the National Film Board of Canada, and distributed by Sterling Educational Films) will compel second thoughts on the subject. MANAS has kindly been provided with review copies of these films, and this is our report.

If you look at all six in a single sitting, you are likely to be dazed, if not overwhelmed, by the tumultuous procession of imagery. The analogy of slicing an anthill in half and watching the agitated insects tumble over one another, besides being presumptuous, doesn't really help—ants don't do all those crazy things. People are busier with the symbols in their lives than they are with the business of living, and you can't say that about ants. What is the spectator most likely to remember? It is more a question of what he will be unable to forget—as, for example, the bas reliefs found in ancient Assyrian cities which Mr. Mumford puts on the screen in the first reel. The figures have a majesty that cleanses and awes. You wish Mr. Mumford would recite some poetry instead of cultural anthropology. You wish you could stay in Assyria the whole three hours. You remember Jacquetta Hawkes saying—

What has mattered most over the last fifty thousand years is the individual man's and woman's inner experience of life. A woman may be living more fully, dancing to make the corn grow than in dancing in the cafe de Paris; a man may have more primitive thoughts driving to Wall Street in a Cadillac than trotting to Ur on a donkey.

—and you wonder when the stockbroker will reconcile himself with this truth. Can cities have the qualities Mr. Mumford longs for before this kind of perception dawns in a lot of people?

The modern city is an enormous, sickly organism that works like a machine on the

outside, poorly helped along by a lot of Rube Goldberg devices, kept going inwardly by the tired hearts of the people who live there and know no other way of life. As a social organism the city lacks the wisdom of nature and its builders seldom accept the wisdom of man—as found, for example, in Mr. Mumford. Avarice, expedience, and short-term solutions for unexpected problems create the modern city, along with occasional monuments of sheer technological genius, some happy accidents, and a few intentional generousities such as New York's Central Park.

The broad-gauge rhetoric of Mr. Mumford's presentation is meant to make you ask who is responsible for all this. When he says "we" in talking about what we have let happen to our cities, you wonder who the "we" includes. This "we" comes so easily to him that after a while it seems like a euphemistic curtain to hide a totally unmanageable problem. We should do thus and so, he says. Then he shows you scenes in Holland, where the people did it.

That, we say, was different, and of course it was. But what do we expect of Mr. Mumford? How much more than a display of ills that are hardly recognized by the rest of us, can we ask of one man? These films dramatize situations that can be bettered only by a flood-tide of moral intelligence, generated by a vision of public responsibility and controlled by mechanisms designed in a spirit of mutual trust.

Accepting, then, Mr. Mumford's role as friendly diagnostician—part Jeremiah, part Cassandra, and part compassionater of the lonely crowd—and accepting ourselves as latecomers to a drama that began with sacred meanings but somewhere lost its plot and fell into the hands of shills and mountebanks, we may begin to look at these films with some vague sense of what they are about.

The first reel contrasts the ancient with the modern city—the myth versus the vulgar utility. The second, titled "Cars or People?", is intended to make people who drive cars realize that they

are getting about in shoes twenty feet long, that the accommodations of their transport have made the accommodations for people cramped, inefficient, and endlessly wasteful of space and time. First time around, about all this reel can do for you is to make you ask if a freeway traffic jam is a symptom of urban thrombosis. Mr. Mumford has some schemes for flushing the city's arteries, but they call for a lot of "we" type thinking.

Reel 3, "The City and its Religion," looks at the symbiosis of city and countryside. Contemplating these physiological relationships through Mr. Mumford's eyes brings on a conflict of private/public feelings. Mr. Mumford thinks about the two-way flow of nourishment between city and country, while the viewer, unless he is very different from his fellows, thinks mainly of some personal version of the pastoral ideal. Maybe you just close your eyes until you get out of reach of the beer-can psychosis, longing for the wilderness-lover's respite—we almost said "fix"—or some kind of coming up for air. If so, Mr. Mumford makes you feel ashamed. The city is a mess, he points out, from the accumulated residues left by thousands of private solutions. His kind of country-city relationships would make you glad to look at the city when coming in, and glad to see the country when going out—and this, not because of show-window landscaping but because the arrangement fits the natural flow of human life on many levels.

Reels 4 and 5 come close to being horrors. "The Heart of the City" (4) is "a study of the growing sterility, dullness and congestion that is destroying the vitality, variety and breadth that once made cities physically attractive and humanly creative." "The City as Man's Home" (5) is a similar statement: "Slums, giant public housing complexes, anonymous and bleak luxury apartments—almost everywhere in our cities communal standards of living are falling even as personal standards of living rise. How did this happen and what can our cities do to improve communal living standards?" The viewer is obliged

to stand off and inspect the tiresome ugliness with which we are all surrounded, to recognize the monotony that gives security its colorless character. It is an ugliness sown in the grain, to which we become indifferent through constant exposure. It is the unspoken credo of a mass truancy from life.

Reel 6, "The City and the Future," "examines prospects for the city and ways to restore its role as the focus of man's highest achievement." The choice is defined as between more "low-grade urban sprawl or a new kind of regional city."

One may think of these films as a kind of bridge from the finally failing ideals of the Renaissance to an as yet undisclosed idealism of the future. Mr. Mumford is an envisioning artisan whose patron is the *polis*, whose mind and skills have used the techniques of science and modern historical research to give vivid objectivity to existing forms of community living. Yet there is little community in our lives, and the *polis* is a scholarly recollection instead of the cultural consciousness of modern man. Fortunately, Mr. Mumford has a growing audience. If you could isolate the Mumford enthusiasts, you would have a nucleus of the sort of people who have some hope of creating a *polis* in modern times.

These films are 16mm. black and white, 28 minutes each. Individual prints are \$135.00, the complete series \$750. Purchase may be made from Sterling Educational Films, Inc., 241 East 34th Street, New York 16, N.Y.