PROBLEMS OF THE INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY

SINCE the days of Pythagoras and his school at Krotona, and of Plato, with his Republic, men of the West have dreamed of establishing an "ideal community"—a place and environment where people would be able to express their full capacities and to realize their cherished goals. The history of community and Utopia-making is contained in scores, probably hundreds, of volumes. The yearning to remake society, or some portion of it, is apparently a basic drive in human beings, and, naturally enough, it has found frequent expression in the United States, where the idea of change, of radical break with tradition, is itself almost a tradition. Let any broadly significant innovation in thought appear in America, and before long there will be those who are determined to develop it into a complete way of life. In illustration of this tendency, there is the following letter to the editors of MANAS:

> You're so turned on over humanistic psychology that I thought you might do well to read and perhaps publish a reaction to what I consider a fatal gap in humanistic psychology. I believe that the psychic values espoused by such people as Rogers and Maslow have social requisites which are largely ignored. That is, I believe that people (and only in small, independent communities would this be conceivable) must actualize a correlative social ethic before the psychological values so espoused can really have a chance of developing widely and easily. Quoting from my essay (enclosed):

> "The essential changes in a social system . . . would consist in substituting the principle of mutual, voluntary, tentative agreements for oligarchic and traditional law and custom; in eliminating the rigidity of the traditional set curriculum and corresponding teaching methods from education at all levels; in the substitution of cooperation for competition, economically; in the elimination of the use of punishment, fear and shame; in removing and/or bypassing the life-inhibiting effects of taboo—especially in the realm of eroticism, and in general finding new and better ways for the continuing development of 'humanness'."

> RICHARD CLARK
> San Francisco

It is doubtless somewhat unfair to Mr. Clark to skip to the end of his essay and quote its last sentence, but since we do not plan a careful critique of his paper, but rather an examination of the general question of community-founding, this sentence helps us to get a start. "What," he concludes, "are we waiting for?"

Well, whatever his readers reply, we can guess what Mr. Clark is waiting for. He is waiting for enough like-minded people to get the project going; he is waiting for (or working on) a solution to the practical problem of an economic base for the community—or, at any rate, for the wherewithal needed, at least initially, to put together the physical shell of the psychic environment that is to embody the principles he describes.

Of course, it is conceivable that people with already-existing means of support could combine forces and live together to practice and experiment with these ideas. This might work, but if "the substitution of cooperation for competition" is to be taken literally, the experimental community proposed would have to include the establishment of an economic program which makes the members at least partially independent of the larger, prevailing economic system. This places the project in the category of more or less "total" communities which do indeed attempt to control all the major aspects of the social environment.

How will this project differ from the numerous attempts at community living which have gone before? It will differ in the terms of its formulation of the content of the good life, and in the fact that it is an avowedly "experimental undertaking." At the outset, Mr. Clark says:

> This paper is about the good that can come from experimenting with man-in-society, not in an impossibly rigorous, scientific way, but in a pragmatic way. That is, I propose that men not merely classify and theorize about interpersonal relationships, but that they experiment and test hypotheses with themselves as a large living group— as an experimental autonomous "society in the making"

or pragmatic community. It would be a continuous event where people would be responsible for themselves in a meaningful and demonstrable way individually and as a group; they would, so to speak, gain a new degree of freedom.

Two questions occur here. The first is whether the grounds or common bonds of the proposed association are strong enough to hold the group together under the strains of community living and cooperative economic labors. The past history of the community movement, far more than any untutored speculations of ours, raises this question. In any event, it seems reasonable for anyone planning a project of this sort to spend some time in one of the existing communities and to experience at first hand the kind of disciplines that community living requires and the problems which arise. It seems certain that, whatever the distinctive qualities of this plan, its application will, at the outset, have more things in common with other communities, past and present, than differences from them.

For reading on this subject, we suggest a pamphlet by Henri Lasserre, *The Communities of Tolstoyans,* published by the Rural Cooperative Community Council and Canadian Fellowship for Cooperative Community (Toronto, Canada, 1944, 25 cents). While interesting in itself, this pamphlet also has an excellent bibliography of the literature on the subject. Two of the books named may be mentioned here: *The Communistic Societies of the United States,* by Charles Nordhoff (Harper, 1875), and *History of American Socialisms,* by John Humphrey Noyes (Lippincott, 1870). The Nordhoff book is especially good for the reason that its author lived for months in the communities he wrote about, giving a first-hand quality to his reports. Noyes is instructive since he is no writer-historian, but the founder of the Oneida Community. It was his contention, largely verified by general experience, that no community can survive without a transcendental or religious dynamic which is capable of submerging practical causes of dissension.

"Survival," of course, is not the most important thing about a community. The "failures" may have been well worth attempting. But a review of the factors of failure and survival should be of considerable interest.

The second question we are prompted to ask concerns the validity of the assumptions made by Mr. Clark in the letter introducing his paper. "I believe," he says, "that people (and only in small, independent communities would this be conceivable) must actualize a correlative social ethic before the psychological values [of humanistic psychology] can really have a chance of developing widely and easily."

At issue here is the nature of the self-actualizing process, and whether, or how, and with what consequence it relates to or is dependent upon "social requisites." A further question would be whether, under *any* circumstances, the psychological values spoken of can be "easily" developed. The basis of this question lies in the fact that *some* values are wholly unattainable without struggle or striving. There are many things which people can do for other people, but making "maturity" or "vision" goals that are easily reached is certainly not among them.

Then, for example, there is a passage in Tolstoy's *Intimate Diary (Journal Intime,* published in Geneva in 1910 by Paul Birukoff, one of Tolstoy's closest associates):

> To withdraw into a community, to live this community life, to preserve in it a certain innocence—all this is a sin, an error! One cannot purify oneself alone or even in a small company. If one wishes to purify oneself, it must be done with others without separating oneself from the rest of the world. It is like wanting to clean a place by working at the edges where it is already clean. No! He who seeks to do good work must plunge right into the mire. At least, if he is already in it, he must not think that he should escape from it.

This is Tolstoyan altruism, expressed in the vocabulary of the nineteenth century. Is there a parallel between the quality of Tolstoy's thought and the contemporary idea of self-actualization? In *Toward a Psychology of Being,* A. H. Maslow has this paragraph

> My findings indicate that in the normal perceptions of self-actualizing people and in the more occasional peak experiences of average people, *perception can be relatively ego-transcending, self-forgetful, egoless.* It can be unmotivated, impersonal, desireless, unselfish, not

needing, detached. It can be object-centered rather than ego-centered.

It is difficult to imagine the self-actualizing person pining for a better environment. He might, that is, want a better environment for all, but he would not pine for it. The quality of his life is not the product of his environment, but of his transcendence of the limitations of environment. In his chapter, "Health as Transcendence of Environment," Dr. Maslow says:

> To the extent that we try to master the environment or be effective with it, to that extent do we cut the possibility of full, objective, detached, noninterfering cognition. Only if we let it be, can we perceive fully. Again, to cite psychotherapeutic experience, the more eager we are to make a diagnosis and a plan of action, the *less* helpful do we become. The more eager we are to cure, the longer it takes. Every psychiatric researcher has to learn not to *try* to cure, *not* to be impatient. In this and in many other situations, to give in is to overcome, to be humble is to succeed. The Taoists and Zen Buddhists taking this path were able a thousand years ago to see what we psychologists are only beginning to be aware of.

Here, in effect, is a serious questioning of the "activist" approach to psychological health, or maturity, or self-actualization. You don't get it, that is, by going after it, nor does it seem probable that you can "set up an experiment" as a means of producing it. What seems more likely is that the good community will result *from* increasing self-actualization. Our question, here, is as to the advisability of setting up the community first. Of course, if you could collect enough properly actualized people and persuade them to join in such a project, there might be interesting results, but the chances are that they would be busy with other matters which they regarded as more promising.

On the other hand, it would be foolish to argue that nothing can be said about an environment which could be expected to contribute to the development of humanistic psychological values. Quite a lot can be said, but it soon becomes evident that what is needed is not so much the correct plan as the correct *people.* In the section entitled, "Some Basic Propositions," Dr. Maslow writes:

> Another crucial aspect of healthy growth of self-hood and full-humanness is dropping away the techniques used by the child, in his weakness and smallness for adapting himself to the strong, large, all-powerful, omniscient, godlike adults. He must replace these with the techniques of being strong and independent and of being a parent himself. This involves especially giving up the child's desperate wish for the exclusive, total love of his parents while learning to love others. He must learn to gratify his own needs and wishes, rather than the needs of his parents, and he must learn to gratify them himself, rather than depending upon the parents to do this for him. He must give up being good out of fear and in order to keep their love, and must be good because *he* wishes to be. He must discover his own conscience and give up his internalized parents as a sole ethical guide. All these techniques by which weakness adapts itself to strength are necessary for the child but immature and stunting to the adult He must replace fear with courage.

> From this point of view, a society or culture can be either growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting. The sources of growth and of humanness are essentially within the human person and are not created or invented by society, which can only help or hinder the development of humanness, just as a gardener can help or hinder the growth of a rosebush, but cannot determine that it shall be an oak tree. This is true even though we know that a culture is a sine qua non for the actualization of humanness itself, e.g., language, abstract thought, ability to love but these exist as potentialities in human germ plasm prior to culture.

> This makes theoretically possible a comparative sociology transcending and including cultural relativity. The "better" culture gratifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization. The "poorer" cultures do not. The same is true for education. To the extent that it fosters growth toward self-actualization, it is "good" education.

> As soon as we speak of "good" or "bad" cultures, and take them as means rather than ends, the concept of "adjustment" comes into question. We must ask, "What kind of culture or subculture is the 'well adjusted' person well adjusted *to?"* Adjustment is, very definitely, *not* necessarily synonymous with psychological health.

The question now to be asked is: Can an experiment in community be designed as a means of obtaining better information about the qualities of a "good" culture? This is more or less the question implied by our correspondent. We can stipulate the qualification set by Tolstoy, namely, that what is done is in behalf of the larger society, since the experiment would be conducted to convert educational and humanistic hopes into scientific

principles. However, might the conditions of the experiment turn out to be so artificial, in relation to the problems of the larger society, that the magic of self-actualization would not work? An individual's answer to this question might be the decisive factor in determining whether or not he would want to take part in such an experiment.

Perhaps we should hear more of what Mr. Clark has in mind. He writes in his paper:

> Our era is supposedly the scientific one, yet our beliefs and methods for raising and educating our children, for instance, remain static and culturally fixed in the same way. And characteristic of all people of the pre-scientific era, our beliefs and methods concerning psychological growth and interpersonal harmony and understanding cannot, by most people, even be consistently or accurately expressed and related to actual happenings or events. Some psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists form the exception. From their disciplines have come much formulation and clarification of cultural beliefs and practices and their theoretical relation to behavior and other empirical fact. Further, there are many substantial and plausible hypotheses or notions that could conceivably be "tested" by small, experimental cultures. . . . If chronically frustrating social circumstances cause aggression (Dollard and Miller among others), let's do something about it. If the limited relationship of a child to one mother figure and one father figure is critical in the development of something called the Œdipus complex, then let's make a social structure where children can easily and freely have more parent figures (as did the characters in Aldous Huxley's *Island*). If status-seeking, competitive, materialistic societies will have neurosis and war and Erich Fromm is right, then let's make small societies that are not status-seeking, competitive and materialistic. Let's try some of A. S. Neill's freedom in education—Education without punishment or force. If patterns of child-rearing are related to adult personalities, then let's experiment, if we can, and see what we can make of E. H. Erikson's contentions.

> Of course, it's obvious that such (cultural) design and experimentation wouldn't be very respectable by present-day scientific standards. So let's develop new standards and methods. For an applied science of man-in-society (within pragmatic communities), perhaps the limitations and even the meaning of science will change. Or perhaps the word "science" will be "obsolete" in this context.

The foregoing by no means explores all the facets of Mr. Clark's program (which includes, incidentally, attempting to "trigger" constructive change by the use of "a psychodelic drug such as LSD"), but it does indicate the rather large area of possible discovery and reform he hopes to investigate through an experimental community. What is the practical possibility of implementing such a proposal?

Our reaction to this question is as follows: Since, of necessity, the description of this undertaking in community is made in terms of the psychological values which are to be achieved by its establishment, and since, admittedly, the realization of these values by rare individuals is by no means wholly understood, but constitutes, in fact, a study that is but barely begun in contemporary psychological science, it seems to us that such an experiment would have to be started by a very small group, and that its merits and fruitfulness would have to be proved, little by little, step by step, through the demonstrable achievements of the members of the group. It seems, further, that any emphasis on "organization" would at the outset become both pretentious and misleading, and that the possibilities of self-deception are also very great. One may doubt in principle the idea of making *any* form of self-actualization depend upon getting people together and organizing their resources and capabilities toward an end of this sort. Maturity is just that quality in human beings which results, among other things, from deeply seated self-reliance. An organization or a community of self-reliant people could no doubt do wonders in almost any direction, but we remain skeptical of an organizational approach to the production of the ideal qualities of human beings. While unusual educators and psychologists (or simply unusual parents) might make remarkably effective contributions in the direction sought, the complex obligations of community life could easily prove an overwhelming burden.

REVIEW
"TOGETHERNESS" VERSUS DEPTH IN RELIGION

ONE reason why MANAS writers have lagged in praise of ecumenical movements designed to produce religious strength stems from the view that there is no necessary correlation between numbers and religious understanding. As between Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, therefore, we incline to the opinions of the latter, since Dr. Tillich is not primarily concerned with doctrine nor with drops in church attendance. He feels that true religion can be evaluated only by each individual in the depth of his own thinking. Speaking at the Chicago Divinity School on May 4, Dr. Tillich remarked:

> I start with man asking questions about the ultimate meaning of life. The important thing is not that people go more to church, listen to evangelists and join churches. The important thing is that the younger generation asks the right question, and this is something which has not yet exhausted itself: The meaning of our life, the conflicts of our existence, the way to deal with anxiety in our life, the feeling of guilt, the feeling of emptiness.

We now turn to some pertinent observations appearing in the bulletin of the Blaisdell Institute for Advanced Study in World Cultures and Religions—portions of a speech delivered by Dr. Herbert Schneider at the University of California in May, 1962, on "International Relations and World Religions." On the question of whether a world community of religions is possible—or even necessarily desirablc in the same sense that a world community of scientists is possible, Dr. Schneider said:

> The world religions are not a world community and their relations toward each other are as complicated and diversified as their international politics. Attitudes of tolerance, fellowship, detachment, and indifference are all present among them. And even when they understand each other well enough, they show little interest in international solidarity or even in inter-religious fraternity. Thus they present a significant contrast to the community of science.

What happens when these world religions meet each other face to face? A parliament of religions is a series of monologues. The speakers, having sworn to keep the peace, treat each other courteously, explain themselves to themselves, agree not to interfere with each other's benevolences, and then subscribe to the well-worn formula: We are all doing the Lord's work, you in your way and I in His. Then, having returned each to his own community, the theologians among them explain why they behave in this formally correct, distantly diplomatic manner.

Dr. Schneider examines various rationalizations which enable the ecumenically-inclined to be publicly tolerant while remaining privately dogmatic. The first of these rationalizations takes the following general pattern: "It is not community of religions, but communion with God that should be the concern of a faithful believer. Judge not religion, that ye be not judged as a religion! Keep your eyes and minds on the true aim of all religion and not on each other as competing ways of salvation. Neither competition nor reciprocity has any place among religions. Each has its place in the world and each has its faith in God. Let all men sow good seed and let God determine the harvest. A religious man is a witness to God, not a judge of his neighbor. It is God, not man, who must decide in which individual and in which religion true faith is to be found. Let other faiths alone. It is as inappropriate that there be community of faiths as that there be community of wives. There is something total and exclusive about love and devotion. A life of commitment to God is not to be interpreted as claiming that only one religion is true, any more than a life-long devotion to a spouse is a declaration that no other human beings are lovable. Loyalty is a practical affair, not a scientific judgment." Dr. Schneider comments:

> This theory of what inter-religious relations should be presents itself as an expression of humility before God. And this it may well be. But it is also an attitude of irreconcilability among faiths: There can be no universal communion of saints so long as saints live in separate monasteries. Let the plurality of communions be accepted as a fact but not as a problem. Any genuine life of devotion to God

Universal is better than a universal way of devotion. Such scepticism about the practical value of an inter-religious ecumenical movement or of fraternity among religions is now being preached officially as merely good common sense. And theologians, with entire toleration, explain that "God himself is patient." Let us, then, speak of this as the *Toleration* Theory of inter-religious relations.

Behind the ecumenical trend is some evidence of the assumption that, if the members of one faith do not feel wholly confident of their group's "spirituality," a broader security is available by way of extended affiliations, not unlike that of various nations under the Atlantic Charter. The trouble is that inspiration of a religious nature has nothing to do with this kind of maneuvering and finds its natural setting in loneliness, rather than togetherness. Here a concluding passage from Clark Moustakas' essay, "The Value of Loneliness," is suggestive:

> The "never be lonely" theme is a reflection of man's estrangement from himself in the world today. When an individual avoids facing directly a situation which contains the seeds of loneliness, he alienates himself from his own capacity for being lonely and from the possibility for fundamental social ties and empathy. It is not loneliness which separates the person from others but the terror of loneliness and the constant effort to escape it. We must learn to care for our own loneliness and suffering and the loneliness and suffering of others, for within pain and isolation and loneliness one can find courage and hope and what is brave and lovely and true in life. Serving loneliness is a way to self-identity and to love, and faith in the wonder of living.

We may turn, finally and hopefully, to psychology for an a-political ecumenical approach, but it is apparent that a psychology appropriate to this problem has yet to be evolved and promulgated. Witness, for example, this statement from L. W. Grensted's *The Psychology of Religion:*

> The student of the psychology of religion is, as things stand today, in the very difficult position that there is no one psychological theory, still less any one psychological textbook, to which he can turn with any assurance that it contains even a minimum of accepted opinions. He must in fact become a psychologist himself, and make his own choice between the views set out with so much conviction and so few common principles, before he can begin the process of applying his psychological knowledge to the elucidation of religious practice and belief. This involves the necessary consequence that it is quite impossible to study the psychology of religion by reading books directly upon that subject and no others.

This is, perhaps, a good place for consideration of a perspective appearing in P. D. Ouspensky's *A New Model of the Universe.* This writer identifies the essence of religion with self-generated mystical sensibility—beyond dogmas and theologies:

> An examination of what is known of mysticism and mystical states of consciousness is of great interest in connection with the idea of hidden knowledge. If we follow neither the religious nor the scientific view but try to compare descriptions of the mystical experiences of people of entirely different races, different periods and different religions, we shall find a striking resemblance among these descriptions, which can in no case be explained by similarity of preparation or by resemblance in ways of thinking and feeling. In mystical states utterly different people in utterly different conditions *learn* one and the same thing and, what is still more striking, in mystical states there is no difference of religions. All the experiences are absolutely identical; the difference can be only in the language and form of the description. In the mysticism of different countries and different peoples the same images, the same discoveries, are invariably repeated.

COMMENTARY
FOR CHANGE IN DEPTH

RICHARD GREGG, to whom we owe this week s Frontiers contribution, is one of the best known and respected pacifist thinkers in the United States. His book, *The Power of Nonviolence,* first appeared in 1935, and was republished in a revised edition with a foreword by Martin Luther King, by Fellowship Publications in 1959. This study of Gandhian principles and practice has probably done more to acquaint American readers with the dynamics of *Satyagraha* than any other single source.

It is of interest, therefore, to see the direction taken by Mr. Gregg's thinking in the present MANAS article. Here he presses, not for the colorful, dramatic demonstrations which show the readiness of peace-makers to endure judgment and punishment at the hands of the nation-state, but for recognition that the entire fabric of industrial civilization needs renovation or regeneration.

There are two ways to approach a task of this sort. One is by social revolution, the other by the reconstruction of human attitudes. But these are not either-or alternatives. Rather, constructive social revolution which has the assent and support of the people is hardly possible without far-reaching changes in attitude. The choice is between priorities, not between means.

The issue is very like that raised by Francisco Ferrer when he said that the education of a child begins with his grandfather. So with any basic change in human attitudes. The process is one which occupies effort across generations.

The objection to this analysis is the objection which is always made to any project which amounts to fundamental re-education: "We don't have time to wait for people to grow into better attitudes. . . . the challenge and the crisis are upon us *now."* There is a further problem in the fact that an individual who is working primarily on his own attitudes may seem to be doing "nothing." Often a man feels that he must convince himself that he is acting righteously, so that he comes to identify action with some form of overt behavior.

It is true enough that thought without action is barren; but it is equally true that action which fails to lift attitudes may be a whirling without a change in position.

The objective, as Mr. Gregg puts it, is to find a cure for "ambition, competitiveness, desire for power, and for money as a means to power." How is this possible? One way is to show that a good life can be lived by people who have given up these drives and replaced them with other motives. It is Mr. Gregg's contention that only such a life has in it the substance of peace.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

WHY THE COLLEGE IS FAILING

[The following discussion is made up of portions of an address with the above title, delivered by W. H. Ferry before the Association for Higher Education, July 1, 1963. Mr. Ferry is Vice President of the Fund for the Republic and an active participant in the work of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in Santa Barbara.]

SOCIETY'S expectations of college can be put in a word: everything. There is no aspiration, no desire, no goal inconsequential enough not to be seen by someone as proper to be embraced by the college. The temptation to support this statement with a catalogue of lunacies and extravagances is strong but will be put aside, since majors in acrobatics, institutes for morticians, and degrees in cosmetology are academic oddities well known to this audience.

The central question is whether society's expectations *should* control the program and conduct of the college. Democratic theory seems to require an affirmative answer. It is the idea of consumer sovereignty brought to roost on the campus. The public pays the cost, through tax exemption, tax support, contributions, fees, and so on. Should not so grand a *quo* be met by a corresponding *quid?* If the college does not exist to meet overwhelmingly expressed public expectations, for what does it exist?

I believe that Americans, perhaps subconsciously, expect their colleges to be better than themselves. I believe that they wish their citadels of learning to stand on higher ground, that the people know better than to wish their colleges to perpetuate the accepted and the commonplace. Somewhere in the public subconscious lingers a warm memory of the *studium,* that mediaeval collection of teachers and students who stood between the proud and powerful institutions of society and the ordinary people, interpreting one to the other to the benefit of both.

If a higher consensus did not exist, the great aims of higher education would long ago have been smothered and heard of nevermore. Even if these aims are often clad in Fourth of July brocade, and while they are often breached in practice even as they are preached in public, the fact that they are still stated and applauded shows that higher education and the public in general retain a sense of the college's true vocation, a respect for its ancient virtues. These are almost the only optimistic words you will hear from me, for I see little evidence that this sense is prospering in contemporary America. All that can be said is that it survives, with occasional flashes of revival here and there.

A major reason why the college is failing is because it has unresistingly turned from a community into a corporation. This alteration presents many difficulties, one of which is encountered in preparing remarks like these. What does one have in mind when he says "the college"? Does he refer to trustees, or buildings, or administrators, or alumni clamoring for field houses, or students, programs or faculties? When I speak of the college with hope in my voice, I am thinking of a community of scholars, young and old, students and faculty, but mostly of students. When I speak with reproach, I refer to a jumbled combination of administrators, fund-raisers, image experts, and employment agents. Neither is a full or fair characterization, but few here would dispute the natural hostility between those transacting with the public and those engaged in the educational transaction.

A formidable aspect of the change from community, a hopeful word, to corporation, a reproachful one, is that it makes the college irresponsible. A community is established to accept common responsibility and insure the dignity of its participants. A corporation is established to limit responsibility, and insures personal anonymity. A community has members, and values and standards springing out of shared experience and tradition. The corporation has

functionaries, and values based on the requirements of profit, public relations and efficiency. Both have their place but they are not the same thing. Yet the notion is widespread that the college improves each time it adopts another corporate style.

Under the American theory of progress, democracy and the arts of self-government should be improving every year. But Stuart Chase, after contemplating all of the important surveys of opinion made in this country over the past generation, sorrowfully says that Americans are

> Unaware of the imperatives of the nuclear age
> Unaware of the massive effects of technology on our lives and on our future
> Ignorant of the true goals of education
> Ignorant of the Bill of Rights and what it means to a democratic society.

Chase's enumeration makes one wonder what education and educators have been doing all this time. Here is the chief and tragic implication of the honoring of society's expectations by higher education. We have had more education for more people for a longer period than any nation in history. The result is that we are not prepared for the new world which, ironically, is principally of our own making. Education is unfairly blamed for failing to do many things for which it has no responsibility. But the blame is properly dropped on its doorstep in this case. Education is after all supposed to be habit-forming, and the campus the place where man's most civilizing habit is to be built. Instilling the intellectual skills needed to cope with all of the simultaneously arrived ages—the ages of affluence, technology, revolution, bureaucracy, alienation, and instant suicide making men habitually ready to live wisely in these ages is the foremost duty of education. Where else in a self-governing nation is the obligation to be placed? Home and church have their responsibilities for character and morals. But if civilization fails and falls, the failure will be mainly that of education. It will show, if any are left to see, that there was in the world much more violence than practical wisdom, and blame will be

assessed against the agency that bears primary responsibility for keeping up an adequate supply of this more and more scarce resource.

I do not propose college courses in the Cold War. I do not ask that every college president denounce the lunacies of the Pentagon. I would like but do not expect universities to follow the recent example at the University of Chicago, where the faculty finally became morally fed up enough to close down the institution's military research laboratory. My hopes are more modest. I would settle for allocating university brains and cash on a 50-50 basis between war and peace research. I would settle for some intellectual leadership against the dismal counsels of anti-Communism. I regret to say that I discern no such leadership on the campuses.

In the long run, and maybe in the short, there is only one way of improving the republic and its chances of getting through the years ahead without a domestic or international catastrophe. That is by criticism. It must be noted that neither of government's constitutionally-endowed critics, the press and the college, are raising any basic objections about our conduct of the Cold War. We hear a good deal about the convergence of the American and Soviet systems. Maybe there are good examples here, with both American and Soviet universities quietly going along with their governments, and with the Soviet press under regulation and the U.S. press regulating itself to the demands of the Cold War.

The managers of the education business and, sorry to say, most of the hired hands, have bowed beneath the weight of the exactions. All our educators are doing is conforming, most of them because they would conform anyway, and many because the public expects them to conform. They know that harboring or uttering dangerous thoughts is a sin punishable in the 50 states by loss of job and social ostracism. They know that McCarthyism is far from dead, that it has only become housebroken and less raucous.

What is needed is a divorce from the *status quo,* a shedding of the fetters of Cold War commitments, a raising up of critical voices, and an intention to instruct the community both as to its true needs and the true goals of higher education. As I look around at the possibilities for such an eruption of reason in institutions other than the college—in corporations, the mass media, the political parties, unions—it seems far too much to expect. The march of any contemporary Davidsbundler against the Philistines will have to find its general staff and troops in the college. I see few stirrings today, although the participation of students and faculty here and there in sit-in demonstrations and peace activities are promising signs. I would feel far better about chances for the salvation of higher education if the sit-ins and peace marches were being led by college presidents and trustees.   I am committed to education and therefore must never abandon hope that it may recover its devotion to mankind's highest values. Yet it must be recognized that this may be only wild optimism.

"The penalty you [Americans] are paying for affluence is a heavy one," Arnold Toynbee says. "It is now threatening America's security, but it is also doing America graver harm than that. Affluence is estranging America from her own ideals. . . . It is pushing her into becoming the policeman standing guard over vested interests. . . . She now stands for what Rome stood for." (*America and the World Revolution.*)

The college is a major element in the forming of a nation's character and in deciding its destiny. The question is whether it will regain the higher ground of intellectual leadership and preparation for the new society, or whether it will cooperate in achieving the domestic decay and international suicide forecast by Arnold Toynbee. I believe it is touch and go.

W. H. FERRY

Santa Barbara, Calif.

FRONTIERS
Reflections on Nonviolence

I AGREE with Gandhi that modern industry, controlled by that ambiguous tool, money, is inherently violent. Exceedingly few Westerners share this view. My opinion is not due just to Gandhi's influence on me. In 1923, after seven years of experience in industrial relations, when I wrote to Gandhi asking if I might come to India to learn of his methods at first hand, I told him that one of the reasons I wanted to come was because I believed that Western civilization was wrongly based and on the skids. There is now much more reason for thinking this than there was then. But almost everybody in the West believes modern industrialism is *not* inherently violent, and that such a notion as mine is crazy.

As I see it, the Western peace movement is supporting or at least condoning violence (via industrialism) with one hand and brandishing peace talk or nonviolent demonstrations with the other. I do not think this will work. Industrialism with money control is a search for power, and the conflict over power results in war. Of course there are other evils present and other causes for war, but industrialism is the dominant feature of Western civilization. Remember Lord Acton's saying that power tends to corrupt. Of course I may be mistaken, and Gandhi may have been mistaken, but all I can do is ponder carefully and then follow the light of my own candle.

Or put it this way: Gandhi's program was all of a piece. His Satyagraha was not unrelated to the rest. Just as the assumptions and activities of Western civilization finally boil up into war, the eighteen different parts of Gandhi's constructive program boiled up into Satyagraha or nonviolent resistance to end wrongful public relations. The peasants did not follow Gandhi just because they thought he was a saint. They followed him largely because they saw he was not just a man of words, but a man of action, and because his constructive program operated to mitigate their immediately felt practical daily needs. He taught them how to help themselves.

The peasants suffered from vast rural unemployment every year because the British had abolished the old hand-spinning and hand-weaving in order to sell Manchester cloth to the numerous Indian consumers. The spinning and weaving done during the dry season when no farm work was possible was no longer permitted. There were the gross hardships suffered by untouchables. (Compare the Negroes in the United States.) There was lack of education, so Gandhi invented basic education through manual skills. The program helped the farmers, the women, the students. Gandhi felt that Indian subjection to British power was due to the weaknesses among the Indians themselves, so he set about to cure those Indian weaknesses. This generated enough unity, self-respect, self-confidence and courage among Indians to enable them to push out the British, but there was still enough weakness left for the British to play on and split the country into Pakistan and India. It was perhaps the last fling of the old policy of *divide et impera,* and it is now coming home to roost.

Gandhi did not create his constructive program in order to win power for himself and his party, but because he had such compassion for the peasants. He knew that the outer condition would follow the inner condition. Our Western peace movement has abstracted nonviolent resistance from all the other parts of Gandhi's program, and now finds that the labor movement is not interested and that people are apparently indifferent to fallout and the risk of annihilation. People are so apathetic or bewildered that merely a call to survive does not generate enthusiasm. You can't expect many people to imagine things they have never experienced. The U.S.A. has never been bombed. People can easily see jobs and money so they support the Congressmen who shout for more weapons. But if the peace movement had well-planned and vigorous

activities to help out our Western big problems—race relations, civil rights, unemployment due to automation, the failure of education, youthful delinquency—then I think labor and small-town folk and city folk would begin to trust the peace movement and give it some support. Then, if people could see some way out of the rat race to a happier future, they would be less bewildered and less frightened. Our international tensions grow out of our domestic tensions. Without any constructive program there will not be mass support that will impress those in power. Yet if the people suspect they are being used for the purposes of the peace groups, they will not respond.

Because of the lack of a constructive program the British peace movement is floundering, and ours is also beginning to flounder. There must be not only a relieving of present social ills; there must be intimations of activities that will build sounder social relations of all kinds. All this calls for social inventiveness of a high order.

You might put it this way: Peace is (of course) not just the absence of overt physical violence And like happiness, peace is not something that can be obtained by action aimed directly at peace. It is an over-all condition that results from other conditions and relations, and the lesser, causative conditions *are* obtainable by direct as well as indirect striving. That is to say, peace is a by-product that comes automatically once the other conditions are established. One of the conditions that leads to peace is mutual trust. Trust comes as a result of repeated and prolonged actions that both bespeak and create a sense of human unity. Consistent talk going along with the deeds helps, but the actions speak louder than the words. Such items as honesty, truth in word and deed, perseverance, steadiness, giving more than one gets, taking risks for the sake of the unity all these promote peace.

A Constructive Program for the U.S.A. would, in my judgment, have to be much more social and economic than political. By the phrase, "constructive program," I do not mean a blueprint a la organizations, each to do a specific kind of action. Maybe only one item of change could be visualized at a time, then another, all to grow into a broad pattern, each step being *ad hoc.* I have only one suggestion other than those mentioned above. In relation to race relations, the trouble is not primarily from the Negroes or Puerto Ricans or Mexicans or Indians, but from the sense of superiority among the whites. We are the proud and censorious ones. We whites subjugated these others and established slavery, legal or economic, and we will have to pay for our sins and so will our children. True, some of the Negro or Puerto Rican children may be dirty, ignorant, ill-mannered, etc., and white parents may dislike to have their children associate with those others. But isn't that a part of the price that whites have to pay for their former mistakes?

It may be said that there is not time to set up a constructive program before things blow up in a nuclear war. That may be true, and mean that we have to pay for our prolonged insensitiveness and folly, or it may mean that we do not believe that love is as strong as fear and hate.

Of course, the basic difficulty is spiritual. The failure in that realm creates the insecurity that causes the suspicion, fear and witch hunts, and also the prejudices, self-righteousness, pride, aggressiveness, and lust for power that prevail over so much of the U.S.A. and in government circles. But I do not find that most Christians are willing to think very carefully or freshly about their assumptions or their civilization or their ways of seeking ultimate reality. The churches, with very few and small exceptions, live up to their contract with Constantine many centuries ago. Most people are very afraid of thinking new thoughts or feeling new feelings. Most Christians are sure they have all the truth, and are satisfied with what they have in the way of religion. Well, while I may be entirely mistaken, I think that in times of such rapid, deep, and wide-ranging change as we are now in the midst of, such

clinging to the *status quo* in every realm spells death.

For those who think that war is merely a fortuitous, temporary, ugly excrescence on an otherwise fair or at least passable civilization, nonviolent protests and demonstrations might seem to be enough to cure the aberration. But others like myself think that ambition, competitiveness, desire for power, and for money as a means to power, are important and *decisive* elements in the very texture of our culture, that they cumulate in war, and that war is what one man called "the health of the State." Such people feel that there must be, in addition to nonviolent resistance and protests, a great constructive program of activities that will stimulate and effectuate not selfishness, greed, competition, fear, suspicion and divisiveness, but kindness, mutual respect, trust, love and the unity of all men. Our whole culture and civilization must be transformed. New values, new institutions, must be built up. Like charity, nonviolence must begin at home. At least, this is the way it seems to me. Maybe there isn't time. But if we are going to go up in smoke, it would seem better to have it happen while we are engaged in a great task instead of a little patching job.

I did not write *The Power of Nonviolence* out of ambition to try to convert the U.S.A. to nonviolence. I just felt it was exceedingly important to try to explain it. It takes at least a whole generation before any new idea gets accepted, usually much longer. Gandhi's major victory was in 1947—only sixteen years ago. It was that which impressed people, not any verbalization of theory. The fact that so many people have come to see it is possible in so short a time is one more evidence of the speed of modern life.

There is no use in feeling disgusted or discouraged by the slowness of people's willingness to change, or by the fact that they learn mostly the hard way, from making mistakes and then paying for them. People are built that way. The price this time is going to be mighty heavy, that's all.

I am trying to see the connection between conduct or morality and Jesus' statement that if we want to follow him we must deny ourselves. Not just deny some pleasure to ourselves, but deny the very existence of our lesser selves. Jesus would not have asked us to deny something that is real. So I think he was agreeing with Buddha who said outright that the self is not real but only a fiction. The churches refuse to accept these words of Jesus, and assert just the contrary, and our whole culture exalts ambition and "success" and greed and other aspects of self-assertion.

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