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THE MISSING FACTOR

WHATEVER the men of modern nations claim to believe about themselves and their "identity," they are for practical purposes Hegelians. It doesn't matter what the learned men in the universities say about Hegel. Nor does the fact that we are *sluggish* Hegelians change the reality very much. This is the doctrine, as stated in *The Philosophy of Law:*

> In the State, everything depends upon the unity of the universal and the particular. In the ancient States, the subjective purpose was absolutely one with the will of the State. In modern times, on the contrary, we demand an individual opinion, an individual will and conscience. The ancients had none of these in the modern sense; the final thing for them was the will of the State. While in Asiatic despotisms, the individual had no inner self and no self-justification, in the modern world man demands to be honored for the sake of his subjective individuality.
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> The union of duty and right has the twofold aspect that what the State demands as duty should directly be the right of the individual, since the State is nothing but the organization of the concept of freedom. The determinations of the individual will are given by the State objectivity, and it is through the State alone that they attain truth and realization. . . .
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> To the complete State belongs, essentially, consciousness and thought. The State knows thus what it wills, and it knows it under the form of thought. . . . The State must be regarded as a great architectonic edifice, a hieroglyph of reason, manifesting itself in reality. . . . That the State is the self-determining and the completely sovereign will, the final decision being necessarily referred to it—that is easy to comprehend.

Hegel's eloquence gives the State the wondrous hierarchy and symmetry of a beehive, every member working in perfect cooperation, sensing his fulfillment in the totality, and secure as a conscious part of the organic whole. What is lacking? Only the climactic presence of the queen bee, but Hegel has this in his doctrine, too: "in such a people, sovereignty is the personality of the whole, and this is represented in reality by the person of the monarch." For the Western democracies, the "person of the monarch" has been replaced by legislatures and elected leaders, but this does not really disturb the general scheme, since lawmakers and officials are regarded as precisely the means by which the "determinations" of individual citizens gain objectivity in the decisions of the State.

People who fight as many wars as we do *have* to be Hegelians; why else would they do it? The Nation-State is obviously the projection of their being, the source of security in the present and of hope for the future. Is there any other way to explain the wars and preparations for war which exist right now?

A related reason for all these military actions is that the Hegelian State works well only as a War State. To have health, an organism must achieve unified motivation and exhibit some kind of *morale.* War, as Randolph Bourne pointed out years ago, is the Health of the State. If men are to act in cooperation under the ægis of the State for common ends, they must share some great, overriding motivation which joins them together, subordinating conflicting personal purposes and providing the discipline united action requires. This motivation must come from somewhere: either it is generated from within individuals, or it is sooner or later imposed from without, and the only external stimulus with sufficient compulsion behind it is quite plainly war.

This is an old story and we know it well. Scholarly books have been written to show that war seems to be the only remedy for the divisive tendencies within the modern State. Less than a hundred years ago, this view was often defended as a quite sufficient reason for making war, but in our time war has become so horrible that it now appears only as an angry diagnosis of the war-making mentality. It is also argued, today, that we continue to go to war because it is the only thing we know

how to do *well,* so far as the State is concerned, and compulsive reasons for doing it are readily available.

The subject of war may now be dropped, since for what we want to discuss war serves only to sharpen the issue and precipitate the questions that lie behind the various failures of modern Western society to work according to plan. The great question is: *Why* has the State become mainly an enormous, war-making machine?

There is a sense in which Western theories of knowledge since the Renaissance have amounted to a virtual conspiracy against the success of modern systems of social organization. The focus of science on external nature and the obsession of modern learning with objectivity produced an overwhelming range of "certainties" which became the basis for the manipulative skills of our technological civilization, and at the same time absolutely shut out from even the possibility of knowledge any consideration of man as subject and moral agent. The human individual, who has the absolutely crucial role of exercising the "freedom" to be given objectivity through the modern State, has no existence at all in scientific theories of knowledge. The application of science to human beings, whether in social behavior or their psychological nature, could proceed only by their reduction to objects, which is nothing less than dehumanization. Thus the full prestige—not to say arrogance—of science and technology gave willing support to the practice of regarding human beings as behavioral units which could be known (because of their erratic individual performance) only statistically. The idea of an internal structure for human beings as subjects was not even conceived of until the first groping efforts of Sigmund Freud, and in his time the authority of the mechanistic assumption was still so all-pervasive that the first impact of psychoanalysis came as the idea that human beings are much more complicated objects than had previously been recognized.

It is simply historical fact that some three hundred years of the evolution of scientific knowledge have been, for man, a vast and long-drawn-out indoctrination in the idea that he is really a "nothing"—has no "self," produces no "causes"—and gains standing as an object of scientific knowledge only by having all real identity taken away from him.

Today, a revolution in psychology is in progress. The existence of the human subject has at last been declared. Michael Polanyi in England, Maslow and others in the United States, and numerous people in related fields have at last brought to visibility in the world of thought—the only region where it can be discerned—the thumping reality of the living, thinking, hoping, striving, aspiring human being, and the response to this new-found self-awareness is gathering strength from year to year. A parallel development may be seen in the seething moral desperation of the peace movement, which is now slowly becoming nothing less than a frontal challenge to the authority of the State. There are other symptoms of vast historical upheaval, of which some—perhaps the most noticeable—are plainly negative, combining a breakdown of faith with formless rebellions which substitute impulse for vision and anger for resolve. In sum, then, a large variety of the symptoms of far-reaching change is in evidence, although an actual *movement,* in the positive sense of a transforming historical force, has yet to make itself felt.

A broad concomitant of these disturbing developments during the past twenty years or so has been the enormous expansion of bureaucratic science, with the introduction of proliferating branches of social science at virtually every level of social organization and even in industry. Scientific "consultants" are turning out papers on every conceivable relationship in which the "human" factor is involved, and the numerous branches of social service in the welfare state are acquiring both the airs and the emoluments held to be appropriate to scientifically *professional* practice. Bureaucratic egotism, hardly anything new in the complex operations of government, has acquired the confirmation of scientific sanctity.

Little attention is paid to the fact that the actual application of scientific ideas to social problems has been largely shunned by research specialists. The areas in which sociology and politics overlap are seen as dangerous zones where partisan emotions are likely to corrupt the purity of research, and there is

also the unpleasant prospect of having to relate scientific ideas to the practical functions of government, where dignified scholarly distance and scientific "objectivity" both fly out the window. It follows that applied science in the social area often becomes a kind of bead game which can continue only because there is no way of keeping score.

This is not to suggest that there are no wonderful exceptions. Reading in the voluminous literature of social science turns up cases in which deep human concern, combined with intuitive understanding of subjective human needs and qualities, operates underneath the facade of "objectivity" and manipulative theory to produce exciting results. But because of the intellectual tradition of scientific indifference to the reality and uniqueness of the individual, these rather wonderful happenings seem to come about mainly through a factor as obscure as the theological notion of "grace," since the practitioners are obliged to describe what they have done as a triumph of method.

Such occasional successes, moreover, are only shy hints as to the nature of the basic problem and the task which lies before us. This is, first, to recognize that there are in every human being infrastructures of both conscious and instinctive relationship with both the natural and social world, and that the acts of the individual as a *causing* being can fulfill the unity of the part with the whole only as those infrastructures are developed into avenues of inwardly regulated action.

In short, a whole universe of human reality has been ignored through the exclusive preoccupation of science with the external world and external forces.

The objection used to be made that such conceptions of the human being are "metaphysical," and hence unreal or nonsensical. But since all ideas of the relationship of the individual to the whole exist in consciousness, and since the data of meaning, role, purpose, and fulfillment are all facts of consciousness, where else can we look for the stuff of human individuality except in the terms of an internal structure which orders the subjective relationships of an intelligence which is an expression of consciousness?

And what, after all, is the statement of Hegel in *The Philosophy of Law* but a metaphysical pattern which gains verisimilitude from an approximate fidelity to the ideal of an "organic" society? Its hideous failure in recent history may be evidence, not of the falsity of the idea, but of what happens when a temporary and artificial entity like the State is substituted for the transcendent dream of the unity of all mankind, and coercion is substituted for developed individuality in the members of the community.

Hegel, as many critics have pointed out, cared little for the individual. He was fascinated by his poetic exposition of the processes of history and so bemused by the spurious grandeur of the national state that he totally neglected the sources of social harmony in the vision and development of individual human beings. And so with other political thinkers wholly preoccupied with the State. When the correspondence between duty and right does not work out in practice, stern political moralists take over the State to *make* it work, and then politics, now no longer an art of the possible, no more a high humanist achievement in constitution-making or self-rule, becomes the desperate practice of propaganda-plus-compulsion, in which, in time, all the "techniques" of science are made to collaborate. We describe this as "brain-washing" when it is done by others, and "engineering consent" when we do it ourselves.

So, quite naturally, the idea of the "Organic State" becomes anathema in the liberal vocabulary, and what is really only a sluggish practice of the Hegelian formula is allowed to call itself "freedom"—until we go off to war. Then, by a humiliating process of self-censorship, most of the scientists, scholars, liberals, and other spokesmen for the intellectual community declare a moratorium on consistency and adopt the language of Hegelian euphemisms until the war is over.

It is within the framework of these increasingly lethal cycles of national behavior, and against the grain of the traditional scientific denial of significance to individuals, that the tide of self-recognition in human beings is slowly rising. And it is on this frontier, where visionary emotionalism

meets the anguish of lost identity—where the children's crusades of the present wear away at brittle social institutions—that the habitual amoralism of science exacts its fiercest retribution. For no one seems really *ready*, either for the struggle or for the freedom that is sought.

Yet from the very abysses of moral contradiction may be born a new Promethean energy. The unending series of crises produced by aggressive national states armed with the techniques of science is generating a rebirth of the human spirit. Out of the suffering of men of imagination a new conception of human potentiality is slowly being forged. Tolstoy, Schweitzer, and Gandhi may be recognized as prophets of this conception, and exemplars, to the best of their ability, of the kind of uncoerced, whole-regarding thought and action in terms of which men may at last be able to join duty with right in both their private and social lives. The first principles of such men sprang from an unashamed altruism, and out of purified high religion, yet, unlike the founders of political reform movements, they placed little confidence in organization, and none in States.

The restoration of the individual as the key to the restoration of mankind is the profound intuition of the age. But for this idea to become operative in human behavior it needs to be more than an intuition. It requires the evolution of institutions which are devoted to release instead of control, and this means the development, first, of knowledge of those disciplines which instruct in the subjective balances which give freedom its meaning. There is a sense in which education is the gradual induction of the individual into awareness of the transitory character of all institutional arrangements, encouraging the student to substitute deliberation and choice for the crutch of conformity, inner discipline for habit, and transcendent insight for conditioned symbols of the good. The aim of education is to launch the individual in the task of exchanging one sort of certainty for another, until he has learned, in and of himself, that the "organization of freedom" can never be anything but an individual equilibrium, of which the social order is only an imperfect reflection.

We have yet to become aware of the enormous accumulation of wisdom we have available concerning the development of the individual—a wisdom easily neglected because it is found in literature rather than in science. The gist of the educational enterprise, for example, is implicit in a phrase of Henri Fauconnier: "Have you noticed that men have settled ideas only on subjects they have never thought about?"

This is a way of saying that wisdom in action—and no other wisdom is worth talking about—can never be defined except in abstraction. It is a way of explaining why the final truths of religion can never be communicated in words. It is an observation concerning the revealing silences which pervade the work of men who find their way to maturity.

The champions of scientific knowledge—of the splendor of those certainties which we can use and enjoy without understanding them—are quick to point out that by means of all these wonderful techniques of the manipulation of nature, science makes it possible for us to feed every hungry man in the world. But science, they neglect to add, does not tell us how we shall become able to *will* to feed every man in the world. And that is what we need to know.

The secrets of the will, of the processes of growth in selfhood, of the disciplines of freedom, of the solvent of human solidarity, are locked up in the mystery of the individual, who does not begin to be a free man until he accepts in eager self-recognition his natural responsibility for all the wholes with which he is joined in consciousness.

Letter from WEST AFRICA

I

UPON revisiting West Africa after five years, one is tempted to quote the French proverb: The more things change, the more they stay the same.

In the DC-8 from Paris to Cotonou, capital of Dahomey, a week ago, among about 70 passengers there were no more than five Africans. Air Afrique, opened in 1959 under the protecting wing of Air France with a sizeable group of aging DC-3's and -4's, is now a very major and very profitable airline indeed, flying a number of DC-6's and -8's. Its planes are full—fuller than most—on hauls long and short; they are served by trim African stewards and stewardesses, in sharp contrast with the khaki-shorted stewards of 1962 Pilots I have seen are still Europeans, and there is now some sort of long-haul association with UTA, another French line, and a trans-Atlantic "arrangement" with Pan American which isn't quite clear. But it is a grown-up operation, quite as mature as other airlines. Nevertheless, a certain flavor has been lost. The big DC-8F cargo planes now carry the loads of French Camembert and the quivering fresh meat of Niger with which I travelled in the general purpose DC-4's of 1962.

Lomé, small capital of Togo, smallest of the Francophone African countries, is building a jet airstrip. It seems a somewhat unlikely notion, perhaps arguing some of that inflated sense of importance and "progress" which results elsewhere in steel mills and vast presidential palaces. But in Togo this is refreshingly not otherwise the case. With the possible exception of construction of expensive artificial port facilities duplicating those of Tema (Ghana) and Cotonou (Dahomey), each about 50 miles away along the coast, activity seems pointed in distinctly useful directions.

Here, in a small, up-country city, Palime, we came upon a striking example of a local, voluntary, social service organization. Its 250 members, assisted in various small ways by several international private organizations, have helped communities build schools, recreation centers, athletic fields; they pay dues to belong and contribute their labor. This is something genuinely new in Africa, where loyalties have been typically limited to extended family or tribe.

We visited the government's organization for rural development, enjoying an hour or more of torrential enthusiasm from its able Togolese director. We visited the very creditable hospital, and were impressed by its Togolese chief, a medical administrator who combines technical competence with a remarkable ability to instill his staff with that *esprit de corps* from which comes great performance; and by the Chief Surgeon, German-born refugee from persecution, with many years of African experience and a devoted identification with Togolese medicine.

One is inevitably startled at the contrasts between Lomé and Abidjan, capital of the Ivory Coast. Here, in three days of visiting men in much the same positions as those we saw in Lomé, we saw no single African in a position of authority. Every person to whom we were directed, including the fine Rector of the University of Abidjan, was French. This includes one dark-skinned obstetrician, an able man, but who proved to be from Martinique, and thus, so far as Africa is concerned, is classified as a Frenchman. He even has a French passport.

As I look over my Abidjan notes from 1962, I see there have not been many changes. The white crust on a technically black society is apparently as firm as ever. While the crust has cracked, broken or blown off in most of the other West African countries, this has not happened in Abidjan. There has been carefully planned Ivory Coast economic growth for years at a creditable annual rate of 5% to 8%. There are more jobs, more houses, more goods, but there are still 50,000 Frenchmen in controlling governmental and commercial positions in the country. Five years ago I noted an almost palpable attitude of waiting. This country is still waiting. It has made more progress in its hydra-headed condition than its more truly independent neighbors. But what happens next?

ROVING CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
THE QUESTION OF "BLAME"

AN article in the March Trans-action, "Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters," by Thomas E. Drabeck and Enrico L. Quarantelli, examines both official and popular reactions to three major disasters—the Cocoanut Grove fire in Boston in 1942, which killed 498 persons; the three airplane crashes at the Elizabeth, N.J., airport within three months, in 1951-52; and the explosion in 1963 at the Indianapolis Fairgrounds Coliseum, which killed 81. The writers show that often the fixing of "blame" for such disasters is a substitute for finding the cause. Review of the actions taken after they occurred brings the following comment:

> Not only does individual blame draw attention from more fundamental causes, but it might actually give the illusion that corrective action of some sort is being taken. A spotlighting by the mass media may give the appearance of action and actually drain off the energy and time that might have led to action. As Merton and Paul Lazarfeld have noted, greater information and publicity can actually create civic apathy. Public attention focused on punishment does not encourage action to correct structural flaws. In the example of the Indianapolis Coliseum, the inadequate inspection procedure remained submerged, hidden by the search for the guilty parties.

Sea captains know this situation well. As heads of families they need to hold their jobs, so that when safety measures are slighted by shipping lines, they may conform, even though they bear legal responsibility. The pressure of competition rather than willful neglect is usually behind company policy in such matters—as when a coast-wise tourist steamer omits fire-drills likely to bore vacationing passengers, or when hasty loading of cargo to hold down expenses causes trouble in an unexpected storm. "Responsibility," in such instances, is really divided in a dozen ways, but on paper the Captain is to blame, since the owners have been careful to protect themselves legally. Actually, concern for appearances seems to be the major commercial interest in "responsibility," and this attitude is so widespread as to be identified as a basic cultural attribute rather than a personal fault.

Drabeck and Quarantelli reach certain broad conclusions:

> Personalizing fault—blaming our problems on the inadequacies or guilt of individuals rather than on systems or institutions—is not confined to disasters. Something akin to it has been observed in every aspect of American life from the content of movies dealing with social problems to the assumptions being made in the present day "war on poverty." Thus Herbert Gans has noted of certain kinds of contemporary films:
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> "Psychological explanations have replaced moral ones, but the possibility that delinquency, corruption and even mental illness reside in the social system is not considered, and the resolution is still left to a hero assisted by the ever-present *deus ex machina."*
>
> S. A. Weinstock on the approach to poverty problems:
>
> "The underlying assumption, here again is that poverty, social and economic deprivation, results from an inadequacy of the personality rather than an inadequacy in the socio-economic system. . . . Only measures aiming at individual rehabilitation . . . are encouraged, while measures designed to modify the *structure* of the economy are rejected."
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> On race riots, Stanley Liberson and Arnold Silverman:
>
> "Accounts . . . attributing riots to communist influence, hoodlums, or rabblerousers . . . participants of this type are probably available in almost any community. What interests us is the community failure to see the . . . institutional malfunctioning or a racial difficulty which is not—and perhaps cannot be—met by existing social institutions."
>
> As with blame after disasters, here too the fault-finding seems rooted in the very fabric of American society. Here also it distracts attention from structural flaws. If the individual is the source of all difficulties, why raise questions about the society?
>
> Apparently it is not only in totalitarian societies that a "cult of personality" serves to protect existing structures, and keeps them from making rapid changes to meet important cultural values and

goals—even if those changes might be vital to the welfare of society.

Curiously enough, this insistence on the identification of guilty individuals is immediately put aside when it comes to larger matters such as war guilt. Individual responsibility is deliberately ignored when we are presented by the propagandists for war with the simplified indictment of a guilty *nation.* The zeal with which this indictment is proposed—and widely accepted—was illustrated in a Town-Meeting-of-the-Air in 1945, when an American major debating Dorothy Thompson argued for the punishment of *all* Germans. When a man in the audience asked, "Would not the punishment of all Germans inflict needless hardship on millions of German children who can in no way be held responsible for the crimes of the elders?"—the major replied:

> "Of course it would. These innocent German children are the potential soldiers of World War III, just as the innocent German children who had been fed after 1918 later served in Hitler's army and did remarkably well."

Analyzing the theory of collective war guilt in his essay, "The Responsibility of Peoples," Dwight Macdonald wrote (also in 1945):

> If "they," the German people, are responsible for the atrocious policies and actions of "their" (in the possessive and possessing sense, again) government, then "we," the peoples of Russia, England and America, must also take on a big load of responsibility. . . .
>
> In the present war, we have carried the saturation bombing of German cities to a point where "military objectives" are secondary to the incineration or suffocation of great numbers of civilians, we have betrayed the Polish underground fighters in Warsaw into the hands of the Nazis, have deported hundreds of thousands of Poles to slow-death camps in Siberia, and have taken by force a third of Poland's territory; we have conducted a civil war against another ally, Greece, in order to restore a reactionary and unpopular monarch; we have starved those parts of Europe our armies have "liberated" almost as badly as the Nazis did, and if we explain that shipping was needed for our armies, they can retort that the food was needed for *their* armies; we have followed Nazi racist theories in segregating Negro soldiers in our military forces and in deporting from their homes on the West Coast to concentration camps in the interior tens of thousands of citizens who happened to be of Japanese ancestry; we have made ourselves the accomplice of the Maidenek butchers by refusing to permit more than a trickle of the Jews of Europe to take refuge inside our borders; we have ruled India brutally, imprisoning the people's leaders, denying the most elementary civil liberties, causing a famine last year in which hundreds of thousands perished; we have—
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> But this is monstrous, you say? We, the people, didn't do these things. They were done by a few political leaders, and the majority of Americans, Englishmen and (perhaps—who knows?) Russians deplore them and favor quite different policies. Or if they don't, then it is because they have not had a chance to become aware of the real issues and to act upon them. In any case, *I* can accept no responsibility for such horrors. I and most of the people I know are vigorously opposed to such policies and have made our disapproval constantly felt in the pages of the *Nation* and on the speaker's platforms of the Union for Democratic Action.
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> Precisely. And the Germans could say the same thing. And if you say, but why didn't you get rid of Hitler if you didn't like his policies, they can say: But you people (in America and England, at least) merely had to vote against your government to overthrow it, while we risked our necks if we even talked against ours. . . .
>
> It is a terrible fact, but it is a fact, that few people have the imagination or the moral sensitivity to get very excited about actions which they don't participate in themselves (and hence about which they feel no personal responsibility). . . .

It is here, in the concluding sentence, that Macdonald puts his finger on the source of the *fundamental* problems of responsibility in the modern mass society. There is and can be no responsibility without "imagination" and "moral sensitivity." The last eminent man of a scientific cast of mind to write in realization of this truth was John Dewey. While Dewey inspired a great many others, and gave an extraordinary lift to the entire educational movement, the synthesis of his vision of scientifically informed imagination with

individual responsibility in human life was not really communicated to the people. Somehow, it could not go deep enough.

The fact is that our educational enterprise does not really include knowledge of the means to penetrate and stir the imagination of one another, and the deliberate cultivation of moral sensitivity remains an unpracticed art.

The social scientists cited in the conclusion of the *Transaction* article speak uniformly of the neglected flaws in institutions, and in the social and economic system. No doubt the proximate causes of the breakdowns and troubles under investigation lie somewhere in the complexities of institutions, but these institutions are only reflections of the idea-systems which produced them. The "good" institution, when it is discovered, can almost always be seen to be the result of holistic attitudes—ideas which relate the individual and society through some profound moral conception of unity and order. Good societies are erected upon simple verities—upon ideas of immanent justice, and such ideas survive in practice only when they are primary affirmations, not intellectual deductions. We know this through the findings of cultural anthropology; we know it from the study of intentional communities, and we know it from the teachings of the high religions of the past. How to know it for ourselves, instead of as wistful outsiders looking back on lost secrets of the individual acceptance of responsibility—that is the great problem and project of modern man.

COMMENTARY
WALKING FOR PEACE

THE purposes, problems, ethics, etiquette, and practical requirements of a Peace Walk are the subject of Paul Salstrom's *Manual on Peace Walks*, published in January of this year by Greenleaf Books, New Hampshire (single copies, 45 cents, three for a dollar). Like other peace walk publications of Greenleaf Books, the manual is clearly mimeographed and easy to read. These earlier volumes include *We Walked to Moscow* ($1.00) by Jerry Lehman, and a larger, well-illustrated report of the San Francisco-to-Moscow Peace Walk by Bradford Lyttle—*You Come with Naked Hands* ($4.25).

Paul Salstrom's manual is a section-by-section discussion of how peace walkers conceive of their project, how they get ready, what decisions they must make, and the kind of experiences they are likely to have. An excellent article by Thomas B. Morgan on the walk from Hanover, N.H. to Washington, D.C.—which the writer accompanied—is reprinted from *Esquire* as an appendix. Another appendix makes suggestions to local peace-walk supporters living along the route of the walk on how to help with hospitality, publicity, and setting up meetings with the walkers.

Besides dealing with practical aspects of peace walking, the manual contains reflective asides and personal wonderings by the author.

Readers interested in support for the Mississippi co-ops sponsored by the Poor Peoples' Corporation, whose products are sold by mail and through Liberty House stores (in Jackson, Miss., New York, Detroit, and Little Rock), may be able to help out by thinking of ways to arrange for the sale of Liberty House goods on college and university campuses. Volunteers for this purpose are needed, to extend the Liberty House system of campus representation around the country. Help and suggestions to anyone able to do this work will be provided by the Poor Peoples' Corporation, and a staff member will be glad to visit the campus to discuss possibilities or speak to groups, if transportation expense can be taken care of. Persons interested, or who have recommendations, should write to Liberty House, 343¼ Bleecker Street, New York, N.Y. 10014 (which is, for prospective shoppers, the address of the New York store).

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

THE THINKING YOUNG

IF the spinning wheel is destined to be acknowledged, some day, as the symbol of a reborn and regenerated India, it seems likely that the lowly mimeograph machine will gain similar recognition in the United States. An article in the Los Angeles *Times* for March 12 describes the "underground papers" published by high school students in Southern California. While the report is mainly concerned with anxieties produced among school administrators by such unofficial forms of student journalism, something of the quality of the thinking of these sixteen-year-olds seeps through. The papers are banned from the school campuses, but this does not prevent their circulation among students. According to the report:

> The underground newspapers which have appeared at Hamilton, Venice, University, Taft, Fairfax and North Hollywood high schools are printed and distributed off-campus by teen-age students who believe their regular school newspapers are puppets of the school administration.
>
> The mimeographed or dittoed two- to eight-page publications have circulations ranging from a few hundred to 2,000 for Hamilton High's *Insight*, which is also circulated at Los Angeles and Dorsey.

The papers concentrate mainly on what the editors regard as "undemocratic and paternalistic" school practices, in one instance accusing administrators of using the weapon of "public humiliation" to secure conformity in matters of dress. A brief comment in the *Times* story suggests the serious intent of the writers and editors:

> The newspapers also contain poetry, often of an antiwar nature, short stories, and many letters. There is little or no space devoted to gossip, such as which boy is going with which girl.

It is obvious enough that the ferment of thought among college students has reached down into the high schools, and the impressive thing about this development is not so much the rebelliousness as the maturity of these sixteen-year-olds. Their efforts to create a forum for discussion of common problems show initiative, resourcefulness, and an exercise of the freedom which is held to be the chief adornment of American society. Actually, the papers are a tribute to the educational process which they are subjecting to criticism.

In further illustration of the kind of thinking being done by the young, we print below the statement of an eighteen-year-old on the position he has taken in relation to the draft.

SOCRATIC REASONING AND MODERN WAR

When I eat a plate of spaghetti, I like to think I'm doing more than refueling my cells, and if I become well-acquainted with an attractive girl, there is more to motivate me than the reproduction of my species. Again, if I were to build a beautiful home, it would not be to protect myself from rain and cold, merely. In other words, I enjoy the human adventure. I don't react the way an animal does, merely. Neither will I live by instinct alone, but principally by reason.

The motivation within me to experience, to love, and to create, I believe, is the heart and meaning of Man's existence. I oppose taking people's lives because I believe that those who hate and destroy are least likely to promote love and creativity. Consequently, I have taken a stand as a conscientious objector, and this has led me to write about my rejection of the Armed Service.

Non-resistance has the advantage of being passive, and, because it is adopted by a minority, it demands of its advocates more time-consuming thought. Combat, on the other hand, is at a disadvantage, because, while it may stem from a justifiable motive, its supporters are innocently compulsive.

It dismays me to witness the pride that militarists have when they are successful. They pin medals on each other for courage, when the

entire operation to which the courageous contribute is unworthy of their energy. I don't deny that countless individuals have, during war, proved themselves virtuous men. But these men are too good for the job of a soldier. War cheats them by contradicting their good judgment: absolute virtues are ignored in the compulsive effort to achieve victory. According to military philosophy, these virtues can be modified in time of war because the safety of the nation has priority over anything else.

Here I have struck upon the fantasy that killed Socrates some 2,300 years ago, when at his trial in Greece, he chose the search for truth over the survival of Athens. I think there is a direct parallel between Socratic reasoning and conscientious objection, because the United States Government may imprison me if unconvinced of the validity of my argument.

At this point, a reader might say, "It's easy for you to sit here and talk of your principles while Americans are dying for you in Vietnam." *Nonsense!* In the first place, I didn't ask any one to go there for *me*. Besides, I believe it is just as easy to talk of patriotic battle when you are not in the midst of it. I doubt that many who talk of "fighting for freedom" would so idealize the genuine experience of conflict. To illustrate, here is a passage from *The Choice Before Us* by G. Lowes Dickinson:

> It is only those who have lived weeks and months in the trenches, those who have taken part in a bayonet charge, those who have struggled like brutes with feet and hands and knives and clubs, who have trampled on the faces and mangled limbs of wounded men, and staggered away at last hardly knowing what they have been doing; those who have lain hour after hour between the lines at night, tortured themselves and listening to the screams of the tortured; those who have hung in agony on barbed wire till a spout of liquid fire released them: these men, with their bowels dropping out, with their lungs shot through, with their faces torn away, with their limbs blown into space, are the men who know what war is.

To say that I refuse going to war for fear of my own life is as illogical as claiming that the enlister goes to war anxious to take the life of another. Actually, the soldier may be convinced that he is carrying on a patriotic endeavor. He claims that non-resistance risks annihilation, but I insist that his reluctance to take that risk indicates that he may lack the very courage he so dearly values. As a result, I believe my position to be the more patriotic one. The difference is that at the end of a long war, the nations are marked with burned flesh and demolished cities, but at the end of a long peace, the nations are marked by advances in medicine and cultural harmony.

The most convincing single argument of the militarist is that if everyone took my position, it would invite our destruction. Well, if in order to survive we must live by the laws of animals, then our reasons for living are nearly void. Then wouldn't it be just as well if we ended it now and left the rule of the world to the insects?

FRONTIERS

Art and Human Longing

THE convergence, in the thought of many men, of the idea of art education with profound longings for simplicity, goodness, and meaning, requires an explanation. The obvious reason is that in art men recognize an active restoration of the reality and primacy of the individual. It is well known that the reduction of the individual to a cipher by the use of political abstractions is the death of all art. Art can flourish only where the individual qualities of human beings obtain expression; when men feel that they are being isolated and confined by the pressure of their times, art turns from affirmation to cries of desperation. Art is indeed a barometer of the human condition.

What can we say about art? Well, we can say, first, that it is not a theory but an act. The artist is a type of all men who act in self-fulfillment. And what he makes is inevitably some kind of a declaration of meaning—it has a relating and uniting function. His work is not something he made only for himself, even though he had to do it for himself. Thus art is both personal and impersonal. It is both individual and social; and it is also transcendent, involving the seizure and measured display of certain mysteries which are made a little less mysterious by becoming the content of a work of art.

It is for this reason that art is felt to have deep parallels with both philosophy and religion. And art, being a kind of "play," is able to pursue these parallels without the sententious self-consciousness which afflicts declining philosophy and religion. The highest art is somehow artless. It is not theory but act. For the individual artist it may be "dress rehearsal" of the discoveries to be made of philosophy and religion—rich in spontaneous realization, daring in its particularity, in its touch with the grain of life.

There is also the wonderful fact that the work of art, like an act of understanding, is an end in itself. That in our time art is bought or sold is an accident of history—more revealing of our history than of art.

What do we do when we are in trouble—when we want help in deciding what to do *next?* Usually, we seek the counsel of those who have been able to exercise a certain management of mysteries we do not know how to deal with. A managed mystery makes action less difficult—without knowing everything about it, we see what we can do.

When the Declaration of Independence avows that all men are entitled to the pursuit of happiness, we do not learn from this statement exactly what or who men are, or what is their final good, but our ignorance of these matters becomes less paralyzing—it has been made into a project we think we can understand. Education is thus the redefinition of ignorance in forms which may lead to growth.

To give a shaping, action-requiring form to mysteries always involves innovation and daring. It leads to confrontation. It anticipates the processes of life, which endlessly shape the forms of mysteries and exhibits them at work. There is no escape from this process for human beings, although some regulation of the encounters is possible. This regulation is the work of every teacher.

So the artist may be regarded as a maker of analogues of the discovery of meaning. And since what the artist does is always what "one man" can do, the wholeness of individual artistic achievement becomes a type of the fulfillment sought by all men.

There is often a confident intuition in the expressed ideas of the artist. Here, for example, is a passage from *Centering,* a book by the potter, Mary Caroline Richards (Wesleyan University Press, 1964):

> If we put self-disregard or self-interest above a reverence for life, we will kill ourselves just as surely as if we were blowing ourselves up with a bomb. What's the difference? Humanity can kill itself

> without lifting a finger, without even pressing a button. All it has to do is turn itself off. And then get "kicks" by "turning on." The picture is everywhere to be seen. Genocide. The bomb is only a detail. The big boom on the firecracker we've been fiddling with for centuries. The mess in social justice, the mess in medicine, the mess in agriculture, the mess in food and drugs, the mess in education are symptoms of the mess in the human soul. Who do we think we are? Meat with hair growing out of it, as a friend of mine suggested? What is man? What is man's work, what is a man's pleasure? What do we want to be when we grow up? Is sexual satisfaction our goal in life? or financial security? or emotional security? or freedom from concern for others? I mean, what are we educating ourselves *for?* We are on our way somewhere, but where? Do we care? Henry David Thoreau says it is our duty as citizens to disobey unjust laws. Fill the jails to overcrowding, he says. Do we dare? We teach Thoreau's writings in our schools. Why do we not fill our jails in protest against unwise laws? Where are the independence and freedom and individualism we are forever prating about in our schools? It seems to me that on the contrary we are ruled by fear of authority and social pressure, masquerading as majority rule.
>
> It was a little child who said, "But the emperor has no clothes on," when all the populace were falsely and hypnotically praising his fine clothes. Be ye as a little child. . . .

In an article which has the same basic themes, Sir Herbert Read (in the *Saturday Review* for Feb. 18) concludes with what is essentially an artist's inspiration:

> The present and urgent necessity is to admit the sickness of man's soul and take practical measures to cure it. I would emphasize the word practical, and even substitute for it the word pragmatic, for it is no longer a question of moral exhortation or of religious revivalism; it is a question of having faith in a few simple ideas, for only such simple ideas have the power to transform the world.

It was his encounter with the drawings of children, and learning what this work meant in terms of the fusion of sensibility and intellect, that brought Herbert Read to enduring recognition that the qualities of full humanity rest upon "a few simple ideas," such as fidelity, self-respect, courage, and love, which are inculcated by example rather than by precept. These ideas, along with his pacifist convictions generated in World War I, are for Herbert Read the Great Simplicities. When challenged as to the "realism" of this faith, he replies that "it represents the essential creed of all the profoundest teachers the world has ever known—Lao-tzu, Confucius, Christ, St. Francis, Comenius, Kant, Tolstoy, Gandhi, and many others."

How do men develop this deep conviction concerning the ingredients of wholeness in life? Wholeness, we may say, is a mode of being, and the practice of art means daily attention to the practical necessities of making wholes.